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The restraint of trade doctrine as understood here developed in English law, but it was 
transplanted to South Africa and Scotland. The two mixed legal systems closely followed 
English law. In Scotland a separate jurisprudence only recently developed in this area. In 
South Africa attempts have been made to distinguish the English doctrine, but it has 
remained fundamentally intact. That does not mean that the three systems are merely 
carbon copies of one another. Yet differences are subtle. 
An attempt is made to analyse the doctrine from broad principles although it is difficult. 
The doctrine has always worked in practice, but produces nice theoretical problems. It is 
submitted that the public policy value of freedom of work should be the most important 
tenet underlying the doctrine. Only clauses that offend against this fundamental principle 
should be investigated in terms of this doctrine. Only when the courts find that the 
interference with freedom of work cannot be justified should clauses be struck down. 
The classical restraints i.e. post -employment, sale of goodwill, and post -partnership 
restraints are discussed. These cases stand quite separate from most other restraints 
because they operate after termination of a work or production relationship, and because 
they have generated a vast corpus of cases. 
The reasonableness inter partes test and the direct impact of public interest is analysed. 
Most importantly, it is argued that the public policy restraint of trade doctrine operates on 
two levels. The question whether the restraint is no wider than the legitimate interests of 
the covenantee makes or breaks a case. But many other aspects are also considered in 
filling the vacuums left by the severe difficulties of applying law to facts in this area of 
public policy. 
The manner in which courts deal with restraints has a profound influence on the result of 
restraint of trade decisions. Here novel suggestions in South Africa have questioned old 
dogmas. The onus in restraint of trade cases, the consequences of restraints that are 
unacceptable, the point in time from which the restraint should be tested, and the 
severability issue are of pivotal importance. Finally, the question of remedies is addressed. 
Here the peculiarities of the Scots doctrine come to the fore. Restraints are often of short 
duration and the slow grind of court systems has to bow to practical necessity. 
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The scope of this work 
In Digest 1.18.6.4 (Ulpianus libro 1, opinionum) it is stated that: 
Neque licita negotiatione aliquos prohiberi neque prohibita exerceri neque 
innocentibus poenas irrogari ad sollicitudinem suam praeses provinciae revocet. 
(The provincial governor must make it a matter of especial concern that no one be 
prevented from carrying on any lawful business, that no one carry on prohibited 
activities and that no innocent persons have penalties imposed on them.) I 
The protection of freedom of work is an ancient principle. Two millennia of societal, legal and 
economic development have changed its appearance. The provincial governor is an institution of 
the past. Yet the principle still permeates modern legal systems. The modern vanguards of freedom 
of work are judges who bolster it through the doctrine of restraint of trade. 
The doctrine of restraint of trade has equalled the durability of the principle on which it is founded. 
The abolition of slavery and, more recently the decline of large -scale manufacturing and the rise of 
the high -technology and service industries have even enhanced the importance of the doctrine 2. 
The modern doctrine has its origin in late medieval and 17th century England 3 and it culminated in 
the fundamental Mitchel case 4. But it crossed the Tweed into the Civil and Common law blend 
that is Scots law and it travelled the wide open seas to settle in Roman-Dutch South African law. 
The aim of this thesis will be to analyse the English mother doctrine and the two scion doctrines in 
Scotland and South Africa. 
Nevertheless, no proper historical analysis will be attempted. The dogmatic development will be 
briefly sketched in the analysis of the many aspects of the doctrine, and some comments about its 
1. Andreas Wacke "Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Konkurentzverbotsklauseln im antiken und modernen Recht" 1982 
Zeitschrift der Savigny- Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte Romanist Abt 91 188 translated in the Law and History 
Review (1993) 1. 
2. Davies 490. 
3. Dyer's case (1414) YB Mich 2 Hen 5, Pasch pl 26; Anon (1578) Moore KB 115; Blacksmith of South Mims 
(1587) 2 Leo 210; Colgate v Bachelor (1602) Cro Eliz 872; Rogers v Parrey (1613) 2 Bulst 136; Jollife v Broad 
(1620) 2 Roll Rep 201, Cro Jac 596, Wm Jones 13; Bragge v Starner (1621) Palm 172; Hall v Haws (1634) 2 Keb 
377; Anon (1641) March 77; Barrow v Wood (1643) March 191; Prugnell v Gosse (1648) Aleyn 67; Ferby v 
Arrosmyth (1669) 2 Keb 377; Hunlocke v Blacklowe (1671) 2 Saund 156; Clerk y Taylors of Exeter (1685) 3 Lev 
241; Thompson v Harvey (1689) 1 Holt KB 674. 
4. Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181. 
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reception in South Africa and Scotland will be made. But no systematic exegesis will be 
undertaken. The reasons for this are pragmatic. A brief discussion of the development of the 
doctrine through the courts would merely be repetitive as this has been undertaken on many 
occasions 5, while a full socio- economic history of the doctrine would require a thesis in itself 
The doctrine shows many similarities whether it is applied in Mafeking or Manchester and, at least 
on the surface, it does not show much divergence from Ballachulish to Bournemouth. Hence this 
is no comparative study in the true sense. It does not primarily compare three legal systems with 
the aim of determining whether there is room for possible cross -pollination, for the doctrine itself 
is the true star of this performance. It will rather be discussed with reference to the three legal 
systems. 
Lord Diplock in Petrofina 6 said: "A contract in restraint of trade is one in which a party (the 
covenantor) agrees with any other party (the covenantee) to restrict his liberty in the future to 
trade with other persons not parties to the contract in such a manner as he chooses." This will 
suffice as an introductory working definition. But in defining the restraint of trade doctrine one is 
conscious of the maxim periculosa omnia definitio est. The doctrine, especially in the classic cases, 
is like the infamous elephant, easy to recognise but almost impossible to define. Many have tried 
but no satisfactory description has emerged '. The next three chapters will accordingly be devoted 
to determining what a restraint of trade entails. At first the juridical niche of the doctrine will be 
described; thereafter the principles underlying the doctrine will be discerned, culminating in an 
analysis of the question: when does the restraint of trade doctrine apply? In drawing a distinction 
between the substantive and the jurisdictional questions the term "restraint of trade" will be 
reserved for clauses that have to be investigated but are not yet finally condemned for offending 
against the principles underlying the doctrine 8. 
The doctrine does not only apply in a numerus clausus of contracts but can be found wherever 
there is a substantial interference with freedom of work. It has undergone a vigorous expansion 
from its traditional hinterland of sale of goodwill, post -employment and post -partnership 
restrictions. 
5. Heydon 1 -35; Holdsworth History of English law IV 3rd ed (1945) 343 -354, 373 -379, VIII 2nd ed (1937) 56 -62; 
Letwin "The English common law concerning monopolies" 1954 University of Chicago LR 355; Matthews and 
Adler Restraint of Trade 2d ed (1907) for a full textual treatment of the early cases; Sanderson Restraint of Trade 
(1926) 7 -20; Seaborne -Davies "Further Light on the Case of Monopolies" (1932) LOR 394; Wilberforce Campbell 
and Elles 122 et seq; Trebilcock 1 -59, But see infra Ch 3. 
6. Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 138 
7. Esso 294, 307, 317 -318, 324, 331; Chitty 1191. 
8. Esso 331, Collinge 412, Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd y BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 439, Kerr 505. 
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It will not even be restricted to contractual obligations in the true sense and will also apply to 
other legal mechanisms that interfere with the principles underlying the doctrine 9. It has played a 
role in limiting regulations of professional sports bodies, professional control bodies, rules of co- 
operative societies as well as guilds, trade unions and other like organisations 10. In fact the 
doctrine had its first real dawning in Scotland in trade union cases. 
However, this thesis focuses on the traditional types of contractual restraints. So, regrettably, one 
of the most virile areas of restraint of trade will fall outside this discussion. But the restraint of 
trade doctrine is vast and a proper discussion of any aspect demands narrowing down. At least 
many of the points made in other areas of restraint of trade have imprinted themselves on the 
general doctrine and the discussion is specked with references to and discussion of many of the 
issues enumerated in other areas of restraint of trade. 
The discussion of the substantive doctrine will form the core of the analysis. In most cases this will 
be the only issue that will really trouble a court. But some attempt will be made to relate it to the 
background within which it exists. The doctrine is still very fragmentary despite and sometimes 
because of innumerable cases and textbook discussions 11. An attempt will be made here to 
develop it from one fundamental principle. The new areas of restraint can only be properly 
constructed once the problems in the bread and butter cases are solved. 
Finally, considerable space will be devoted to the fate of restraints in the courts. If there is one 
thing on which ordinary people are still prepared to litigate, it seems, then it is when their ability to 
work is being interfered with. The formal rules which courts apply to restraints of trade have 
interacted considerably with the substantive rules and principles of the doctrine. The dominant 
aspects in South African and Scots law will be discussed under this rubric. The innovative Magna 
Alloys case in South Africa has had a radical impact on the manner in which courts approach 
restraints, while the Scots doctrine is being shaped in applications for interim interdicts, which has 
had a radical impact on de facto Scottish restraint of trade law. This calls for in -depth analysis. 
9. Heydon 73 -75, Hevdon McGill 334; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406 -407. 
10. Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners [1910] 1 KB 506; Russell y Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters and Joiners [ 1912] AC 421; Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [ 1964] 1 Ch 413; Dickson y 
The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 558; Pharmaceutical Society of GB y Dickson [1968] 
2 All ER 686; Nagle y Feilden [1966] 2 WLR 1027; Trebilcock 42, 190 -191. 
<<. Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 363; Fitch y Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 
179 at 180; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 245; Cf Christie Jur Rev 294 but today it will be different. 
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1. Doctrinal positioning of the restraint of trade doctrine 
It will have to be determined how the restraint of trade doctrine, as a corpus of rules and 
principles, is classified in England, Scotland and South Africa. The positioning of the doctrine and 
its significance in the English mother system will first be discerned and the approach in the other 
legal systems will thereafter be compared with it. 
2. English law 
The doctrinal positioning of the restraint of trade doctrine in English law is settled. When pressed 
most English lawyers will admit that the doctrine is a more specific expression of public policy 1. 
All the major textbook writers, as a matter of organisation, group the restraint of trade doctrine 
under the heading public policy 2. 
1. Morris v Colman (1812) 18 Ves Jun 437 at 438; Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 665; Rannie y Irvine 
(1844) 7 Man & G 969 at 976; Hilton v Eckerslev (1855) 6 El & BI 47 at 53, 64. 66; Leather Cloth Co y Lorsont 
(1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354; Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 364; Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor 
Gow & Co [1891] AC 25 at 39, 42, 45, See Winfield 93; Nordenfelt 552, 553, 554, 562, 564, 565, 566; Tivoli 
Manchester (Ltd) v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 437 at 438; Mouchel v William Cubitt & Co (1907) 24 RPC 194 at 200- 
201; Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 367, 368, 369; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd y Andrews 
[1909] 1 Ch 763 at 766, 768, 770; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co 
Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 794, 797, 800; Continental Tyre and Rubber (Great Britain) Co Ltd v Heath (1913) 29 TLR 
308 at 310; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 469, 476, 477; Mason 733 and 
the discussion of Nordenfelt, 734, 738 -739, 740; Herbert Morris 699, 706; Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading 
Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 at 310, 311, 312; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 11, 24, 26; 
McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 571, 581, 583 -584, 
587, 588, 592, 596, 598; Rawlings v General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635 at 643, 645, 647, 651; Fitch v Dewes 
[1921] 2 AC 158 at 162; Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 804, 806, 809; Gaumont- British 
Picture Corp Ltd v Alexander [1936] 2 All ER 1686 at 1690, 1691 -1692; Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd v Parslay [1936] 
2 All ER 515 at 522; Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] 1 Ch 211 at 215; King v Michael Faraday and 
Partners Ltd [1939] 2 KB 753 at 763 -764; Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 
Ch 108 at 117; Esso at 298, 304, 305, 318, 324, 325, 330, 331, 333, 340, 341; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash 
[1964] 2 All ER 10 at 12; SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 638; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 
WLR 1419 at 1422; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 282; Peyton v Mindham [1972] 1 WLR 8 at 14; 
Instone V A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 171 at 176, 177, 178, A Schroeder Music 
Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 621, 623 but see infra; Luck v Davenport-Smith [1977] EG 
73 at 85; Shell (UK) Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 492, 493 with reference to the court a quo; 
Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 396; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 
485 at 486; R v General Medical Council, ex parte Colman [ 1990] 1 All ER 489 at 508; Silvertone Records Ltd y 
Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 at 155; JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 587; Panayiotou e Sony Music 
Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 316, 317; Anson 321; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 397, 404, 405; 
Chitty 1199, 1190 with reference to Holdsworth History of English Law vol 8 at 56-62, Chitty 1199; Collinge 412; 
Winfield 86; Guest 6 -7; Gurry 205; Haslam 92; Hickling 32; Heydon 270; Heydon McGill 331; Sales 601; Cf 
Magna Alloys 887 -888 infra. 
2. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 393 and 397; Anson 321; Chitty 1190; Cf Treitel 387 but he was still conscious of 
the link between the doctrine and his reasons for discussing it separately are pragmatic 378. 
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Some authorities have submitted that an unacceptable restraint of trade will be contrary to public 
policy and therefore illegal 3. However, many have ascribed a narrower meaning to that word 4. 
There is a line of authority that restraints are void rather than illegal 5. This distinction is drawn in 
an attempt to demarcate different degrees of public policy, a laudable purpose, but the terminology 
used is unfortunate 6. 
- The word void straddles the whole law of contract and it is confusing to attempt to give it a 
specific meaning here. 
- The consequences of contracts that are contrary to public policy are too diverse to be pinned 
down into two categories. 
- It is doubtful whether unacceptable restraints are actually void'. 
It is accepted in the other legal systems under discussion that unacceptable restraints are illegal. 
The term illegality will, nevertheless, be avoided as far as possible in discussions of English law 
because of the above mentioned confusion. But it is simply a matter of terminology. This does not 
mean that the doctrine in England is different from its Scots and South African counterparts. 
How then, should unacceptable restraints be labelled? Some courts have maintained that restraints 
are unlawful 8, but this is also problematic. The word unlawful has delictual or criminal law 
connotations that should be avoided 9. It is not a term which is widely used in this field. Restraints 
that are unacceptable will therefore be called ineffective, in an attempt to avoid confusion in 
English law discussions. 
3. Hilton v Eckersley (1855) 6 El & BI 47 at 59; Urmston v Whitelegg Bros (1890) 63 LT 455 at 456; Mogul 
Steamship Co Ltd y McGregor Gow & Co [1891] AC 25 at 45 -46; Dowden & Pook Ltd v Pook [1904] 1 KB 45 at 
53; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 469, 471, 476, 477, 478, 480, 481; 
Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 at 312; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- 
Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 571, 582; Rawlings v General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 
635 at 645, 646, 652; Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] 1 Ch 211 at 215; See Anson 293ff; Farwell 66, 67, 
69; Treitel 377ff; Beale Bishop and Furmston 745, 776. 
4. Green v Price (1845) 13 M & W 695 at 699; Hilton v Eckersley (1855) 6 El & B1 47 at 53, See also 57, But cf 62 
and 64; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 CID 154 at 156; Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor Gow & Co [1891] AC 
25. See narrower 42, 50 -51, 57, 58, See Treitel 387, See Mogul a quo (1889) 23 QBD 598 at 619; R v General 
Medical Council , ex parte Colman [1990] 1 All ER 489 at 508; Collinge 411; See Vester & Gardner 32, 
Wedderburn 521 -522. 
5. Price v Green (1847) 16 M & W 346 at 353; Bennet v Bennet [1952] 1 KB 249 at 260; Cheshire Fifoot and 
Furmston 358 -360 the author is the primary advocate of this theory although he accepted that it has some problems 
360, 392. 393. 
6. Atiyah 337; (Anson 292) See the criticism by Treitel 377 -378. 
7. Infra Ch 12. 
8. Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 664, 669; Jacoby v Whitmore (1883) 49 LT 335 at 337; Tool Metal 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 1 at 10; SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 
629 at 638; Fyffes plc v Chiquita Brands International Inc [1993] FSR 83 at 105. 
9. Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor Gow & Co [1891] AC 25 at 39; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 
Australia y Adelaide Steamship Co [1913] AC 781 at 797; Rawlings v General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635 at 
643; Brekkes Ltd v Cattel [1972] 1 Ch 105 at 115; Collinge 411; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1214; See Vester & 
Gardner 32, Wedderburn 521 -522. 
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2.1. Obstacles between public policy and the restraint of trade doctrine 
The connection between public policy and restraints of trade has not been as pivotal as the above 
authorities would suggest. Many cases do not even refer to the public policy basis of the doctrine. 
Authorities such as Heydon 1° do not always show that its significance has been appreciated. Some 
aspects will isolate the doctrine from its public policy roots, despite the ostensible link between the 
two. 
Historically the categorisation of the restraint of trade doctrine under the rubric of public policy is 
not as strong as has been generally supposed. It is stated that the doctrine has been related to 
public policy since Elizabethan times ", but this must be qualified. 
- The early cases contain expressions that seem public policy -oriented 12 but public policy was not, 
initially, a concept which lawyers used consciously and it was not specifically defined in 
English law 13. The only real connection between early expressions of public policy in 
restraint of trade cases and modern principles of public policy is that restraint of trade law, 
in retrospect, formed a foundation of latter -day public policy 14. Public policy notions as 
they are understood today only developed in the later 18th century 15. A restraint of trade 
doctrine tied to a thoroughly modern concept of public policy only came to the fore in the 
19th century 16 
- The notion of public policy as a separate and autonomous legal concept underlying the doctrine 
accordingly only evolved after the restraint of trade doctrine had become fixed in English 
law. It was often a case of the tail wagging the dog. The restraint of trade doctrine 
contributed more to the establishment of the principle of public policy than vice versa 17. 
The restraint of trade doctrine has been the most virile area of public policy. 
- Courts, in developing the doctrine, initially did not emphasise only public policy as a basis for the 
doctrine. Other pegs on which to hang it, such as the notion of adequate consideration, 
to Cf Heydon 270ff although he did no clear analysis of the full role of public policy. 
11 Winfield 85; Winfield (1946) 285; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 357. 
12. Dyer's Case (1414) 2 YB Hen 5, Pasch pl 26 "encounter common ley "; Anon (1586) Moore 242 "encounter le 
ley .., encounter le necessity del commonwealth "; Colgate v Bachelor (1602) Cro Eliz 872 "against the benefit of 
the commonwealth "; Bragge v Stanner Palm 172 "covenant ou condition encounter Ley "; Winfield (1946) 285; 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 183 "against the policy of the common law ", 187 "against the policy law ", 
See Winfield 85, Knight 208; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 559, 561, 563 "against general policy ". 
13 Knight 207 -208. 
14 Knight 207 -208; Winfield 83. 
15 Knight 208 -210; Cf Winfield 85ffand Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 357. 
16 Knight 208. 
17. See Beale Bishop and Furmston 748; Winfield 76. 
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were also mooted 18. Most of these issues have now been absorbed in the public policy 
doctrine but they played an important historical role. 
Remnants of this historical development survive in the modern doctrine. 
Some aspects of the test for the effectiveness of restraints lead to the marginalisation of the notion 
that the doctrine is a more specific expression of public policy. 
- Reasonableness inter partes plays an important role in restraint of trade law, and some authorities 
have found it difficult to relate this concept to public policy 19. 
- The proliferation of highly technical rules, especially in post- employment restraints and restraints 
in sales of goodwill, has wedged in between the doctrine and its public policy roots. The 
doctrine consists of a multitude of specific rules and principles that exert centrifugal forces 
upon it. It has been stated that "The principle as to covenants in restraint of trade has so 
clearly precipitated itself that occasionally judges do not think it worth while to state that 
its foundation is public policy 20 ". 
The doctrine of restraint of trade is still not fully embraced by the principles of public policy. The 
impression that public policy lies at the basis of the doctrine is often created by courts and 
textbook writers but frequently only as an afterthought for the sake of systemic tidiness. 
2.2. The Winfield approach 
There is an uneasy alliance between the restraint of trade doctrine and the principle that contracts 
should not be contrary to public policy. Winfield stated that public policy can take on one of three 
different forms 21. On the one hand some issues of public policy never crystallise into any clear 
rules or acid tests. The courts decide such cases by looking at the broad principles of public policy. 
On the other hand more specific rules and principles, on the basis of which public policy issues can 
be decided, may develop, and this category can again be subdivided. At the one pole the rules may 
become so independent and separate that the only link between the body of rules and the notion 
public policy will be historical. At the other end the rules may remain in the shadow of public 
policy. In this last mentioned class there will be a continuing interaction between the body of rules 
and the principles of public policy in general. Winfield argued that the restraint of trade doctrine is 
an example of this and it appears to be the most accurate description of the relationship between 
18. See Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) PWms 181 discussed infra Ch 9.9, Chitty 1190; Cf Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & 
W 548 at 559; Cf Heydon 25 and the criticism infra Ch 5.3. 
19 Infra Ch 5.3. 
20. Winfield 96 with reference to Neville v Dominion of Canada News Co Ltd [1915] 3 KB 556. 
21. Winfield 96 from Rodriguez v Speyer Bros [1919] AC 59 at 77 -81. 
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the doctrine and public policy. 
2.3. Impact of the doctrine as a specific expression of public policy 
The doctrine not only grew out of public policy, but is still regarded as a specific expression of it. 
The specific rules and principles underlying the doctrine will also be related to public policy. 
Public policy is a concept that is flexible and difficult to pin down even if the variability of it over 
time is ignored 22. The amorphous nature of the concept has always been one of its important 
features. Pliability is also an important characteristic of the restraint of trade doctrine based on 
public policy values. It is more precise and it concerns more specific public policy principles, but it 
is still not specific. The Winfield approach will ensure that this is recognised despite the 
proliferation of specific rules and principles. 
Public policy impacts upon the angle from which restraint of trade issues should be approached. 
The public policy basis of the doctrine has continued to play a particularly important role in 
problematic cases where new ground is being broken 23. 
The public policy basis is most fundamental on the level of variability. Substantive and attitudinal 
variability will be discerned although it may exist on several different levels. 
On the one hand public policy, in the substantive sense, is variable over time 24. This is inevitable. 
Over time courts will change their views on public policy. It is made up of societal values which 
are in constant flux. Variability is not one of the negative aspects of public policy but it is this 
element that continuously invigorates it in a changing society. Winfield stated that variability "is a 
stone in the edifice of the doctrine [of public policy] and not a missile to be flung at it" 25. 
Public policy is subject to change and the restraint of trade doctrine should be sensitive to its 
22. Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 364; Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd 
[1971] 1 All ER 215 at 219; Esso 331; Anson 307; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 358; Chitty 1133; Bell Policy 
Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) Chapter VI. 
23. North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 469; See e.g. Esso supra 2.1. 
24 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 364, 396 -397, See Knight 214; Maxim- Nordenfelt Guns and 
Ammunition Co Ltd v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch 630 at 665, Cf Trimble v Jameson & Co (1903) 24 NLR 53 at 55 
where this point was also made in South Africa; Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [ 1896] 1 QB 478 at 484; English 
Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 174 at 185; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935 at 957 -958; 
Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 181 at 189; Nagle v Feilden 
[1966] 2 WLR 1027 at 1037, See Anson 308; Esso 325; Beale Bishop and Furmston 751; Cheshire Fifoot and 
Furmston 358, 360, 397; Chitty 16 -003, 16 -004; Guest 6 -7; Gurry 205; Winfield 93 -94. 
25. Winfield 95. 
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gravitational pull. It is unavoidable that the flexibility and variability of the doctrine will be muted 
by its specificity and its apparent independence from public policy. But the doctrine should not 
become stultified. Its continued attachment to public policy along the lines proposed by Winfield 
ensures that its fluidity and flexibility over time is not completely eclipsed by specific rules 26. The 
attachment to public policy will neutralise the harshest effects of the precedent system in restraint 
of trade cases 27. Hence stare decisis will be important in an area such as this where some 
separation from public policy has occurred, but courts should not be as rigid as in other fields of 
law 28. Continuous though controlled flux will be ensured if the doctrine is not divorced from 
public policy. 
Judicial attitudes towards public policy have changed over the years 29, and these changes should 
impact upon it. A conservative attitude towards public policy will rub off on the restraint of trade 
doctrine 30, while a more positive attitude towards public policy in general should in turn manifest 
in a more activist approach towards the doctrine. This should impact on both the attitude towards 
restraints and the rules and principles that constitute the restraint of trade doctrine. The interaction 
can only be properly facilitated if the doctrine is viewed against its public policy background. 
3. South African law 
Many cases simply state that public policy lies at the basis of the doctrine in South Africa 31, and it 
26. Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 364, 396 -397; Urmston y Whitelegg Bros (1890) 63 LT 455; Maxim - 
Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch 630 at 666; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 
571 at 581; English Hop Growers Ltd y Dering [1928] 2 KB 174 at 185; Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd 
v Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 181 at 189, PVB 310; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 
1227 at 1229; Esso 325; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 320; Anson 319; 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 397, 406; Gurry 205; Hickling 33; Winfield 94. 
27. Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 396 -397; Nordenfelt 553 -554; Mason 733; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 
360; HG Beale WD Bishop and MP Furmston Contract: Cases and Material first ed (1985) 628 although the point 
is not again made in the second edition. 
28. Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 451; Cf Attwood y Lamont [1920] 3 
KB 571 at 581 -582 where the precedent system was regarded as a considerable obstacle; Anson 308; Heydon 72 is 
too strict. 
29. Anson 307. 
30 Hilton v Eckersley (1855) 6 El & BI 47 at 64; The negative attitude towards public policy was carried through to 
the restraint of trade doctrine in Mogul Steamship Co Ltd IT McGregor Gow & Co [1891] AC 25 at 45, See Anson 
292. 
31. SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 367, 368, 371; Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van 
Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940, at 944, 945; Bathurst Farmers' Union v Bradfield 1923 EDL 391 at 397; Trimble v 
Jameson & Co (1903) 24 NLR 53 especially 61, 62; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773; African Theatres 
Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 at 127; Halliwell v Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 180; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 
1933 NPD 479 at 493; New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 82 with reference to 
Herbert Morris 706 -707, Referred to Witwatersrand Trustees (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 
140 at 151, See also 155; Wilkinson v Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 16; Park Gebou -Belleggings en Wynkelders Bpk v 
Rogers and Hart (Pty) Ltd 1954 (3) SA 109 (T) 116; Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 501; Spa 
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is generally accepted that contracts which are unacceptable in terms of the doctrine are illegal. 
Most authors in South Africa contend that some contracts are ineffective on the basis of illegality 
and then distinguish different sources of illegality, including public policy 32. The rules and 
principles applying to restraint of trade clauses are described as more specific manifestations of 
public policy 33. Public policy has been paramount in settling and developing restraint of trade 
rules and principles. 
3.1. Public policy as a basis for importing the restraint of trade doctrine 
The earliest South African cases 34 on restraint of trade are difficult to interpret. No justification or 
full explanation of the rules and principles was given, although English influences were already 
evident in the terminology used 35. The initial approach is in many ways reminiscent of the Scottish 
development 36 
In some cases courts simply contended that the English law applied in this area 37. But this is not 
the view generally taken. Some of the debates concerning the doctrine in South Africa are 
therefore misconceived. Authorities have devoted considerable time and effort to the question 
whether South African courts are free to modify the English law doctrine in South Africa 3 8. Yet, a 
restraint of trade rule or principle cannot be applicable in South Africa simply because it applies in 
English law 39 
Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 717; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 578; Arlyn 
Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) SA 308 (W) 309; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 
191 (W) 198; BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd v Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd 1979 (4) SA 1063 (N); Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 
1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330, 331, 333; A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 417, See the criticism 
Magna Alloys 889; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd v Sanderson -Kasner (1984) 3 SA 850 (W) 858; Cf Kotze & Genis 
(Edens) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 786 see also infra. 
32. Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 8, Kerr 150ff; Lubbe and Murray 237. 
33 De Wet & Yeats 81; Christie 409; Lubbe and Murray 237; Van der Merwe 139ff. 
34. Willet v Blake (1848) 3 Menzies 343, Stephan Bros v Loubscher (1877) 7 Buch 137, Hendriks v Doorasamy 
(1898) 13 EDC 25; See Kahn 394, Oosthuizen 382. 
35 Christie (1981) 352. 
36 Compare Willet If Blake (1848) 3 Menz 343 with Stalker v Carmichael 1735 M 9455. 
37. Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 489 where English authorities were referred to as "the 
authorities "; See the extensive reference to English cases without any real justification in New United Yeast 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 82; Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 42; It 
seems however that this was exaggerated by the critics: Van De Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 569, Magna 
Alloys 886, 888, Annual Survey (1984) 129, See Kahn 396, Suzman 91. 
38. Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 610; Van De Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 569 and Tamarillo 
(Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) 439; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) 
SA 101 (D) 103; Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 111 -112; Aronstam 21; Christie (1981) 353. 
39 Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940 at 943; Diamond Cycle and Motor Works 
Ltd v Hirschmann 1916 TPD 241; Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 111; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban 
Wire and Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 781, See Kahn 393; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1102. 
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Other courts simply stated that the doctrine was taken over from English law 40. The rules and 
principles of the restraint of trade doctrine have certainly been taken over from English law. But 
statements of this nature need to be qualified. It is wrong simply to maintain that the doctrine is 
foreign and engrafted onto South African law (if by "foreign" and "engrafted" is meant borrowed 
without reference to systemic considerations and contextual harmonisation) 41. 
Courts soon made one fundamental connection. Excerpts on public policy from the Digest 42 and 
the Roman -Dutch writer Voet 43, were taken as the authentic soil into which the English doctrine 
could be transplanted. The Roman -Dutch notion of public policy became the basis on which the 
restraint of trade doctrine was cemented onto South African law. 
Some authorities suggested that courts were merely building on the ideas of Voet as if the author 
impliedly included restraints of trade in his concept of public policy 44. But the Roman -Dutch 
concept of public policy at the time of its development did not include a clear restraint of trade 
doctrine 45. Most authorities were conscious of this and did not base the incorporation of the 
doctrine on this ground. The South African doctrine cannot be effectively criticised on the basis 
that it took the incorrect view that the doctrine also existed in Roman -Dutch law 46. The doctrine 
in South Africa cannot merely be rejected on historical grounds because it was not accepted 
40. Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 489, 495; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 148; Katz v Efthimiou 
1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 610, See Drewtons v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 310 where the view expressed here is 
followed; Spa Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 717; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 
1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 103; Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudrè (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 502 -503, See 
Coenraad Visser The Principle Pacta Servanda Sunt in Roman and Roman -Dutch Law with Specific Reference to 
Contracts in Restraint of Trade (1984) 641 although his final solution is unhelpful; Otto 209; Aronstam 21; 
Oosthuizen 383. 
41 Kerr (1982) 184 -185 and the criticism of Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 610. 
42. D 35.1.71.2; Cf also on the roots of a restraint of trade principle in Roman law Wacke "Wettbewerbsfreiheit and 
Konkurentzverbotsklauseln im antiken and modernen Recht" 1982 Zeitschrift der Savigny- Stiftung fur 
Rechtsgeschichte Romanist Abt 91 188 translated in the Law and History Review (1993) 1. 
43 Voet 2.14.16. where the author stated that promises, which were contrary to law or public policy could not 
sustain contractual claims and where he argued that promises in restraint of marriage were invalid, See Lubbe and 
Murray 238ff. 
44 KWV v ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 434; See Christie (1981) 353. 
45 Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226, mentioned Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van Almelo 
(1908) 25 SC 940 at 943; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 610. See however the court talked of Roman- 
Dutch systems of law; Van De Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 569; Diner v Carpet Manufacturers Co of SA 
Ltd 1969 (2) 101 (D) 103; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire and Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 781; 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 502; Drewtons v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 
310; Magna Alloys 890 -891; Annual Survey (1962) 112; Annual Survey (1984) 129; Aronstam 22; Christie (1981) 
353; Christie 433; Du Plessis & Davis 95; Kahn 398 and the Roman -Dutch cases mentioned; Kerr (1982) 184; Kerr 
Tribute 192; Oosthuizen 382; Wessels vol 1 539. 
46 Too much emphasis was placed on this: Christie (1981) 353, Drewtons v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 310, 
Oosthuizen 382. 
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primarily on such grounds 47. 
The doctrine is most accurately anchored in South Africa via the Roman -Dutch principle that 
contracts which are contrary to public policy are illegal though the public policy values are 
contemporary 48. Courts accepted that a contract would be contrary to the Roman -Dutch concept 
of public policy if it interfered with contemporary public policy values and they agreed that a 
specific illegal restraint of trade offended against such public policy values 49. 
The so- called Winfield approach towards the relationship between public policy and the restraint 
of trade doctrine became settled in South African 50. The South African principle of public policy 
provided the basis for the doctrine, but the rules and principles as copied from English law were 
regarded as a contemporary expression of public policy in terms of which restraint of trade cases 
could be adjudicated. This approach was consolidated in the cases 51 
3.2. Public policy as a factual issue 
In Drewtons 52 Van den Heever J put forward a revolutionary notion of public policy 53. She 
contended that problems regarding public policy were merely factual 54. She refused to accept that 
there were general principles or policy considerations on the basis of which restraint of trade cases 
could be adjudicated. Accordingly she denied that there was a need for a restraint of trade 
doctrine 55: 
"I can think of no reason why what is and should remain a factual inquiry should be 
elevated to a rule of law; particularly when a decision in the United Kingdom as to 
47. Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudrè (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 503 -504 cannot be accepted, See infra Ch 
5.2.1. 
48. Cf Coenraad Visser The Principle Pacta Servanda Sunt in Roman and Roman -Dutch Law with Specific 
Reference to Contracts in Restraint of Trade (1984) 641 thought it could be based on the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus but this is unhelpful. 
49 Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226, See the references: Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van 
Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940, Tilney infra, Diamond Cycle infra, See Oosthuizen 282 did not understand this 
argument, See Christie (1981) 353; Diamond Cycle and Motor Works Ltd v Hirschmann 1916 TPD 241 at 245; 
Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 333; Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 111 -112; Brooks and 
Wynberg v New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1936 TPD 296 at 304, See Kahn 396; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Durban Wire and Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 781, See the discussion of these cases Kahn 396; National 
Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1099; Wessels 2nd ed vol 1 183; Du Plessis & 
Davis 95. 
50 See Van der Menve 144. 
51. Especially Trimble v Jameson (1903) 24 NLR 53 at 58, Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 111. 
52. Drewtons v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C). 
53 Schoombee 132. 
54 prewtons v Carie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 311. 
55 Drewtons v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 311, 312. 
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what will detrimentally affect the interest of the community is not necessarily valid 
for a community differently constituted and circumstanced, thousands of kilometres 
away. And dubbing the result of a factual enquiry a legal doctrine does not 
necessarily alter its nature, particularly since our Provincial Divisions have no 
legislative authority ". 
The statement essentially refutes the existence of public policy. But the notion that a contract can 
be emasculated on the basis of public policy, with the emphasis on policy as opposed to merely 
public interest, has been accepted in South African law almost since its inception, and even 
Roman -Dutch authority can be found for it. Contracts can be ineffective because they offend 
certain fundamental policy considerations. It is not necessary or possible to look at the actual 
interests of the public in every case. Public policy concerns normative notions of what would be in 
the best interests of the public 56. Experience of courts in a specific field is elevated to a method 
for solving certain types of problems and legal principles are distilled. Van den Heever J 
overlooked the pragmatic importance of laying down more concrete principles and rules upon the 
basis of which courts can decide difficult issues regarding the interest of the public 57. Public policy 
principles are related to factual situations; courts will continuously have to evaluate principles to 
see if they still actually defend what is regarded as the interests of the public, but that does not 
mean that public policy is a factual issue. The judge does not refer to any authority that supports 
her point 58. Most cases illustrate that the ideas expressed in Drewtons have not been accepted, 
although there are no explicit judicial rejections of the decision 59 
3.3. Utilising the Winfield approach to re -align the doctrine with South African public 
policy 
The only valid criticism against the courts in receiving the doctrine in South Africa is that they did 
not properly appreciate the significance of the Roman-Dutch public policy milieu in earlier cases 
6o The restraint of trade doctrine in South Africa had been forged on the basis of public policy, 
but was more than lip service paid to South African public policy? In the late 1960s the Provincial 
56 Kerr (1982) 184; Schoombee 133, 139. 
57. Cf the discussion of stare decisis in Drewtons. 
58. Van den Heever J referred to an article written by her father under the pseudonym Aquilius (1941) 43 but 
Aquilius was discussing variability of public policy and he cannot be interpreted as supporting her thesis; Cf Tilney 
v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 111, Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 486, 
Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset Schools v Van Aswegen 1992 (1) SA 807 (W) 824 although none of these cases 
give strong support to it. 
59. Schoombee 133, 138 -139; Magna Alloys 897; Lubbe & Murray 241 gave a more acceptable explanation of how 
these principles operate; Van der Menve 139 -140, 145. 
60. Kahn 393. 
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courts started to utilise the public policy foundation of the doctrine in an attempt to harmonise the 
doctrine with what they regarded as actual South African public policy 61. They felt that the 
doctrine did not fully coincide with South African public policy, but did not deny that some 
restraints would be illegal, and they did not undermine the notion that this would be measured by 
looking at more specific rules 62. 
The movement culminated in the watershed Magna Alloys judgment in 1984 63. It was accepted 
that some restraints were still illegal 64. It was stated that restraint of trade problems had to be 
dealt with in terms of South African principles of public policy 65. However, the court did not 
really discuss the principles that made South African law different from English law (though it was 
admitted that public policy also lies at the basis of English law 66), and the case is opaque 67 in 
laying down more specific rules. It is difficult to determine whether Rabie CJ thought that the 
second tier of the Winfield approach should be maintained. Public policy was stressed and scant 
reference was made to particular rules and principles by which the illegality of restraints was 
determined in the past 68. The court did not seem to feel a great need for concretising broad 
statements into more specific rules and principles. But Rabie CJ in the end probably still accepted 
a two -tier test, albeit with a much reduced second tier. The emphasis on public policy was 
probably only made in an attempt to alter particular long accepted principles and rules 69 
Some cases immediately following Magna Alloys placed much emphasis on public policy 70. But 
later cases again utilised a more specific doctrine 71. Magna Alloys is often quoted, but the more 
specific doctrine has mostly been revitalised, albeit within the framework where public policy has 
been enhanced. A somewhat different doctrine is still, in South Africa, couched in slightly different 
Winfield terms. 
61 Katz y Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 610 may also be open to this interpretation, See Kerr (1982) 184; SA 
Wire Co (Pty) Ltd y Durban Wire and Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 787; Roffey y Catterall, Edwards & 
Goudrè (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 503ff, See Nathan 37; Madoo (Pty) Ltd y Wallace 1979 (2) SA 957 (T) 957; 
Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd y Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 405; Kahn 398, 399; Nathan 36 although it is not clear 
whether the author was talking about contemporary or historical Roman-Dutch policy. 
62. Schoombee 132; See infra Ch 5 and 6; Cf Botha J in National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd y Borrowman 1979 
(3) SA 1092 (T) 1099 accepted that only few changes should be made if at all. 
63 But see infra Ch 10. 
64 Magna Alloys 891; Christie 433. 
65 Magna Alloys 892ff and the authorities quoted there. See Interest Computation Experts y Nel 1995 (1) SA 174 
(T) 179; Basson y Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762. 
66 Magna Alloys 888 and 892. 
67. Schoombee 139 see infra Ch 5.3. 
68. Magna Alloys 892 found support in Otto 211 who proposed a monolithic approach. 
69. Infra Ch 5, 6, 11 -14. 
70. Amalgamated Retail Ltd y Spark 1991 (2) SA 143 (SEC) 150; Cf Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset Schools y 
Van Aswegen 1992 (1) SA 807 (W) 824; Van der Merwe 158. 
71. See infra 5.2.1; Christie 433. 
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3.3.1. The consequence of the new South African approach towards public policy and 
restraints of trade 
In South African law there is now less of a restraint of trade doctrine interposed between restraint 
clauses and public policy than in England and Scotland. All consequences of the law of restraint of 
trade are portrayed as flowing directly from public policy. In most respects the consequences of 
the public policy connection discussed with reference to English law will also be evident in South 
Africa. The only difference will probably be that these consequences will be more pronounced 
because the link between public policy and restraint of trade is more direct. 
It has been accepted that public policy will change and that this must be absorbed by the doctrine 
72. Despite some conservatism 73, most South African courts have accepted that the role of stare 
decisis will be reduced in restraint of trade cases since the doctrine is an expression of public 
policy 74. But stare decisis will still play a considerable role and it is open to question whether the 
direct significance of public policy will be maintained as a new set of technical rules and principles 
becomes established 75. Du Plessis and Davis 76 highlight the role of the relative importance of 
interventionism and laissez -faire in the sphere of public policy. In Basson 77, Botha J suggested 
that it would be useless to look at pronunciations in cases that concern other public policy aspects 
which are to the effect that a court will be reluctant to interfere with contracts. But the general 
attitude of courts to other public policy issues may be important in determining the general attitude 
of the courts to restraints 78. 
4. Scots Law 
In Scotland it is also accepted that the restraint of trade doctrine is an expression of public policy. 
When a contract is found wanting in terms of the doctrine of restraint of trade, such a contract 
72. For pre -Magna cases see: SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 367 -368, Dempsey v Shambo 1936 
EDL 330 at 333, Trimble v Jameson & Co (1903) 24 NLR 53 at 55; Magna Alloys 891; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) 
SA 742 (A) 762; Kerr (1982) 185; Lubbe (1990) 11; See Lubbe & Murray 240 -241 with reference to Magna 
Alloys, 241; Van der Merwe 158; Drewtons v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 311, 312 public policy requirements may 
differ in different parts of a country, Oosthuizen 382. 
73. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1100 -1109; Du Plessis & Davis 95. 
74. Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 506, Aronstam 24; Cf Drewtons v Carlie 
1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 310, See the criticism Schoombee 133, See supra. 
75. See Du Plessis and Davis 91. 
76. 
Du Plessis and Davis 97 -98; Cf also SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 367 -368, 371. 
77. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776 -777. 
78. Basson 762 and the criticism of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9 must be approached with 
caution. 
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term is normally described as illegal or as a pactum illicitum 79 on the grounds of public policy 80, 
and there is also criticism of the use of the word unlawful in this context 81. Most contract authors 
have classed the doctrine with other aspects of illegality or pactum illicitum on the grounds of 
public policy 82. 
4.1. Walker and the case of George Walker: a conflicting approach 
However, Scots lawyers are not unanimous when it comes to the doctrinal positioning of the 
restraint of trade doctrine. Walker distinguishes three related grounds: public policy, illegality, and 
contracts that will not be enforced for a variety of reasons. He then refrains from following the 
orthodox approach of defining the restraint of trade doctrine as a specific expression of public 
policy ß3. He classes the restraint of trade doctrine under a further rubric, "contracts not enforced 
for a variety of reasons" 84. 
Normally authors combine the three notions of illegality, public policy, and the restraint of trade 
doctrine in some way. But Walker's reason for making this trilateral distinction is obscure. One 
seeks in vain for a definition of illegality. Public policy is defined as a ground upon which contracts 
can be avoided if they "are not strictly illegal" 85. He provides no reason for not categorising the 
restraint of trade doctrine under the heading "public policy ". He refers to some of the Scots 
institutional writers but none of them support his thesis 86. 
It is accordingly very difficult to establish why he has categorised the restraint of trade doctrine in 
79. Watson v Neuffert (1863) 1 M 1110 at 1112; Barr v Can 1766 M 9564; McKernan v United Operative Masons' 
Association of Scotland (1874) 1 R 453 at 457, 459, 460, 461; McGahie v Union of Shop Distributive and Allied 
Workers 1966 SLT 74; Pratt v Maclean 1927 SN 161 at 162 and the submissions of counsel; Scottish Farmers' 
Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 152, 154, 157, 155; BMTA v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 604, 
Maclntyre v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 98, 99; Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT 
ShCt 89 at 90; Randev v Pattar 1985 SLT 270 at 271; Campbell 281; McBryde Thesis 150; Gloag 121, 569, 570, 
575 -576. 
80. Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1161, 1162, 1163, 1171, 1172; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 533; 
Kennedy v Clark ([1917) 33 ShCt Rep 136 at 138 and the manner in which the case was argued; Aberdeen 
Varieties Ltd v James F Donald (Aberdeen Cinemas) Ltd 1939 SC 788 at 796 and 797 where unlawfulness is also 
mentioned; BMTA v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 598; Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 9; Maclntyre v Cleveland 
Petroleum Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 100; Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 40; 
Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90; Letinvest plc v The Victor Tramway Ltd 1994 SCLR 
164 at 165; Campbell 281, 282; More in his notes to Stair (1832) lxiv; Gloag 121, 564 -565 and 569; McBryde 602, 
608; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1208. 
81. McBrvde Thesis 152. 
82. Bell Prin (10th ed) 40 and Comm 7th ed 322; Gloag 565 and 569ff, McBryde 590; McBryde Thesis 4. 
83. Walker 155 and 167. 
84. Walker 174. 
85. Walker 167. 
86 Bell Corn I 322, Prin 40 and Ersk I 7,62. 
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this manner. He probably attempted to follow certain developments in English law 87. However, 
the manner in which he categorises the doctrine still differs materially from the approach of any of 
the English authors. Most of them still regard public policy as the ground upon which courts 
refuse to enforce contracts in restraint of trade, although some of them place public policy (and 
with it restraint of trade) on a different plane from illegal contracts 88. Walker's typology must be 
rejected. No cogent reason for departing from established practice can be discerned, and it is not 
even clear whether the author was aware that he was taking a non -conformist view. 
In the recent case of George Walker ß9 the court also seemed to draw a line between public policy 
and the restraint of trade doctrine. The respondent sold his business as Messenger at Arms and 
Sheriffs Officer to the petitioners. In terms of the contract the respondent was then restrained 
from being involved in the same business in three sheriffdoms. The restrictive covenant was 
attacked on two grounds. It was argued that the restraint offended against the doctrine. Moreover, 
counsel for the respondent submitted that the clause was contrary to public policy on grounds 
unconnected to the restraint of trade doctrine. 
The averments of the respondent were based on an Act of Sederunt which placed a duty on 
Messengers at Arms and Sheriffs Officers not to refuse business from anyone except in 
circumstances set out by the Act. The respondent accordingly argued that the restraint was 
ineffective on one of the above mentioned grounds because it would give rise to an obligation to 
act contrary to his statutory duty. 
As far as the restraint of trade goes, the court refused to accept the argument of the respondent 
because a distinction was drawn between public policy and the doctrine. The court considered the 
effect of the Act under the broad public policy head. The approach indicates that there is a 
distinction between public policy and the restraint of trade doctrine. 
But the conclusions mentioned must be qualified 90 
- The court never made an explicit statement about the doctrinal positioning of the restraint of 
trade doctrine. 
- The case is also open to another interpretation. Perhaps the court merely intended to distinguish 
between the restraint of trade doctrine as one manifestation of public policy and other 
87. See supra 2.1. 
88. See supra 2.1. 
89. George Walker & Co y Tann 1991 SLT 771. 
90. See infra Ch 10.5.2. 
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more general requirements of public policy. Lord Cullen decided 91 that the second ground 
for ineffectiveness argued by the respondents pertained to the issue of "illegality per se ". 
The majority of cases and authors on restraint of trade leaves little doubt about the doctrinal 
positioning of the restraint of trade doctrine. The solitary voice of Walker speaks for a different 
categorisation, but there is little to commend or support his stance. 
4.2. More precise relationship between the restraint of trade doctrine and public policy 
in Scotland 
Up to now, no Scots court has investigated the precise relationship that should exist between the 
doctrine and public policy in Scotland. The restraint of trade doctrine is mostly applied without 
regard for its theoretical basis. 
Moreover, acceptance that the doctrine is an expression of Scots public policy is not always 
apparent from the Scottish authorities 92. Courts have never really investigated this point. When a 
court in Scotland refers to the restraint of trade doctrine as an expression of public policy, it is 
often only mimicking English law. Public policy is frequently referred to via quotation of the 
dictum of Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt 93 supporting the approach that the broad basis on 
which the validity of restraints should be determined is public policy 94. 
It is suggested that Scots courts should make it more explicit that the doctrine is an expression of 
Scottish public policy. A doctrine that is so related may blend in better with the Scots law of 
contract and might impact on the doctrine, although it will probably not justify a strong departure 
from existing principles. Such a distinction is not made obsolete by the political union between 
Scotland and England. Public policy is endemic to the legal system and the Scots system contains 
certain features which may have some minimal impact. 
4.2.1. Relations between the doctrine and public policy in Scotland 
Scots authorities have also not determined how the doctrine should relate to public policy in 
91. George Walker & Co v Tann 1991 SLT 771 at 773. 
92 Cf Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1161 -1162 discussed Ch 3.3 and Ch 9.6; The doctrine does however 
now have somewhat of a separate identity in Macintyre v Cleveland Petroleum 1967 SLT 95 at 99 -100 the court 
went no further than stating that it would be apt to give weight to English authorities in the absence of Scots 
authority; SOS Bureau Ltd Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37 where the court held that a certain English principle 
"seems to accord fully with the equivalent Scottish principles "; See infra Ch 3.3 and Ch 9.5. 
93. Norc4enfelt 565. 
94. BMTA v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 592 -593; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531 -532; Maclntyre v Cleveland 
Petroleum Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 99; See also Gloag 569. 
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Scotland. These issues have not been regarded as relevant within the accepted Scottish 
methodology. On the whole it seems that the relationship between public policy and the restraint 
of trade doctrine will not be much different from the relationship between these two elements in 
English law. The doctrine will, even if it is related to Scots public policy, still have considerable 
independence, because it consists of copious technical and separate rules. The Winfield approach 
should also apply in Scotland even if some Scottish elements may in future have some impact on 
the relationship between the different factors. 
4.3. The direct consequences of the doctrinal positioning of the restraint of trade 
doctrine in Scots law 
Generally the consequences of the doctrinal positioning of the restraint of trade doctrine will be 
similar in English and Scots law. Public policy is variable over time 95 and authority of precedent 
will be diminished by changes in circumstance 96 
Moreover it is hoped that Scots public policy may in future come into its own. Public policy issues 
in Scotland developed in an atmosphere where sanctity of contract was of much greater 
importance than in England, and courts might consider whether this should impact on the doctrine 
97. The narrower scope of Scottish public policy might have some influence on the Scots restraint 
of trade doctrine even though Scots lawyers will probably remain more reluctant to show this, and 
even though divergencies will probably remain less evident in Scots law than in South Africa 
where English law has lost some of its status as a major authority. 
95. McBryce 573, 590 with reference to Gloag. 
96. McBryce 593 -594. 
97. McBryce 574. 
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1. The principles underlying the doctrine 
The restraint of trade doctrine has survived many changes in legal, social and economic ideas. The 
fervour with which judges apply it has waxed and waned. However, it is difficult to discern the 
underlying principles t, as they are sometimes lost in the haze of technical rules. Clearly the courts 
feel that the doctrine satisfies some sense of justice but they are vague in expressing it. 
2. A clash of principles 
The restraint of trade doctrine is aimed at resolving the clash between conflicting public policy 
principles. Van den Heever J in Drewtons " stated that restraint cases only involve "factual" issues, 
but this cannot be accepted. Legal principles underlie the doctrine 3. 
It is trite that sanctity of contract 4 is one principle that comes into play here. In cases that concern 
restraints of trade it has a general and particular meaning. In a general sense courts accept that the 
protection of faith in contracts is an important societal value. They acknowledge that it is morally 
important and in the interest of economic organisation that individuals should be able to rely on 
contracts. In particular courts accept that, in these cases, specific interests will underlie the 
enforcement of contracts 5. 
However, it is difficult to discern the counter -principle. Some courts have relied on overly vague 
tenets such as public policy in general. But more flesh will have to be added. Others have argued 
that the restraint of trade doctrine is also based on freedom of contract 6. Restrictions often limit 
the ability of the covenantor to enter into further contracts. However, there is a more profound 
clash of principles that underlies the doctrine. 
The most important objective here will be to investigate all the different possibilities and to 
determine precisely what the counter -principles are. Many restraint of trade aspects can only be 
understood and developed if the principles underlying the doctrine are described with precision. 
. Herbert Morris 717 they have been obscured at times; Du Plessis & Davis 95 for some reasons. 
2. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C), See supra Ch 2.3.2. 
3. E.g. Esso 304. 
4. Already visible in Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 186 where the court mentioned volenti non fit 
injuria; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453; Esso 323. 
. Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322 at 327 is too wide; Nordenfelt 552 fair dealing between man 
and man, 555 rules of common honesty. These are unde lying reasons for maintaining sanctity of contract; 
Woolman 
257 where the right to protect interests was stresse but this is a manifestation of sanctity of contract. 
. Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [ 910] 1 KB 506 at 516, 518; Rautenbach & Reinecke 
555, 556 especially 561; Collinge 410; See the criticism of Lubbe 239 of Joubert. 
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Many of the problems in the area of restraint of trade exist because courts do not clearly delineate 
the principles underlying the doctrine. 
3. The restraint of trade doctrine and restrictions of liberty in general 
The liberty of the subject in general has historically been emphasised in restraint of trade cases in 
Scots law ', and has also been stressed in the other systems 8. This is correct but simplistic 
statements like these must be qualified. The doctrine is only concerned with specific aspects of the 
liberty of the individual 9 (although other forms of interference with liberty may also be contrary to 
public policy). Lord Watson correctly distinguished the different aspects in Nordenfelt 10. He 
contended that the law would be opposed to all infractions upon the liberty of the individual that 
interfere with the interests of the state or the community. The judge then noted that a contract by 
which an individual binds himself not to use his time and talents in pursuit of a trade or profession 
will also be ineffective if attended with these consequences, i.e. if it interferes with the interests of 
the community. 
The principle is the same in Scotland. In Stewart 11 the pursuer noted that restraint of trade law 
has been treated as part of the law in favour of individual liberty 12 and that English law had 
developed from different roots. He concluded 13 that Scots law should be different from English 
law although the practical result should often be similar. But personal liberty has not gained any 
specific and separate meaning in Scots law. The court in Stewart did not even address this point, 
7. Stalker v Carmichael 1735 M 9455, See the case is placed under this heading in Morison's Dictionary, Quoted in 
Watson v Neuffert (1863) 1 M 1110 at 1113; Bell Prin (10th ed) 40 and Comm 7th ed 322; More in his notes to 
Stair (1832) lxiv; Gibson Encyclopaedia 511; See Woolman 253. 
8. Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 188 with reference to the Magna Carta although the court accepted 
that this does not apply in voluntary restraint cases; E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 309 -310; 
Hilton v Eckersley (1855) 6 El & BL 47 65; Nordenfelt 565 where the two aspects were separated; Russell v 
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [1910] 1 KB 506 at 526; Russell v Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters & Joiners [ 1912] AC 421 at 430, 435 mentioned by Fridman 859, See further criticism infra 6.2; Mason 
737, 742; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] 2 QB 514 at 565; The Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686; Atiyah 337; Willet v Blake (1848) 3 Menz 343; KWV van 
ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 437. 
9. Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 189; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 
827 although considerable emphasis was placed on liberty; Harrop v Thompson [1975] 1 WLR 545 at 548 -549; 
Cronin & Grime 51 but their further arguments can be criticised; See Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1170 
and the careful language 1166 -1167, 1164, See Christie Jur Rev 294; See also Macrae & Dick Ltd v Philip 1982 
SLT ShCt 5 at 7; Christie Encyclopaedia 580 -581. 
10 Nordenfelt 552 quoted in E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [ 1899] 1 Ch 300 at 311. 
1 t 
Stewart v Stewart (1899) F 1158 at 1161 -1162, See supra Ch 2.4.2.1 and infra Ch 9.5. 
12. Witt reference to Bell an d More's Stair supra. 
13 With reference to Watson v Neuffert (1863) 1 M 1110 and Curtis v Sandison (1831) 10 S 72. 
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and Scots courts since have closely followed English law. The principles underlying the doctrine 
and the rules built upon these principles will be very similar in the two systems. 
Yet the opposite error must not be made. The range of the principles underlying the doctrine 
should not be so narrowed down that issues which should fall within the doctrine become 
excluded from its operation. In Strathclyde Regional Council i4 training of N, an employee, was 
paid for by the employer S. An agreement stipulated that the employee would continue in the 
employment of S for two years or alternatively would pay back certain sums. The court classed 
the question of the legality of such a limitation as falling outside restraint of trade law. That is 
unacceptable and several of the problems in the case can be traced back to this fundamental error 
15 
4. The doctrine and unconscionabilitv 
In the broadest sense it has been suggested that the doctrine should be aimed at protecting fairness 
in contracts 16. In A Schroeder 17 Lord Diplock correctly accepted that broad economic theories 
have played no more than a formal role in the field of restraints of trade. He then averred that the 
issue here is unconscionability. However, this is acceptable only as long as the doctrine is not 
thereby used for resolving general issues of unconscionability. 
- Unconscionability interacting with public interest in a very particular way lies at the heart of the 
doctrine 18. The restraint of trade doctrine is not the panacea for problems of fairness in 
contractual relations 19 
- The restraint of trade doctrine may sometimes go completely beyond even these very particular 
types of unconscionability 20. 
In George Michael 21 Parker J in a carefully reasoned judgment distinguished the doctrine from 
broad unfairness as a ground of public policy ineffectiveness. He accepted that the two issues 
to Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90 -91. 
15 
Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 can be criticised on similar grounds. 
16 Atiyah 337; Schoombee 130 with reference to J Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) 160; 
Wedderburn 149 although he contextualised it somewhat. 
17. A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 623, See Anson 319, Nelson 44; 
Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records Ltd [ 1975] 1 All ER 237 at 240. 
18. 
See Herbert Morris 698, See Christie Encyclopaedia 593 -594; Palmolive Co (of England) Ltd v Freedman 
[1928] 1 Ch 264 272 although it was incorrect to limit the issue to employment in the narrow sense; Cf Esso 323 it 
is not clear how the court understood oppression here; Collinge 406, 410; Gurry 206; McCullough & Whitehead y 
Whitaeway & Co 1914 AD 599 at 625, See infra Ch 5. 
19. Dawson 458 -459 cannot be accepted. 
20. Infra Ch 9. 
21 
Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 316 -319. 
24 
Chapter 3: The principles underlying the restraint of trade doctrine 
might overlap but, he still stressed that they have separate requirements. However, the judge then 
attempted to redeem A Schroeder. He contended 22 that the point about fairness made by Lord 
Diplock in A Schroeder 
23 
was aimed at this first public policy ground and not at the restraint of 
trade doctrine. Parker J noted that Lord Reid in A Schroeder confirmed the principles expressed in 
the fundamentally important Esso case. He stated that the point in the judgment of Lord Diplock 
would have conflicted with that of Lord Reid if it was regarded as an expression of the doctrine. 
But he concluded that the court did not view it thus. Lord Simon of Glaisdale in A Schroeder 
agreed with the speeches of Lord Diplock as well as that of Lord Reid. 
Yet this is unacceptable. Parker J did not pay heed to the context of Lord Diplock's comment. The 
gist of the speech indicates that he aimed his remarks at the doctrine. It opens with the words, 
"Because this can be classified as a restraint of trade the restrictions that the respondent accepted 
fell within one of those limited categories of contractual promises in respect of which the courts 
still retain the power to relieve the promisor of his legal duty to fulfil them ". It then goes on to 
discuss the circumstances in which courts have exercised the above mentioned powers. Lord 
Diplock in A Schroeder 
24, even in the passages quoted by Parker J, made it manifest that he was 
dealing with the restraint of trade doctrine. 
5. Promotion of economic progress 
The view has sometimes been taken that the doctrine is concerned with economic progress. If so 
understood, the doctrine aims at increasing buying and selling or wider economic activity 
25. 
However, this is an unacceptable basis for the restraint of trade doctrine. The doctrine is 
concerned with more specific principles. 
In Petrofina 26 Diplock LJ stated that the public interests which the court tries to promote in terms 
of the restraint of trade doctrine are social and economic, i.e. liberty and prosperity. He accepted 
that the principle of liberty here connotes "liberty of the individual to trade with whom he pleases 
in such manner as he thinks desirable ". He then acknowledged that prosperity concerns the 
"prosperity of the nation by expansion of trade ". This seems unacceptable but the judge later 
qualified his statement. He came to the conclusion that "their reflection in the courts takes the 
22. 
Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [19941 EMLR 229 at 318ff. 
23. 
A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974 3 All ER 616 supra. 
24. 
A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [ 19741 3 All ER 616 at 623. 
25. 
Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 37; Although not clear Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 at 
977; Connors v Connors [19401 All ER 179 at 191; Nordenfelt 566; Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 
226; Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v V n Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940 at 944; See infra Ch 10.5.1. 
26. 
Petrofina (G13) Ltd v Martin [19661 1 All ER 126 at 138, See also 139, See Gurry 206. 
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form of a change of approach to the question of what is reasonable in the interests of the parties ". 
It is not clear exactly how the court sees the interaction between the principles, but it is submitted 
that prosperity can be no more than a background principle 27. 
6. The principle of freedom of trade 
It has been established that the doctrine concerns a more narrow concept than liberty in general or 
unconscionability 28. Yet what will this concept be? Freedom of trade is often mentioned as the 
basis of the doctrine and this is certainly acceptable 29. But it is difficult to determine what freedom 
of trade means. 
6.1. Restraints of trade and buying and selling 
Freedom of trade can be interpreted as the protection of freedom of buying and selling or the 
conclusion of a transaction of buying and selling. Here the use of the word "trade" can be likened 
to its use in common parlance. 
It will, however, be wrong to suppose that the doctrine protects the ability to conclude particular 
transactions. Such restrictions may in certain cases be in restraint of trade but restrictions on a 
transaction, per se, will not offend freedom of trade. 
27. Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 826 -828. 
28. Contra Du Plessis and Davis 95 -96, But see Schoombee 128. 
29. Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 561; Hilton v Eckersley (1855) 6 El & BL 47 at 55 -56, 59 "free will ... in 
their management "; Nordenfelt 566, 567 -568, 565, See the impact of this dictum on the scope issue Esso 294 -295, 
308; E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 312; United Shoe Machinery Co of Canada v Brunet 
[1909] AC 330 at 342 -343; Attorney -General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd 
[1913] AC 781 at 795, Quoted in McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society 
[1919] AC 548 at 572, Bathurst Farmers' Union v Bradfield 1923 EDL 391 at 397, Halliwell v Laverack 1929 
WLD 175 at 177 -178; Herbert Morris 699, 715 -716; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and 
Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 581, See the reference KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 435; Faramus 
v Film Artistes' Association [1963] 2 QB 527 at 558; Esso 317 and the discussion of Magna Carta; Dickson v The 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 558 at 573; Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine 
Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 614 -615; Chitty 1199; Collinge 410, 420, 423; Watson v Neuffert 
(1863) 1 M 1110 at 1112; Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 9; Campbell 281; McBryde 590; Woolman 253; 
Park Gebou -Beleggings en Wynkelders Bpk v Rogers and Hart (Pty) Ltd 1954 (3) SA 109 (T) 116 "vryheid om 
handel to dryf' although it is not clear if this should be translated with freedom of trade or freedom to trade, See the 
most acceptable Afrikaans definition in Magna Alloys infra 7; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) 
SA 609 (SR) 614; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 505; Diner v 
Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 
1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 505; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 
192; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 647 and see the discussion of Pest Control supra; Basson v Chilwan 
1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776, Quoted in Gero v Linder 1995 (2) SA 132 (0) 135; De Wet & Yeats 81; Schoombee 129; 
Kerr 503; Lubbe (1990) 13 "hanclelsvryheid" probably also should be so translated; Van der Merwe 156. 
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- It was argued in Shearson 3° that a rule of the London Metal Exchange that interfered with a 
specific set of transactions, in the narrow sense of the word, was in restraint of trade 31 
However, the court correctly rejected this notion 32_ 
- The court in BMTA 33 had to determine whether a restriction in a sale of goods could be 
regarded as being in restraint of trade. The First Division unanimously rejected the 
contention that a contract in terms whereof the buyer of a motorcar was not allowed to 
resell that car for a certain period restrained the trade of a one -off buyer of a motor car. To 
this extent the court is clearly correct. The restraint of trade doctrine is concerned with 
broader trends and wider issues of principle (although the court did not take a completely 
acceptable view of the principles that underlie the doctrine 34) 
The view can be taken that the doctrine is aimed at protecting the free capacity of individuals to 
buy and sell 35. A passage from the judgment of Kekewich J in Davies illustrates this 36: 
"There are frequent statements in the books, that in thus favouring trade the law 
desires to assist every man to earn his living by that trade for which he was apt; and 
possibly some judges thought that this was required by public policy, but to my 
mind what is really meant by the law favouring trade is, that it was considered a 
matter of essential importance to encourage all men to trade so the public might 
gain advantage by their trading - in other words it was considered public policy to 
assist England to become a nation of traders." 
The courts have also talked of restraints on "trading" 37, and they have sometimes placed the 
emphasis on "traders" 38 and the verb "to trade" This may also limit the meaning of trade to 
buying and selling. 
30 Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570. 
31 Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 131 also stressed "arrangements ", See Shearson quoted the 
3passage from Lord Denning but it omitted this part. 
2. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 614 -615; Treitel 423. 
33. British Motor Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 598, 602 although the issue was not properly discussed, 
See also BMTA v Gilbert [ 1951] 2 All ER 641, Macrae & Dick Ltd v Philip 1982 SLT ShCt 5 at 7. 
34 
Infra 6.2. 
35 Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 134, 141; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative 
Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 568, 568 -569, See also 581 -582; The Pharmaceutical Society of 
Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686 at 706, 707, Chitty 1234, See Koh 73; Instone v A Schroeder Music 
Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 171 at 172; Cf also United Shoe Machinery Co of Canada v Brunet [1909] AC 
330 at 343 "liberty to hire or not to hire the appellant's machine" and "privilege ... to dispose of the products they 
manufacture ". 
36 
Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 365. 
37. 
Hilton v Eckersle' (1855) 6 El & BI 47 55 -56; Nordenfelt 565; Herbert Morris 701; Hepworth Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 33; The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686 at 
698; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 398. 
38. United Shoe Machinery Co of Canada v Brunet [1909] AC 330 at 342 -343; Collinge 410. 
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However, this view is confusing. It has been expressly and convincingly rejected in Hepworth. 
Atkin LJ 40 stated that "It is a misapprehension to suggest that this doctrine is confined merely to 
restraint of trade in any ordinary meaning. of the word 'trade'; it extends further than trade, it 
undoubtedly extends to the exercise of a man's profession or calling... ". The judge, after quoting 
authorities, submitted "that the doctrine was not confined to restraining commercial transactions 
as such ". 
The doctrine is not primarily rooted in protecting the freedom of buying and selling of goods. 
Most courts have at least accepted that other aspects will also be relevant 41. But the protection of 
sellers or buyers should only come into play via the principles underlying the doctrine 42, that is, if 
buying and selling is the work of the covenantor. 
Collinge 43 averred that the courts will be lenient in regulating the movement of commodities while 
they will be strict when it comes to restrictions on the freedom of employees. However, one can 
go even further. The doctrine is not directly concerned with the former. 
6.2. Restraint of trade and monopolies 
Trade is sometimes also used as a synonym for the operation of markets. Thus courts have, on 
occasion, opined that the doctrine is market- related, anti -monopolistic 
44, 
and aimed at the 
promotion of competition 45 or free trade at large 46. 
39 Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 138, Adopted in Esso 317 but see the warnings 307; Esso 
306, See the reference Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 73; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry 
Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 826, 827, 829, See Texaco infra; Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil 
(GB) Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87 at 104; Collinge 423; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 
148 at 152; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 612; Roffey y Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) 
SA 494 (N) 504, See Aronstam 23; Nathan 37; Van der Merwe 140; Woker 331. 
40. 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 26 -27, Heydon McGill 326; See also Atiyah 343: Cf 
Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 828 the court omitted the part about the trading in 
goods in its quote from Dickson. 
41 McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 572, See the 
criticism Esso 296 of McEllistrim; Dickson v The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 558 at 
573. 
42. 




Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 398; Swaine v Wilson (1889) 24 QBD 252 at 257; Wedderburn 149. 
45 
Dottridge Bros (Ltd) v Crook (1907) 23 TLR 644 at 645; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] I WLR 1419 at 1423; 
Spencer v Marchington [ 1988] IRLR 392 at 396; Anson 319; Collinge 410; Korah JBL 251, 253; Blake 627; Guest 
7, 9 -10; Notes (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 347; Kales 195; Sales 606 -607, 607 -608, 615; Scottish Farmers' 
Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 152 -153, 157; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1212, 1213, 1215ff. 
46. 
Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone -Waite [1907] 1 Ch 322 at 326 -327; Russell v Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters & Joiners [1912] AC 421 at 435; Herbert Morris 699 although it is not clear how the court used this 
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However, this must be approached with caution. It is incorrect to see the restraint of trade 
doctrine as being primarily an anti -monopoly tool. 
- There are no authorities that expressly reject this notion as a basis for the doctrine, but some hint 
at it 
- It will become apparent from the ensuing discussion that the jurisdictional and substantive 
aspects of the doctrine have not really concentrated on anti -monopoly issues. 
- Most authorities mention principles that accord more precisely with the jurisdictional and 
substantive character of the restraint of trade doctrine as it has developed. 
The philosophical and economic background against which the restraint of trade doctrine will 
operate is rooted in the notion that a free and competitive economy is the best machine for the 
development and maintenance of prosperity 48. But the doctrine is ill suited to developing such a 
notion, and only confusion is caused by placing it at the core of the doctrine. 
47 
The most that can be said is that the promotion of free markets will probably still, to some extent, 
be a secondary aim of the doctrine. The duality of the principle underlying the doctrine is already 
evident in Mitchel 49. Lord Macclesfield in his discussion of voluntary restraints first enumerated 
what he called "The true reasons of the distinction on which the judgment in these cases of 
voluntary restraints are founded 50 ". He then continued: 
"A second reason is the great abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to, as for 
instance, from corporations who are perpetually labouring for exclusive advantages 
in trade and to reduce it into as few hands as possible 51." 
phrase here; Empire Meat Co Ltd y Patrick [1939] 2 All ER 85 at 91; Connors y Connors [1940] All ER 179 at 
191; Monkland y Jack Barclay Ltd [1951] 2 KB 252 at 265; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd 
[1994] EMLR 229 at 317; Korah JBL 252, See the criticism infra; See the emphasis in Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co 
(Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 152, Quoted Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 -35; Drewtons (Pty) 
Ltd y Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 311, See Otto 209, See the criticism supra; A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd y Becker 
1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 417 quoted in Magna Alloys 889. 
47. 
Collins y Locke (1879) 4 App Cas 674 at 685; United Shoe Machinery Co of Canada v Brunet [1909] AC 330 at 
331, 341 although it is not clear, 342 -343 where the monopoly and restraint of trade issues were more properly 
related; Esso 327; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 827 -828, See infra Ch 10.5.1; 
Chitty 1190 might be so read. 
. This also seems to be the meaning of the comparison between monopolies and restraints in the discussion of 
Lord Morris in Esso 304; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 76, See however the 
interpretation of Schoombee 129; See Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd y Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 500. 
49. Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966 ] 1 All ER 126 at 135; The duality already played some role in Ipswich 
Tailor's Case (1613) 11 Co Rep 53a. 
30. See infra. 
Si 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 190, See also 187; See also supra. 
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This duality became crystallised in later cases 52, and it has been confirmed again recently by 
Simon Brown LJ in JA Mont 53. He regarded the protection against monopolies as a further basis 
for the restraint of trade doctrine although correctly he did not view it as the only ground. 
However, it should be asked whether even this duality ought not to be abandoned. It is now no 
more than a legal anachronism. Market issues should only play a role as the determinant of the 
legal backdrop against which fundamental principles should be protected 54. These issues were 
elevated to an important status in the 19th century in terms of then current notions of political 
economy, but it has lost some of its power here. 
Freedom of markets and the core values that underlie the principle of freedom of trade must be 
clearly distinguished even if the former is still part of the doctrine. A properly understood principle 
of freedom of trade and the interest in a free market may in certain circumstances clash 55. Such 
clashes can be more comfortably dealt with by utilising other techniques 56 
Korah 57 criticised the common law doctrine on the basis that it did not properly take note of the 
competitive position. But the main purpose of the doctrine lies on a different level. The 
significance of competitive position is much reduced because other values are at the core of the 
doctrine. Korah's criticism is therefore not a serious indictment of the doctrine, although it shows 
that competition issues will still have to be dealt with in some other way. 
52. Wickens v Evans (1829) 3 Y & J 318 at 329 and 330; Hilton v Eckersley (1855) 6 El & BI 47 at 55; Nordenfelt 
in the Court of Appeal quoted 561, Nordenfelt 566; Attorney -General of the Commonwealth of Australia v 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 795 -796; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd 
[1914] AC 461 at 469 -473, 479 although Viscount Haldane LC 471 emphasised it in commercial contracts; 
Rawlings y General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635 at 644; English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 174 at 
187; Esso 340 -341; Dickson v The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 558 at 574; Shearson 
Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 614; Christie Jur Rev 286; Atiyah 
337; Chitty 1199; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 415; Kales 195; To some extent recognised Korah JBL 253 
although it is not clear see infra; Christie Encyclopaedia 582; Woolman 253; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1213, 
1217; Schoombee 129. 
53. JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 587. 
54 Ts i s s apparently how it was seen in Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) 
SA 173 (T); See especially the discussion infra Ch 6.16. 
55 
See Alberts 288ff and the discussion of the right to be economically active in the context of competition 
legislation. 
56- 
. See infra Ch 10.5.1; But see Chitty 1199, Heydon McGill 352, 354, 357. 
57. 
Korah JBL 254. 
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7. Correct approach: the emphasis on work 
The most important element of the principle of freedom of trade is work. In this sense it is an 
extension of the noun "trade" as used in the sentence "A carpenter practises a trade ". It denotes 
the use of acquired skills by an individual to earn a living. It will avoid much potential confusion if 
courts more accurately and consistently talk of "freedom of work" 58, although the use of the 
phrase "freedom of trade" has a long history and it is probably too late to argue for such change in 
usage. 
Freedom of work has several meanings. Its composite nature often makes it difficult to discern the 
principle underlying the doctrine. The different dimensions of freedom of work and the different 
concepts which freedom of work embraces will have to be distinguished. 
8. Protection of the ability to work 
The doctrine concerns the protection of the ability to work or the right to use work skills 59. Work 
skill is one of the most important assets of an individual and of the society to which he belongs. 
58. E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 304; Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & 
Joiners [1912] AC 421 at 434, 435; Mason 732; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 33; 
Gozney v Bristol Trade & Provident Society [1909] 1 KB 901 at 909; Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v 
Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 181 at 189; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 819; Mason 
737; Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 614 -615; Lansing 
Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 427; Treitel 423; Collinge 410; Davies 490; Graupner 879; Stewart v 
Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1164, 1166 -1167, 1164; Walker 183; Woolman 253 in his discussion of the position in 
English law in early times; Magna Alloys 894, 898 contains the most acceptable Afrikaans formulation "handels en 
beroepsvryheid "; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 501, 505; Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762, 767, Rautenbach & Reinecke 555 took a too narrow view; Paragon Business 
Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 442; Van der Merwe 140, 155; Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v 
Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 785; Schoombee 129; Woker 332. 
59 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 187; Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322 at 326, See 
the references Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 666 and Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 583; Faner 
v Close (1869) LR 4 QB 602 at 612 and the discussion of the memorandum of Sir William Erle, Quoted Russell v 
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners [1910] 1 KB 506 at 527; Collins v Locke (1879) 4 App Cas 674 at 
685; Leather Cloth Company v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354, Quoted: Herbert Morris 701, McEllistrim v 
Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 571, Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 
KB 571 at 584, Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 810, Esso 296, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] QB 514 at 546 -547 in turn quoting McEllistrim, Shearson Lehman Hutton 
Inc v Machine Watson & Co Ltd [ 1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 614, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401, Holmes v 
Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 41, Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 
(W) 347 also with reference to Cheshire and Fifoot; Mineral Water Bottle Exchange & Trade Protection Society v 
Booth (1887) 36 ChD 465 at 472; Nordenfelt 552; Bromley v Smith [1909] 2 KB 235 at 240; Mason 738, 739, 741; 
Herbert Morris 698 -699, See Christie Encyclopaedia 593 -594, Herbert Morris 706, 714; Hepworth Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 9, 12, 26 -27, 27 -28, See the reference to Hepworth in South Africa: Aling and 
Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 222, Biografic (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 347, Filmer v Van 
Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 579; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin 
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Protection of that interest will be central to any legal system that has the interests of members of 
society and society itself at heart. The phrases "freedom of work" or "freedom of trade" can be 
used to denote this more specific aspect. "Freedom" is then used in the same sense as "right ". 
The restraint of trade doctrine, accordingly, is the contract law version of a principle that seems to 
be developing in England and South Africa. 
- The courts in England have in certain cases maintained that there is a general right to work 
principle fi0 although its content has not been clarified yet. Goring 61 accepted that the 
principle does not apply in the domain of the restraint of trade doctrine, that is, where a 
contract already exists between the parties. The court is probably correct but it is 
submitted that right to work notions (in such cases) will be promoted by the restraint of 
trade doctrine. 
- It has been recognised in the law of delict in South Africa that a right to earn a living should be 
protected. The exact theoretical position and content of this principle have not been 
worked out 62, but courts have been prepared to protect the ability to work 63, and this 
principle has now been recognised in the Interim Constitution 64 
[1966] 1 All ER 126 at 131 quoted in Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 570 at 614; Esso 304, 328; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 400; Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 
WLR 1027 at 1041; Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 (R) 439; Greig v 
Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 at 496 and the interpretation of Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 
Ch 413; Cf however Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406 where the author said that the covenantee can rely on a 
right to work to justify the restraint. This is the wrong way round although the right to work may play a role in the 
development of protectable interests see infra Ch 6.16; Sales 601; See Trebilcock 1ff; Winfield 320, 324; BMTA v 
Gray 1951 SC 586 at 598, See the reference in Macrae & Dick Ltd v Philip 1982 SLT ShCt 5 at 7; Christie 
Encyclopaedia 582; Woolman 257; Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 110; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v 
Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 171; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198 
although it is unacceptable to see this as a basis for distinguishing different types of restraints see infra Ch 9.2; 
Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 158; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 640 with reference to Magna 
Alloys 898 but see the word "vryelik" or "freely" is left out in the translation in Book; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v 
Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 794; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 571; Paragon 
Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC). 
60 
Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 WLR 1027 at 1032 -1035, 1037 -1039 and see the authorities mentioned there, 1040- 
1043; Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd [1971] 1 All ER 215 at 219; Edwards v 
SOGAT [1971] 1 Ch 354 at 376 -377; McInnes v Onslow -Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520 at 1528; Greig v Insole [1978] 
3 All ER 449 at 509ff; Goring v British Actors Equity Association [1987] IRLR 122 at 127. 
61 
Goring v British Actors Equity Association [1987] IRLR 122 at 128; See also: Enderby Town Football Club Ltd 
v The Football Association Ltd [1971] 1 All ER 215 at 219, Edwards v SOGAT [1971] 1 Ch 354 at 376 -377, Greig 
v Insole [ 1978] 3 All ER 449 at 509ff. 
62. 
Neethling (1990) 101; See Alberts 288ff. 
63. 
See Hawker y Life Office Association of South Africa 1987 (3) SA 777 (C). 64See 
infra 12. 
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However the notion "right to work" might imply a positive right to be able to work, but the 
principle underlying the doctrine is more negative. It concerns the protection of individuals against 
unnecessary interference with work skills or the ability to work: a right to use work skills 65 
8.1. Economic efficiency and the doctrine 
Trebilcock argues that the right to work concerns an equity and an economic efficiency element. 
The two elements correspond quite closely with subjective and objective elements 66. But the 
objective element especially is more narrowly economic. He then attempts to develop the doctrine 
in terms of economic efficiency. He analyses the entire doctrine in terms of Pareto efficiency and 
the wider question whether the contract harms third parties economically. He accordingly gives a 
refined theory that combines the notion that economic progress underlies the doctrine with 
freedom of work. 
However, his basic point of departure does not seem wholly acceptable. Restraint of trade lawyers 
have much to learn from his analysis, but it seems that the efficiency notion cannot form the only 
basis of the doctrine. The original rationale is a legal principle. Freedom of work is seen as a 
fundamental societal value that is partially separate from economic efficiency. Trebilcock 67 
addresses some elements of this argument: 
"A second reaction is that most of the claimed deficiencies of the common law 
process, viewed in an efficiency framework, are indeed inherent features of it and 
that rather than viewing them as deficiencies they should be construed as 
suggesting that the common law in this area is not and should not be primarily 
concerned with efficiency objectives." 
He looks at the question whether the doctrine should then concern commutative fairness and he 
then relates these notions to efficiency 6%. He is probably correct in noting that such a commutative 
justice principle could also be explained in terms of a sophisticated efficiency theory. But the 
primary aim of the doctrine is not commutative justice 69 
He then addresses the more radical critique that the market reference cannot apply in the labour 
context 70, but contends that this has not been the ethical logic underlying the doctrine. If it was, 
he states, employment would be removed from the contract law sphere completely and all or most 
65 
Cf McInnes y Onslow -Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520 at 1528 -1529; See Kidner 99. 
66 Infra. 
67. Trebilcock 407ff. 
68. With reference to James Gordley "Equality of Exchange" (1981) 69 California Law Review 1587. 
69 Supra 4. 
70. David M Beatty "Labour is not a Commodity" in Reiter and Swan (eds) Studies in Contract Law (1980). 
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restraints would then be illegal. But this either -or argument is too absolute. The law accepts that 
work or labour is affected by the market. It acknowledges that work cannot be regarded simply as 
a commodity and it therefore balances the effect of the market against ethical principles that have 
developed independently from market -related notions. 
It has been accepted that work cannot be completely separated from the market. Some restraints 
have therefore been regarded as enforceable. This can be explained as an efficiency principle and 
Trebilcock explains the grounds for enforcing a restraint on this basis. But the notion has not been 
absolute. The jump from this to the more absolute contention that the entire doctrine should be 
rooted in efficiency is not justified by the author. The courts rather seem to balance efficiency and 
freedom of work on an ethical level. The fundamental point of departure in this thesis is that 
through the doctrine the law attempts to promote ethical principles in the market place. 
Moreover, the efficiency argument can be further relativised. Ultimately the approach here turns 
on a different view of law and legal argument. Trebilcock is fundamentally enthused by economic 
arguments in law. A more traditional view of law will be taken here. Law deals fundamentally with 
ethical and justice arguments. Economic analysis gives an interesting perspective on law but the 
arguments which lawyers find convincing operate on a different level. This does not mean that law 
must be inherently static, as Trebilcock seems to suggest. But law and with that the restraint of 
trade doctrine develops through other channels. 
9. The underlying notions 
Many aspects underlying the ability to work have been thrown up by the cases. These different 
aspects play an important role in shaping and developing the restraint of trade doctrine and they 
will accordingly be separately discussed. They will be divided into those that can be described as 
subjective, and those that can be called objective. All the different issues are, however, 
interwoven; they interact continuously. Some of these interactions will be discussed but a full 
survey would be too complex. 
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9.1. Subjective aspects 
Freedom of trade concerns the interests of the public through the interests of the individual. These 
issues still fall under the public policy rubric, but they will be called the subjective aspects because 
they do so via the interests of an individual 71 
9.1.1. The right or ability to earn a living 
One of the functions, if not the most important purpose, of work skills is to provide an individual 
with a living. The courts have often mentioned that the interest to be protected is the right or 
ability to earn a livelihood through acquired skills 72. This aspect, although at the core of the 
freedom of work principle, is just one element underlying the doctrine. It does not equate with 
freedom of work. A clause may still interfere with freedom of work in many cases where the 
covenantor can still earn a living. 
't. For examples of expressions of both aspects: Leather Cloth Company v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 345, 
BMTA v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 598, See also supra 6.1, 8; It is unclear whether this is properly appreciated by Sales 
601. 
72. Dyer's Case (1414) YB 2 Hen 5 fo 5; Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 190, See 192 it will not have to 
be shown on a particular set of facts; Young v Timmins (1831) 1 Cr & J 331 at 340; Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 
735 at 744; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 560; Newling v Dobell (1868) 38 LJCh 111 at 112; Davies v 
Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 386; Nordenfelt 561 quoting Lindley LJ a quo, Nordenfelt 569 in similar terms as 
Ward v Byrne; Davies Turner & Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 656 although discussed in granting of interdict; 
E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 309 -310, 312; Counsel in Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 MR 
325, See the criticism infra 9.2.1; Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone -White [1907] 1 Ch 189 at 194; Sir WC 
Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 767, 771; Dottridge Bros (Ltd) v Crook (1907) 23 TLR 644; 
Attorney -General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 795 quoted in 
McEllistrim, Bathurst and Halliwell supra 6; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 
461 at 471; Mason 732, 737, 740, 746; Herbert Morris 699, See Christie Encyclopaedia 594, See also Herbert 
Morris 714; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 577, See the reference Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 
273 at 277; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryon [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12, 24; Faramus v Film Artistes' Association 
[1963] 2 QB 527 at 558, Faramus v Film Artistes' Association [1964] AC 925 at 942; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v 
Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1376 although the arguments are here limited to employment contracts; Esso 304; 
A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 621, Nelson 45; Office Overload Ltd v 
Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 43; Greig v Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 at 495, 502 -503, 503 -504; JA Mont (UK) Ltd v 
Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 585, 587; See counsel in R v Jockey Club ex parte RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 
225 at 243. The court apparently accepted this view; Watson v Prager [1991] 1 WLR 726 at 747; Chitty 1203, 
1206; Heydon McGill 355 when determining whether a delictual claim will lie for interference by restraint; Kales 
195; Selwyn 385; Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1169; Pratt v Maclean 1927 SN 161 and the emphasis of 
counsel; Woolman 253, 256; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 221; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing 
Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 
(R) 439; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 504; Highlands Park Football Club 
Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 201; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313 although she placed 
too much emphasis on it; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 500; Nathan 37; 
Cf also Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 13 although the doctrine was not directly in issue here, See 
Van der Merwe and Lubbe 97. 
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9.1.2. The right to use work skills and fulfilment of an individual 
The status and function of an individual are often determined by the work that he performs in 
society. Interference with the ability to work should therefore be taken seriously. This important 
dimension of the right to use work skills has not really been distinguished in the cases. However, 
the social importance of work was already emphasised in Ipswich Tailors 73 where it was stated 
that "no man could be prohibited from working in any lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness, the 
mother of all evil, otium omnium vitiorum mater ". 
9.1.3. Acquiring further skills 
A person will gain skills and experience by being employed. The court will accordingly be sceptical 
of interference with the ability to work as it inhibits the ability of the covenantor to improve his 
work skills and abilities'. 
9.2. Objective factors 
Aspects that relate more directly to the interests of the public can be distinguished. These issues 
will be labelled objective freedom of trade elements. 
9.2.1. Entitlement of society to the skills of an individual 
The courts have emphasised society's entitlement to the fruits of the work of persons who have the 
necessary skills In Herbert Morris 76, even the entitlement of employers to use employees was 
73 
Ipswich Tai lors case 11 Co Rep 53a; See also Woker 332. 
74 Ipswich Tai lors case 11 Co Rep 53a; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 157; 
See infra Ch 6.14. 
75. 
Ipswich Tailors Case 11 Co Rep 53a; Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 190; Young v Timmins (1831) 1 
Cr & J 331 at 340; Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 745; This appears to have been one of the most important 
reasons why a distinction was previously drawn between partial and general restraints see: Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 
M & W 548 at 562, Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 386; Nicholls v Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42 at 4445; 
Leather Cloth Company v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354, See the cases that quoted Lorsont mentioned supra 
8; Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 TLR 325 at 325 although it was incorrect to emphasise this to the exclusion of the 
right to earn a living; Dottridge Bros (Ltd) v Crook (1907) 23 TLR 644; Herbert Morris 706, 714; Atrivood v 
Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 577, See the reference Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 277, Cf also Bull 
282 discussed infra; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12, 24; Wyatt v Kreglinger and 
Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 798, 807, 810; Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries Ltd 
[1934] AC 181 at 189; Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 WLR 1027 at 1041; This point appears to have played an 
important role in the arguments of the court in Dickson v The Pharmaceutic Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All 
ER 558 at 574; The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968 2 All ER 686 at 690 where this issue 
is touched upon; A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 6 16 at 621, Kales 195, Nelson 
45; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 282, 283 -284; Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] 
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mentioned. In Basson, the latest Appeal Court case in South Africa, Nienaber JA 77 again stated 
that sanctity of contract and the discouragement of unproductivity have to be balanced in terms of 
the public interest requirement . The interest of society in the input of productive individuals is an 
important aspect underlying the doctrine, although the court probably overstated its importance. 
In Stewart 78 Lord Young accepted that a restraint could still be ineffective even if the public only 
had a marginal direct interest in it. A contract will not only be in restraint of trade where it can 
actually be shown that the interests of the public will be interfered with. This issue will play an 
abstract role. It will not have to be shown that a particular contract will de facto undermine the 
direct interest of the public. The courts will theoretically accept that the public will be deprived of 
the services of men if restraints are not curtailed, and that will be sufficient. The main importance 
of this aspect will be as a principle rather than a concrete reality in any particular case. This 
relation, within the doctrine, between the ability to work and the interest which society will have in 
output of work will impact on the manner in which the last mentioned issue is considered. 
Hence, the narrower view expressed by Du Plessis and Davis 79 must be rejected. They criticise 
the conclusion that freedom of trade entails the freedom of the individual to work. They deny that 
the doctrine is at all concerned with the interests of the individual covenantor. For them the basis 
of intervention is much more fundamental. They submit that the doctrine is solely aimed at 
ensuring that society is not deprived of the services of an individual without receiving a 
concomitant advantage. But the two arguments in support of their thesis cannot be accepted: 
- They argue that courts have accepted that a contract may not even fall within the doctrine 
although it interferes with an individual's ability to work. Yet this will only be so when the 
court comes to the conclusion that the ability to work is not on the whole interfered with, 
or if it is accepted that there are other principles which override it ß0 . 
IRLR 377 at 382; The court in JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 587; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 
401; Sales 601; Winfield 320, 324; Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 1164; Pratt v Maclean 1927 SN 161; BMTA 
v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 598; Macrae & Dick Ltd v Philip 1982 SLT ShCt 5 at 7; Christie Encyclopaedia 582; 
Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226; KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 437; Dempsey v 
Shambo 1936 EDL 330 338; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 347 with 
reference to Cheshire and Fifoot; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198 but see the 
criticism supra; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 501; Basson v Chilwan 1993 
(3) SA 742 (A) 762. 
6. Herbert Morris 699 emphasised the interests of "all those who desire to employ him ". 
77. 
Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767, Rautenbach & Reinecke 555. 
78. Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1166; A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 
616 at 623; Schoombee 129, See also 149; On a more direct effect see infra Ch 10.5.2. 
79. 
Du Plessis and Davis 95 -97. 
80. Infra Ch 4. 
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- They submitted that the individual interests are not relevant within the doctrine because the test 
for upholding a restraint often merely emphasises the interests of the covenantee in 
determining whether a restraint should be upheld 81. Courts emphasise the interests of the 
enforcer in determining whether the restraint should be maintained but that does not mean 
that the interests of the covenantor are irrelevant. His interests in work are already 
discounted when it is accepted that the contract falls within the doctrine 82. 
The authors are correct in so far as they see the interest of the public in the services of an 
individual as the basis of the doctrine, although their view must be rejected where they contend, 
that this will be the sole ground for the doctrine. 
9.2.2. Interest which society has in the ability of an individual to support himself 
It has been emphasised in some cases that restrictions will be ineffective because they will cause 
the covenantor to become a burden on society 83 - an argument pertinent to the modern welfare 
state. This will not always be the case. A covenantor will sometimes be able to continue 
supporting himself, and the burden on society is clearly not the only aspect underlying the principle 
of freedom of trade. It is possible that a restraint might still be ineffective in restraint of trade even 
if the covenantor will not become such a burden upon society. However, it will remain one of the 
aspects underlying the protection of freedom of work. 
10.Freedom to choose work 
The principle of freedom of work also concerns the right to choose where and how such work 
skills should be exercised. It concerns the power to choose in what type of work relationship a 
person wants to be, the right to leave one work or production relationship for another, or the 
power to leave work relationships altogether 
84 Here "freedom" can best be interpreted as 
"freedom of choice ". 
81. 
Otto 210 can be submitted to the same criticism. 
82. 
See infra Ch 6.16. 
83. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313; Schoombee 129. 
84. 
Attorney -General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 793, 
Quoted Esso 318, See Esso 293 -294, Quoted in Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 
2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 614; Mason 741; Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1957] WLR 
1012 at 1019; Faramus y Film Artistes' Association [1963] 2 QB 527 at 558; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 
All ER 126 at 131, See Esso 307; Fe}lowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 129; Clifford Davis Management 
Ltd v WEA Records Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 237 at 240; Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd t1988j 
IRLR 388 at 391; Blake 627; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 411; Heydon McGill 328; Kales 195; Du Plessis an d 
Davis 95 -96; Walker 183; Woher 332; Nathan 37; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 
171; Lubbe and Murray 239 -240. 
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The phrase "freedom of trade" has also received this more restricted interpretation in some cases. 
In McEllistrim 35 Lord Shaw of Dunfermline stressed that the problem in this case was 
interference with freedom to change from one production relationship to another. If effective, the 
restriction would tie a member's "industry" and "daily occupation" for life. 
The two legs of the freedom of work principle are closely intertwined. In a market economy and 
free society it is acknowledged that free choice will ensure optimum efficiency. This is also 
believed to be true of work skills. The ability to work is often directly interfered with if the ability 
to choose is undermined: 
- In M & S Drapers 86 a restraint would apply after termination of an employment contract. Lord 
Denning mentioned that this restricted the freedom to leave the relationship. The 
covenantor had to choose between remaining within the relationship or having to submit to 
a post -employment restraint. The judge then showed how this could interfere with the 
ability to work and the aspects underlying it. The limits of choice would make it more 
difficult for the employee to improve his position during employment. 
- In McEllistrim %7 Lord Birkenhead LC mentioned that limits on freedom to choose work in a 
particular location will often constitute complete fetters on trade. There are other factors 
that will make humans immobile, and limits on freedom to work in a particular area will 
often constitute a fetter on the ability to work as a whole. 
This principle also contains an objective and subjective element. They are motivated by some 
similar factors but occasionally differentiation will be necessary. 
11.Aspects unique to the freedom to choose work 
In the subjective sense work necessarily involves the person who performs such work, and it will 
constitute a radical interference with personal liberty if a person has no control over work, even if 
the output itself or the reward from the work is left untouched. In some cases the courts have also 
equated limitations on freedom of work with slavery, and they have accordingly stipulated that 
such interferences cannot be accepted 88. The comparison would be particularly apt here. Freedom 
85. 
McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 588. 
86. 
M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 820; See also Herbert Morris 718; See Hilton v Eckersley 
(1855) 6 El & B1 47 55 -56. 
7. 
McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 565. 
88 
Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 ChD 482 at 490; Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 393; Honvood v Millar's 
Timber and Trading Co Ltd [ 1917] 1 KB 305 at 312, 314, 317 although this issue was not clearly related to the 
doctrine; Herbert Morris 718; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] 
AC 548 at 590; Despite emphasis on wider notions see Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin ;1966] 1 All FR 126 at 144; 
Halston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 351; Wedderburn 149; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v 
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to choose how and where skills should be used are interfered with and the options of a covenantor 
are often limited by a restraint. 
The principle of freedom of work comes into play in relationships where freedom of choice is in 
issue, although it must not be exaggerated. In D'Oliviera ß9 it was emphasised that the court 
would be loath to interfere with sanctity of contract. Krause J accepted that restraints may 
sometimes be struck down. But he took too narrow a view of the circumstances that will allow the 
court to do so. He stated that a restraint will not be upheld where obligations are so unbearable 
and oppressive that they equal slavery. Yet, restraints that can be equated to slavery are just 
extreme examples of a type of contract that can also be ineffective even in cases where the 
interference is considerably narrower. 
Objectively the public has a separate interest in ensuring that individuals have some freedom to 
choose work 90. Wider freedom makes a wider tapping of work resources possible. In Russell 91 
the court emphasised the ability of employers to canvass employees freely. In Herbert Morris Lord 
Shaw of Dunfermline 92 stated: 
"Under modern conditions, both of society and of trade, it would appear to be in 
accord with the public interest to open and not to shut the markets of these islands 
to the skilled labour and the commercial and industrial abilities of its inhabitants, to 
further and not to obstruct for these les carrieres ouvertes.". 
On the one hand this may mean that the ability to work should not be restricted because the public 
has an interest in the fruits of work. However, it may also mean that entry into the market by 
choice should not be unnecessarily obstructed. 
Freedom to choose work or the freedom not to be forced into a certain work relationship will be 
important aspects of the freedom of work principle. However, it does not give a complete picture 
of freedom of work. It is an important though probably subsidiary aspect of the principle of 
freedom of trade. 
Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 200; Lubbe and Murray 239, Christie 455 with reference to Eastwood v Shepstone 
1902 TS 294 emphasised that it is against public policy if contracts promote forced labour but the authors 
distinguished this from restraint of trade issues, See also: Zondekili v McKenzie (1897) 18 NLR 188, Eastwood v 
Shepstone 1902 TS 294 especially 302, Biyela v Harris 1921 NPD 83, Raubenheimer v Paterson & Sons 1950 (3) 
SA 45 (SR). 
89. 
African Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 at 127. 
90. Blake 627 who related this to markets. 
91. 
Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [ 1910] 1 KB 506 at 516. 
92. 
Herbert Morris 718. 
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12.The principles underlying the doctrine and the new South African Constitution 
One important aspect that now separates South African law from the other legal systems under 
discussion is the Bill of Rights that forms part of the Interim Constitution. Sec 26(1) of the new 
Constitution 93 provides that: 
"Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity and to 
pursue their livelihood anywhere in the national territory". 
This is then qualified by sec 26(2) where it is provided that: 
"Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the protection or 
the improvement of the quality of life, economic growth, human development 
social justice, basic conditions of employment, fair labour practice or equal 
opportunity for all, provided such measures are justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality ". 
Sec 26 is moreover qualified by the general limitation clause (sec 33), which states that rights may 
be limited provided the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality, and provided that it does not negate the essential content of the 
right in question. It must be established how these constitutional aspects will interact with the 
common law of restraint of trade. 
In Waltons 94 and Kotze 95 the courts made short shrift of reliance on sec 26 of the Constitution. It 
was accepted that the principle expressed in sec 26 is similar to the one that formed the basis of 
the doctrine of restraint of trade. It was then acknowledged that this principle was undermined by 
legislation. Both Edeling J in Waltons and Conradie J in Kotze decided that sec 26 was aimed at 
such legislative undermining of freedom of trade 96. The courts therefore accepted that the 
common law as expressed in Magna Alloys would still apply here. 
This is correct if somewhat incomplete The common law doctrine is concerned with the same 
interest that underlies sec 26(1). A contract in restraint of trade can accordingly also be described 
93 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
94. Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 510 -511. 
95. 
Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 786 -787. Reliance was placed on Pierres Property 
Consultants v Brian Patrick (unrep). 
96. 
For a discussion of the position in Scotland see Christie Encyclopaedia 604. See also on the presumption against 
restraints of trade in legislation Rossi v Lord Provost Corp of Edinburgh [ 1905] AC 21 at 27. 
97. 
It might also be a question whether the Bill of Rights will only apply vertically. Authorities point towards the 
view that it will. Thus it is theoretically possible that it may play some role here. See Woker 329 at 330 -331 and the 
discussion of sec 35(3) (the so- called seepage clause), Cachalia et al Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution 
(1994) 20; See the criticism Rautenbach & Reinecke 551 -552, 554 and the explanation 556ff. 
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as unconstitutional 98. However, where the common law expresses the same principle in terms of 
the doctrine it would probably be more acceptable to deal with it thus. The doctrine is not 
absolute, but then neither is the Constitution. The most important issue here will be to determine 
whether the limits on freedom of trade that the doctrine allows are justifiable in terms of the 
Constitution. It is submitted that the doctrine cannot broadly be faulted in terms of the 
Constitution 99. Thus, the doctrine will probably be sufficient in the types of case that have until 
now been judged in terms of it. A party will probably not be allowed to rely on sections 26 and 33 
of the Constitution as an alternative to the restraint of trade doctrine. Woker too states that it is not 
necessary to refer to the Constitution in determining restraint of trade issues. This should be more 
strongly put. Parties cannot argue a case merely in terms of the Constitution if the common law is 
able to deal with it adequately 1 °1 Conceivably the Constitution will not be irrelevant. The 
restraint of trade doctrine is an expression of public policy which is not static. The courts must 
express and develop the doctrine against the backdrop of the Constitution 102. It may be shown 
that the doctrine in a particular case does not conform with the principles set out in the 
Constitution. But the Constitution will not directly impact on the doctrine. 
13. Conclusion 
The aim of the restraint of trade doctrine is to balance freedom of work and sanctity of contract. It 
will be important for proper development of principles to take a correct view of those principles. 
This will mean that priority may sometimes be given to one over the other. But none will ever 
become wholly dominant 103 There will be a continuous interaction between two conflicting 
principles. The doctrine is not just an expression of laissez -faire economics 
104 It also has a 
considerable paternalistic dimension. It aims to instil the ethos of a modern freedom of work 
principle into the market place 105 
The principles that now underlie the doctrine are still of actual importance. In Roffey 
106 the court 
stated that the current English position was brought about by the hardening of a series of 
98. Woker 332, 335. 
99 Woker 333 -335. 
10o Woker 334 -335. 
tot Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 510 -511. 
102. Woker 335. 
103 
See SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 505, See Book v Davidson 
1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 647 the court apparently criticised SA Wire but it then made essentially the same point. 
104 
But see Wedderburn 149 laissez -faire at one stage exerted strong influence over it. 
1°5 
On illegality and this type of legal function see Hugh Collins The Law of Contract (1986) 117 discussed Lubbe 
and Murray 242. 
106 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 502. 
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principles that developed with a particular problem of a bygone era in mind. But this is clearly 
incorrect. The restraint of trade doctrine today is based on principles that are relevant now even 
though the doctrine may have been founded on principles that will not be actual today. It is wrong 
to over -emphasise the origin of the restraint of trade doctrine in the Statute of Monopolies in 
England 107. It is perfectly legitimate to argue that the principles that underlie the doctrine have 
different values in South Africa and that the South African doctrine should accordingly be 
developed along indigenous lines. But a move away from the classic English doctrine cannot be 
justified on the basis that the principles underlying the doctrine have become obsolete in England. 
107. Suzman 90 at 91. 
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1. The scope of the restraint of trade doctrine 
Little attention was initially paid to the scope of the doctrine by courts and text -writers alike: 
- The jurisdictional question regarding the application of the doctrine, was fused with the 
substantive question pertaining to the effectiveness of a restraint. Courts simply asked 
whether a restraint was reasonable or, in some cases, did not clearly distinguish between 
the two questions I. 
- Courts sometimes assumed that contracts were within the purview of the doctrine and 
concentrated on the substantive aspects 2. 
- In the run -of -the -mill sale of goodwill, post -employment, and post -partnership restraints, it is 
often clear whether the doctrine should apply and it was sometimes thought that the 
restraint of trade doctrine only applied to this numerus clausus of contracts 3. 
- The scope issue was often not taken up for practical reasons. In many borderline cases counsel 
for the covenantor would probably not argue that the contract falls within the doctrine 
because it would, in any event, be effective in terms of the substantive test 4. 
Yet it is now open to the courts to decide whether a certain contract or category of contracts 
should fall in or outside the doctrine. This question is fundamental in the non -traditional types of 
cases but it will also be of some importance here. Most of the discussion regarding the scope of 
the doctrine has taken place in England, and English law will be emphasised, but there is nothing 
to indicate that South African 5 and Scots law 6 differ from it. 
2. Justification for separating jurisdictional and substantive questions 
Most recent authorities have acknowledged that it is necessary also to ask a jurisdictional question 
', but acceptance of this notion is not unanimous. In Instone g the court contended that a general 
t. See Esso 296 -297, 331, 338 -339 and the cases mentioned; Collinge 412. 
2. Esso 295 and the cases discussed; See also Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries 
Ltd [1933] AC 181 at 189 where the question was left open; Giblin v Murdoch 1979 SLT ShCt 5 at 6, See 
Campbell 281. 
3. See infra 5. 
4. Esso 306; Pharmaceutical Society (GB) v Dickson [ 1968] 2 All ER 686 at 699. 
5. SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 785 -786 after looking at: Shell Co of 
SA Ltd v Gerrans Garage (Pty) Ltd 1954 (4) SA (G), Witwatersrand Trustees (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) 
Ltd 1946 WLD 140 and Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Brothers 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 171. 
6. Maclntyre v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 99. 
7. Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 321 although the more narrow view of 
Lord Hodson was referred o 324; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401; Walker 184; Campbell 281; Cf A Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 618 where a somewhat different approach was 
followed. The court mentioned that the question is whether the contract should be justified or whether it cannot be 
justified at all. 
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approach could be followed and that it was unnecessary to class some restrictions as falling inside 
the doctrine, and others as falling outside. The reasons for and the criticism of the distinction will 
therefore have to be discussed. 
2.1. Grounds for asking jurisdictional questions 
Attempts to justify the two -stage test with administration of justice arguments can be cursorily 
dealt with. 
- It has been stated that a wide application of the doctrine may provide greater scope for 
procedural "chicanery and delaying tactics" 9. But Heydon correctly answered this point: 
procedural abuse can be penalised through awarding costs against the party whose 
behaviour is unacceptable 10 
- It has been mentioned that a wide application of the substantive doctrine will increase the amount 
of litigation concerning the restraint of trade doctrine 1 t. But Heydon 12 is probably correct 
in stating that a sensible one -stage test will not open the floodgates of litigation although it 
may increase slightly. 
Moreover, Lord Reid in Esso 13 argued: 
"And in the ordinary case the court will not remake a contract; unless in the special 
case where the contract is severable, it will not strike out one provision as 
unenforceable and enforce the rest. But here the party who has been paid for 
agreeing to the restraint may be unjustly enriched if the court holds the restraint to 
be too wide to be enforceable and is unable to adjust the consideration given by the 
other party ". 
But the problem of unjust enrichment is not unique to this area of public policy, while many of the 
severability problems are not insoluble here 14. It might be important to categorise restraints 
separately because different rules of severability might apply 15. However, severability rules will, if 
8. Instone v A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 171 at 177 with reference to Heydon, See 
Dawson 458; Heydon infra 2.1 his discussion boils down to the same conclusion; Cf also Esso 306, Lord 
Wilberforce 331 acknowledged that the common law has "thrived on ambiguity ". 
9. Esso 325, Collinge 418. 
10 Heydon 76 -77 (the discussion of the scope of the doctrine in Heydon's book is the same as an article he 
previously wrote 1969 LQR 229; in this chapter reference will be made to the passages from the book); Cf Instone v 
A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 171 at 177. 
11 See Dawson 458. 
12. Heydon 77. 
13 Esso 295, See Heydon 75. 
14 See infra Ch 14; The argument of Heydon 76 where he stated that unjustified enrichment can be justified by 
comparing morality is completely unacceptable see infra Ch 12.4.2. 
15 Heydon 76 and his discussion of severability see infra Ch 14. The severability argument mentioned by Heydon 
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anything, be wider than in other areas of public policy. 
These reasons for utilising two stages must be rejected. The real reasons for the separation of the 
jurisdictional and substantive questions are twofold. It can be justified by principle as well as by 
pragmatic and systemic considerations. 
Certain general policy principles may necessitate the exclusion of the operation of the doctrine. 
Many principles can be discounted in terms of the doctrine itself but others will be unacceptably 
undermined even by the mere application of the doctrine 16. The doctrine of restraint of trade 
should not override basic constitutional principles or fundamental tenets underlying the property 
system. 
The specific principles that are normally balanced in terms of the doctrine may furthermore require 
the exclusion of a contract from the doctrine. Thus the narrowing down of the jurisdiction of the 
doctrine is largely necessitated by that omnipresent bogey, the principle of sanctity of contract i7. 
The doctrine concerns the balancing of freedom of work and sanctity of contract, and a too wide 
doctrine will unnecessarily interfere with the latter. 
The exact interference with sanctity of contract must be precisely delineated. A contract will not 
be ineffective merely because it is regarded as a restraint of trade. The classification of a clause as 
a restraint will not interfere with sanctity of contract on this basis. However, classification as a 
restraint has a considerable impact upon the certainty of the contract and the relationship of the 
parties in other respects: 
- In England and Scotland an onus to prove that the contract is effective will come to rest on the 
party who wants the contract enforced 18. Sanctity of contract will accordingly be 
undermined by classing a contract as falling within the doctrine even if such a contract is 
eventually found to be effective i9. Heydon 20 tried to counter this argument by stating 
that: 
"there is very rarely any doubt that those covenants [covenants where the 
onus is not satisfied] are in fact undesirable and deserve to be 
unenforceable ". 
75 -76 does not really concern the issue under discussion here. 
16 This ground probably underlies the "existing interests" test proposed in Esso. 
17. See Collinge 410, Campbell 285. 
18. Heydon 76 although he put it too strongly; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1212. 
19. Pharmaceutical Society (GB) y Dickson [19681 2 All ER 686 at 698 -699, See 690 where the court doubted 
whether the onus in professional society cases should be on the society. The issue was finally left open. 
20. Heydon 76. 
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However, his point is not borne out by many of the cases. Onus, and the role which onus 
plays in the restraint of trade context, will have a considerable impact on the reasoning of 
judges 21. 
- The contract can be ineffective for being unreasonable. Generally a contract cannot be rendered 
ineffective on this basis in most other areas of contract law 22. In South African law the 
party who argues that the contract is illegal will have to prove it in all cases 23. But sanctity 
of contract is also undermined on this ground. This criticism is not answered by the 
proponents of a wider view 24. 
These forms of interference are not always properly observed by Heydon and other authorities 
arguing for a wide application of the substantive doctrine. Thus Heydon asserted that widening the 
doctrine would not interfere with sanctity of contract 25, because the substantive reasonableness 
test would continue to ensure that only a limited amount of contracts will ultimately be found to 
be ineffective 26. But the interference is on a much more fundamental level even if Heydon's 
argument is accepted. Sanctity of contract is not an absolute principle in the legal systems under 
discussion. Courts interfere with it regularly but this should only be done if there are sufficient 
grounds. 
Furthermore, there are systemic and pragmatic reasons for limiting the operation of the doctrine by 
delineating the field of its operation 27. The doctrine developed as a solution to very specific 
problems. It will not be appropriate to deal with all contracts that may, in the widest sense, be 
described as restraints of trade in terms of the doctrine. It will strain the specific substantive test if 
it has to deal with situations that do not properly belong there. 
This, more than any other aspect, underlines the importance of demarcation of the doctrine in 
South Africa. There, specific rules and procedures still form what can be described as "restraint of 
trade law ". It remains pivotal to circumscribe the types of contracts that will be singled out for 
such treatment. Christie 28 avers that it is not really necessary to determine the scope of the 
doctrine in post Magna Alloys South African law, but he admits that it will still be helpful to 
distinguish contracts that fall within the doctrine from contracts that do not "as an aid to clear 
21. See infra Ch 11.3. 
22. Esso 295; Collinge 410; See Bank of Lisbon and South Africa (Ltd) v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) where 
the exceptio doli generalis was rejected; See the discussion infra Ch 5.3. 
23. See infra Ch 11.5. 
24. Heydon 75 -76 did not separate this question from other completely different problems. He tied it in with the 
question of a windfall in the case of ineffectiveness but this is a different issue see infra Ch 12.4.2. 
25. The argument has been here represented in a different order than Heydon did in his book see especially 75 -77. 
26. Heydor 77, See also 76. 
27. See Collinge 415. 
28. Christie 434. 
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thinking ". It is submitted, however, that the scope question should play a more important role than 
that. It will still be important to determine in every case when the unique aspects of the South 
African law of restraint of trade should apply. 
2.2. Criticisms of the application of a narrow jurisdictional question 
Thus there are sound theoretical reasons for framing a properly limited jurisdictional question. The 
sanctity of contract principle cannot be theoretically side -stepped. But some practical problems 
with the application of a dual test have been foreseen. 
It has been stated that the same evidence may not necessarily be relevant in determining the 
jurisdictional and substantive question, and that the two questions should accordingly be 
distinguished 29. Heydon foresaw difficulties 30: 
- He contended that the two -stage doctrine would lead to problems in the production of evidence 
and averred that it would be difficult to determine at what stage different pieces of 
evidence should be tendered. However, the production of evidence will be simple. All 
evidence required for the proof of different legal points must be placed before the court at 
one stage. There will be a general jurisdictional question that the court will first have to ask 
on the basis of the evidence before it, and thereafter more specific questions will have to be 
answered on the basis of that same corpus of evidence. Only aspects of evidence that the 
court will consider will differ. Incidence of onus will have to determine the outcome of any 
one of these questions if the necessary evidence is not before the court. 
- He averred that a one -step production of evidence will not justify a two -stage restraint of trade 
decision. But there is no reason why this should be so. The two -stage procedure is still the 
most effective technique for dealing with the singular corpus of evidence. It answers 
different questions that must be kept apart. 
Moreover, the doctrine is not only concerned with cases decided in courts. It also establishes rules 
and principles for parties who have to draft contracts and to resolve disputes outside courts. In 
both the planning of relationships and the resolution of out of court disputes it will be important to 
be able to distinguish between contracts that fall within the doctrine and those that do not. 
The strongest argument for taking a wide view of the jurisdiction of the doctrine was also put 
29. Esso 326, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401, Walker 184; Cf however SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & 
Pl stics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 787 the court was prepared to decide jurisdictional issues on exception as it 
did not regard evidence as important in casu. 
30. Heydon 73 in his criticism of Lord Wilberforce in Esso although it should have wider application. 
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forward by Heydon 31. He accepted that the opacity and rigidity of all further limitations of the 
restraint of trade doctrine will militate against formulating a separate jurisdictional question. He 
argued that the circumstances where a restraint, in the widest sense, will be ineffective, and the 
cases where it will not, are so inextricable that they can never be properly distinguished 32. Hence, 
the tests for determining the scope of the doctrine will, according to him, be unsuitable for 
accommodating the fine balancing of principles necessary in these cases. 
However, this argument must also be rejected. Heydon stated that certainty and predictability 
would be fundamentally important here B. But in this field courts are concerned with public 
policy, which almost always entails some vagueness 34. It is fundamental that the jurisdictional 
question must have a core of certainty, making it possible to plan contractual relationships, while 
contracts where freedom of work needs to be protected should not be excluded from the doctrine. 
This can be achieved if the principles underlying the doctrine are kept in focus, and if the scope 
test is properly developed 35 
3. The scope of the doctrine in relation to public policy 
Wide definitions of restraints have been laid down by the courts. If applied literally many, if not all, 
contracts will fall within the ambit of the doctrine. But a simple definition cannot be used as a 
limiting device 36 
It must be continuously asked whether a contract can be rationally linked to infringement of the 
principles underlying the doctrine to such an extent that it should be further investigated in terms 
of the doctrine 37. The net should be cast widely and questions as to reasonableness should not yet 
31 Heydon 71, 77, See also Heydon 63 and the criticism. 
32. Heydon 77 quoted by Du Plessis and Davis 92 in South Africa. 
33 Heydon 63. 
34. Esso 331; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 403; Esso 331; Campbell 283, 285. 
35 Esso 331 Lord Wilberforce puts forward a solution that can be of much value although it will not be discussed 
here because it is not relevant to the older types of restraints infra 5; Cf Trebilcock 42. 
36 Esso 294ff, 307, 324 -325, 333, Cf however Lord Hodson who simply adopted the wide definition in Petrofina 
and Lord Hodson Pharmaceutical Society (GB) v Dickson [ 1968] 2 All ER 686 at 699, See Panayiotou v Sony 
Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 321 -322 and his interpretation of Lord Reid 294 is not 
acceptable. The term is used in the narrow sense in both cases; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401 -402; Chitty 
1191; Collinge 414; Treitel 402; Atiyah 339; McBryde 591; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1212; SA Wire Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 783 -784; Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super 
Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 (R) 439; Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982(1) SA 398 (A) 439- 
440; Christie 434; Du Plessis and Davis 92 although they also mentioned suggestions of Heydon. 
37. Esso 307, 308; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 713 although the court did not always distinguish 
jurisdiction and substantive issues; Cf Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 where 
the court saw this as a principle underlying the entire doctrine; Anson 318; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401 -402; 
Chitty 1191; Letinvest plc v The Victor Tramway Ltd 1994 SCLR 164 at 165; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban 
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come into play 38. 
The solution proposed in this work will still not work magically. Collinge 39 stated that a test 
based on degree cannot be acceptable here, but this is inevitable in restraint of trade law. Public 
policy does not allow for clear delineation. A rational rule of reason will still be pivotal. In Esso 40 
Lord Wilberforce put it thus: 
"The doctrine of restraint of trade is one to be applied to factual situations with a 
broad and flexible rule of reason .... It is not to be supposed, or encouraged, that a 
bare allegation that a contract limits a trader's freedom of action exposes a party 
suing on it to the burden of justification..." 
3.1. Heydon, George Michael, and the normal or general meaning of the phrase 
"restraint of trade" 
Two compromise positions must accordingly also be rejected. Heydon distinguished three issues 
that should be determined here 41. The first two boil down to the question: Is the contract in 
restraint of trade? He then argued that the phrase "restraint of trade" should for this purpose be 
interpreted in its general normal sense 42. In George Michael 43 Parker J suggested that the courts 
first determine whether a clause can, in common parlance, be called a restraint of trade. He then 
proposed that they should thereafter determine why the contract should not be justified in terms of 
the doctrine. He emphasised that the second leg should be of a negative nature. 
But policy principles with a particular content underlie the restraint of trade doctrine. The question 
whether a contract is a restraint of trade must be considered in the light of these principles. There 
are no other cases where this approach was followed, and it was explicitly rejected in Bull 44 
Moreover, it is also doubtful whether the word restraint and, especially, the word trade have any 
one relatively specific normal meaning 45. The courts have never attempted to establish the elusive 
Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 784; Cf however the criticism Guest 9. 
38. Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413 at 427 -428 cannot be accepted. 
39 Collinge 415. 
4o Esso 331 -332. 
41. Heydon 48; Collinge 411 also distinguishes the two questions. 
42 Heydon 48 -49, 52. 
43 Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 327. 
44. Bull v Pitney -Bowes [19671 1 WLR 273 at 281 with reference to the judgment of Lord MacDermott in London 
Graving Dock Co Ltd v Horton [1951] AC 737 at 761; Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 
413 at 427, See the same judge in Esso 331; AD Neal The Antitrust laws of the USA 2nd ed (1970) 18 -19. 
45 See supra Ch 1. 42's0__' l! 
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normal meaning of the phrase "restraint of trade ". Parker J's definition of what constitutes a 
restraint in common parlance is very vague 46. It would avoid many difficulties if a meaning for the 
phrase "restraint of trade" could be plucked from the air, but it cannot. The courts here necessarily 
have to deal with policy issues. Heydon's approach must be judged in the light of his hidden 
agenda. In his view restraint of trade should be interpreted widely so that all questions can be 
answered by the substantive test 47. According to him a "restraint" is a fetter which limits future 
liberty of action vis -à -vis third parties 48. The only further exclusion from the term would be 
through the de minimis rule 49. Moreover, Heydon did not really address the meaning of the word 
"trade" S0. 
Hence the first leg of the test proposed in George Michael is not viable either. The second leg 
depends on it and the whole test must therefore be rejected, although the court took a narrower 
and more acceptable view than Heydon. Yet the broad principle underlying the discussion of 
Parker J may still be of some use in developing an appropriate two -stage test. 
3.2. The two tiers of the jurisdictional test 
Courts should ask whether there is a clause that can be said to interfere with the principles 
underlying the doctrine, and they should thereafter determine whether the doctrine should apply to 
such a contract in the light of the particular contractual relationship of which it forms a part. These 
two issues have not always been clearly distinguished, but they are often visible. It is not 
necessarily unacceptable to merge them, but they will be discerned for the purpose of discussion. 
4. Does the restraint clause sufficiently undermine the principles protected by the 
restraint of trade doctrine? 
Freedom of work underlies the doctrine 51. Thus the question is whether a particular clause 
offends against this principle. This is more specific. In the widest sense it will perhaps still be 
possible to say that almost every obligation can be related to these narrower principles. But only 
terms that, in a proper and rational sense, offend against the ascribed principles should be so 
regarded. 
46 See Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 342. 
47. Cf Collin e 414 and the equally wide view taken here with reference to the definition in Petrofina (GB) Ltd y 
Martin [1966 1 All ER 126 at 138 although the author did not mention concepts like normal interpretation. 
48 
1- eydon 49 -51; Collinge 414. 
49. Jeydon 51 and the references to the annotators of Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181. 
50. Heydon 52 and his discussion of British Motor Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586. 
51. Supra Ch 3.7ff. 
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A term will clearly be a restrictive covenant if it contains a direct negative contractual obligation 
that restricts a person from working in certain areas. However, courts should not be formalistic. 
The problem here is one of public policy; judges must ignore legal niceties and look at the 
practical effect of a clause 52. 
- Contracts that tie the accrual of certain advantages, like the payment of a pension or other 
privilege, to a condition or obligation prohibiting a person from doing certain work may 
fall within the doctrine if the practical effect is also specific interference with the freedom 
of work 53. It might sometimes be difficult to distinguish between restriction and profit - 
sharing, but these distinctions will be drawn by looking at the practical effect of the clause 
against the backdrop of the principles underlying the doctrine 54 
- A scheme according to which the covenantor would be forced to restrict his freedom of work, or 
pay certain penalties, may also be in restraint of trade 55. A conditional obligation that can 
only be avoided by not exercising freedom of work will in appropriate cases be in restraint 
of trade. The court will again have to look at the purpose of obligations. In Tool Metal 56 
compensation had to be paid where a quota was exceeded. The court asked whether it 
could be said that "the sum to be paid as compensation is so large that it must have the 
effect of limiting output ". This is correct, although the application on the facts is 
questionable. The court placed excessive emphasis on profit margin and the lack of proof 
of actual constraint 57. In Neil 58 a trainee employee agreed to pay certain sums on leaving 
52. Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402 -403, See Heydon McGill 328 -329, Chitty 1192, 1203; 
Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 390; Chitty 1203; Schacklock Phillips - 
Page (Pvt) Ltd v Johnson 1978 (1) SA 321 (RA) 325; Cf the application of the same principle in a slightly different 
context: Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686 706 -707, MacIntyre v Cleveland Petroleum 
Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 100, See Campbell 282. 
53 See also the discussion in Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 807, 808, 808; Bull v Pitney - 
Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 especially 282; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402 -403; Sadler 
it Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 390 -391; Heydon 51, 203; Heydon McGill 358; 
See Walker 192; Schacklock Phillips -Page (Pvt) Ltd v Johnson 1978 (1) SA 321 (RA) 325; See Spence v 
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 UR 390 where both parties treated the restraint as a contract. The court 
accepted that problems otherwise might have arisen; Cf In Re Prudential Assurance Co's Trust Deed [1934] 1 Ch 
338 where the court simply assumed for the purpose of the case that the clause was unenforceable; Cf also the facts 
of Alder v Moore [1961] 2 QB 57 a clause of this nature will probably today fall within the doctrine although the 
doctrine was not discussed here. 
54 Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402 -403, See Heydon McGill 328 -329. 
55 Witwatersrand Trustees (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 140 at 150. 
56 Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 1 at 11 -12. 
57. Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 1 at 11 -12 preferred the view that 
a compensation clause was not in casu in restraint of trade although it was clearly accepted that such a mechanism 
may constitute a restriction in appropriate circumstances, See the criticism of Heydon 50, On Appeal Tool Metal 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 2 All ER 657 at 687 the court was sceptical of the notion 
that the particular levy was in restraint of trade although the question was finally left open; Cf Heydon 50 also 
referred to Holcomb v Nixon (1855) 5 Gr 278 at 372. 
58. Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90. 
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employment within two years. The court did not discuss the jurisdictional issue in any 
detail and the sheriff made some dubious statements. But the application of the doctrine 
could have been excluded here. The courts will have to determine whether it is one of the 
direct consequences of the clause to restrict freedom of work. The duration of the 
obligation here was too short to justify such a conclusion. 
- Restrictions that might indirectly constitute restraints on work will also fall within the doctrine 
where there is a proper link with interference against freedom of work. This is illustrated 
by the restrictions on the use of a certain name or title. In Hepworth 59 an actor agreed that 
he would not use the pseudonym under which he performed after leaving the employment 
of the defendants. The court accepted that the restriction was a restraint on the ability of 
the actor to work even if it operated indirectly. In the more recent Fyffes 60 case the court 
took a narrower view, doubting whether a restriction on using a trade mark was a restraint 
of trade. But the doctrine should not be too conservatively applied, although contracts 
where the name is sold as a trademark might fall outside the doctrine on other grounds, 
and although restrictions on using a name in sale of goodwill contracts will probably be 
protectable as a proprietary interest by the buyer in terms of the substantive test 61 
- Some positive obligations may also in future be held to be restrictive covenants, although there is 
little direct authority for this 62. Positive obligations have a restrictive effect in the sense 
that they often cause the exclusion of other possibilities. However, this issue will have to 
be approached with caution. Heydon 63 mentioned the example of a person who agrees to 
live in Paris and accordingly is deprived of the ability to run a butcher shop in the United 
59. Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1, See 67 -68, Chitty 1192, Apple Corps Ltd v Apple 
Computer Inc [1992] RPC 70 at 79, Cf also Lotinga's case (1913) Times Nov 13 -15, 17 and 25; Cf also 
Wolmerhausen v O'Connor [1877] 26 LT 921 where the court apparently accepted that a restraint against 
representing a previous connection with the covenantee was inside the parameters of the doctrine; Heydon McGill 
327 takes a wide view with reference to Hope J in the Australian case of McGuigan Investments Pty Ltd v Dahrood 
Vineyards Pty Ltd [1970] 1 NSWR 686. 
60 Fyffes plc v Chiquita Brands International Inc [1993] FSR 83 at 105; See Vernon v Hallam (1886) 34 ChD 748 
at 751 where the court accepted that restriction of a business name in a sale of business is not in restraint of trade; 
Cf Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 189 where the court simply stated that difficult problems 
could arise with regard to such restrictions; Cf also where a person is restricted from advertising that he as been 
connected to a certain business. Such restrictions will often be justifiable: Wolmerhausen v O'Connor (1877) 36 LT 
921 where the court accepted a restraint by a partner against advertising that he was connected to a certain 
business, Konski v Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530, GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 14; Measures Bros 
Ltd v Measures [ 1910] 2 Ch 248 where the covenantor was also restricted from allowing his name to be used in 
connection with a certain type of business. 
61 The court in Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 14 explained Vernon v Hallam (1886) 
34 ChD 748 at 751 on the basis that it was another type of contract but this issue should only come to the fore in 
determining reasonableness. 
62, See Nelson 39; Cf also the role of keep -open clauses in petrol solus agreements such as Esso. It is not clear 
whether the court regarded them as restraints. 
63 Heydon 53. 
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States 64. He accepted that such a clause will not be a restraint of trade and he argued that 
it will be important to look at the purpose of clauses. Agreements for the performance of 
services for improper remuneration may in appropriate cases be regarded as restraints of 
trade 65. In Tamarillo 66 a franchisee agreed that leases of business premises on which the 
franchise business was carried on would be transferred to the franchisor on termination of 
the franchise. The court contended that this clause was not in restraint of trade, but the 
purpose of this clause was clearly to restrain the trade of the covenantor as developed on 
the premises. This might be reasonable, but that is not an issue which should hold up the 
court at this stage. In Letinvest ó7 a lessor took a lease of a unit in a shopping centre 
subject to a clause that he would not take up a lease for certain businesses in an adjacent 
rival complex. The sheriff held that the clause was not in restraint of trade, as it did not 
oblige the covenantor not to trade in another shopping centre. But it forced him to make a 
choice, and the sheriffs approach again seems excessively formalistic. 
It may sometimes be difficult to determine whether a restriction restrains work even if it operates 
by direct negative obligation. What constitutes work activities will have to be determined from one 
case to another. Loosely, a clause that restricts activities of an individual that are performed for 
income by using skills and abilities will constitute a restriction 68. The distinction between such 
activities is clearly drawn in Nagle 69. Here the court found that the practice of the Jockey Club, a 
body that controlled racing in Britain, of refusing grants of trainer licences to women simply on 
the grounds of gender could be against public policy, inter alia, on the grounds of restraint of 
trade. However, Lord Denning MR 70 mentioned that it would not be the same where a social club 
refused membership to a person, and he emphasised that the Jockey Club could, by making rules, 
put a person out of business. 
64 Cf Monkland v Jack Barclay [1951] 2 KB 252 at 265 refused to accept that an obligation to deliver a car against 
the background of a protection scheme would be in restraint of trade; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) 
Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 374 rejected the notion that a sale of property like copyright that gave exclusive use to the 
buyer could be in restraint of trade; Dawson 458 cannot be accepted; Cf it might in future in cases like Tolhurst v 
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 be asked whether a contract is a restraint; Cf 
also Performing Rights Society Ltd v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1922 SC 165 where it was held that a society which 
obliged rights holders to transfer their rights to it so that they could be promoted and protected by the society was 
not in restraint of trade. But the court accepted that a duty to transfer future rights was in some ways restrictive 
although it did not constitute a restraint here. 
65 Cf Rowe v Walt Disney Productions [1987] FSR 36. The court did not find unconscionability. But there is no 
restraint of trade issue here even if unconscionability came into play the assignment probably can not be described 
as interference with work. 
66 Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A). 
67. Letinvest plc v The Victor Tramway Ltd 1994 SCLR 164 at 165. 
6E Cf for instance Buckley v Tutty [1970] 3 NSWR 463 especially the discussion 472 were the court held that paid 
rugby league players worked, See Heydon McGill 326. 
69. Nagle v Fei] en 1966 2 W1JR 1027. 
70. Nagle v Feilen [1966] 2 WLR 1027 at 1032. 
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Finally, it may be difficult to determine whether a clause that restricts the freedom of work of third 
parties constitutes a restriction of trade. Many clauses will impact on the freedom of work of third 
parties, but when will they be restraints of trade? It can firstly be argued that the restraint of trade 
doctrine is only concerned with the parties to a contract, but this is too formalistic to be applicable 
in this area of public policy 71. It has not been accepted in the courts. The question whether 
interference with the interests of third parties will constitute restrictions will again be one of 
degree that must be answered in the light of the principles underlying the doctrine and the purpose 
of the clause. It is fundamental that parties should have the power to indulge freely in commercial 
activity without constant concern for the freedom of work of third parties. However, direct 
interference with freedom of work will have to be contemplated in terms of the doctrine. 
- In Kores 72 two companies agreed that they would not employ each other's employees. Scope 
issues were not alluded to, and the case was decided on the basis that the non -poaching 
clause operated as a restraint between the contracting parties. But the court was also 
strongly of the view - although it finally did not decide the case on this point - that the 
restrictions which this contract placed on the employees could also cause ineffectiveness 73. 
Here the contract had a direct impact on the freedom of employees even though they were 
third parties, and the doctrine would probably have been applied even if the contract did 
not constitute a restriction inter partes 74. 
- Eastham 75 concerned the retain and transfer rules of professional football in England. A 
footballer was directly bound by contract to a club and agreed to obey certain restrictive 
rules when leaving the club for another. Wilberforce J accepted that the restrictive rules as 
between the clubs were within the ambit of the doctrine. The court could declare them 
ineffective even on insistence by a third party like a football player. There was again a 
direct connection between third party football players and the rules of the organising body. 
71. Heydon 52; BMTA y Gray 1951 SC 586 at 598 would probably not be accepted in Scots law today, See the 
criticism Heydon 52, Contra Lord Russell 602 although the judge considered similar factors in holding that the 
restraint was reasonable, Lord Keith 604 apparently thought that this issue carried some weight. The judge did not 
however properly distinguish whether third parties could plead illegality and the question whether third party 
interests would be relevant in determining illegality and he did not finally decide these issues. 
72. Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd y Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108, See Sales 608. 
73. Cf also Showell y Winkup (1889) 60 LT 389 but the effectiveness of the particular clause did not come into 
play; Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd y Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 125 -126; Mineral Water 
Bottle Exchange and Trade Protection Society y Booth (1887) 36 Ch 465 where the position of third parties was 
also stressed in determining effectiveness although the scope issue was not in question; Cf also Nisbet y Edinburgh 
and District Aerated Water Manufacturers' Defence Association Ltd (1906) 14 SLT 178 where the restrictions by 
employers inter se were emphasised. 
74. See also Sales 601 he is probably correct that mere non -solicitation would not be a restriction on other 
employees, But see 607 -608 the arguments seem to be too market -based. 
75. Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413. See Sales 605; See Greig v Insole [1978] 3 All 
ER 449 at 495 -496. 
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The rules were directly aimed at restricting the freedom of work of footballers 76. 
- In Nagle 77 the court accepted that there were good grounds for declaring illegal a practice of the 
Jockey Club that interfered with the ability to work of women trainers of horses. This is 
probably the furthest that the courts will be prepared to go (although the issue was not 
finally decided on the facts in this case). The Jockey Club was an organisation with a 
virtual monopoly over racing. It had the function of regulating it. The practice was directly 
intended to impact on the ability of work of a particular group of people. 
5. Investigation of the contractual relationships of which restrictive covenants form 
a part 
Obligations seldom exist in isolation. They form part of wider contractual relationships. The 
question whether an obligation falls within the restraint of trade doctrine will therefore have to be 
determined with due regard for such relationships. 
There will be no problems on the second level with the types of restraints that are discussed here. 
It has been argued that the restraint of trade doctrine only applies in a numerus clausus of 
restrictions, viz. post -employment, post -partnership, and sale of goodwill restraints. Most cases on 
restraint concern these standard type relationships 78. Here the restraint operates after the 
relationship between the parties has been terminated; there is nothing that can be balanced against 
the existence of a restriction of trade. 
In many of the other restraints the problems really start here. The courts have expressly refuted the 
numerus clausus approach 79 on the basis of principle and authority 80. It conflicts with the 
fundamental idea that the restraint of trade doctrine is based on public policy. There are cases 
76. Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413 at 440ff. 
77. Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 WLR 1027 especially 1041 -1042. 
78. See infra Ch 5.1; Treitel 422 initially courts were reluctant to extend the restraint of trade doctrine beyond the 
standard types of restraints; See also the reluctance Shell Co of SA Ltd v Gerrans Garage (Pty) Ltd 1954 (4) SA 752 
(G) 755 -756. 
79. Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 131, 139 -140, See Heydon 54 although he is incorrect in 
accepting that the issue was decided in Esso on the basis of authority only; Esso 295, 306, 337; Panayiotou v Sony 
Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 324 -325; Atiyah 339; Collinge 411, 415 -416; Cheshire Fifoot 
and Furmston 403; Chitty 1192; Koh 72; PVB 309; Turpin 109; Campbell 282; Trebilcock 39-40; Ackermann- 
Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 74; Schacklock Phillips -Page (Pvt) Ltd v Johnson 1978 (1) SA 321 
(RA) 324; See also the Australian case of Quadramain v Sevastapol Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 50 ALJR 475 at 
479 per Gibb J. 
ß0. There are still older cases where this approach was apparently not followed: Young v Timmins (1831) 1 Cr & J 
331, Jones v Lees (1856) 1 H & N 189, Servais Bouchard v The Prince's -Hall Restaurant Ltd (1904) 20 TLR 574 
although this case is not clear, Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 
181. 
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outside the numerus clausus where freedom of work may be severely interfered with. The doctrine 
cannot be stultified; it must be susceptible to the requirements of public policy and changes 
therein. 
"The factual situations which invite the application of the doctrine must needs 
change with prevailing economic and social conditions and it is important to bear in 
mind that those referred to later in this chapter are not exhaustive. 'The 
classification must remain fluid and the categories can never be closed' 81." 
Baker in a note 82 suggested that the doctrine be restricted to the traditional categories of 
contracts, as there is now adequate legislation to deal with monopoly issues. But this argument 
must also be rejected. The doctrine is not primarily concerned with anti -monopoly aspects. The 
author did not properly contemplate the real principles underlying the doctrine. 
Relationships where restrictive clauses should be regarded as falling within the doctrine will have 
to be distinguished from those where restrictive clauses should not have this effect. Relationships 
will be of much greater importance here. These restraints often apply contemporaneously with a 
wider production or work relationship. There might be wider public policy reasons for excluding 
certain relationships from the doctrine. Wider relationships may show that the restraint does not 
on the whole offend against the principles underlying the doctrine. The sterilisation and absorption 
test, the existing interests test, and Lord Wilberforce's test in Esso all operate on this level. 
Fundamentally difficult questions will arise but luckily these conundra need not detain us here. 
81. Esso 337 quoted Anson 319; Petrofina (GB) Ltd y Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 131; Korah JBL 252; PVB 
311; Guest 9. 
82. PVB 310. 
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1. The substantive restraint of trade question in context 
When it is established that a certain contract falls within the restraint of trade doctrine it must next 
be determined whether that contract should be condemned for being in restraint of trade t. Much 
has been said and written on restraint of trade 2 and most of it concerns this issue. But an attempt 
will be made to take stock of the state of modern restraint of trade law. 
Different methodologies are currently being used for determining the effectiveness of the classic 
restraints, i.e. post- employment, sale of goodwill, and post -partnership restraints on the one hand, 
and all other types of restraints on the other 3. The majority of cases concern these classic 
restraints 4. 
The methods for determining effectiveness will be examined, and an attempt will be made to 
establish a more layered reasonableness test in the classic cases. There are many different factors 
that can be considered in determining reasonableness, and an investigation will be made into two 
important aspects: which factors should be considered, and what weight should be attached to 
them? This objective will be combined with the general motivation of this thesis, which is to 
explain the restraint of trade doctrine in terms of certain public policy objectives. 
2. The Nordenfelt test 
The current substantive test used in England and Scotland for determining reasonableness was 
developed around the turn of the century in English law. The classic exposition of this test can be 
found in the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt 5: 
t. Rautenbach & Reinecke 561 suggested that restraints should be viewed in a positive light as contracts that protect 
goodwill or other trade interests are normal but that cannot be done at this stage. This has not yet been established. 
All that can be said is that the contract restrains trade because it has not passed the scope test. 
2. Supra Ch 1. 
3. Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 140; Davies 491; See infra Ch 6.16, 6.17; Cf the 
criticism of this Korah JBL 251 is not based on a correct view of the principles underlying the doctrine. 
4. Esso 293 where it is stated that counsel could only find about 40 cases where restraint of trade was pleaded in 
cases that were not classical, See Heydon 205; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 190; Petrofina 
(GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 139; Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 323; Atiyah 
338; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1209; SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 
783. 
5. Nordenfelt 565 although the test was not plucked from the air. See the cases mentioned in the discussion of the 
interests test infra 6.2, It was enshrined in a series of cases: Herbert Morris 689 and 707, Mason 733 and 739, 
Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571; The cases where this test was applied are too numerous to mention but it was 
again confirmed in the most recent cases: Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [ 1994] EMLR 229 at 
328, 359 and the cases referred to; For confirmation that the position in Scotland is more or less similar see: 
Christie Encyclopaedia 585, Gloag 569, McBryc[e 593 with reference to Nordenfelt and Bridge v Deacons [1984] 
AC 705 at 713; Walker 183; The post Nordenfelt cases in Scotland almost always contained references to the case 
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"It is a sufficient justification and indeed it is the only justification if the restriction 
is reasonable - reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties 
concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and 
so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is 
imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public ". 
The court based the test on reasonableness and two elements of this test were immediately 
distinguished. The restraint must be reasonable in the interest of the parties, and it must be 
(reasonable) in the interest of the public. 
2.1. The Nordenfelt test today 
It might be suggested that Lord Pearce in Esso 6 attempted to compress the doctrine into one 
broader public interest test, but this interpretation cannot be accepted': He stated that: 
"There is not, as some cases seem to suggest, a separation between what is 
reasonable on grounds of public policy and what is reasonable as between the 
parties. There is one broad question: is it in the interest of the community that this 
restraint should, as between the parties, be held to be reasonable and enforceable ?" 
But the judge merely attempted to stress that public policy underlies both requirements. He did not 
attempt to fuse them into one test. He still placed considerable emphasis on the reasonableness test 
despite some contrary dicta 8. The purport of the dictum of Lord Pearce is merely that the close 
connection between the reasonableness and the public interest test as well as the affinity between 
reasonableness and public policy in general must be closely observed 9. That the statement should 
be so interpreted is illustrated by Rhodesian Milling 10. Goldin J stated: 
"It is always necessary to determine - and the said aspects are only means and 
relevant factors of testing this - whether the restrictions exceed what is reasonably 
see e.g: Meikle v Meikle (1895) 3 SLT 204, British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 
SLT 67, Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531 -532; The Nordenfelt case was also mentioned in some early South 
African cases e.g. Empire Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 WLD 289 at 291. 
6. Esso 324. 
7. See Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 404, Treitel 420, McBryde 593, Schoombee 141, The dictum was also quoted 
without comment in Letinvest plc v The Victor Tramway Ltd 1994 SCLR 164 at 165; Heydon McGill 343 
interpreted the court in Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 1 ALR 385 as 
making this point but his interpretation cannot be accepted infra. 
8. See Esso 329 -330 see the discussion and criticism of the reasonableness approach of Lord Pearce; This is also 
how: Nelson 45, Rautenbach & Reinecke 557 understood it. 
9. Although it is not clear the same point is apparently made by Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 404 who state that it 
is a revitalisation of the approach of the Court of the Exchequer in the 19th century with reference to Mallan v May 
(1843) 11 M & W 653 at 665, Schoombee 141 also gave a more limited interpretation to this dictum. 
1o. Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 (R) 442. 
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necessary for the protection of the parties and are consistent with the interests of 
the public. As the whole doctrine of restraint of the trade is based on public policy, 
the one question is, as was said above, is it in the interests of the community that a 
restraint should, as between the parties, be held to be reasonable and enforceable ? ". 
Moreover, this view can be rejected in so far as it was accepted by the court. Heydon it suggested 
that the reasonableness and public interest elements would still have to be distinguished because 
the onus will be different with regard to the two elements. But this argument begs the question. 
There are much more important methodological reasons for maintaining the distinction. It will be 
apparent from Chapter 2 that difficult restraint questions cannot simply be answered by such a 
wide test. The two questions look at the problems here from different but separately important 
angles 12. 
Reasonableness is at the core of the English and Scots doctrines of restraint of trade, but some 
questions hang over the South African doctrine. In South Africa a test similar to that in the other 
systems was followed 13 until the Appeal Court in the 1984 decision of Magna Alloys threw the 
substantive restraint of trade law into disarray 14. The court emphasised that the doctrine was 
based on public interest 15, and many of the orthodox elements regarding restraints of trade in the 
courts were rejected 16. However, one of the biggest difficulties with the case is that Rabie CJ did 
not take a specific stand on changes to the substantive restraint of trade doctrine. 
South African law still displays a need for more specific tests to allow for the discounting of the 
broad principles of public policy 17. But what will that more specific test (or tests) be? Will the 
courts in South Africa now depart from the Nordenfelt test as developed in English law? 
In Magna Alloys the court accepted that reasonableness would play a role in determining public 
policy in restraint of trade cases 1 8. A restraint would, according to Rabie CJ, probably be against 
11 Heydon McGill 343; McBryde 593 although he referred to the difficult dictum of Lord Pearce in Esso see supra. 
12. Infra 9. 
13 Ch 2 supra. 
14 Christie 432 went as far as saying that the courts simplified the law of restraint of trade in Magna Alloys and the 
cases that preceded it. It is doubtful whether the Magna Alloys approach truly constituted simplification; 
Schoombee especially 130 and 151; Christie 433 said that some of the old learning will survive "like nuggets in a 
reef' but he is vague on this; Cf Kahn 398 merely suggested that it was not necessary to follow English law in all 
respects although he was unspecific on what the rules would be. 
is Supra 3.3. 
16 Infra Ch 11 -14. 
17. Supra 3.3. 
18. Magna Alloys 894 and 898; Cf Didcott J in Roffey y Catterall Edwards & Goudrè (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 
503 -504 was sceptical of the reasonableness issue because there is no historical justification for it. He merely 
assumed that it will still be part of South African law. This is open to doubt, See the criticism National Chemsearch 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1099, Nathan 37 and Schoombee 132 contended that Roffey- 
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the public interest if it was unreasonable. But it is problematic to determine what further factors 
will now be relevant in determining legality and it is unclear how reasonableness will relate to 
other factors that determine illegality in South Africa 19 
Schoombee 20 stated that the traditional two -tier test would now be replaced by a monolith. He 
contended that the court suggested some factors beyond reasonableness which will now be 
relevant in determining legality, and he struggled to determine what these mystery factors may be. 
But in the end he also came up with nothing new. He only mentioned factors that may be 
accommodated by the reasonableness test, and made reference to the broad public interest 
requirement which exists in all three legal systems anyway. 
Van der Merwe 21 also tried to show how the old ideas will now be replaced by the Magna Alloys 
test, but his attempts only throw up the same types of issues that will form part of the second leg 
public interest requirement in England and Scotland and in pre -Magna Alloys South Africa 22. 
It seems that courts after Magna Alloys have not fundamentally changed the Nordenfelt test in 
South Africa. Reasonableness will still be central to the doctrine in the same way as in England 
and Scotland. Public interest will still only be relevant as a second determinant of legality. The 
only consequence of the Magna Alloys case will probably be that some change of emphasis will 
take place, and that the importance of traditional public interest factors will be slightly enhanced, 
but this constitutes no real departure from the position in other legal systems under discussion Z3. 
still accepted the reasonableness test; J Louw & Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 243 where this was 
accepted but where the point was also not taken further; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 650 still shows 
that reasonableness will play an important role although the content of the test was not really relevant in this case 
infra Ch 11.3; Interest Computation Experts v Nel 1995 (1) SA 174 (T) 179; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v 
Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 442; Schoombee 130, 134; Van Der Merwe 158 attempted to place less emphasis 
on the reasonableness requirement; Woker 332, But see 331 the court "moved the emphasis from reasonableness to 
one of public policy ". 
19. Schoombee 140. 
20. Schoombee 130, 140; Cf also Woker 331 -332 she emphasised that public interest will now be the yardstick. 
However she accepted that reasonableness was not abandoned. No suggestions regarding possible changes to the 
substantive test itself was made. 
21. Van der Merwe LJ "Die funksie van die reels ten beskerming van die handelsvryheid" 1988 TSAR 252 at 266; 
See the discussion of the aspects mentioned here infra Ch 10.6. 
22. Kerr Tribute 195 did not accept this view although the issues mentioned by him cannot necessarily be dealt with 
in terms of the reasonableness requirement see infra Ch 10.6. 
23. See the latest cases infra 4. 
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3. Reasonableness inter partes and public policy 
It was established in previous chapters that public policy forms the basis of the restraint of trade 
doctrine, and it should accordingly also lie at the root of the reasonableness inter partes test. But 
this is not always clear from the authorities. In some cases this test has been emphasised to such an 
extent that the public policy basis of the restraint of trade doctrine has been overlooked or, at the 
least, terminology has been used which might create this impression 24. However, in most cases 25, 
notably again in the South African law in Magna Alloys 26, and in cases that followed it, courts 
have accepted that the reasonableness test is an expression of public policy. It has been 
acknowledged that contracts cannot generally be avoided on the basis of general reasonableness 27, 
and that restraints of trade concern a special type of reasonableness 28. Courts have accordingly 
accepted that there is a wider milieu within which reasonableness exists. But they have not really 
analysed the theoretical basis upon which the application of the reasonableness inter partes test can 
be accommodated as an expression of public policy. 
24. Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 743; Nordenfelt 561 and the discussion of the judgment of Lindley LJ, 
566; Everton v Longmore (1899) 15 TLR 356; E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 308. 309; 
Herbert Morris 708 although there are various other dicta in the case where the court clearly stated that both legs 
are stooped in public policy; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 187; Atiyah 345 -346 who assimilated the 
importance of the reasonableness requirement with the promotion of fairness in contracts as opposed to public 
interest; Hickling 35 -36 to some extent made a connection but some elements of his discussion also seem 
unacceptable; Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd y Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1112. 
25. Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 665; Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont (1869) 9 LR 354; Nordenfelt 565, 566; 
Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 451; Mills y Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 
at 589; Cf the exchange between the bench and counsel in Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 TLR 325 at 325. The court 
tried to effect a clear separation between the interests of the individual and the public. However, counsel clearly 
made the point that they might coincide; Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 437 at 438; Sir WC Leng 
& Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 766, 768, 771; See the criticism in Mason 738, 740 of Tallis v Tallis 
(1853) 1 E & B 391; McEllistrim 592; Esso 304, 318, 324 should be interpreted as supporting this point see supra 
Ch 2.1, 332, 341; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 827 and 828; Shell UK Ltd v 
Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 492; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 
229 at 328 -329; Anson 325; Collinge 410, 423; Heydon 25, 270ff although the point was not made clearly; Nelson 
45; Sales 615; Treitel 410; Heydon McGill 344; Pieterse v Cilliers 1945 (2) PH A.31 53 at 54; Allied Electric (Pty) 
Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 333; Schoombee 132 in the discussion of National Chemsearch and Roffey; 
Heydon McGill 343 criticised the court in Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd 
(1973) 1 ALR 385 for saying that the different aspects of the doctrine overlap but he placed a too wide 
interpretation on the dictum of Stephen J. The judge apparently only wanted to make this point; See supra Ch 3. 
26. See especially Magna Alloys 894, 887 -888 and the discussion of Esso although the reference to Lord Morris 
here is actually to the judgment of Lord Hodson; This was accepted Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van 
Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 500 (Stegmann J fully quoted his judgment in Thorpe Timber Co (Pty) Ltd v CJ Griffin 
(unrep) and all references to Sibex 498 -506 also refer to this case). 
27. Middleton v Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 discussed Heydon 166 -167; Esso 295, 298; Collinge 410; McBryde 
590; McCullough & Whitehead v Whiteaway & Co 1914 AD 599 at 625; Rhodesian Milling. Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super 
Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 (R) 438 and 443 although the misunderstanding between bench and bar 443 is 
probably caused by different use of the word public interest; Magna Alloys 893; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 
(A) 762; Van der Menve 152 with reference to CFC van der Walt "Die Huidige Posisie in die Suid -Afrikaanse Reg 
met betrekking tot Onbillike Bedinge" 1986 SAL1 probably at 654 -655. 
28. Herbert Morris 698; Cronin & Grime 51. 
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At first sight the notion that the reasonableness inter partes test is an expression of public policy 
seems to constitute a mixing of concepts that are theoretically incompatible 29. Public policy and 
private interest have, in classical contract law, often been contrasted. In the heyday of laissez -faire 
economics, courts could interfere with contracts on the basis of public policy but contracting 
parties were regarded as the best judges of their own interests. Private interests were not 
perceived as being subject to judicial control, but the courts still accepted that they were the 
custodians of public interest in litigation between individuals. 
However, a certain interest is not excluded from the domain of public policy merely because it can 
also be described as an interest of an individual. The only reason why all individual interests are 
not public interests is because there is, in many cases, no direct perceivable link between such 
interests and the interests of the public at large. Public policy is a generic term for a set of values 
that has particular importance for the public. Individual interests may also have such a public 
dimension 30. Here "the interests of the parties are simply a particular facet of the interest of the 
public and generally the most important facet 31" 
Some examples to support this argument can be given: 
- In Nagle 32 a woman was refused permission to register as a trainer of horses merely because she 
was female. The court found that a practice in terms whereof the Jockey Club had acted 
was discriminatory and contrary to public policy. It was the individual interests of the 
woman trainer that were in issue, but her private interests had a public policy dimension 
because her interests had been infringed in a discriminatory manner. 
- In Horwood 33 a contractual clause interfered radically with personal freedom and such 
interference was also regarded as being contrary to the interest of the public. Some dicta 
tried to show that there was more direct interference with the public interest, but it was 
also acknowledged that the interference with the interests of the individual was itself 
contrary to the interests of the public. 
29. McBryde 590 who accepted that there is something anomalous here; McBryde Thesis 135ff. Under influence of 
the utilitarians most Scots lawyers made a clear distinction between utility and public policy factors on the one hand 
and equity or justice factors on the other; Otto 210 -211 seems to think that these concepts are incompatible but he 
does not take a correct view of the principles that underlie the doctrine, LF van Huysteen and Schalk van der 
Merwe "Good Faith in Contract: Proper Behaviour amidst Changing Circumstances" (1990) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 248 do not seem to properly relate reasonableness here to public policy although their general thesis 
regarding the distinction between public policy and private interests can be supported. 
30 Van der Merwe 140 -141, 144. 
31 Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 138 see also 139. 
32. Nagle y Feilden [ 19661 2 WLR 1027. 
33 Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading Company Ltd [ 1917] 1 KB 305. 
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The same can be said of the reasonableness requirement in restraints of trade cases. Work - and 
the protection of work - is a public policy value. It has implications that go far beyond the interests 
of an individual but, ultimately, the public policy infringement most frequently manifests itself in an 
unreasonable interference with the work of an individual 34. Reasonableness here is a public policy 
factor 3s 
The reasonableness inter partes test is accordingly also utilised in an attempt to balance freedom of 
trade and sanctity of contract. The judgment of Nienaber J in Basson 36 is unacceptable in so far as 
it suggests that the principles to be balanced differ depending on whether reasonableness or public 
interest is determined. Perhaps certain aspects of freedom of work are particularly emphasised 
when it comes to reasonableness inter partes, but the principle will equally form the basis of both 
the reasonableness and public interest legs of the restraint of trade test. 
3.1. Reasonableness in restraint of trade cases and a wider concept of public policy 
unconscionability 
It may be that the rigid distinction between public and individual interests is further breaking 
down. Courts will perhaps accept that clearly unfair contracts will not be maintained. No final 
opinion is ventured on this point because it is not necessary to answer it for the purpose of the 
restraint of trade doctrine. But one important caveat will nevertheless have to be entered: it will be 
wrong to attempt to infer too much from the use of the reasonableness concept within the restraint 
of trade doctrine. 
Kerr emphasised that the court in Magna Alloys confirmed a general power to refuse to enforce a 
contract on the basis of public policy, and observed that reasonableness played an important role 
within this test 37. He suggested 38 that a public interest notion so constituted will be able to fill the 
lacuna left by the rejection of the exceptio and replicatio doli in the Bank of Lisbon case 39. 
34 Herbert Morris 699, 714, See 716; Cf contra Russel v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [1912] AC 
421 at 435 where the judge seems to have taken the view that more than the interference with the freedom of trade 
of the individual was required, See the criticism in Ch 3 supra; Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 
215 is too narrow; Cf Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762, 767, 773 and the manner in which wider 
principles were related to reasonableness. 
35 Rautenbach & Reinecke 556 -557, 560 -561. 
36 Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767, Rautenbach & Reinecke 555, but see 556 -557 ibid where this 
connection is apparently made. 
37. Kerr 477 -478, 497 -498, 500, 502, 503. 
38. Kerr 490, 497 -498, 500 -503; Kerr Tribute 194 where he concluded that the powers provided in Magna Alloys 
show that actions on contract are actions bona fidei. 
39 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa (Ltd) v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
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However, this is questionable. The authorities that he relied on do not support him. 
Reasonableness has a very particular meaning in restraint of trade cases. He took passages out of 
context 40. Reasonableness is bound to certain specific public policy factors, and the court in 
Magna Alloys did not use the concept in a wider sense. The technical rules for the determination 
of reasonableness are specific. They will break down if applied outside the doctrine. Thus a 
different form of reasonableness will have to be applied for the purpose of unconscionability. 
Magna Alloys may be helpful in that it established a general basis upon which courts can refuse to 
enforce contracts for public interest reasons 41 But the final conclusion of Kerr cannot be deduced 
directly from the case itself. 
4. The more specific aspects of the reasonableness inter partes test 
The determination of reasonableness in restraint of trade cases is technical 42. The technical rules 
and principles applicable in England and Scotland are quite similar 43. However, it is difficult to 
determine to what extent these technical rules and principles still form part of South African law 
44 
It is almost impossible to divine how the court interpreted reasonableness inter partes from the 
cursory references to its theoretical content in Magna Alloys. 
"Although the importance of the criterion of reasonableness was thus 
acknowledged it is unfortunate that the Appellate Division did not go further and 
analyse and rule upon the way in which our courts have over the years applied the 
test of reasonableness and have given it a definite content by coupling it with the 
protectable interests of the covenantee 45 
4o Kerr 478 relied on J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 243. This case confirms the first part 
of his argument namely that the court will have a broad discretion to refuse to enforce contracts which it considers 
contrary to public interest. This is the part that Kerr Tribute 198 quotes. But the cases cannot be authority for 
anything wider. The court said "It is against public interest to enforce a covenant which is unreasonable" but it is 
clear that the judge meant "covenant in restraint of trade" where he used the word covenant. 
41 Cf the more careful approach towards Magna Alloys in Van der Merwe 144, 152, 159 -160, Schalk Van der 
Merwe & Gerhard Lubbe "Bona Fides and Public Policy in Contract" (1991) 2 Stellenbosch Law Review 96 -97, 
Lubbe (1990) 13; Christie 418 did not even discuss Magna Alloys in his analysis of the interaction between fairness 
and public policy. 
42. See especially the observations of Neville J in Dottridge Brothers (Ltd) v Crook (1907) 23 UR 644 although 
many of his criticisms can however today be answered. 
43 Infra Ch 6 -9. 
44 Many of the issues discussed by Schoombee 141 under the previous head should rather fall into this category. 
45 Schoombee 138. 
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Rabie CJ only mentioned the extreme example where the restraint goes beyond any interests of the 
covenantee 46 
In its application of the doctrine, the court seems to envisage at least some change to the 
substantive Nordenfelt doctrine, even though the judgment remains obscure on exactly how far, or 
indeed where, the court intended to go. Yet an analysis of the treatment of the facts in Magna 
Alloys shows that the substantive restraint of trade doctrine is still very similar to its pre -Magna 
Alloys counterpart 47. Christie 48 stated: 
"For over a century contracts in restraint of trade have been very much a part of 
South African business life, and have so often been examined by the courts that a 
wealth of detailed rules has emerged, many of which can survive the change of the 
underlying policy of the law ". 
The cases, with the exception of Drewtons 49, in which the court in Magna Alloys found 
encouragement for its approach, also followed the traditional approach with respect to the 
substantive doctrine 50. Later cases confirmed that the more technical aspects of the English and 
Scottish substantive reasonableness tests are also still at the core of South African restraint of 
trade law 51. Courts often quote the statement in Magna Alloys to the effect that restraints will 
probably be unenforceable if they are unreasonable and then determine reasonableness by means of 
the orthodox tests 52. Recent cases confirm that vast chunks of the substantive Nordenfelt test still 
prevail. 
- The clearest expression can be found in the lucid decision of Stegmann J in Sibex 53. He stated 
that the question is: 
46 Magna Alloys 894; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 486. 
47. Magna Alloys 898, See Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 501 per 
Stegmann he also emphasised the manner in which facts were considered in Magna Alloys. 
48. Christie 433. 
49. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 309 (C) 310 although Van den Heever J alternatively looked at the 
case in terms of the traditional rules and principles. 
50 Schoombee 132; See the very clear point of Botha J in National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 
(3) SA 1092 (T) 406; Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) but see supra 2.1. 
51. BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 56; Kerr Tribute 196; Kerr 505; Christie 433; Cf 
also Harms J in Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 486ff stated that it is merely 
a question of fact but he still applied the substantive reasonableness test; Domanski 2.10 argued that the old cases on 
restraint of trade would now be "suspect" which implies considerable - and probably also substantive - departure 
from the old doctrine but he later accepted the approach of Stegmann J in the Sibex case; The views of Van der 
Merwe 158 are vague and unsatisfactory although not incompatible with this approach; Schoombee 151; Lubbe and 
Murray 258 cautiously accepted that the old interests test will still be important after Magna Alloys. 
52. Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 687 but see the criticism Ch 8.3; Coin 
Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk Ltd v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 572 with reference to Sibex; Rawlins v 
Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 540ff although it must be admitted that this was not the basis on 
which the issue was argued in front of the court. 
53 Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd If Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 493. 
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"...how anyone ... is to set out proving ... that the public policy which requires him 
to be held bound to his contract is in a particular case to be overridden on the 
ground of facts establishing that that aspect of public policy has become 
unreasonable in the particular case and that some other aspect of public policy 
identified as "reasonableness" is, in the particular circumstances to be accorded a 
higher priority ". 
He then applied the substantive doctrine along orthodox lines but with due consideration 
to changes in other areas effected by Magna Alloys 54 
- In the latest pronouncements of the Appeal Court in Basson 55, Eksteen JA submitted that there 
could be no numerus clausus of circumstances that would establish reasonableness. But 
this view cannot be accepted and it was not followed by any of the other judges. Nienaber 
JA, whose judgment is theoretically preferable, stated that 56 "the considerations that are to 
be considered in judging enforceability of a clause remains essentially the same" (my 
translation). The judge then proposed a four -pronged test which in most respects coincides 
with the general methodology in the other Iegal systems under discussion S7. 
Divergencies between the South African reasonableness test and the test in the other systems are 
subtle 58. Although they cannot be ignored, they do not really justify a clear separation between 
South African law on the one hand and English and Scots law on the other. 
54 Especially 499ff. 
55 Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762. 
56. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767, See 774; Rautenbach & Reinecke 555 where it is not expressly 
stated but where these principles are clearly followed. 
57. But see the criticism infra Ch 9.12. 
58. Christie 434 seems to take a similar view in the end; See infra Ch 9; See infra Ch 9.6. 
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1. The role of the interests of the covenantee 
Interests have, for many years, been at the heart of the determination of reasonableness inter partes 
'. The covenantee must do no more than protect his interests with the restraint. A wider approach 
has been followed in cases where a restraint operates during work relationships. The courts have 
sometimes measured the effectiveness of these restraints by asking whether they are fair 2. But this 
should not affect the test that applies to traditional restraints. These relationships have special 
features that do not apply in the traditional cases. 
- There will be a very complex interaction of the interests of the parties because they will still stand 
in a relationship of work 3. 
- These cases will seldom be decided on the basis that the covenantee has protectable proprietary 
interests. Commercial interest will mostly be the relevant factor and in the case of 
commercial interests the question whether the restraint is not unreasonable towards the 
covenantor will become more prominent 4. 
Some of the earlier South African cases simply looked at the temporal and spatial scope of the 
clause without reference to interests 5, but the interests test also became firmly entrenched in 
South Africa before Magna Alloys. And although there was initially uncertainty about the future 
of this requirement after Magna Alloys 6, recent judgments have also confirmed that it will prevail 
in South Africa 7. It has now become more or less settled that the point of departure in South 
African law will still be the protectable interests of the covenantee s. 
t. The earliest English case is Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 743; See the cases infra; Interests were 
probably first mentioned in Scotland in Bell Prin 1.40 see cases infra; Much emphasis was placed on other aspects 
but interests already played a considerable role in Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226, SA Breweries 
Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 368. 
2. A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 623; Watson v Prager [1991] 1 WLR 
726 at 747, 750; Silvertone Records Ltd v Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 at 165, 170 where fairness is mentioned; 
Zang Tumb Tuum Records Ltd v Johnson [1993] EMLR 61 at 66. 
3. See the reluctance of the court in Gaumont- British Corp Ltd v Alexander [1936] 2 KB 1686 at 1692. 
4. See Heydon McGill 340 and his discussion of Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v McKenzie [1972] VR 315 at 318. This 
case will probably be regarded as too narrow in the legal systems under discussion. 
5. SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 369, Cf the more careful view 372; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 
TPD 770 at 775. 
6. Schoombee 138 and especially 140. 
7. The treatment of evidence in Magna Alloys shows that the interest test was still fundamental see Schoombee 140. 
8. See the discussion of the latest South African cases infra; Christie 442; Van der Merwe 158 although the 
statement with regard to interests is too vague and although it is not clearly tied to the reasonableness test; Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 774 it is also mentioned that many other aspects will be relevant although many of 
the issues that he mentioned will have an important connection to the interest test; Fisher v Salon Mystique 1995 
(2) SA 136 (0) 140. 
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The broad principle implies that a restraint may only be aimed at protecting the interests of the 
covenantee. However, the courts should not be influenced too strongly by formal company law 
divisions of group companies 9. Courts should perhaps look at the practical rather than formal 
interests of the covenantee where a parent company attempts to protect its subsidiaries 10. A 
pragmatic approach must be followed where business is carried on by many subsidiaries, and the 
one subsidiary also protects the interests of others, or the interests of the parent company ". The 
court should determine interests that can be protected by looking at the scope of business and the 
way in which different elements of business are inter -connected. Company law divisions will help 
to establish the lines that the courts have to draw, but cannot be conclusive. 
A restraint will have to exist in support of an interest. Hence, in theory, only interests that will in 
time actually be protected by the restraint will be protectable. The interests test only makes sense 
if the temporal nexus between interest and restraint is maintained 12. An interest cannot be 
9 Left open in Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 433. 
10 Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 404 found it unnecessary to go into the concept of "group 
enterprise" because the business of the covenantor was to some extent handled by subsidiaries; Systems Reliability 
Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 383 although the court could have investigated the issue more deeply. 
The approach towards trade secrets of subsidiaries at 385 is more acceptable; See the comments Group 4 Total 
Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 72; Hall Advertising Ltd v Woodward 1992 GWD 29 -1686 noted that it was 
necessary that averments had to be made about the type of work that the employer did. The view of the court that 
actual facts will have to be shown is probably incorrect infra 13. 
11 Continental Tyre and Rubber (GB) Co Ltd v Heath (1913) 29 TLR 308 where the relationship between different 
companies was not properly analysed; In Great Western & Metropolitan Dairies Ltd v Gibbs (1918) 34 TLR 344 it 
was common cause that a restraint of this nature was unenforceable; Although Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v 
Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1482 -1483, 1491 is not strictly relevant it concerned the question whether a 
covenantor could be restricted from working for subsidiaries of a competitor (see Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v 
Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 453). It shows a less rigid view; Business Seating (Renovations) Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 
729 at 734 the arguments of the court are extremely cursory and not helpful although the decision is correct on the 
facts; It was not investigated in Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486 -487. 
The court merely accepted that the company could only protect its own interests; Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds 
[ 1994] FSR 52 at 55. The reasons for the decision were not discussed. It would certainly be too wide to protect 
interests of all associate companies. See the difficult problems here 55 -56; Chitty 1214 although this issue was not 
properly distinguished from the one in 15 infra; Heydon McGill 338 -339 and McGuigan Investments Pty Ltd v 
Dalwood Vineyards Pty Ltd [1970] 1 NSWR 686; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 23 Lord Ross 
took a too narrow view and the First Division appears to be sceptical of it. It decided this case on another point, See 
Forte 22 and 23; Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 72 although it is perhaps too lenient in lifting 
the veil and ignoring legal personality on the facts; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 453 is too 
strict although correct on the facts. Especially the explanation of Group 4 is too simplistic, See MacQueen 342; 
WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 220 left the question open in interim interdict proceedings; Cf Living 
Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71 it was not necessary for the judge to go into it; 
McBryde 606 was chary of such restraints but admitted that there should be circumstances where they can be 
admitted; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) the court still felt that the restraint was 
reasonable because it held that the covenantor would know information - because of his different positions - which 
justified 
protection. 
2. The restraint in Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 was inter alia probably invalid for this reason; Mulvein v 
Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531, 532 where the court protested against a restraint that restricted trading in any area 
where any business was at some stage carried on by the covenantee; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 
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protected merely because the covenantee at some stage had an interest that might have been 
protectable. Normally, in the types of cases under discussion here, that will be an interest of the 
covenantee that is contemporaneous with the period during which the restraint is effective. 
Yet contemporaneity will not necessarily be required. One possible quasi- exception to the 
principle can be mentioned with reference to artist restrictions 13. Here a performing artist is 
restricted from working in a particular area for a period before and after working for a certain 
theatre in order to enhance his value while in the service of the covenantee. Here the aim of the 
restraint is to protect an interest which does not, in time, coincide with the restraint. The interest 
will exist during the period of employment although the restraint will operate before and 
afterwards 14. But the restraint is still directly connected to the interest. 
Moreover, other aspects of the doctrine in England and Scotland will complicate this otherwise 
simple matter. The courts in these legal systems have not actually asked whether an interest exists 
contemporaneously with the restrictive period. In both these legal systems the reasonableness of a 
restraint has been determined from the point of conclusion of the restraint i5. That an interest does 
not actually exist any more when a restraint comes into effect will be ignored by the court if it was 
reasonably foreseeable at conclusion of the contract that the interest would still prevail at such 
time. 
The restraint should be valid if it provided for reasonably foreseeable expansion 16. Expansion will 
be protectable as long as it was foreseeable that such expansion would take place before the 
450 at 451 although this point was not clearly distinguished from other issues; NCH (UK) Ltd v Mair 1994 GWD 
34 -1986 where the court refused an interdict that could restrict a covenantor from dealing in products dealt in by 
the covenantee during employment but which they could have ceased dealing in. 
13 Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley (1904) 20 UR 437; Empire Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 WLD 289; African 
Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122; See infra 7.1.4.3. 
14 The position with actors in films may be more difficult. See with reference to Higgs (Inspector of Taxes) v 
Olivier [1951] Ch 899, [1952] Ch 311 by Treitel 405. 
15 Infra Ch 13. 
16 
Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 and the question asked by Tindall CJ during the trial 25; Middleton v 
Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 412 -413; It was not necessary to decide this in Bromley v Smith [1909] 2 KB 235; 
Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 367 -368, 368 -369 although the wide approach here will 
probably not be accepted today. The conclusion of Cozens -Hardy 370 seems more acceptable although his argument 
also displays some unacceptable features; Cf Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 the restraint was 
unreasonable because future competitors at which the restraint was aimed was unrelated to the trade secret 
protectable vis -à -vis the competitor, See 191 -192, 195 and 196; The argument on the provision of a customer list 
Gifford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 967 is too narrow; Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 394 
it is unclear why restraint against dealing with customers would have to be limited tq existing customers, Cf also 
395 -396 where reasonableness was determined with too much hindsight; Heydon 143, 145 -146. 
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restraint terminated 17. It will be of little significance that such expansion has not actually taken 
place. 
In South Africa the court will look at the issue from the moment when it is asked to enforce the 
restraint. Courts will therefore be nearer to the actual position between the parties. They will 
sometimes be able realistically to determine whether a protectable interest will exist during the 
period of restraint 18. However, the restraint will mostly still have to run for a period that follows 
the litigation, and this prospective element may again cause a discrepancy between the actual 
interests and the interests that the court can protect. 
Finally, the court should determine interests objectively as it is dealing with public policy. In South 
Africa reasonableness is determined from the time at which the court is asked to enforce the 
restraint, and this may mean that the interest which the parties intended to protect may be different 
from the one that exists when the restraint is enforced; but this cannot influence reasonableness. 
The court in Sibex 19 tried too hard to separate the different aspects. A restraint will still be 
acceptable if it is too wide for the protection of the interest intended but reasonable for the 
protection of another unrelated legitimate interest . 
2. Development of legitimate interests 
The covenantee may not in the widest sense, restrict someone where such a restriction exceeds 
any interest of his 20. But courts have also accepted that not all interests of the covenantee are 
protectable. Only legitimate interests can be the subject of an effective restraint of trade 21. 
17. See infra 4.3. 
18. Amalgamated Retail Ltd v Spark 1991 (2) SA 143 (SEC) 150 although this was a franchise restraint: The court 
held that it would have made a difference if the covenantee seriously intended to compete with the covenantor in 
future see Annual Survey (1991) 46ff. 
19. 
Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488 cannot be accepted on this point, 
Annual Survey (1991) 49; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edens) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 573; Cf Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 770 and explicit contractual reliance on certain interests; Malden Timber Ltd v 
McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 731 at 733 and see the problems with the subjective position here, See infra 8.1. 
20. SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413; Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292; Spence v 
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390; Great Western and Metropolitan Dairies Ltd v Gibbs (1918) 34 
UR 344; Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick [1939] 2 All ER 85; Dickson v Jones [19391 3 All ER 182 at 189 
apparently confused restraints against competition and restraints that are wider than any interest of the covenantee; 
Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 281; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227; 
Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [19651 1 QB 623; Chitty 1213 called such covenants "naked" but this phrase is 
normally differently used; Heydon 145; Lindley 10 -180 although the cases mentioned mostly fall in the categories 
mentioned below; Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 456 -457 did not properly observe the distinction; 
Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0); Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) especially 481; Cowan v Pomeroy 
1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 651 -652; See the arguments of the court in Kin v Sharneck 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) notably 536; 
Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) specifically 580; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 
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The interest test developed in the 19th century in England, but the courts initially took a wide view 
of such interests 22, and this continued into the 20th century 23. However, the courts gradually 
became more cautious 
24, 
and this culminated with Mason and Herbert Morris in the current 
notion that only legitimate interests could be protected 25. 
A wider view of interests was also initially followed in Scotland `6. However, the notion that not 
just any interest could be protected was recognised by Bell. He stated 27: "Obligations in 
(W); Magna Alloys 894 still saw such restraints as clearly unreasonable. See Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 
(D) 158; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk Ltd y Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T); Kerr 510; The importance of this 
distinction will become apparent later See the criticism of Heydon 263 infra 2: See infra Ch 9.12. 
21. Cf the distinction Heydon 261, 263 -264 it is fundamentally correct although some of the more specific elements 
are open to criticism. They will be discussed where relevant. 
22. Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 743; Whittaker IT Howe (1841) 3 Beav 383; Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 
Ad & E 438 at 454; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 560, 561; Proctor y Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 32- 
33, 34, 36; Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 at 977; Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 667; Tails v 
Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 411 but see the criticism infra Ch 8.3; Avery v Langford (1854) 1 Kay 663 at 664- 
665; Allsopp v Wheatcroft (1873) LR 15 Eq 59; Wolmerhausen AT O'Connor (1877) 36 LT 921 at 922; Rousillon v 
Rousillon (1880) 14 ChD 351 at 363 -364; Nicoll y Beere (1885) 53 LT 659 at 660; Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 
359 at especially 368, 396; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 ChD 154 at 156; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 at 587, 
589; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 451; Peris v Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch 
149 at 151 -152, 154, 156; Davies Turner & Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 655 where the court talked of 
interests although it only considered the interests of the covenantee and where the court suggested that this should 
be related to the reasonableness questions of space and duration; Rogers v Maddocks [1892] 3 Ch 346 at 355, 357; 
Woods v Thornburn (1897) 41 Sol Jo 756; Nordenfelt 549, 555, 556, 558, 559, 565, 566; Dubowski & Sons v 
Goldstein [ 1896] 1 QB 478 at 482, 483 and 484ff although the wide notions expressed at 486 certainly do not apply 
today; Stride v Martin (1897) 77 LT 600; Hood and Moore's Store Ltd v Jones (1899) 81 LT 169; Isitt and Jenks v 
Ganson (1899) 43 Sol Jo 744; Notes (1888) 14 LOR 240; Kales 136; Heydon 263 is wrong in stating that interests 
in this sense has not traditionally been relevant; Trebilcock 15 -29 takes it too far in saying that all cases were 
upheld. 
23. Lyddon v Thomas (1901) 17 UR 450; Delius AT Muller (1901) 45 Sol Jo 737; Howard v Danner (1901) 17 TLR 
548; British Mannesmann Tube Co Ltd v Phillips (1903) 48 Sol Jo 117; Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips 
(1904) 91 LT 363 at 365, 367, 368, 369, 370 although the view of the majority in the Court of Appeal would 
probably today be regarded as being too wide; Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 437 at 438; Dowden 
& Pook Ltd v Pook [1904] 1 KB 45 at 52, 53, 55; Hooper & Ashby v Willis (1905) 21 UR 691 at 692; Henry 
Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone -White [1907] 1 Ch 322 at 326, 328; Bromley v Smith [1909] 2 KB 235 at 240; 
Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [ 1909] 1 Ch 763, 766 -767, 771, 772 -773 although the court here already went 
one step further see infra, Morris & Co v Ryle (1910) 26 UR 678; Continental Tyre and Rubber (Great Britain) Co 
Ltd v Heath (1913) 29 TLR 308; Cf the criticism of the interests test by Neville J in Dottridge Brothers (Ltd) v 
Crook (1907) 23 TLR 644 and his discussion of his earlier criticism in Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone - 
White [ 1907] 1 Ch 189 at 194 -195 the more refined legitimate interests test as discussed below will be able to deal 
with issues in a more satisfactorily manner, See also Henry Leetham infra 15, See the criticism of Neville 1 in 
Goldsoll v Goldman [1914] 2 Ch 603 discussed in Jur Rev (1915) 14. 
24. 
It started to develop in cases like Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [ 1909] 1 Ch 763 at 768 -769, 773 -774 and 
Pearks (Ltd) v Cullen (1912) 28 TLR 371 at 372. 
25. 
Herbert Morris and Mason see the references in the ensuing sections; The new development was clearly 
confirmed in: Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490 -491 and Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 542, See 
Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 480 and the approach towards old authorities. 
26. 
Meikle v Meikle (1895) 3 SLT 204; Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1163 per the Lord Justice -Clerk 
although the emphasis was placed on other issues, This aspect was stressed by Lord Trayner 1169 -1170, 1172; 
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restriction of the exercise of trade to particular districts, and for the protection by reasonable 
restraint of a fair interest, are good" (my italics). The courts in Scotland, albeit in a less refined 
form, also have some pre -Mason authority for the notion that only more narrow interests should 
be protected 28. The legitimate interests notion as expressed in Mason was therefore also 
unambiguously accepted in Scotland 29. Some interests have been regarded as legitimate, while 
protection of some other interests has not been allowed. 
Woolman 30 argued that the Scottish courts do not look properly at legitimate interests, and some 
of the cases on which he relies provide some authority for this point. However, his analysis is too 
narrow. The importance of such interests in this system has only been clouded by the procedural 
aspects 31 
In South Africa the doctrine only became firmly established in the early 20th century. The 
legitimate interests test quickly became a feature of the doctrine 32, although there are some earlier 
cases where a wide approach towards interests was followed 33 
3. Legitimate interests in post -employment covenants 
In England and Scotland courts have accepted that trade connections and trade secrets may be 
protected 34. The same legitimate interests still play an important role in South Africa. Magna 
Alloys did not settle this point but a plethora of authorities has again entrenched the principle that 
these legitimate interests are pivotal to the reasonableness question: 
Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1110 -111, 1112, 1113 and 1115; Dumbarton 
Steamship Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 at 996, 997; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 533, 534; Gloag 
571 who accepted that a wider approach to interests was initially followed. 
27. Bell Prin 1.40. 
28 Berlitz School of Languages Ltd v Duchene (1903) 6F 181 at 186 where the view of the court of narrower 
interests can be criticised but where a clearly narrow view was taken of interests, Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co 
Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1113 -1114 and some typical Mason type of arguments can already be found in 
British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68. 
29. Minimax Ltd v Geddes (1914) 31 ShCt Rep 36 at 39; Remington Typewriter Company v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168; 
Taylor v Campbell 1926 SLT 260 at 261; Kennedy v Clark (1917) 33 ShCt Rep 136 at 139, 140; Gloag 571 thought 
that Scots law would so develop. 
30 Woolman 253ff and especially 258. 
31 
Infra Ch 15.2.2, Ch 11.5.1. 
32. 
Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 312. 
33 
African Theatres Trust Ltd v Johnson 1921 CPD 25. 
34. 
Atiyah 342 described both as nebulous concepts but some flesh can be placed on the skeletal notions; The third 
interest relating to working for competitors that Selwyn 385 mooted cannot be accepted. 
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- This was the view taken in two of the cases on which Rabie CJ in Magna Alloys relied for 
changing the law in South Africa 35. 
- It is still the accepted position in most of the cases that follow vlagna Alloys 36 
4. Trade and customer connections 
Not only customer but also wider trade connections 38 may be protected by restraints of trade. The 
emphasis here will however be on customer connections because most cases deal with such 
interests. Only cursory remarks will be made about wider connections. 
Customer connections consist of two elements: 
- They are covenantee -related. It will have to be shown that there is a connection between 
customer and the employer's business that can be protected Such connections will only 
be protectable if customers belong to the covenantee, with some exclusivity and continuity 
in the relationship. 
35. On the two important cases of National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) and 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N), See Schoombee 132, See supra Ch 2.3.1, 
Oosthuizen 383 also still stresses these aspects in the discussion of the cases mentioned here. 
36. Both were again endorsed in the latest Appeal Court case in South Africa Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 
(A) 770; See the cases infra these interests are still utilised as the cornerstone of reasonableness, But Cf 763 where 
the question was left open for cases of inequality of bargaining, See infra 4.5. 
37 For early expressions: Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 560, Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 34, 
36, Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 at 726 although it will not be applied in a similar manner today; Middleton 
v Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 413, Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940 at 944- 
945. 
38. Herbert Morris 709, 710, 711; Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 652; SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 
WLR 629 at 638, 639, 640; Francis Delzenne Ltd v Klee (1968) 112 Sol Jo 583; Marion White Ltd v Francis 
[1972] 3 All ER 857 at 862; Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 44; Spencer v Marchington [1988] 
IRLR 392 at 395; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; Atiyah 342; Davies 
492; Gooderson 415; Heydon 108; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 409; Chitty 1206 used the phrases "trade 
connection" and "connections with customers as if they are synonyms "; Gurry 210; Taylor v Campbell 1926 SLT 
260; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 150, 152 -153, 157; Kilgour v McNicol 
1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 9; Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 at 35; Rentokil Ltd v Hampton 1982 SLT 422 at 422, 
423; Agina Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248; Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 
at 90; Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116; Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355, Scott Robinson 
161; Walker 188; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 775; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307; 
Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 at 152; Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 42; Aling and 
Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 
353; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 74, 75; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) 
SA 64 (C) 67; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 785; U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd 
v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 144; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd IT Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 307, 314; 
BHT Water Treatment (Ply) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 56; Basson v Chiiwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A); The 
Concept Factory v Heyl 1994 (2) SA 105 (T) 114; Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 
(0) 511; Christie 444 but see the criticism infra 4.4; Rautenbach & Reinecke 555. 
9. 
Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 10 where the court was also prepared to some extent to protect 
recommendations but see the discussion of the protection of goodwill in these cases infra 11. 
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- They are also covenantor -related. Customer connections will only exist relative to a particular 
employee. 
Especially covenantee related requirements must not be too strictly applied. Employers need 
protection of fragile customers. It is in such cases that protection will be significant, and a limited 
view of connections should not be taken 40. 
4.1. The first covenantee- related issue: customers must belong to the employer 
The courts will refuse to protect customer connections that were only created and maintained by 
the aptitude and skill of the employee 41, and they have often referred to the contribution of the 
covenantee 42. But customer connections may still be protected even though the restraint interferes 
with the use by the employee of his personal skills and aptitude 43. The covenantee can protect 
customer connections even if the covenantor has contributed substantially towards their 
establishment. The important reason for this was given in Eastes 44, where the court asked: 
"Would it not now be a great hardship upon the plaintiff if the defendant were to be permitted to 
take away the benefit of the connection which he has been paid to assist in building up ?" 
Connections will only fall foul of this principle where the covenantor brought in former customers 
of his and continued serving them exclusively without much support by the employer The 
contribution of the employer in providing support may, even in cases where customers were 
40. John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334 and 335 on the granting of interdict but see the 
criticism of the case infra 4.3. Treitel 406; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401. 
41 Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 652 -653 although other aspects were more important; Cf Oswald 
Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] 1 AC 720 where the parties excluded customers that were brought in 
by the covenantor from the workings of the clause; Heydon 111 the narrow approach discussed there with reference 
to American cases will probably not be followed in the jurisdictions under discussion here (The reference to Croft v 
Hawe (1836) Donnely 82 is dubious. At the most favourable the case very vaguely supports this contention but it 
was decided on a different basis see the discussion infra Ch 9.6); Marshall v NM Financial [1995] 1 WLR 1461; 
Heydon McGill 336; See also the comparison of Trebilcock 95ff; Cf some elements of this Ballachulish Slate 
Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1115 although the court here was dealing with issues of consideration; 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 75 although not properly investigated. 
42. 
GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 538, 542; Cf Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 272, 
273 although the court also emphasised that some customers existed before the covenantor became employed; 
Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 69; Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 
542ff with reference to Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 69 although the Appeal Court 
incorrectly placed some emphasis on the improvement of personal skill by training; The duration of the 
employment may play an important role here: Cansa supra and M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 
820. Although it might be difficult to determine what the duration of the employment would be. In both these cases 
the employment had already run for some time when the restraint was concluded; Cf however Luck v Davenport- 
Smith [1977] EG 73 though the case is confusing. 
43 Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399_ (C) 406. 
44 Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 487; Cf Blake 654 relies on the agency principle. This may be too narrow. 
45 M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 especially at 818 and 820 per Morris LT although he did not 
give a final opinion, 821 per Denning LJ, Discussed Gurry 215 -216; Heydon 120. 
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brought in by the employee, be sufficient to ensure that a person also becomes his customer 
connection 
46 
In Biografic 47 the court argued that a company which made advertising films did not establish 
customer connections with the advertising agencies that provided it with work 48. Almost every 
production of a film went out on tender to advertising agencies and all producers could bid for the 
work. There was an added dimension in this case. The abilities of the individual in control of the 
business would also play a role in the decision of the advertising agency. But the court rejected the 
notion that this established a customer connection with the business. Davies J held that the 
personality of the director determined this relationship, and he therefore decided that it could not 
be a connection of the business. Yet such a reputation is established with the support of the 
business for which the employee worked. A relationship such as this could not be excluded from 
protection on the basis suggested by the judge. 
In Humphrys 49 a business was acquired by the respondents (L). The appellant (H) had been 
employed in the business and was its mainstay. When the respondent acquired the business a new 
employment contract was entered into by the appellant. This new contract contained a restraint. 
The court decided that the respondent had no trade connections or established customers to 
protect. The customers were brought into the business by the appellant, and the restraint was 
therefore declared illegal. But courts have generally been more lenient towards employers. The 
appellant had merely been an employee, albeit an important one. The connections that an employee 
gains should, except in extraordinary cases, be regarded as the connections of the employer. In this 
case such interests should have been protectable against the appellant. 
The business was sold to the respondents, and this probably played an important role in persuading 
the court to condemn the restraint. But that issue should have been irrelevant for the purpose of 
the contract with the covenantor, who was only an employee. The covenantee had, with the 
goodwill, also bought customer and trade connections even though these were built up by the 
appellant. It should then still be possible to restrict the appellant from stealing those customers 
because of the connections that he had built up with them during employment It should not 
46 
Blake 664 although he showed that the principle has also been extended in some US jurisdictions; Hines 614ff 
on the basis of Louisiana cases will probably also be regarded as too wide for the purpose of the legal systems under 
discussion. 
47. 
Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 345. 
48. 
See infra Ch 7.2.3 on whether it was at all important to go into this question. 
49 
Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 402ff. 
50 
The same criticism would apply in so far as the court accepted that there were trade secrets here although such 
secrets actually belonged to the covenantor see Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 
402 -403. 
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influence the ability of the buyer to protect customers bought if no "customer goodwill" was 
created after renewal of the contract. 
4.2. The second covenantee- related requirement: exclusivity and recurrence 
Some exclusivity of relationship will have to exist 51, but it will not have to be total: 
- In Rawlins 52 the court accepted that a connection could also exist where a customer historically 
traded with a certain number of businesses. The court accepted that this even enhanced the 
need for protection. 
- Some customer connections may exist even in cases where work is done on a first come first 
served basis. It may perhaps also constitute a customer connection if the business has 
contacts which allow it to be informed of work before any other business The mere fact 
that an employee of a business that does on -line leak sealing lives near a business that 
utilises such services on a first come first served basis does not create a customer 
connection 54 
- In Kemp 55 the court argued that mandates to an estate agent were proprietary interests even if 
such mandates were not exclusive. There might be some room for also protecting 
mandates where they are only given to a few agents and where it depends on the particular 
identity of the business. 
It has been stated that persons dealing with a business will have to conclude recurring transactions 
before they will constitute customer connections 56. However, recurrence again cannot be an 
absolute requirement. The significance of recurrence should probably depend on the circumstances 
of the case. A customer connection will, in certain cases, also be established where only a singular 
51 
Douglas Llambias Associates Ltd v Napier 1990 GWD 39 -2243 although this issue did not come to the fore in 
other recruitment agency cases in Scotland; Snap -on -tools Ltd v McCluskey 1991 GWD 7 -367 loyalty and 
exclusivity had to be averred; Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 513. 
52. Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 544. 
53 
Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 510 although the court found that it was 
not clear on the facts whether there were such advantages. 
54 
Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488 is too careful. 
55 
Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 687, HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v 
Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 4 but see the criticism infra 4.5; Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 652 where the 
court took a more strict view of exclusivity although it was criticised infra. 
56 Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 652; Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 48 TLR 613; Scorer v 
Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1423, 1426, Scorer was distinguished on this basis from Bowler although 
Danckwerts LJ 1425 criticised it on somewhat wider grounds; For examples see Heydon 110-111; In the influential 
exegesis by counsel in Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 731 "old established customers" are 
mentioned. This is perhaps too narrow, See similarly Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [ 1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12; 
The court in CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Lt4 v McKeag 1987 GWD 1 -2; Cf also HE Sergay Estate Agencies 
(Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 3; Christie 444; See the film and theatre cases supra 1 and infra Ch 7.1.4.1. 
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transaction forms the basis of the relationship between the parties. The question will be a matter of 
degree to be determined on each set of facts 57. The relationship will probably be protectable 
where the single transaction is fundamentally important and valuable and where the relationship 
will last for a considerable time 58. Thus relationships based on one transaction may also 
sometimes be protected, although it will be important to limit protection to the duration of the 
single transaction 
59 
4.3. Time at which customer will have to be tied to the business for the purpose of the 
covenantee -related requirements 
Customer connection can only be protected during a particular period if the customers would have 
remained with the employer during the period of restraint but for the fact that the employee had 
left the service of the covenantee 60. But this principle has not been followed through absolutely 61 
The courts in England and Scotland have been more sensitive to the interests of employers. That a 
person who was a customer, has ceased patronising the employer, does not in these systems 
necessarily exclude protection 62: 
- Reasonableness must be temporally determined from conclusion and if it was foreseeable at 
conclusion that customers would still exist during the enforcement period, then the 
connections may be protected 63 
- Not only existing customer connections, but for pragmatic reasons, the spes that customers will 
return will probably also be regarded as protectable. In GW Plowman 64 the court stated 
57. Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 504 -505 although the argument of 
counsel places too much emphasis on knowledge as opposed to connection see the criticism infra 4.5. 
58. Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 687 accepted that a 3 month average 
relationship between a client who sells his home and an estate agent was sufficient although this case was probably 
on the border. 
59 Recurrence would still be central in a case like Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 where protection 
for a longer period was sought, Cf Lawrence LJ in Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 654. 
60 Especially John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334 and 335 on the granting of interdict 
but see the criticism of the case infra Ch 15.2.2.1, PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 282 at 283 
where the court was also prepared to grant and interdict although it would probably just be an issue of principle, 
See Treitel 406; Cf Rogers v Drury (1887) 57 LJCh 504 where the argument that patients would not go to the buyer 
of a business was rejected. 
61 
Heydon 155 with reference to Coote v Sproule (1929) 29 SRNSW 578 580 (NSWSC) and the analogous 
argument 
that should theoretically apply in non -solicitation cases. 
. The point was already made in Nicholls v Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42 at 45. 
63 
See infra Ch 13; Cf Macintyre v MacRaild (1866) 4 M 571 the restraint of trade doctrine was not discussed. 
However, the fact that the employer could not receive the appointment anyway would probably not be conclusive on 
the grounds discussed here; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 222 although the court did not consider 
foreseeability. 
64 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13, See Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds [1994] FSR 52 
at 57; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1232, 1234 and 1235; Heydon 153, 155; 
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that customers who are customers at termination can still be protected as the hope that 
they will return cannot be abandoned. In Rentokil y Kramer 65 Lord Davidson stated with 
reference to GW Plowman that "proprietary interest is wide enough to cover persons who 
are no longer their customers but were customers at the beginning of the 2 years [that is 
when the restraint started to bite] ". 
Restraints of trade are often aimed at protecting customer connections most vulnerable to 
interference by the covenantor 66 
The South African courts have apparently followed a stricter view 67. However, it is suggested 
that the pragmatism of English law should be heeded on this point. The first reason for taking a 
wide approach to these cases does not always apply in South Africa, but the second ground for the 
Anglo- Scottish approach should be sufficient. 
However, the pragmatic exception must not be taken too far. A court will probably not protect 
connections with customers where it was foreseeable at conclusion - or in South Africa at the time 
at which the court is asked to enforce the restraint - that such customers would not return before 
the end of the restraint 68. 
In Home Counties 69 the restraint was limited to customers who had been such during the last six 
months of employment. It was submitted for the covenantor that only customers who had 
patronised the business during the last month should be protectable. His counsel suggested that 
customers who left before this time would not revert back to the covenantee. However, the court 
rejected this argument on the basis of the pragmatic exception proposed in GW Plowman 70. The 
covenantee would still have a hope that customers who had left during the last six months would 
return. But this case is quite extreme; the business here was the selling of milk by a roundsman. 
The court should not follow the GW Plowman principle slavishly in future. 
Heydon ,McGill 346 the author limited these arguments to non -dealing restraints but they will be of wider 
application although they will practically be most important in this context. 
65. 
Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116; McBryde 597 
66 
Supra 4. 
67. Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 862; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van 
Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503. 
. Cf A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 419 for a similar argument in the context of implied 
protection in goodwill cases. 
. Home Counties Dairies Ltd Skilton 1970 1 All ER 1227 
70. Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton 19701 1 All ER 1227 1232, 1234, 1235 
83 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
Courts must moreover be careful in laying down cut -off points. Harman LJ in GW Plowman 71 
stressed that "if a man was a customer at the beginning of the employment I do not see why hope 
should be abandoned of his becoming a customer again at the end of it ". It is unclear why 
emphasis was here placed on termination. This might imply that there is no reason why further 
justification will be needed if customers leave the employer after termination of the employment. 
But such a conclusion would be unacceptable. In England, no restraint will be maintainable if it is 
foreseeable that a customer will not remain a customer of the employer for the whole of the 
duration of the restraint even if the relationship with that customer will only cease after 
termination of employment. The pragmatic exception must also protect the employer in cases 
where the customer leaves after employment of the covenantor has terminated, but before the 
restraint has run out. 
4.4. The covenantor -related requirement: the relative aspect of a customer connection 
The law does not allow protection of every customer of the employer 72. In a broad sense the 
covenantee can protect his customers but in reality protection is much more limited. Mere 
knowledge that the covenantor is an employee of a business of which a particular person is a 
customer will not suffice 73. It is a prerequisite for a customer connection that there must be 
contact between customer and employee 74. The rejection of the contact requirement in GW 
Plowman 75 cannot be accepted. 
But this requirement is not sufficient 76. A special type of contact is required. Cheshire Fifoot and 
Furmston 77 state that customer connections will only be protectable where: 
71. 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13; Heydon 153; Heydon McGill 346. 
72. British Workmen's and General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68 already stressed this; Cf 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1375 clause limited to "customers visited ". 
73. 
National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1110 placed too much emphasis on this; 
See infra 4.5. 
74. Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 652 although the clause failed on other grounds; Gilford Motor Co Ltd 
v Home [1933] Ch 935 at 966; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402 although it was combined 
with "influence "; Smith & Wood 139, 140 the closer the contact the easier it would be to justify the restraint; 
Selwyn 386; Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 at 153; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 61; See also David 
Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 438, Kerr 511 where dealings were emphasised; See Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 764. 
75. 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 12. The reliance on Gilford is too wide the latter case 
concerned the protection of customer information. 
76. Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538, Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 188 but see also it was 
further narrowed down infra, See also the qualification in Dickson; Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 
857 at 862 -863; Methven Simpson Ltd v Jones (1910) 2 SLT 14 at 15; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v 
McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 154; Walker 188. 
77. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 408; See also criticism Heydon 109; Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 
272; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 444 -445; Christie 444. 
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"the nature of employment is such that customers will either learn to rely upon the 
skill or the judgement of the servant or will deal with him directly and personally to 
the virtual exclusion of the master with the result that he will probably gain their 
custom if he sets up business on his own account ". 
This statement again leans too strongly to the other side. The truth lies somewhere between these 
two views. Sufficient connection 78, intimacy 79, acquaintance 80, influence 81 and personal or 
business relations 82 will be required. Customer connections will only exist where the employee has 
influence over customers because of the employment which makes it possible to plunder them 
from his employer 83. It will accordingly not be sufficient to show that customers will leave when 
the employee leaves; the covenantor must gain such influence that he will be able to take them 
78. Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 568- 
569, 572 where mere connection was not regarded as sufficient. But see the criticism infra 4.5; Paragon Business 
Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 444 -445. 
79. Dewes v Fitch [1920] 2 Ch 159 164, 165; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 149. 
80. It was already stressed before Mason: Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 34, Lewis and Lewis v 
Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 64; Herbert Morris 702, 710; Dewes v Fitch [1920] 2 Ch 159 at 165; Bowler v Lovegrove 
[1921] 1 Ch 642 at 651; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 188; Chitty 1206; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 
at 532 although it was not clearly distinguished from the protection of knowledge; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 
791 (D); Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 408; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 
348 -349; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 314 although the other aspects included and the rubric 
of trade connections are too wide, See 307 where the court correctly explained why the restraint in this case could 
also be extended to the family of customers; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 
258 but see further infra 4.5; It is sometimes mentioned that the covenantor would get to know customers: Gifford 
Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 964, Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 188, Financial Collection 
Agencies (UK) Ltd v Batey (1973) 117 Sol Jo 416. Some of the statements may however be differently interpreted 
see infra 4.5; Cf SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37 was distinguished from SW Strange. 
81. Herbert Morris 702, 709; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1426; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v 
Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1228 although it was not clearly related to protectable interests; Stenhouse 
Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 542; Lansing 
Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425; Anson 322; Collinge 420; Treitel 404; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 348 -349; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 
(SEC) 258; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 444 -445. 
82. Herbert Morris 702; Dewes v Fitch [1920] 2 Ch 159 at 170; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker 
[1988] IRLR 483 at 486; Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395; GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 
535; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 65 good relationships with customers were stressed on the 
facts although it was not properly central to the case; Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 272; Magna 
Alloys 905; Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 159 close relationships were stressed by counsel although this 
was not really addressed by the court; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503; 
Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 785; Fisher v Salon Mystique 1995 (2) SA 136 (0) 
141 where relationships with customers were perceived as a ground for protection although Van Coller J accepted 
that it could not be relied on here. 
83. 
Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 543; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 188; SW Strange Ltd 
v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 640 -641; Heydon 108 -109 called this the customer contact doctrine, Cf Blake 658; 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 408; Collinge 420; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 153; Rawlins If Caravantruck 
(Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 541; The Concept Factory v Hey! 1994 (2) 105 (T) 114. 
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with him 84. The true object of protection in these cases now emerges. The courts allow a 
restraint: 
"... against the unfair invasion of his [the covenantee's] connexions by a servant 
who has had the special opportunities of becoming acquainted with his clientele, 
and if the protection is no more than adequate for this purpose it is permitted by the 
law 85 
Blake mentioned three factors which the court should look at when these issues are to be 
determined 86. 
- The frequency of the employee's contacts with customers and whether he is the only person who 
is in contact with customers. 
- Locale of contact. 
- Nature of functions performed by the covenantor. 
In England and Scotland the covenantee may only protect the customers with whom the 
covenantor will foreseeably form such connections. In South Africa mostly only customers with 
whom the covenantor formed connections will constitute protectable interests. Finally, courts 
conceivably will go beyond the influence over actual customers. It will probably be sufficient if an 
employee only dealt with the customer at the canvassing stage, if some influence was already 
obtained over those potential customers 87. Customers are sometimes won by an elaborate process 
of canvassing that requires investment of time and money. In such cases potential customers will 
be a very vulnerable potential asset of the covenantee. These customers may well be protected 
where a reasonably strong relationship has already been established between the covenantor and 
the prospective client, as such connections will be very valuable. 
84. Cf Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 at 35 although the court here only discussed the issue in determining 
whether interim interdict should be granted and although many of the factors considered could not be allowed in 
terms of the doctrine. The court still felt that there was some possibility that customers could be enticed away. 
85. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 408 with reference to Dewes v Fitch [1920] 2 Ch 159 at 181 -182. 
86. 
Blake 658ff; Heydon 109ff; Cf also the different aspects mentioned Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) 
SA 537 (A) 541; Fisher v Salon Mystique 1995 (2) SA 136 (0) 141 -142. 
87. 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 3 All ER 288 at 292 where it was not finally decided; Spencer v 
Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 396 was sceptical of this although the judge implies that some protection will be 
possible. These factors can perhaps play a broader role than the one that was proposed in this case; Reed Stenhouse 
(UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354 at 356 shows that there must at least be some clear and strong link between 
potential customers and business. Although the interpretation of Lord Grieve of the contract here was probably too 
narrow; In Aramark plc v Sommerville 1995 GWD 8 -408 the court did not allow the protection of prospective 
customers at termination of employment because the covenantor would not necessarily have knowledge of such 
customers. The issue must however be approached with caution because the court did not deal with the customer 
connection issue here; McBryde 597; National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1109 
where too wide a statement was probably made; Although the court was probably correct on the facts the blanket 
statement in Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd v S nderson- Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 859 is too wide; Sibex 
Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503 although it is also cautious. 
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4.5. Knowledge of the names or requirements of customers 
The employee's knowledge of customers' personal affairs or requirements has been stressed as a 
customer connection issue in many cases 88. But this practice cannot be accepted, though it is 
apparently supported by illustrious authority. The notion that this type of knowledge can be 
protected was in many cases juxtaposed with acquaintance as the basis upon which customers 
could be protected. The courts apparently believed that connections will also be open to abuse 
where such knowledge of customers has been acquired. Yet knowledge probably cannot be 
protected under this rubric if no relationship has been created. This knowledge can help to show 
that a protectable relationship of influence has developed between customer and employee 89. It 
might show that influence over a customer has been gained, and that the customer might follow 
the employee when he leaves the employment of the covenantee. Yet the knowledge itself should 
not be protectable under this rubric. The jump cannot be made directly from knowledge to 
influence, and the cases should not be accepted in so far as they indicate that the relational aspect 
can be side -stepped. 
88. 
Mason 743; Eastes y Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490; Herbert Morris 709; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 165 
distinguished the protection of intimacies and knowledge and both were seemingly related to customer connections, 
See Routh y Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 at 760 -761, Cf Grigson y Kinsman 1921 NLR 172 at 175 where the court 
stated that "employers secrets" were protected in Fitch; Spence y Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 UR 390 
at 394 -395 the judge started talking of "use of confidential information for ... attracting the custom of old 
customers" but then went on to refer to "special knowledge ", 395; Putsman y Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 641 -643 
where the protection of information was not expressly related to customer connections but the court talked of 
knowledge that would undermine goodwill; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 181, Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All 
ER 758 at 760 -761; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1426; T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [1974] 1 
Ch 129 at 135; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] 
ICR 123 at 134; Blake is also not consistently clear on this matter see 655, 670 -671; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 
408; Gurry 215; Heydon 113; Smith & Wood 139; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 775 -776; Estate 
Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 314 approved Herbert Morris but see the discussion infra 5.7; 
Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 152 -153; Holmes y Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 see the argument 
of counsel and the court at 42; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 150; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 792 
and 793 -794; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd y Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 3 -4; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & 
Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 500. The court accepted that the information was confidential and 
inaccessible but some aspects create the impression that its protection was discussed under this rubric; Tension 
Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd y Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 349, 353; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd y Mohammed 
1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 687 where knowledge 
about mandates was not really distinguished from the mandates themselves; Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 
1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 784 -785 with reference to Joubert General Principles of Contract Law 784. 
89. For authorities that ascribed a more exact meaning to knowledge: SW Strange Ltd y Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 
640 -641 on knowledge and confidential employment, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 408, Walker 188, Rawlins y 
Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 541; Cf infra 5.7. 
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That the employee had knowledge of customers' names and addresses should therefore be of no 
value here. The cases that have stressed this aspect 90 cannot be accepted. Such knowledge should 
only be protectable if it constitutes a trade secret 91 
Heydon 92 stated that information about customers is sometimes called trade secrets because 
courts will be more likely to protect trade secrets. However, this is untenable. The trade secret 
requirements are better suited to being a yardstick for the protection of information, and it is 
highly doubtful whether it will be easier to achieve protection under the trade secret rubric if the 
trade secret requirements are properly applied. The customer connection basis for the protection 
of influence over customers may to some extent have developed from the protection of knowledge 
93 but it now stands on its own feet. 
It will create a paradox if information itself is regarded as protectable here An example may be 
mentioned. (A) and (B) are exclusive customers of (X) Co. Their needs are generally known in the 
industry but they are still truly customers of (X). (Y), an employee of (X), does not deal with these 
customers, but he too knows this information about their needs. Can these customers be protected 
against (Y)? Is this information protectable under the customer connection rubric? It is difficult to 
see why information that is generally accessible should be protectable here. This type of 
information cannot be protected as such while other types of information have to meet the rigid 
requirements set for trade secrets 95. 
Sibex 96, and the contentions put forward by counsel, vividly illustrate the problems that may arise 
if a proper niche is not provided for knowledge about customers. Counsel mentioned the problem 
of a field of business where customers are shared and their needs generally known. He stated that 
knowledge of the identity of customers, which he called "confidential information amounting to a 
form of property called trade connection ", will not exist in such a case, and he submitted that the 
90 
Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 641 -642; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 314 
although it is not clear from the case whether the court allowed the protection of customer information as trade 
secrets, See infra 5.7; Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 see the argument of counsel and the court 
at 42; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 3 -4; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) 
SA 305 (C) 314, Christie 444, See the more acceptable judgment of Watermeyer ]P. 
91. 
Cf Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 572. This basis for protection was rejected 
on the facts as the information was generally known. But it is difficult to see how this information can contribute to 
creating customer connections even where it is not general. Cf also the confusion in the restraint clause in this case 










Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503 -505, Cf 487 Harms 1 saw customer 
lists as a trade secret this is more acceptable. 
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knowledge of customers' identity will merely constitute personal skill here The argument is 
correct in so far as it concludes that such knowledge is not protectable. But categorisation of the 
protection of knowledge under the customer connection rubric is problematic. The argument 
shows that knowledge has its own prerequisites before it can be protected; it has to meet the 
requirements of a trade secret. The determination of knowledge -related questions under the trade 
connection rubric merely draws attention away from the more important matter of connection. 
The answer of Stegmann J 98 to the conundrum posed by counsel is only acceptable because he 
emphasised connection rather than knowledge (although it would have been even clearer if the 
judge had further distanced himself from these arguments). He mentioned that it will still be 
important to determine whether there is a special relationship - though not an exclusive one - with 
the customer, i.e. a relationship that will be valuable to a competitor. But the judge was also 
influenced by the awkward fusion of concepts made by counsel. He concluded that it may become 
difficult to distinguish trade secrets and customer connections 99 in a case where a special 
relationship is built up with a customer but it is not exclusive. However, the distinction is clear - 
cut. Connection can establish protection in such a case, although knowledge will probably not, 
because the latter will not comply with the requirements for a trade secret. 
4.6. Confidential employment 
The term "confidential employment" has mostly been used to describe the relationship between 
employee and employer too Here confidential employment means employment relationships where 
some confidentiality exists between employer and employee. In such cases the concept of 
confidential employment will not really add anything to determining the reasonableness of 
restraints. It can only cause confusion in determining whether trade secrets or protectable trade 
connections exist. It must therefore be welcomed that its use has ceased in more recent restraint of 
trade cases. 
97. The argument is probably taken from Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 652 at 651 -653, 654 but it is 
subject to the same criticisms. 
98. Sibex 505. 
99 
Sibex 505 whereupon the judge then declined to draw a distinction between these concepts. 
ioó 
Mumford v Gething (1859) 7 CBNS 305 at 319; Lewis and Lewis v Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 64; British 
Mannesmann Tube Co Ltd v Phillips (1903) 48 Sol Jo 117; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd y Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 
768; Pearks (Ltd) v Cullen (1912) 28 UR 371; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 392; 
Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 641 -642 where the court accepted that all contracts are confidential but 
where it was stressed that the employment here was particularly confidential, Cf Vincents of Reading v Fogden 
(1932) 48 TLR 613; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 188; Chitty 1207; Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 
1936 CPD 35 at 42; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 314 contains elements of both this and the 
next point but the former dominates. 
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Some, albeit fewer, authorities have mentioned confidential or fiduciary relationships with 
customers 101. This type of confidentiality will exist where employees enter relationships with 
customers that require discretion and secrecy, and will be important in determining whether 
customer connections exist. The court will provide emphatic protection where relationships 
between customers and employees are confidential 102 
4.7. Wider trade connections 
Other trade connections are connections that a business has with organisations that allow it to 
have a competitive edge, and which are important assets of the business, for instance a connection 
with a particular supplier who gives special and, to some extent, exclusive privileges to the 
business. These connections have not really been properly analysed by the courts 103 The latter 
form of trade connection has only started to develop as a protectable interest in recent times. 
However, the rules regarding customer connections will probably be extended by analogy to these 
cases. Some exclusivity and continuity will again be required. In Ropeways Ltd too the court noted 
that connections with a supplier cannot be protected if the supplier will supply to any person on 
similar terms 105 
5. Trade secrets ló6 
The courts have recognised that a trade secret will constitute an interest on the basis of which an 
effective restraint of trade can be founded. There were harbingers 107, but this principle was 
established in Herbert Morris 1°8 
101 Bridge y Deacons [1984] AC 705 at 719; Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] AC 720 at 723 
and Edwards v Worboys [1984] AC 724 at 726; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 
153; Christie Encyclopaedia 595 took a too narrow view of the extent to which customers can be protected; Tension 
Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 349; Basson v ChiIwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 774. 
102 
The problems that have occurred in Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] AC 720 at 723 have 
now been solved see infra Ch 10.5.2. 
103 
E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 307 was prepared to protect the covenantee against the 
covenantor's knowledge of suppliers and buyers of hay but it may be extended by analogy; Gifford Motor Co Ltd v 
Horne [1933] Ch 935 the restraint aimed at protecting "any other person that the business traded with" but the court 
did not discuss this as a separate aspect; Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 shows how 
important the protection of suppliers may be although secrets were in issue; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) the court should have gone to more trouble in determining to what extent 
104. 
uuppliers could be protected as business connections. 
Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538. 
105 
HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA I (R) 2, 4; Premier Medical & Industrial 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd y Winkler 1971 (3) SA 866 (W) 868 accepted that "customers" in a certain restraint clause 
would include suppliers; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 502, 503. 
106 
See infra 5.8. 
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Heydon stated that both trade secrets and know -how can be protected by restraint. He saw know - 
how as extending the information that could be guarded and he defined it roughly as knowledge of 
how to solve particular problems 109. However, no consistent distinction between trade secrets and 
know -how has emerged 110 Some courts have called unprotectable personal skill "know -how" 111 
Yet, know -how - if any specific meaning can be ascribed to the term - is, rather, a very specific 
form of trade secret 112. It will accordingly be accepted here that information can only be protected 
if it constitutes a trade secret. 
Trade secrets will be protected by an implied term against use and disclosure in a contract of 
employment. But they can, and will often, be guarded by express restraints of trade. The emphasis 
will here be placed on express restrictions for the protection of trade secrets. Yet many cases 
regarding implied protection, and even cases where no contract between the parties existed, will 
be referred to in the discussion of trade secrets. No full analysis of the distinction between the 
different types of protection will be made. Only the complex interaction between express and 
implied protection will be discussed in some detail 113 
toy William Robinson & Co Ltd v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451 at 456 -457; Haynes y Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 23, 28- 
29; British Mannesmann Tube Co Ltd v Phillips (1903) 48 Sol Jo 117; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 
LT 385 at 388 accepted on appeal 587; Mason 740 where the court distinguished Haynes v Doman on the basis that 
it concerned trade secrets; SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 370 -371. 
108 Herbert Morris 711 -712. 
109 Heydon 86, 101 -103 relying on 1) Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1 although this case 
concerned the question of trade secrets and 2) Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent but see the discussion of the case 
infra 5.2.2; Heydon !vIcGill 335; Treitel 404 -405 stated that Pearson LJ in Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent 
[1965] 1 QB 623 at 642 "faintly hints at it" but the court included the protection of this information as confidential 
information; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 71; Schoombee 132, Domanski 229. 
11(1. MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1455 mentioned that know -how has now been defined in an EC Commission 
Regulation. This has now been replaced by the Technology Block Exemption 1995. The author described it as a 
mysterious concept and did not discuss its meaning relative to trade secrets. 
111 Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 768 -769; Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd v 
Macdonald and Evans (1952) 1 TLR 101 at 104, See Heydon 102; Herbert Morris 711 -712; Balston Ltd v Headline 
Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 339; Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 319; See Gurry 90 -91; 
Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 201. 
It 
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 344; Potters- Ballotin Ltd v Weston - 
Baker [1977] RPC 202 at 206 is not clear; Turner 14ff; Blake 672; Davies 491; Heydon 102 accepted that know - 
how had at times been so understood; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1209; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v 
Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 190491 described information which is protectable as a whole as 
know -how. See also the discussion on the facts 194 -195, Cf 5.2.1; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 
1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 487, 494, 508 -509; Knobel 489; Cf Kerr 511 regarded specialised marketing techniques as 
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The three legal systems are discussed together. Scots law on this issue is closely intertwined with 
English law and there will be no difficulties in discussing these systems together 14. However, 
there are foundational differences between South African and English law when it comes to wider 
protection of trade secrets 15 English law cannot be slavishly applied in South Africa, but the 
courts have nonetheless accepted that the legal systems will be similar in many respects. In all 
three systems protection in employment cases will be based on an implied term in the contract 16 
Protection of trade secrets will depend on two main requirements. There must be a trade secret, 
and the covenantor must be in a position to undermine that trade secret as a result of the 
knowledge of it. The second requirement will be discussed first, as it is settled, quite 
uncomplicated, and some knowledge of it is necessary to facilitate an understanding of the type of 
trade secrets that can be protected. 
5.1. Knowledge of trade secrets 
Trade secrets cannot be protected against all activities by which they will be devalued. A restraint 
can only be based on a trade secret if the covenantor knows the secret. The covenantor may be 
restricted only in so far as he may diminish its value by disclosing it, or by exploiting his 
knowledge of it, and he may only be restricted from utilising the trade secret in so far as it is 
directly or indirectly derived from the employer 117 
14 There was some initial reluctance see Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Guilianotti 1959 SLT 293 at 297; 
MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1451; Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 40 accepted 
that the branch of law was not fully developed in Scotland. But a considerable amount has since been decided on 
this issue; Cf however infra 5.3, 5.7. 
115 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 190 -191; Meter Systems 
Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 427; Pistorius 330 -331 and the cases mentioned there. 
116 
Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 190 -191; Meter Systems 
Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 427, 429 -430; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 529; 
On the notion that information in employment cases is protected on the basis of contract in England: United 
Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 167 stated that the basis of protection was not clear 
and accepted that the scope of the remedy would be the same whatever the basis, Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler 
[1987] Ch 117 at 135, Neill LT rejected the view of counsel 134, Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 
at 348. 
117 
It was already recognised in Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 768, 774; Stuart and 
Simpson v Halstead (1911) 55 Sol Jo 598; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385, 388 where this issue 
was regarded as fundamental; Mason 731, 733, 740, 741; Herbert Morris 702 -703, 709, 710, 711, 712, 717; Millers 
Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 TLR 413 at 416; Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 542, 544; Spence v 
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390; For this reason standard clauses that apply to all or a large group 
of employees may be problematic see Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 192; Commercial 
Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 640 -643; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 
1480, 1485, 1486; Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 
at 452, 426, 433, 435; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 407 -408; Farwell 67; It is however not necessary to show that 
the covenantor would disclose the trade secret: Heydon 101 with reference to Farwell 68; Treitel 404; Bluebell 
Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 22, 28; Cf also SOS Bureau Ltd Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37; SOS 
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The only qualification will be on the basis of the principle regarding the time at which 
reasonableness should be determined. In England and Scotland a restraint for the protection of a 
trade secret will be allowed if it was foreseeable, at conclusion, that it would come to the 
knowledge of the employee even though the de facto position may be different 118 
5.2. Features of trade secrets 
It is difficult to delineate trade secrets 119. They are notorious for being very difficult to define, 
both on the facts 120 of a case and in law 121 
5.2.1. Accessibility/ Confidentiality 
Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299; Group 4 Total 
Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 73; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 735; Aramark plc v 
Sommerville 1995 GWD 8 -408; Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) though the protection of knowledge in this 
case was not clearly related to trade secrets; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 73, 74, 76; 
U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 144 although this was a 
franchise case; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 500 -501; Poolquip Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 362 although there are problems with the approach to knowledge for other 
reasons supra 4.5; Madoo (Pty) Ltd v Wallace 1979 (2) SA 957 (T) 958 but see infra 5.7; National Chemsearch SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1103, 1105; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 308 
the shortness of the restraint would not influence the protection of interests because the covenantor would 
immediately obtain information about customers (although the information issue was not clearly related to trade 
secrets); Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 
1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 487, 494 -495; 
BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57 -58 said that the mere fact that the covenantor 
contended that he did not remember the secret will not be enough. It is true that a bare allegation will not suffice. 
But the restraint will not be acceptable where it is clear that the covenantor did not carry it away in his head or 
otherwise; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 760; BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 
(W) 57 -58; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 443 and the reference to the 
unreported Yanasak case, see counsel 443. 
118 Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 449; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 
WLR 1472 at 1485; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36; The pre -Magna Alloys position was similar 
in South Africa: Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 613, Christie 444 is wrong in 
still holding this view in post -Magna Alloys South African law. 
119. 
Blake 667ff and the problems in the modem world; See except for the cases below: Hepworth Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12, Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90; Rex Stewart 
Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 760, 764, 
769, 774; Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 402. 
120 ' McBryde 598; For the determination of whether a trade secret exists on difficult facts see e.g. Commercial 
Plastics Ltd v Vincent [ 1965] 1 QB 623 at 6412. 
121 The courts have not finally decided when information can be protected as trade secrets see Thomas Marshall 
(Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 at 209; Turner 120; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 
(W) 335; Domanski 230. 
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Primarily, information must be secret or confidential. It is difficult to determine this because the 
courts will not merely protect information that is only known to the parties. Information does not 
have to be privy only to the covenantee. Both absolute and relatively secret information will be 
protectable 122 
Courts have determined confidentiality by discerning the accessibility of information to parties to 
whom it is not disclosed by the holder. Hence information that is known to the public cannot be 
protected 123. In Spencer 124 the court again held that certain information could not be protected 
because it would be provided on request to any member of the public who asked. 
Almost any information can be independently discerned by third parties if they are prepared to 
devote enough time and resources to it. Thus information can be protected if it can also be 
independently established as long as it will take considerable effort 125. Information will be 
122. Abernethy v Hutchinson (1824) 3 LJCh 209, See Lamb v Evans [1893] 1 Ch 218 at 230; Caird v Sime (1887) 
12 App Cas 326; Heydon 88 -89 although some statements are too wide; Gurry 75 -76; Cf the narrow view that was 
followed by the Scottish court in Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd IT Guilianotti 1959 SLT 293 at 297. 
123 Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 543 -544. The protection of a slight change to a well known 
formula can probably be contested on this ground; Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd 
(1948) 65 RPC 203 at 215; Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd [1962] RPC 97 at 104; 0 Mustad and 
Son v Dosen [1963] RPC 41 at 43; Franchi v Franchi [1967] RPC 149 at 152 -153; Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) 
Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47, 51; Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 825; 
United Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 167; Potters -Ballotini Ltd v Weston -Baker 
[1977] RPC 202 at 206; Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751 at 754; Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v 
Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 at 209; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 at 598; Berkeley 
Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 505 at 527; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425; 
Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 546; Gurry 70; Heydon McGill 337; Blake 672; SOS Bureau Ltd 
v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36; Harben Pumps (Scotland) Ltd y Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 at 753; Earl of Crawford 
v Paton 1911 SC 1017 discussed by McBryde 598; Coolair Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 
686 (W) 689; Premier Medical and Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler 1971 (3) SA 866 (W) 869 -870; 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 78; Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 
1977 (1) SA 316 (T) 321 with reference to Saltman supra, 322 see the argument of counsel, See Domanski 446 and 
JM Burchell "Confidential Information" (1978) 7 BML 121; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 (2) SA 
84 (C) 93; Easyfind International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Instaplan Holdings 1983 (3) SA 917 (W) 927 mentioned 
Aercrete SA (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 (4) SA 814 (D) 822; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 
1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436; Schultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A) 680; Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v ISCOR 
1983 (1) SA 548 (T) 551 see on appeal where a different view was taken of the facts 1987 (4) SA 412 (A); 
Cambridge Plan AG v Moore 1987 (4) SA 821 (D) 845; Cf Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 
(2) SA 482 (T) 487, Cf 509 is probably too wide, See the criticism Domanski 242; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v 
Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 433; Domanski 230 with reference to Joubert "Die Reg tot Inligting" 1985 De lure 42; 
Neethling (1990) 560; Cf Kerr 511 and the passage also referred to in Heydon 107, But see the criticism of the 
further points made by Heydon infra 5.4. 
124 
Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395 on rates for temporary staff or for supplying permanent staff. 
125 
United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson (1931) 49 RPC 178 at 186 -187 will not be acceptable today. The 
materials used in a process was not regarded as confidential as it could be easily determined but there were other 
aspects that would today be confidential, See the criticism Turner 74 with reference to Merryweather v Moore 
B1892] 2 Ch 518 at 524 and [leid and Sigrist Ltd v Moss and Mechanism Ltd (1932) 49 RPC 461; Terrapin Ltd v 
uilders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1960] RPC 128 at 142 accepted Roxburgh 1 at first instance quoted 130 and later 
94 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
confidential if it will involve considerable effort to discover its corpus in the useful form that it has 
taken on in the hands of the employer 126 
The test for inaccessibility is fundamentally objective. Information will not be a trade secret merely 
because the parties have assigned this label to it 127. But indiciae that have a subjective tint will 
play a role in showing that information is objectively confidential: 
- It will be significant if information is only allowed limited circulation 128. It has been stressed that 
the holder of the information should treat the information as confidential or do everything 
in his power to ensure that the information remains secret 129 
reported Terrapin Ltd v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375; Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell 
Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 215: Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd [ 1962] RPC 97 at 
104; Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1964] 3 All ER 289 at 295 -296, See also 302 the court 
suggested that Roxburgh J's decision was not expressly accepted in Terrapin but this cannot be accepted; 
Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 642 -643 this was probably what the court was protecting 
here. See further infra 5.2.2, Walker 188 should be viewed in this light; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] RPC 349 at 
368 but see the criticism 5.5; Under Water Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 at 
506; Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 825, 820 -821; Potters - 
Ballotini Ltd v Weston -Baker [1977] RPC 202 at 206; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 
at 1480; PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 and the discussion 282; Gurry 70; This played a 
role in SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1460; Ackermann- 
Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 79 is open to question; Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) 
Ltd 1977 (1) SA 316 (T) 323 -325; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 500; 
Aercrete SA (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 (4) SA 814 (D) 821 -822; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v 
Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 528 -529; BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57. 
126. E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 308 is probably too strict, See the criticism and 
explanation Turner 84; Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans (1952) 1 TLR 101 at 104; 
Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 215; Under Water Welders 
and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 at 505 -506; Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] 
RPC 41 at 47; Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 825; Faccenda 
Chicken Ltd v Fowler [ 1987] Ch 117 at 135 and the argument of counsel. But it was rejected on the facts 140; 
Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 475 although the court took a too narrow view; Johnson & Bloy 
(Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135 at 140 -141; Heydon 87; Gurry 71; Hinton & Higgs 
(UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 454 mentioned that the defender had not attacked the restraint on the basis 
that others also had access to some of the information; Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 (1) 
SA 316 (T) 323ff; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 500; There are limits to this 
SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 (2) SA 84 (C) 93; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn 
Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 190 -192, 194 -195, See Domanski 435; Northern Office Micro Computers 
(Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C) 137 -138; Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v ISCOR 1983 (1) SA 548 
IT 
551. 
. Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 138; Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 
505 at 525; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 544 with reference to John Zink Co Ltd v Lloyds 
Bank Ltd [1975] RPC 385; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 858; Domanski 
230. 
128. 
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 138; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 543. 
129. United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson (1931) 49 RPC 178 at 186 -187, Discussed Gurry 180 -181; Under 
Water Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 at 503, 505; Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v 
Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 825; Heydon 87; Blake 
674; Gurry 85; Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 194; Domanski 230 with reference to 
Joubert "Die reg op inligting" 1985 De Jure 42. 
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The court will look at the extent to which it was impressed on the employee that the information 
was confidential 130 
The subjective knowledge of the holder of information that such knowledge constitutes a trade 
secret may play some role 131 However, the contentions in Thomas Marshall 132 cannot be 
accepted. In casu 133 Megarry V -C laid down several requirements for determining when 
information or knowledge should be protectable from the perspective of the holder of 
information. His approach can be criticised with reference to the most important 
requirement within his scheme. He submitted that the owner of knowledge should 
reasonably believe that the information is confidential or secret, i.e. not in the public 
domain. The judge concluded that information would be protected even if it was proven 
that the reasonable belief was false. But this cannot be accepted, even if it is acknowledged 
that the judge qualified his statement by noting that only reasonable perceptions of the 
owner of a purported secret should be conclusive. The subjective knowledge of the 
employee may play some role in determining this issue, but is again not a necessary 
requirement in restraint of trade cases. This issue may be conclusive in barring a claim 
based on implied protection but it will only be a factum probandum in restraint cases 134. 
It is most important that the determination of these issues be looked at in context. It will be 
fundamental to determine these questions in the light of uses and practices in a particular industry 
135 
5.2.2. Personal skill and knowledge 
130 
E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 307; Under Water Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & 
Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 at 505, 507; United Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 173, 
172 and the comparison between the Under Water Welders and the Printers and Finishers cases criticised infra 5.6; 
Ansell Rubber Co Ltd Pty v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 823 with reference to Amber Size 
and Chemical Co Ltd v Menzel [1913] 2 Ch 239 at 241 -242 where it was stressed for the purpose of implication; 
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 138, Discussed Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 
at 543; Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 505 at 525; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All 
ER 418 at 425; McBryde 598; Coolair Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W) 691 will not 
necessarily be conclusive. 
131 Infra 5.6. 
132 
Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193. 
133 Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 at 209 and 210; McBryde 598; These factors are 
also mentioned by the court in Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 (3) SA 182 (D) 186. 
134 
Emphasis on this in Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 at 388 was not really explained in the 
case; Amber Size and Chemical Co Ltd v Menzel [1913] 2 Ch 239 at 245 although the precise role of this 
requirement was not stated; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 (3) SA 182 (D) 185 but it was apparently' 
seen as a requirement for a claim and not as a requirement for confidentiality; Domanski 239 relying on bona fides. 
See the further discussion of bona fides infra 16. 
135. 
Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 at 209 and 210; Gurry 72 -73; Turner 84. 
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Mere personal skill and knowledge cannot be protected by restraint 136 Trade secrets will have to 
be distinguished from information that has been acquired during employment but which constitutes 
general skill and knowledge 137, although it is notoriously difficult to determine in what class 
particular information falls 
138 
The distinction has mostly been drawn by keeping the reasons for its existence in mind 139. General 
knowledge or information that is of general applicability in an industry will not be protectable 14°. 
136 Infra 8.2. 8.3. 
137 Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 666 the court saw the fact that skill and experience would be gained as 
a reason for upholding the restraint, See the criticism Herbert Morris 709; E Underwood & Son Ltd y Barker 
[1899] 1 Ch 300 at 314 although the principle is much further developed today; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd y Andrews 
[1909] 1 Ch 763 at 773; Mason 740 -741, 742; Herbert Morris 711, 714 -715, Cf especially on subjective and 
objective knowledge: Mason 740 -741, Herbert Morris 711, 714 -715, Turner 132. Gooderson 415, Selwyn 386, 
Trebilcock 86; Cf the argument of counsel in Forster and Sons Ltd y Suggett (1918) 35 TLR 87 at 88 although it 
was not accepted on the facts; E Worsley & Co Ltd y Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 309 -310 in turn referring to 
United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson (1931) 49 RPC 178 at 187 and Herbert Morris Ltd y Saxelby [1915] 2 
Ch 75 at 88 although this principle was not clearly expressed in either see infra 5.4. and 5.6; Stevenson Jordan and 
Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans (1952) 1 TLR 101 at 104; John Zink Co Ltd y Lloyds Bank Ltd [1975] RPC 
385 at 388; Potters -Ballotini Ltd v Weston -Baker [1977] RPC 202 at 206; Evening Standard Ltd v Henderson 
[1987] ICR 588 at 592; Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 343, 350 especially 351; Lock 
International plc y Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373 at 378; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 259; 
Mainmet Holdings plc y Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 544, 546; Heydon 103 -107, But see infra 5.4; Farwell 66 -67; 
Gurry 67 -68, 211; Turner 120ff; Sales 610 and the discussion of GD Searle & Co Ltd y Celltech Ltd [1982] FSR 
92, Baker v Gibbons [1972] 1 WLR 693 on knowledge of the abilities of fellow employees; Scottish Law 
Commission 40 20; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1468, 1469; McBryde 599 with reference to Rentokil infra; 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 79, 80; Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) 
Ltd 1977 (1) SA 316 (T) 322, 327; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 335 but see the criticism 
infra 5.6; Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C) 138; Sibex Engineering 
Services (Pty) Ltd y Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 486; Aercrete SA (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineers Co (Pty) Ltd 
1984 (4) SA 814 (D) 822; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 430; Pistorius 344; Woker 
334; See further discussion of the protection of personal skill and investment in human skills infra 8.2 and 8.3. 
138 Balston Ltd y Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 342; Blake 653; Turner 120; MacQueen Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1468; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 193- 
194 with reference to Callmann Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies 3rd ed vol II para 54.2, This is 
also quoted in Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 159, Domanski 435; Northern Office Micro Computers 
(Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C) 136; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd y Sutcliffe 1983 (2) SA 84 (C) 91, 
Domanski 238; Knobel 497. 
139 
Callmann Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies 3rd ed vol II para 54.2 and the references Atlas 
Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 193494, Northern Office Micro 
Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C) 136; On the principles underlying unprotectability of 
personal skill infra 16.2. 
ao 
Herbert Morris 711; Millers Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 TLR 413 at 416 cannot be accepted; Triplex Safety 
Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 215; Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd y Macdonald and Evans (1952) 1 
TLR 101 at 104; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 641; Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied 
Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 815, It is impossible to make sense of the discussion 822 the court 
completely misquoted Sir WC Leng. The judge probably meant particular knowledge; United Sterling Corp Ltd y 
Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 172, 173; The point is made by the plaintiffs in Faccenda Chicken Ltd y 
Fowler [ 1987] Ch t 17 t 135; Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [ 1990] FSR 505 at 527; Lansing Linde 
Ltd y Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425; Heydon 104; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 22 with 
reference to Commercial Plastics supra; Coolair Ventilators Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W) 
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Knowledge of business organisation will accordingly often be unprotectable as it frequently 
concerns nothing more than a knowledge of "reasonable mode of general organisation" 141. The 
emphasis must, nevertheless be placed on generality 142. Statements that can be interpreted widely 
have sometimes been made 143 but unique information about policy and organisation will be 
protectable 144. Some Scottish authorities have submitted that information about policy and 
organisation can be protected in Scotland but not in other legal systems 145. Yet, Scots law is in 
line with other systems on this point. Such information will be protectable in all three systems as 
long as it is not general 146. Wide statements such as the one in Commercial Plastics must be 
interpreted in context. 
It is difficult to discern if the personal skill requirement is truly a second hurdle after the 
determination of inaccessibility in the narrow sense. The determination that information is merely 
personal skill mostly only excludes information that would not pass the test for inaccessibility. 
They cannot be viewed as completely separate. However, the two elements are also not absolutely 
689. The court incorrectly accepted that general information would be worthless but that is not necessarily true. The 
issue was here more directly applied to the confidentiality question, See especially Knobel 497; See the authorities 
mentioned by Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 193 -194 and 
Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 159 especially the discussion of the American authority Callmann ibid, 
Domanski 436 criticised the distinction between general and special knowledge with reference also to HJO Van 
Heerden and J Neethling Die Reg Aangaande Onregmatige Mededinging (1983) 139 -140, Christie 444; Pistorius 
345. 
141 Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 774, 768 -769, Trebilcock 88 does not cast much new 
light on this; Herbert Morris 703 but see infra, Referred to Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 
505 at 524; Herbert Morris 704 -705, 711, 712, Cf Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 433 and the 
reliance on Herbert Morris; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1485; Ixora Trading Inc 
v Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 258 -259, 261; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 407 -408; Turner 124ff. 
142 
Gurry 94. 
143 Herbert Morris 703; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 394 although the court 
contrasted it with "special knowledge "; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 641, Cf however 
642 where the court talked of general education and method; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 22 
with reference to Commercial Plastics supra; Cf MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1468 where it was simply stated 
that information of organisation will be protected in extraordinary circumstances; Cf Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 
475 (C) 479 where the wide statement made by counsel was not really addressed by the court; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v 
Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 314 is apparently too wide "methods of operating and knowledge of conditions of 
business" cannot always be protected, Christie 444 the ideas were ostensibly taken from Drewtons and is subject to 
similar criticism; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 256, 259; David Wuhl (Pty) 
Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436; The suggestion in Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 
4W) 430, 432 -433 cannot be accepted. 
44 
Stuart & Simpson v Halstead (1911) 55 Sol Jo 598 although the court felt that no secret information was 
acquired; A too wide view was probably taken in Millers Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 TLR 413 at 414, Cf also the 
criticism of the general approach to personal skill in this case infra; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [ 1977] 1 
WLR 1472, See Walker 188, McBryde 599; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33; Counsel for the pursuer 
in Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116 but the court stressed other issues; See the cases infra 5.7. 
145 Woolman 255 and Scott Robinson 160 (also mentioning Rentokil Ltd v Kramer supra) considered that there 
was a contradiction between Commercial Plastics on the one hand and the Scottish cases of SOS Bureau Ltd v 
F e 1982 SLT ShCt 33 and A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299. 
i Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734 -735. 
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similar. Perhaps the only distinction is that the personal skill requirement approaches the trade 
secret question from another important perspective. 
5.2.3. The value and purpose of the information 
It has sometimes been stressed that information must be valuable 147 or, preferably, commercially 
valuable 148 before it can be protected. Thus, commercial value is probably a necessary 
requirement of protection in these cases. But two approaches must be criticised: 
- Too much emphasis was placed on this aspect in Coolair 149. The court suggested that 
information that is valuable is prima facie protectable. 
- In Thomas Marshall 150 the court stated that the owner of the information must reasonably 
believe that release of the information would harm him or benefit his competitors and this 
is too subjectively stated. But subjective perceptions will again play some role as an 
indicator that information constitutes a trade secret 
5.3. Information that can be protected during and after employment 
There is an obligation on an employee to act with fidelity and good faith during employment. 
Information that is only "confidential" in that it will constitute a breach of the obligation to act 
with good faith during employment cannot always be protected after employment has terminated. 
The two situations have now been clearly delineated where there is no explicit restraint 151 
However, some difficulty exists in the case of express restraints. Goulding J in Faccenda Chicken 
147 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 at 598; United Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Manion 
[1974] RPC 162 at 166; Cf Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 48 where the court doubted 
whether it was necessary for a claim in equity, Heydon 87; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734; 
Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 194; Pistorius 345. 
148 Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425 who saw this as a basis for distinguishing confidential 
information from trade secrets; Gurry 82 -83 did not regard this as separately important for establishing the general 
protection of information in terms of the doctrine of confidentiality. A different principle may however apply in 
post- employment cases; See Neethling (1991) 560; Knobel 497 with reference to Coolair Ventilators Co (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W) 689, See the criticism of Coolair infra. 
149. 
Coolair Ventilators Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W) 689. 
151 
Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [ 1978] 3 All ER 193 at 209 and 210. 
151 
Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 815, 825; United Sterling 
Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 166 -167; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 
136 -138 with reference to E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 and Printers and Finishers Ltd v 
Holloway [1965] RPC 239 at 253; Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 345 -346; Manor 
Electronics Ltd v Dickson [ 1988] RPC 618 at 624; Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 
1 FSR 135 at 139 -140; Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373 at 378; Ixora Trading Inc v .Jones 
[1990] FSR 251 at 259; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 543; Treitel 404; Chill Foods (Scotland) 
Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 40 counsel argued that information would be more strongly protected where 
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152 initially contended that the information protectable during employment relationships would also 
be protectable after termination of employment by explicit restraint. But this view has been duly 
rejected by Neill LJ on appeal 153. Information protectable during employment should be much 
wider because the proper and bona fide operation of the work relationship must be ensured during 
that period. Wider obligations exist during employment as the skills and knowledge of the 
employee will not be inhibited. The employee will merely have to use it for the purpose of the 
employer. After employment this ratio falls away in cases of express as well as implied protection. 
The interests of the parties diverge; the covenantee must only be protected against abuse of what 
can truly be described as information belonging to him. 
Later cases that doubted the approach of Neill LJ in Faccenda on this point must be rejected 154 
The reasons given in Balston 155 for accepting the view of Goulding J deserve particular attention: 
- Scott J incorrectly interpreted Faccenda and Printers and Finishers. He referred to the 
statements that some information can only be protected by express restraint. The judge 
stated that the type of information that is not merely confidential in the sense that it is 
it had been clandestinely obtained for competition. The court did not finally decide the point although it showed 
sympathy for the view, See counsel Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 761; Malden Timber Ltd v 
McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734 and especially the summary of law 731 this has now become a widely accepted set of 
tenets; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1158 accepted 1160; Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 
SLT 757 at 760 relied on by both counsel, The pursuer 761 stated that Faccenda was not boldly accepted in 
Scotland but see the criticism infra 5.7, 763 did not finally lay down the basis for distinction between the different 
types of protectable information but the court accepted that there would be a distinction; MacQueen Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1467, 1468, 1469; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 526 -527. Pistorius 340 was 
critical of the acceptance of the judgment of Goulding J in Faccenda. But her views are unacceptable; Meter 
Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 430 -432 with reference to Faccenda Chicken a quo, Pistorius 
340 averred that this principle conflicted with the broad notions as set out by Stegmann J but that is not acceptable 
cfinfra 5.3. 
152. Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 at 599. Some of the elements of such a distinction can be 
discerned from Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] RPC 239 at 253 although this passage was also 
quoted without comment in the Court of Appeal where a different view was taken; Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis 
[1987] ICR 464 at 437 where these arguments were limited to implied protection; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v 
Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 431 quoted the view of Goulding J without mentioning the criticisms of the Court of 
Appeal on this point; Knobel 497 also seems to take this view. 
1 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 137 with reference to Herbert Morris 709 although the case 
does not provide clear authority for it, 138 and the criticism of the court a quo; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] 
FSR 251 at 258 although the court apparently did not regard the issue as finally settled 259, 261; Mainmet 
Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 544 this is what the court meant when it stated that "information which is 
not a trade secret does not become entitled to protection merely because it comes within the wide terms of an 
express covenant "; Chitty 1205; Malden Timber Ltd If McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734 although the judge finally just 
emphasised that implied protection of such information will not be allowed; Implicit in Malden Timber Ltd v 
Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 763. 
154 
Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 347; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 258, 
Cf 261 where the point is apparently left more open; Systems Reliability Holdings plc IT Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 
384; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1470 also seems to take a view of Faccenda that is not justified by the case; Cf 
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protectable during employment will already be protectable by implied restraint. Hence, he 
concluded that some information that is confidential in the limited sense was still regarded 
as protectable by express restraint. However, the passages relied on concerned different 
issues 156 
- Scott J accepted that restraints could protect wider information because they are limited spatially 
and temporally. However, implied protection will also be limited in the granting of 
remedies i57. It is in any event difficult to see why this distinction, even if it exists, should 
carry much weight when it comes to the type of information that can be protected. 
Some of the factors mentioned by the court may play a role in distinguishing express and implied 
protection but it cannot apply on this level 158 
It is still very difficult to distinguish information that can be protected during employment from 
information that will also be protectable afterwards. Different bases for distinction have been 
proposed and some of them must be rejected. 
- In Lansing Linde 159 Staughton LJ specifically attempted to establish the distinction between the 
different types of information. Yet he did not come up with much. He concluded that only 
information that will cause commercial harm and information of which the dissemination is 
limited will be protectable after employment. However, it is doubtful whether information 
not meeting these requirements will be protectable during employment. 
- In South Africa in Knox 160 the court distinguished information that is carried away in the head of 
the employee, and is therefore not permanently protectable, from information that is. But 
the protectability of information even after termination of employment will not necessarily 
be undermined merely because it is carried away in the head of the employee 161 and 
information that is only protectable for a limited duration should also, in many cases, be 
protectable qua trade secrets after employment has terminated 162. The argument in Knox 
was based on the English case of Roger Bullivant 163 where the court protected 
information in a card index that was taken away during employment. Roger Bullivant 
accepted that the index would not be protectable, without more, after termination of 
156 
See infra 5.6. 
157 




Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425, see 426 the court apparently doubted whether the 
distinction existed at all, See MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1471. 
160 
Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 527 and especially 528 -529. 
161 Infra 5.4. 
162 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [ 1987] Ch 117 at 138; Pistorius 340 with reference to Meter Systems Holdings 
Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 430 although it is not clear whether the dictum pertains to this point; No post- 
employment protection has ever been refused purely on this basis. 
. Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [ 1987] ICR 464. 
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employment 164 But it was regarded as protectable as it was irregularly taken away during 
employment 165 The court stressed that information was protectable even though it would 
only be guarded for a limited duration 166. Accordingly, this case is open to the Knox 
interpretation. But it is doubtful whether it should be so understood. The court did not 
have to decide, and did not clearly decide, that information that was not permanent would 
never be protectable after termination. 
The distinction can only be drawn by keeping its purpose in mind 167. Information that is 
protectable during employment will not necessarily be confidential in the sense described above. 
The Court of Appeal in Faccenda Chicken described such information as being confidential in 
inverted commas. With information that is protectable during employment, the court will have to 
ask if it would be against the fidelity of the relationship for an employee to use or disclose it. After 
termination of employment the question will be whether the information is secret information 
belonging to the employer so that it would even be unacceptable to disclose or use it after such 
termination. 
The question will be one of degree: 
- Different degrees of accessibility or confidentiality will be required 168 although it will often be 
difficult to distinguish the different shades of confidentiality. 
- A significant role will be ascribed to the distinction between confidential information and 
personal skill and knowledge 169 But the rule cannot be that the personal skill and 
knowledge test only applies after employment. There is no clear distinction between the 
personal skill and confidentiality questions while there is no reason why mere personal skill 
should be restrictable during employment. Yet the personal skill test approaches this issue 
from an angle that will be particularly important. 
164 Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 473 -474. 
165 
Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 473 -474. 
166 
Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 476ff; Cf PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 
at 282 where similar arguments were relied on by counsel as a further alternative but the court did not discuss it 
fully. 
167. 
Gurry 177 -179, 198; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1471 no clear distinction can be drawn. 
168 
Littlewoods Organisation Ltd y Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1484 is too rigid; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v 
Fowler [ 1987] Ch 117 at 136 talked of a "sufficient high degree of confidentiality "; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones 
[1990] FSR 251 at 258; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734; Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 
SLT 757 at 760 and the discussion of Faccenda. 
169. Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 at 599; Manor Electronics Ltd v Dickson [1988] RPC 618 at 
624. 
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In South Africa Pistorius 170 asserts that the whole distinction should be rejected; she states that: 
"The fact that an employee has left the employment of her employer cannot be the touchstone to 
determine the confidentiality of information ". But the distinction is not aimed at delineating what is 
confidential. It rather concerns the level of "confidentiality" - using this word in the widest sense - 
that is required before information will be protectable. A wider obligation to protect information 
exists during employment than after it. The author was correct in criticising Knox 171; the court in 
that case took a too narrow view of the information that could be protected after employment had 
terminated. But the wider opprobrium levelled at other authorities is based on a misinterpretation 
of those authorities. 
5.4. Recollected information 
Some authorities suggest that information should not be protectable if it will necessarily be 
impressed on the mind of the employee, as such information becomes mere personal skill 172. But 
this is unacceptable as a general proposition 173. It would be too formalistic, as it confuses the 
protection of information and the physical form that it takes on. The inherent nature of information 
should determine its protectability. Information committed to memory has been protected in many 
cases 174 
Some authorities are too wide 175, but most of the cases that seem to create the impression that 
memorised information cannot be protected can be explained. Several trade secret principles will 
increase the likelihood that particular memorised information will not be protected: 
17o Pistorius 344. 
171 Knox D'Arcy Ltd y Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 
172. 
Gurry 69; Heydon 105 the cases that he relied on do not support such a wide thesis; This aspect was also 
stressed MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1469. 
173 Cf Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 343 where the court placed too much emphasis on this 
issue in determining that information was personal skill; See the criticism of Trebilcock 86; Cf Comments (1951) 
19 University of Chicago Law Review 97 at 104. 
174 
Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 823 with reference to Amber 
Size and Chemical Co Ltd y Menzel [1913] 2 Ch 239 at 241 -242; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 
623 at 642; Printers and Finishers Ltd y Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1 at 5; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd y Harris 
[1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1479, 1485; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 at 559 a trade secret can be 
protected though it was learnt by heart; Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135 
at 142 -143 see especially the discussion of Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330; Turner 77 and the 
discussion Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241, Amber Size and Chemical Co Ltd y Menzel (1913) 30 RPC 433, 
Ellolite Ltd y Thomas Travis and Insulators Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 366 at 352, Turner 141; Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd 
v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 40 a very narrow argument was formulated by counsel for the defender. The court 
did not reject it outright but accepted that such a principle could not apply where an employee clandestinely 
memorised information during employment for the purpose of using it afterwards; Rentokil Ltd y Kramer 1986 
SLT 114 at 116 although it was not clearly related to trade secrets. 
. Merryweather v Moore [ 18921 2 Ch 518 at 524; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [ 1915] 2 Ch 75 at 88 quoted in 
United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson (1931) 49 RPC 178 at 183 see the interjections, 187 although the court 
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- It already suggests that the employee will have difficulty in otherwise acquiring the information if 
he copies or takes away documents with him. It should play some role in establishing 
inaccessibility 176 
- It will offend against the implied duty of an employee to act bona fide during employment where 
documents are surreptitiously taken away or copied during such employment 177. However, 
where information is merely memorised in the normal currency of activities, it will only be 
protectable in terms of the narrower post -employment obligations. Most memorised 
information falls in this category, although information that is purposefully memorised 
during employment and outside normal duties will for this purpose be treated like 
documents 178. 
- The employee -related requirement for the protection of a trade secret will often play an 
important role. Recollected information will not constitute a trade secret if elements of a 
wider trade secret that do not in themselves constitute a trade secret are carried away. This 
will be particularly true in cases where information is only confidential as a corpus but is 
only remembered in a piecemeal manner. In some cases the courts have held that such 
information is not confidential, while other recollections were not protected because they 
were regarded as part of the personal skill and knowledge of the confidant 179. 
also mentioned a more acceptable ground for rejecting an interdict, See Turner 137 -141; E Worsley & Co Ltd v 
Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 307 although the case was also decided on different grounds infra. 
176 Heydon McGill 337 
177. 
Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 641; This seems to be the basis of Printers and 
Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] RPC 239 at 253; Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 474 where the 
breach of the duty of good faith was stressed; Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 
FSR 135 at 140 -141, 143; Harben Pumps (Scotland) Ltd v Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 at 754; MacQueen Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1467; Knobel 497 with reference to Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 (1) SA 
316 (T) 326 -327 although the point was merely made in a quote from an Australian case. It is unclear to what 
extent the facts here are similar; Cambridge Plan AG v Moore 1987 (4) SA 821 (D) 846; Meter Systems Holdings 
Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 428, 433. 
178. 
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 136; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 543; 
Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds [1994] FSR 52 at 59 although it was stressed that information about customers 
was not sufficiently confidential to be protectable; Gurry 69; Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 
SLT 38 at 40 discussed supra. Although the court did not clearly relate it to the intentional memorisation of 
information; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 
409 (W) 428, 433. 
179 
Herbert Morris 703, 712; Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 543; E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper 
[1939] 1 All ER 290 at 309; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 641; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr 
[1991] 1 All ER 418 at 433; See Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135 140- 
141; Blake 650 -651 cannot be accepted. He did not properly distinguish trade secret and customer connection; Lock 
International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373 at 378; Turner 77, 136 -137, 141; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v 
Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1159 -1160; Christie Encyclopaedia 595 quoting Herbert Morris supra; Northern Office 
Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C) 137 -138; These issues appear to have played some 
role in Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 428, 433 although it might perhaps also be 
interpreted as laving down a general rule, Cf Pistorius 339 -340 apparently thought that the court laid down a 
general tenet. 
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- Recollected information will be problematic when it comes to the enforcement of implied or 
express obligations against use and disclosure. Such information will often be insufficiently 
clear and separate 180. Courts should be cautious about restricting employees in using such 
information 181 
It is merely an indicator that such information does not constitute a trade secret where it is not 
carried away in any corporeal form but it is not, in itself, a reason for not protecting information. 
5.5. Duration of trade secrets 
Logically, any one of two contingencies can terminate the special status of information. 
- It could be expected that information can only be protected for as long as it is not public 182 
- Information that can be independently established should only be protectable for as long as it 
would reasonably have taken the confidant to achieve this 183 
Nevertheless, possible exceptions to this principle have developed. 
It has been suggested that protectable information does not lose its status where the information 
has become public without consent of the holder 184, but this principle is unacceptable. 
- It is the nature of the information rather than the source from which it was acquired that should 
determine protectability. The aim is to protect information and not to penalise the 
confidant. Any other approach would be overly formalistic and highly unfair towards the 
employee confidant 185 
180. Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 1 Ch 336 at 346; United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd y Robinson (1931) 49 
RPC 178 at 187 mentioned in E Worsley & Co Ltd y Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 309 although some of the 
language used in these cases is somewhat wide see infra 5.6; Printers and Finishers Ltd y Holloway [ 1965] 1 WLR 
1 at 6 see infra 5.6; United Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 173; PSM International plc 
v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 282 and the discussion of Printers and Finishers Ltd y Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 
1; Turner 77 and the discussion of Lamb v Evans, Turner 77 -78; There are some indications that the court in Allied 
Electric (Pty) Ltd y Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 335 was addressing this point, See Domanski 235. But the 
language used by the court is confusing. 
181 
Infra 5.6. 
182. o Mustad & Son v Dosen [1963] RPC 41; Franchi y Franchi [1967] RPC 149 at 152 -153; MacQueen Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1461. 
183. 
Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 477; PSM International plc y Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 and 
the discussion 282; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1462; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 (3) SA 182 
(D) 189 -190, Domanski 239; Knox D'Arcy Ltd y Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 528; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd 
v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 430; Neethling (1991) 561. 
184 Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp y Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] RPC 45 at 54 -55 where this question was not 
finally decided; Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1964] 3 All ER 289 at 298ff saying that this echoed 
Reid and Sigrist Ltd v Moss and Mechanism Ltd (1932) 49 RPC 461 at 480. But it is not clear whether Cranleigh 
was decided on this point, Cf MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1461. 
185. 
Gurry 246 -247 accepted that the distinction in Cranleigh was artificial, See also 249 -252. 
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Terrapin 186, the case on which this doctrine was based, did not intend such a principle. In casu 
the mode of construction of a product was confidential. The product was marketed. The 
court held that the information was protectable though the product itself was marketed 
because it would still take considerable effort and time to establish the information by dis- 
assembling the product. Here the information had not yet become public in the true sense. 
There are only two types of cases where publication should not terminate obligations of 
confidentiality: 
- A person may be restricted after information has become public where time was won by use 
before information was published. Where a secret is used to construct machinery that can 
be used in a manufacturing process and X months before disclosure has already been taken 
to construct the machinery, then the covenantor can still be restricted from using the 
machinery for X months after the information has become public. 
- The confidant cannot benefit from his own disclosure in breach of confidentiality 187. 
Information that can be independently discerned will only be protectable for as long as it is not 
public, or for the period that it would actually take to catch up independently. In Coco 188 the 
court discussed the position of a person who had acquired information but who might have 
independently worked it out himself over a period. The judge said that such a case would be 
problematic because the confidant would either have to go through the process of determining the 
information himself or wait for the information to become public. However, the court should only 
allow protection for as long as it would have taken to develop the information independently or 
until it becomes public. After that time the information may be used irrespective of its actual 
source. The court in Coco placed too much emphasis on derivation. 
A restraint for the protection of a trade secret may only endure for the duration of the trade secret 
as here set out. But acceptable duration will also be influenced by the time at which reasonableness 
has to be determined 189. A restraint may in England and Scotland be reasonable if it actually exists 
186 
Terrapin Ltd y Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375, Cf Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber 
Industries (Pty) Ltd [ 1972] RPC 811 821 the court was critical of the use of Terrapin in Cranleigh; Heydon 88 does 
not recognise the differences between the cases; Gurry 247 -249; Cf MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1462. 
187. 
Speed Seal Products Ltd y Paddington [1985] 1 WLR 1327 at 1332; Trebilcock 91. 
188. 
Coco y AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 49, Cf Potters -Ballotini Ltd y Weston -Baker [19771 RPC 
202 at 206 -207 accepted that there might come a time when information will not be protectable any more although 
the issue was not taken any further, Cf Balston Ltd y Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 343, 344 also made a 
similar point in discussing the distinction between personal skill and trade secrets. 
189. 
Gurry 212 -213; Heydon 161. 
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for longer than this, as long as it was foreseeable at conclusion that this requirement would be met 
190 
5.6. The distinction between express and implied protection/separability of information 
After termination of employment, trade secrets can be protected by implied terms or explicit 
restraint. The authorities believe that there is some distinction between the two sources of 
protection 191 But along what lines? 
There is no clear substantive difference between the types of information that can be protected. 
Restraints cannot be used to protect information after termination of employment that will be 
protectable during employment but which will be unprotectable by implied term after such 
termination 192 
The existence of an express restraint might impact subtly on the type of information that courts 
will protect. Information in principle will have to meet the same requirements in both types of 
cases but an overview shows somewhat wider protection of trade secrets in express restraint 
cases. Where there is some doubt, courts will be more prone to accept that a trade secret exists 
where an express restraint has been concluded 193 Many of the arguments in Balston 194 cannot be 
accepted but the court made one point that will be relevant here. In cases of express protection 
there is often an element of choice while the implied term is laid down ex lege. The courts must 
therefore be extremely cautious in implied protection cases. 
Although this issue has not been settled, it might be a requirement for protection based on 
implication that the employee must know that there were protectable secrets 
195 But it is manifest 
that there is no such requirement where relief is based on a restraint of trade 
196 
The distinction between express and implied protection will become fundamental when it comes to 
the further question whether a remedy can be granted. A covenantee will have no wider support 
190 
In Reid and Sigrist Ltd y Moss and Mechanism Ltd (1932) 49 RPC 461 at 480 can only be explained in the 
light of this principle. 
. Except for the authorities infra also: E Worsley & Co Ltd y Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 307, Ansell Rubber 
Co Pty Ltd y Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 823. 
192. 
Especially Ixora Trading Inc y Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 258; Supra 5.3. 
193. 
Chitty 1205 makes a similar point. 
194 
Balston Ltd y Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 352; Ixora Trading Inc y Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 261; 
Chitty 1205. 
195 
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from an express restraint against use and disclosure but for the subtle distinction mentioned above 
197. Yet there will be vast differences between implied protection and more specifically framed 
restraints. It would be more accurate to say that the distinction actually lies between general 
restraints against use or disclosure, that are also implied, and more precise restraints of trade for 
the protection of information. 
A restraint of trade will be important for the holder of trade secrets even if he may also achieve 
implied protection, because implied obligations will only protect against use or disclosure of trade 
secrets. More comprehensive activities can be restricted by explicit restraint of trade 198. 
The separability of information and the ability of the court to grant relief will be most important. 
The courts will have to balance the need for protection with its aversion to restricting skill and 
knowledge outside trade secrets i99 Express restraints can be utilised to bridge the problems that 
will arise where protectable and unprotectable information are intertwined. 
In some cases separability will be irrelevant for the purpose of the remedies that may be granted. 
- Information cannot be guarded, through the implied protection of trade secrets or through 
explicit restraint, where the whole of the information is affected by the part that is not a 
trade secret to the extent that it also is not a trade secret, even if it would have been 
protectable standing alone 200 
- The information can be protected by both means if it constitutes a clear and separate trade secret. 
However, the degree to which information is inextricable may also impact upon the remedies that 
can be granted: 
- Sometimes trade secrets may exist but they will still be so intertwined with other information that 
an interdict against use cannot be granted, as such an interdict will interfere widely with 
personal skill and knowledge 201. Courts will only allow interdicts, based on implied 
197 Turner 120; Some cases cannot be accepted: Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 348, 351, Cf 
however the suggestion 351, PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 282. 
198 
See infra Ch 8.5.4. 
199 Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135 at 141 
zoo 
United Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 172 -173 although some of the cases 
mentioned apparently fall in the next category; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 138 but see the 
criticism infra; Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 505 at 526; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin 
[1991] FSR 538 at 544, 546; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 433. 
01 
Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 1 Ch 336 at 346; United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson (1931) 49 
RPC 178 at 187 mentioned in E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 309 although it is not clear 
whether Morton J appreciated the import of the statement in United Indigo, See Turner 84; Balston Ltd v Headline 
Filters Ltd [ 1987] FSR 330 350 -351 can only be explained along these lines although the case is not easy to 
understand; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1915] 2 Ch 75 at 88; Turner 77 -78, See the criticism of these cases 
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protection, against disclosure. The problem is one of degree and it will be difficult to 
decide where to draw the line. This was the problem that the court in Printers and 
Finishers attempted to solve when it stressed that a reasonable man would not think that 
there was something improper in tapping his memory as to particular knowledge and that 
the restraint could therefore not be enforced 202, although it was not clearly delineated in 
the case and has led to much confusion 2 °3. 
- In other cases the information may contain some elements that are trade secrets, although those 
elements cannot be circumscribed. In these cases the protectable information cannot be 
separated from other information which does not constitute trade secrets for the purpose 
of either use or disclosure 204. It will leave the covenantor in an impossible position if he is 
interdicted against use or disclosure in such cases. The law will accordingly not allow 
implied protection or a restraint to the same effect. Some courts have granted non- 
disclosure restraints when no clear trade secret is delineated in an attempt to compensate 
for refusing more comprehensive remedies 205, but these cases are unacceptable. 
supra 5.4; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 335, Coolair Ventilators Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W) 690 -691 but the emphasis on own account is misleading, Domanski 235 -236, The 
explanation of Domanski 237 does not really assist, See the criticism of the judgment supra, Cf the more acceptable 
view in Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [ 1984] ICR 589 at 599 and the discussion of United Indigo. 
2 °2. Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1 at 5, 6, Cf Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle 
[1978] 3 All ER 193 at 208, PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 282. 
203 Many authorities interpreted this dictum as being a definition of trade secrets: Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v 
Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 815, Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 543, 
United Sterling Corp Ltd v Felton and Mannion [1974] RPC 162 at 173 the discussion of Printers and the 
distinction between it and Under Water Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498, Chitty 
1205, MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1469, Heydon 86, Trebilcock 82. 
204 Potters- Ballotini Ltd v Weston -Baker [1977] RPC 202 206; The interdict was made more specific Johnson & 
Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135 at 142, 143; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] 
ICR 123 at 132 and see especially the discussion of Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193; 
Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373 at 378; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 
544, 546; PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 281; Garry 84 -85; The interdict which the Lord 
Ordinary was prepared to grant in Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 24 -25 should probably be 
regarded as too wide. The court rejected Printers and Finishers without properly considering it. This issue was not 
raised on Appeal; Harben Pumps (Scotland) Ltd v Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 the interdict here also seems too wide; 
This issue does not appear to have been properly investigated in WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 217, 219- 
220. It was argued by the defender that the restraint was not based on precise trade secrets. But the defender later 
made an undertaking in similar terms and the issue was not really canvassed as the case concerned interim 
injunction; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 735 although there are still some problems with 
vagueness of the remedy; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1160; Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 
GWD 7 -355; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1471; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 
433. 
205. 
Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 335; Cf Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 
1977 SLT 38 at 41 in determining the balance of convenience in an interim interdict case did not regard this issue 
as relevant. 
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In both these types of cases, trade secrets can be protected fairly and effectively by properly 
framed restraints of trade 206 
5.7. Different types of trade secrets, especially customer and other business knowledge 
Trade secrets can roughly be divided into two different categories 207, although no scheme can be 
rigidly applied 208. Secrets regarding special manufacturing processes and the technical nature of 
products are paradigmatic trade secrets 209. Commercial information such as trade secrets about 
pricing, customers, suppliers, marketing or important business policies will also, in appropriate 
circumstances, be regarded as trade secrets 210 
A rudimentary notion that commercial information can be protected by restraint was already 
recognised in some cases that preceded Mason and Herbert Morris 211, but it was only refined 
206 Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1 at 6, Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 
623, See Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 at 601; This is perhaps how the conundrum posed by 
Megarry J in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47 and 49 should be answered; Littlewoods 
Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1479 although Lord Denning did not clearly keep different issues 
apart, Cf 1490 it can be submitted to the same criticism, 1485; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 
137 -138, See the criticism of the interpretation of these cases by Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 
at 347 -348 supra 5.3; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 132 -133 but see the criticism of Littlewoods 
supra; Chitty 1205; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1160; Forte 21 emphasised the practical 
necessity of wider restraint. His argument apparently applies to this point; Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd y Kruger 1979 
(4) 
SA 337 (W) 340 -342. 
Different categorisations were laid down by: Heydon 86, Turner 71ff for a more specific categorisation, Knobel 
489 and the examples of trade secrets mentioned, Neethling (1991) 561, Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 
1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 428 -430, Kerr 511. 
208. Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 138; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 
(W) 428; Pistorius 344 -345 takes the importance of the categorisation too far and this led to conceptual problems; 
Kerr 511. 
209. 
Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 UR 325; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 773; Caribonum 
Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 and 587; Amber Size and Chemical Co Ltd v Menzel [1913] 2 Ch 239; 
Herbert Morris 703; Forster & Sons Ltd v Suggett (1918) 35 TLR 87; United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson 
(1931) 49 RPC 178 where a process was not regarded as secret; Reid and Sigrist Ltd If Moss and Mechanism Ltd 
(1932) 49 RPC 461; Clark v Electronic Application (Comm) Ltd [1963] RPC 234; Technograph Printed Circuits 
Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 136, 138; Balston Ltd v 
Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330; Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135; 
Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 133 -134; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425 
although the court accepted that there were no such interests here 433; PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] 
IRLR 279; Gurry 90 -92; Farwell 67; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 28; Gloag 570 placed too 
much emphasis on the technical nature of secrets; McBx de 599 on the protection of an ongoing industrial process 
with reference to Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1468; Pest Control (Central 
Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 613; Coolair Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 
686 (W) 689 only this information was called trade secrets; BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 
47 (W); Christie 444. 
210 Infra. 
211 
Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322 at 326 -327; Wilford lfor v Gething (1859) 7 CBNS 305 at 
320; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453; Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 
1 
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afterwards 21 It must still in each case be determined whether the information constitutes a trade 
secret in the particular business according, to the standards set out above 213. Courts have, on 
occasion, gone too far in protecting this type of information in restraint of trade cases 214, and this 
has been especially true of customer information. In some cases the protection of this kind of 
knowledge was not properly related to trade secrets 215. In Scotland proper investigation was 
and 315; E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 309; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 
Ch 763 at 768; Pearks (Ltd) y Cullen (1912) 28 UR 371 at 372; Cf Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 532 where 
knowledge of area and the possibility of trade was also regarded as protectable although this was not conceptually 
distinguished from acquaintance with customers. 
212. 
Gifford Motor Co Ltd y Home [1933] Ch 935 at 947; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd y Harris [1977] 1 WLR 
1472 at 1480; Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 at 208; Lansing Linde Ltd y Kerr 
[1991] 1 All ER 418 at 426, 433, 435, Cf Davies 497; PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 
282; Blake 655 but see the criticism supra 4.5, 670, 672ff; Farwell 67; Gurry 92 -94, 94 -96; Turner 75; Hey-don 107; 
Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 40; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 
299; Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 73; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 
453 -454; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734 -735. In Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 
at 761 counsel argued that this showed that Faccenda was qualified in Scotland but it is doubtful, 731 but see infra 
5.8; SOS Bureau Ltd y Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36; WAC Ltd v Whitlock 1990 SLT 213 at 217; NCH (UK) Ltd 
v Mair 1994 GWD 34 -1986; Scotcoast Ltd y Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355; McBryde 599; MacQueen Stair 
Encyclopedia 1471; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 613; Coolair Ventilator Co 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd y Liebenberg 1967 (1) SA 686 (W) 689; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) 
SA 1092 (T) 1105; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436; Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T) 64; Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 
454 (C) 456 -457; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 428, 430, 429; Paragon Business 
Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 442 -444 with reference to Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v 
Yanasak. 
213 
E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 at 308; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 
136, 138, 139 -140, 136, 138; Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395; Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds 
[1994] FSR 52 at 59; Harben Pumps (Scotland) Ltd v Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 at 753; Hargreaves Vending Ltd v 
Moffatt 1990 GWD 26 -1437; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1159; Aramark plc v 
Sommerville 1995 GWD 8-408; Premier Medical & Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler 1971 (3) SA 866 
(W) 869 -870; U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 144; Allied 
Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 334 -335; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano 
(Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) 195 -196; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 487. 
14 
Millers Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 UR 413 at 414 although this statement is only part of the general 
discussion of the facts, 416; Blake 672 -673; Farwell 67; Cf Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd y McGhee 
1933 SC 148 at 154; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299, Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 
1985 SC 70 at 73, Hutchison & Craft v Burns 1994 GWD 26 -1547 and NCH (UK) Ltd v Mair 1994 GWD 34 -1986 
although it is difficult from the short report; Woolman 258's criticism applies here; Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 
147 at 153; Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 479 and the wide arguments of counsel; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van 
der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 69, See the criticism: Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) 850 (W) 
858, Neethling (1991) 561, Annual Survey (1984) 130; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd y Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 
404; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 760, 764. 
215 'Mason 734; Herbert Morris 714 -715; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 6.48 with reference to Attwood 578; 
Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935 at 966 -967 the court a quo is more acceptable at 947; JW Chafer 
Ltd v Lilley [1947] LW. 231 at 233 -234; Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 42; Spencer v Marchington 
[1988] IRLR 392 at 395; Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116; Geo A Moore & Co Ltd y Menzies 1989 
GWD 21 -868; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 314; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 150; Pest 
Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 613 and see 614: Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 362; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 500; Madoo 
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hampered by procedural difficulties. The trade secrets concept was not properly developed in 
earlier cases, while the later cases are a result of the dubious approach of protecting information 
about customers under the guise of the customer connections notion. But it is information that is 
to be protected here. It may lead to a severe undermining of the notion that mere personal skill 
cannot be the object of protection if this type of information is not also rigorously tested against 
trade secret requirements 
216 
5.8. A terminological maze: confidential information and trade secrets 
Various typologies have been used to denote a plethora of different ideas. The distinction between 
the terms "trade secret" and "confidential information" is especially difficult. Initially courts did not 
clearly distinguish the two terms 217. However, there is strong authority that they now denote 
different concepts. 
The most effective and accurate distinction would be to use the phrase "trade secret" to mean 
confidential information that has a commercial dimension Z18. Courts in England and Scotland have 
taken a wide view of confidential information, and it is suggested that only commercial 
information should come into play in the restraint of trade area. The term "trade secret" was used 
in the narrow sense. 
However, the courts have also used different further bases for distinction. Recent influential cases 
have reserved the term "trade secret" for information that can be protected after employment has 
terminated 219, while they have used the term "confidential information" in a wider sense that 
(Pty) Ltd v Wallace 1979 (2) SA 957 (T) 958; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 314; Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 760, 764; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 432. 
216 
Supra 4.5; Cf also Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 502 where the court accepted that a 
restraint would be for the protection of competition per se even though the employee had knowledge of customers. 
217. 
Domanski 232; In Afrikaans the courts have not always properly distinguished between " handelsgeheime" 
(trade secret) and "konfidensiele inligting" (confidential information). 
18. 
See supra 5.2.3; Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811 at 822 although 
it was stated that trade secret was not normally used in England; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 
425 although some aspects of the definition of trade secrets are probably too wide. 
219 
Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] RPC 239 at 253; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 
at 598 -599; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 136; Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 
330 at 347; Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 473; Lock International plc y Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 
373 at 378; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 256 -259; MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1469; Harben 
Pumps (Scotland) Ltd v Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 at 753; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 731 
followed in Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1158 read with 1160. Common between counsel 
Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 760, The court in Lux 1159 and McLeish 734 simply included both 
types of information under trade secrets. 
112 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
includes information that can only be protected during employment 220. This distinction will also 
be applied here, yet it is not unproblematic: 
- In analysing older cases it must be realised that different terminologies were previously used, 
especially in the restraint of trade context. 
- It is something of a misnomer to refer to information that is protectable during employment as 
being "confidential ". The typology cannot be used without keeping the principles 
underlying the distinction in mind 221. 
Courts have, in the recent cases, mostly stated that it is not only trade secrets that can be protected 
after termination of employment but trade secrets or its equivalent 222. The or its equivalent 
addition suggests that there is information beyond trade secrets that can be protected after 
termination of employment. 
It may be required because of a narrow interpretation of the words "trade secret ". Some courts, 
especially in recent decisions, have used trade secrets as meaning technical secrets 223. The courts 
have probably used the addition to show that technical knowledge and other knowledge that is at a 
similar level of confidentiality can be protected. If so interpreted, the addition will not be of much 
use here. A wider meaning - that is also often found in the authorities - has been given to the term 
"trade secret" in this work 224. 
However, the addition also has a second more useful meaning. In Malden 225 Lord Caplan gave a 
wider meaning to trade secrets, but he nevertheless acknowledged that "protection will be 
afforded not only to what can accurately be described as a trade secret but to information of a 
220. 
Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 347; Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 at 481; 
Manor EIectronics Ltd v Dickson [1988] RPC 618 at 624; Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc 
[1989] 1 FSR 135 at 140, 141, 143; Lansing Linde Ltd y Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 425 but see the discussion 
supra, 426, 435 where the court was critical of it; Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 543; PSM 
International plc v Whitehouse [ 1992] IRLR 279 at 281 -282; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734- 
735; Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 763; Atiyah 343; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 
(W) 527; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 426. 
221. Supra 5.3. 
222. 
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1984] ICR 589 598 -599, [1987] Ch 117 at 137; Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis 
[1987] ICR 464 at 473; Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink plc [1989] 1 FSR 135 at 140, 143; 
Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 3 All ER 373 at 378; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 258; 
Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 544; PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 
282; It seems this is the point made by Treitel 403 and 404; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 
1159 although the court later only talked of trade secrets. 
223. 
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 at 136 -138 some indication that the court understood it in this 
narrow sense; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 528. 
224. 
See Heydon 85ff. 
225. 
Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734 -735; Gurry 90. 
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highly confidential nature equivalent to such ". It might still be valuable as a general qualifier 
without any set meaning. 
6. Interest also has to exist during employment 
It is trite that the covenantee may not protect a business that was only carried on after the 
relationship between covenantor and covenantee is severed 226. It has been stressed that customers 
who were not customers during employment cannot be protected 227. 
In the older cases other reasons were given for this rule 228, but today it is probably an expression 
of the covenantor -related requirements for trade secrets and customer connections. The employee 
cannot build up acquaintance with customers or knowledge of trade secrets that did not exist 
during employment. 
There will, however, again be important qualifications to the general applications of this rule. 
English and Scots courts will not look at the actual position when determining this question 229. 
Judges determine effectiveness through a temporal periscope from the moment at which the 
restraint was concluded. The question therefore is not whether the interest actually existed during 
employment. The court will accept that a restraint meets this last mentioned requirement if it was 
foreseeable that restricted persons would be customers during employment, even when it turns out 
that the reasonably foreseeable scenario did not materialise. 
226. Not investigated Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653; Davies Turner & Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 656; 
Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 TLR 8; Chard v Hammond (1904) 48 Sol Jo 773; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch 
(1913) 109 LT 385 at 388; See the facts Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1160. 
27. Nicholls v Stretton (1847) 10 QB 346 and the argument of counsel 350 and 354 and especially the interjections 
of the court at 353 in discussing Hunlocke v Blucklowe 2 Str 739, Hunlocke v Blacklowe 2 Wms Saund 156, 
Rannie v Irvine; The court in Nicholls v Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42 merely enforced the restraint although it was 
stated that the terms of the injunction still had to be determined; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 ChD 154 and the 
discussion of Nicholls and Rannie; Moenich v Fenestre (1892) 67 LT 602; Dubowskì & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 
QB 478 at 483 was critical of the principle, 482 preferred the view that all customers could be protected and was 
critical of Baines, 484 -486 rejected this principle; Lewis & Lewis v Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 64; Konskì v Peet 
[1915] 1 Ch 530 at 539; East Essex Farmers Ltd v Holder (1926) 70 Sol Jo 1001 Konski preferred to Dubowskì; 
Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147 at 149; Gilford Motor Co Ltd y Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 960 
and 962 -963; Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 481; Not really discussed in GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash 
[1964] 2 All ER 10 but see 12; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486487; Not 
discussed in Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 although it should have been; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 
1989 SLT 450 at 452; Scottish Agricultural Industries plc v Richard 1990 GWD 13 -640; See also NCH (UK) Ltd v 
Mair 1994 GWD 34 -1986 where the court refused to allow an interdict that concerned competing in products not 
dealt in; Ex parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 479481 although no final stance was apparently taken, See 
especially the comment 479. 
228. See infra Ch 8.5.4. 
229. 
See also infra Ch 13. 
114 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
In England and Scotland an interest should therefore be protectable if it did not exist at 
conclusion, or if it was smaller at conclusion but would foreseeably expand. However, there are 
limits to this. The covenantee -related aspects of trade secret and customers connections will have 
to be satisfied, and this will place important temporal limitations on expansion. Future expansion 
can only be protected if the covenantee would foreseeably be able to build up acquaintances with 
wider customers or if he would get to know wider trade secrets. Hence expansion would at least 
foreseeably have to take place during employment 230. Any other foreseeable expansion of 
interests can only be protected if it was inherent in the existing interest at termination of 
employment 231. 
It will be apparent that there are two aspects regarding the time at which an interest will 
(foreseeably) have to exist if this is combined with what was said earlier. The first question will be 
whether it was foreseeable that it would constitute an interest while the restraint is in force, and 
the second is that it will have to be foreseeable that an interest must exist during employment. In 
the case of future expansion the two requirements will act in the following manner: 
- It must be foreseeable that the expansion will take place at such a time that it can exist as an 
interest of the covenantee against which a restraint can be set -off 
- It must be foreseeable that the restraint will come into effect during employment so that the 
covenantor -related aspects can be satisfied. 
In South Africa the courts will determine whether an interest is reasonably protectable at the time 
when they are asked to enforce the restraint. Judges can therefore frequently ask whether interests 
existed during employment, although they will often have to make a prediction as to whether the 
interest will exist and expand during the duration of the restraint 232. 
7. The employment must exist for long enough to enable the covenantor to get into 
proper contact with customers 
Compliance with the covenantor -related requirements of both trade secrets and customer 
connections will also depend on the duration of employment. Employment will have to be for long 
enough to enable the covenantor to gain influence over customers or knowledge of trade secrets 
233 
230 
Heydon 134 -135 does not properly appreciate this. 
231 
Cf infra 11 and goodwill cases. 
232. 
See infra Ch 13. 
233 
Cf Notes Columbia Law Review (1929) 29 347 at 351. 
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In South Africa this will be simple after Magna Alloys. The case will normally come to court when 
the relationship has broken down. The court may then look at actual duration 234. However, the 
pre Magna Alloys, English, and Scottish approach to the time at which reasonableness should be 
determined is problematic 
235. 
In many of these cases the court merely looked at the length of the 
notice period 
236. But this seems too narrow. Reasonableness will have to be determined by 
looking at the likely duration of employment, and this should be done less mechanically 237. 
Sometimes the facts themselves may suggest solutions. In the pre Magna Alloys case of Allied 
Electric 238 the restraint was concluded as part of a probationary contract. The court accepted that 
the parties had still only contemplated a short term relationship at this stage. 
8. Interests that cannot be protected in post -employment restraints 
The courts have also singled out some interests that cannot be protected in post -employment 
restraints. None of these interests can be utilised as a basis for justifying a restraint. 
8.1. Restraints against mere competition 
Freedom from competition which ex- employees might generate cannot be the basis upon which a 
restraint of trade can be justified 239. A different view was initially followed in Stewart 240 in 
Scotland, but it has since been discarded 241. 
234. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1106 -1107; Recycling Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 259; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 
482 (T) 511; Waltons Stationery Co (Pty) Ltd v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 513. 
235 
See the criticism of National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1106 -1107. 
236 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1377; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 
(T) 223 -224; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 579; Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 
348 -349; Cf also Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 259. 
237. 
Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 26, 30; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 643; Remington Typewriter 
Co v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168 at 170, See also infra Ch 9.9. and 8.3. 
238. 
Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 332 and 334. 
239 
Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 48 TLR 613 at 614; JW Chafer Ltd v Lilley [1947] LJR 231 at 233 -234; 
SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 638; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 
1372, 1375; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 136; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 
1 WLR 1472 at 1478; The Marley Tile Co Ltd v Johnson [1982] IRLR 75 at 77; Winfield (1946) 320; Ex Parte 
Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 479; Oosthuizen 383. 
240. 
Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 especially 1170 and 1172; Cf Eksteen JA in Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 
742 (A) 762 -763 accepted that it could be protected where the parties are in a position of equal bargaining but this 
is unacceptable, See Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 773 per Van Heerden JA but he did not compare 
analogous types of contracts, See infra 10. 
241 Questioned and explained away see Giblin v Murdoch 1979 SLT ShCt 5 at 6; See also in Scotland: SOS 
Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37, Christie Encyclopaedia 597 -598; In English law the court expressly 
refrained from following Stewart: Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] 
AC 181 at 190, Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin [19661 1 All ER 126 at 139 although it is wrong to state that 
Vancouver is the only case where a restraint was not upheld on this basis. 
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A restraint will mostly limit the ability of the covenantor to compete with his ex- employer 242. 
Competition will be incidentally restricted when parties aim to protect another interest that is 
regarded as legitimate. It is a mistake to think that competition may not be restricted at all by a 
restraint 243. However, the validity of a post -employment restraint may not be based merely on the 
interest which the covenantee has in reducing competition 244. 
Some confusion has arisen on this point in Scotland. McBryde 245 states that it was at one time in 
England believed that no covenant against competition would be upheld. The author then attempts 
242. Routh v Jones [ 1947] 1 All ER 758 at 761; See Gooderson 415. 
243 Farwell 66 must not be interpreted too strictly. Cf Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 191. 
244. Eastes v Russ [ 1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490; Herbert Morris 702; Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 at 578 and 
589; Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 544; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 
12, 31; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 395; Bowler y Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 
651; Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 181 at 190; Putsman v 
Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 642; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 181 and Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 
at 761; Jenkins v Reid [ 1948] 1 All ER 471 at 478; Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 449; M 
& S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 818; Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 195- 
196; Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1 at 6; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 
1423, 1425; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Sicilian [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1235; Marion White Ltd v Francis 
[1972] 3 All ER 857 at 862; Court Homes Ltd v Wilkins (1983) 133 NLJ 698; Kirby (Inspector of Taxes) v Thorn 
EMI plc [1988] 1 WLR 445 at 453; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; 
Heydon 78; Winfield (1946) 326; Treitel 402; Atiyah 341; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 407 quoted Tension 
Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 347 the author starts with a general statement but it is 
limited by a quote from Herbert Morris; Gurry 214; Nelson 39 is unacceptable where the competition question is set 
against the interests test, 43 n42 where mere competition is perceived as a public interest issue is also unacceptable; 
Selwyn 385; Taylor v Campbell 1926 SLT 260 at 261; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 298; 
Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 150, 152 -153; Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT 
ShCt 8 at 9; Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 with reference to the Scottish Farmers' case; Rentokil Ltd v 
Hampton 1982 SLT 422 at 423; Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90; Rentokil Ltd v 
Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116 with reference to Scottish Farmers' Dairy; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 
727 at 731 at 733, See supra 1, Accepted in Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1157 read with 
1160; Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 762 despite the criticism of counsel for the pursuer 761, 760 
McLeish utilitsed by both counsels, See also 763; Gloag 570; Walker 188; Christie Encyclopaedia 590, 594, 595; 
Scott Robinson 161; Woolman 254. See also 257 although he is not correct in stating that the approach of the 
courts have led to the protection of competition alone; Grigson v Kinsman 1921 NLR 172 at 176; Gordon v Van 
Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773, 775; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311; Tilney v Rock and Way 
1928 EDL 108 at 110; Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 at 152; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 
492; Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 42 -43; Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 
502; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 3; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 
1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 785; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W); Recycling Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258; Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 
(C) 402, See also 403 and 407; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 792; Magna Alloys 904 -905 and the 
discussion of the decision in the court a quo; Basson v Chiiwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 771, 772; Van der Menve 158 
was careful he merely stated that competition per se cannot normally be protected; Christie 443; Lubbe and Murray 
258; Woker 333. 
245 
'McBryde 595 with reference to Herbert Morris 708; See similarly: Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [ 1977] FSR 39 
at 41, Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1209. 
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to show that such restrictions have since been accepted both in England 246 and Scotland Z47. But 
he is mixing two different issues. The cases that McBryde endeavours to contradict concern the 
question whether freedom from competition as an interest can be restricted, while the cases which 
he utilises for answering this point pertain to the form which a restraint clause may take. A 
particular formula for a restraint of trade clause has, especially in Scotland, been called a "restraint 
against competition" 
248. 
A distinction has also sometimes been drawn between fair and unfair competition 249, but this 
distinction should not be taken too far. Unfair competition has merely meant interference with 
competition that is not justified by a proprietary interest. Protection against unfair competition in 
the wider sense might not be irrelevant 250, but it has not played an independent role in establishing 
protectable interests. In Tension Envelopes 
251 the covenantee used very specialised employees. 
There were no people trained in this field in South Africa, and workers had to be imported from 
Germany. Moreover, the covenantee was involved in very destructive and acrimonious 
competition with another company which apparently attempted to filch its hard -gained employees. 
But the court still did not allow a restraint that would merely restrict an employee from working 
for such a competitor. This is correct if it is considered that it is not the employee who is 
competing unfairly with the covenantee. But even more direct unfair competition by the 
covenantor will probably not be regarded as a basis for protection per se. 
8.2. Restraints against the use of personal skill, knowledge and other personal attributes 
The courts have steadfastly refused to accept the effectiveness of restrictions that inhibit 
employees in the use of their personal skill, knowledge and other personal attributes 
252. The 
246. Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158. 
247. Especially Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 152, 153. 
248. 
Infra Ch 8.5.2; See especially Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 152; This 
is robably how Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 487 must be interpreted. 
249. 
Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 394; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 
189; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503 
250 Infra 9.12. 
251 Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W). 
252. 
Contra Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 486 although it was not done expressly. Cf 490 where Phillimore J 
confusingly talked of personal knowledge of customers as a legitimate interest; Mason 734; Attwood v Lamont 
[1920] 3 KB 571 at 589 -590 and 596; The Court of Appeal in Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 741 upheld the whole 
of the restraint. The judgment is very short but it emphasised that the covenantor had a well known reputation. This 
cannot in itself be the basis for protection. The Kings Bench decision is more acceptable; Hepworth Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 394; Routh v 
Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 181; See also Electric Transmission Ltd v Dannenberg (1949) 66 RPC 183 it was not 
discussed, See Chitty 1204, Heydon 107 this distinction would have provided the easiest solution to the case; Cf 
Clark v Electronic Applications (Commercial) Ltd [1963] RPC 234 at 236 with reference to Pilkington Bros Ltd v 
Proctor (unrep); Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1376 -1377; Commercial Plastics Ltd v 
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concept of personal skill will play a dual role. It will be important in defining the interests that can 
be protected. It was shown above that it will play a role in the delineation of both trade secrets and 
customer connections 
253. But the concept of personal skill will not only be relevant on a 
definitional level. A restraint will not be effective where it merely restricts the personal skills of the 
covenantor, although the courts have not been as careful in formulating this principle as they have 
been in outlining the same idea with regard to protection against competition. 
8.3. Restraints against protecting investment in human skills 
It will also not create protectable interests where some investment has been made in improving the 
skills or in enhancing the earning capacity of the employee. It is settled in England and Scotland 
that the covenantor may not be restricted from performing certain acts that will be detrimental to 
the business of the covenantee merely because he acquired skill or personal knowledge during 
employment 254. The covenantee does not get to own the skill and aptitudes of the covenantor 
merely because he has assisted the covenantor in acquiring them 
255. In Hepworth 256 an actor was 
restricted from using a pseudonym that had been devised and developed by the actor in tandem 
Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 640; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401; Sadler v Imperial Life 
Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 390; Anson 325; Atiyah 341; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401; 
Farwell 66; Cf the discussion of AL Corbin Corbin on Contracts 1394 by Heydon 105 -106; Winfield (1946) 326; 
Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773. 775, 776; 
Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 492, Aling 
and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220; Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 501 at 502 cannot 
be accepted. The court suggested that the restraint might have been reasonable on the basis that the employee was 
trained in Europe; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 579; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 
1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 347 with reference to Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston supra, 354; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 
(2) SA 243 (C) 245; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C); Highlands Park Football Club 
Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198, 200 -201; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 
482 (T) 486, 503 -504; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 772 -773, 778 "ordinarily" these interests cannot be 




Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 773 -774; Herbert Morris 704 -705, 710, 717; Mason 
740 -741; Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 542, 544; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 
TLR 390 at 394; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 24; Gilford Motor Ltd v Horne [1933] 
Ch 935 at 947; Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 215, 216; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 
181; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 at 761; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 239; SW 
Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 638; Home Counties Dairies Ltd y Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 
1229; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 400; Anson 325; Atiyah 341; Cheshire Fifoot and 
Furmston 401; Chitty 1204; Heydon 118 -119; Heydon McGill 336; Winfield (1946) 326; Selwyn 385; Cf Mulvein v 
Murray 1908 SC 528 at 532 was decided before Mason and it must be approached with caution; Minimax Ltd y 
Geddes (1914) 31 ShCt Rep 36 at 39; Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90; It was common 
cause between the parties in Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 731 accepted Lux Traffic Controls 
Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1158 read with 1160, The exposition of principles was also relied on in Malden 
Timber 
Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 760 the submissions were utilised by both parties; Walker 188. 
. Infra 16. 
256 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 15 -16, 18 -19. 
119 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
with the producer who employed him. The court accepted that this pseudonym was not a 
proprietary interest in the hands of the producer even though the contract expressly provided that 
it would be. It was accepted that the restraint was part of the personal make -up of the covenantor, 
and it was acknowledged that investment made in the promotion of the covenantor did not 
transform the name into a proprietary interest for the employer 257. 
In Magna Alloys 258 there are some indications in the discussion of the facts that the court saw 
investment in training as one of the aspects that determined reasonableness. However, the case 
cannot serve as authority for such a radical departure from traditional restraint of trade principles: 
- It was not strongly suggested if it was suggested at all. 
- A different view was taken in most other South African cases before and after Magna Alloys 259 
- Investment in human capital is not a proprietary interest, and it will be contended that the 
proprietary interest notion is still the safest foundation for recognising protectable interests 
260 
An employer must be able to protect his investment in the improvement of employees, but it 
cannot be done by simply concluding a post -employment restraint 261. It will often happen that the 
employer will be able to protect his investment in human capital by relying on another legitimate 
interest 262, and investment in human capital will be one of the factors that will influence the 
attitude of the court when approaching the reasonableness of a restraint 263. But other techniques 
will have to be used where this is not so 264. 
257, 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 22. 
258. Magna Alloys 904 -905; It played some role in Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 544; 
Some dicta in Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) are also too wide; Cf also Fisher v 
Salon Mystique 1995 (2) SA 136 (0) 141. The court a quo relied on this. Van Coller J on Appeal accepted that the 
case could not be resolved by relying on investment in time and attention given to the employee as it was not 
pproperly pleaded but reliance on this issue was not attacked on the merits. Some arguments are confusing. 
59 
Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773, 775; African Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 at 129; 
Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311; Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 110; Thompson 
v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 at 152; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 347; 
Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) 191 (W) 200 -201; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 
1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 76 -77; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 259 although it 
was related to granting of an interdict; Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 159; Sibex Engineering Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503 -504, 507 -508; Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) 





Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 76; Humphrys y 
1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 402. 
262. 
Infra 16.2 especially the criticism of Kales 195. 
263. 
Blake 652 -653; Heydon 106 with reference to Forster & Sons Ltd v Suggett (19 
not clearly expounded in the case; See infra Ch 9. 
264 
Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 402. 
Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 
18) 35 TLR 87 although it was 
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- The covenantor may be bound to a long employment contract. 
- Employers may require that an employee buys himself out of the employment to compensate for 
investment made in him 265 
9. Sale of business 266 
Restraints in sales of businesses that restrict the seller after the sale have also come before the 
court with considerable frequency. These types of contracts can therefore also be described as 
classical. 
10.Protection against competition in sale of goodwill cases 
Some authorities hold that competition can be restricted in sales of business cases 267, or that 
competition can be restricted in a sale of business but not after the termination of employment 268. 
This may create the impression that competition per se is protectable in sale of goodwill cases. But 
statements to this effect can be misleading 269. It is more acceptable to see its protection as being 
incidental to the guarding of the more specific proprietary interest, goodwill 270. Competition is 
not the ultimate object of protection. Protection against competition has been closely tied up with 
265 
Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89. 
266 
See also: William Fraser & Son v Renwick 1906 SLT 443; Rodger v Herbertson 1909 SC 256; George Walker 
& Co v Jann 1991 SLT 771 at 773 discussed infra Ch 1; Dunman v Trautman (1891) 9 SC 24; Coetzee v Eloff 
1923 EDL 113. 
267. 
Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 272; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246; 
Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 41; There is the implication in Dumbarton Steamboat Co Ltd v 
MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 at 997; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 868 relied on by Kerr 209; Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 773. 
268 Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick [1939] 2 All ER 85 at 92; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 
at 238; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1372; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton 
[1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1229; Halsbury 3rd ed vol 38 25 -26; Blake 643; Treitel 404; Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co 
(Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 150; Gloag 570; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 60ff; Aling and 
Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 650 and the suggestions of 
counsel; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198; Kerr 508; Oosthuizen 383 although 




Herbert Morris 701 -702, 708 -709; Vandervell v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 190; Kirby (Inspector of Taxes) v 
Thorn EMI plc [1988] 1 WLR 445 at 452 -453; Anson 322 -323; Atiyah 340; Treitel 402; Walker 187; Super Safes 
(Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 785; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 
1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) especially 234, 236 and 240 stressed that protection of competition depended on a proprietary 
interest; Christie 442 -443; Cf also Van Heerden AJA in A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 
417 -419. The terminology used in the justification of implied protection in sale of goodwill cases cannot be 
accepted. He called interference with goodwill other than solicitation of customers indirect interferences with 
goodwill and he stated that this was interference by competition per se; Van der Merwe 155; Schoombee 132. 
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the protection of goodwill sold 271. These statements mean that it will generally be sufficient in sale 
of business cases to show that it is a restraint against competition, because goodwill mostly 
justifies protection against competition. 
11. Protection of goodwill 
Courts have accepted that the protection of goodwill lies at the heart of these sale of business 
cases Z72. Goodwill as such will be a legitimate interest in sale of business cases 273. The buyer can 
protect the customers and the ability of the business to attract custom against interference from the 
covenantor 274. Business connections can also be protected in sale of business cases. But much 
wider interests are also at stake. Goodwill and customer connections must therefore be 
distinguished 275. A customer connection is only an aspect of goodwill 276. It is acceptable to 
271. The notion of restriction of competition was already tied up with the promotion of transferred interests in 
Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354; Mason 737; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 589- 
590; Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v 
Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64; Trebilcock 260, 266 -267; Christie Encyclopaedia 591; McBryde 600 -601; 
Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773 -774; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311 -312; 
Estate Fisher y Bradley 1931 CPD 46 at 48; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 492; Wilkinson v 
Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 13, Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 281; Diner v Carpet 
Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; David Wahl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 435. 
272. Supra 10 and infra 16. 
273. 
Goodwill concept was already utilised: Archer v Marsh (1837) 6 Ad & El 959 at 967, Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 
CB 241 at 260, Avery v Langford (1854) 1 Kay 663 at 665, Nordenfelt 548; Herbert Morris 701 and 708; British 
Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 575 with reference to Herbert Morris; D 
Bates & Co v Dale [1937] 3 All ER 650 at 654 -655; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 especially 
192 and 194 -195, 193 should not be interpreted too narrowly; Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 
at 190; Kirby (Inspector of Taxes) v Thorn EMI plc [1988] 1 WLR 445 especially 452453; Allied Dunbar (Frank 
Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64; Anson 322; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 411 -412 where the 
court stressed proprietary interest and the protection of a business although goodwill was not specifically 
mentioned; Atiyah 340; Chitty 1198; Collinge 420; Davies 491; Treitel 402; Already recognised in a minority 
judgment in Scotland in Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1113; Whish Stair 
Encyclopedia 1209; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 492; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 60; 
Schwartz v Subel 1948 (2) SA 983 (T) 988 -989; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd 
v Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 785; Lubbe and Murray 260 with reference to MO Van Heerden and J 
Neethling Die Reg Aangaande Onregmatige Mededinging (1983) asked whether these interests are protectable. 
274. 
On the meaning of goodwill see: Churton v Douglas (1859) Johns 174; Inland Revenue Commissioner v Muller 
& Co's Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217 at 223 -224; Kirby (Inspector of Taxes) v Thorn EMI plc [1988] 1 WLR 445 
at 453; Trebilcock 260, 266 -267; Green's Encyclopaedia vol 7 465ff, Coetzee v Eloff 1923 EDL 113 at 115 -116; A 
Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 417; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh - 
Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 232 with reference to Inland Revenue Commissioner y Muller & Co Margarine Ltd 
[1901] AC 217 at 234 and In re Brown 242 NY 1 at 6 per Cardozo J; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edens) Bpk Ltd v 
Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 573; Botha v Carapax Shadeports (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 202 (A) 211 -212; Neethling 
(1991) 212 on the so- called "reg op werfkrag "; Lubbe and Murray 260. 
75. 
There can be goodwill without customer connections Luck At Davenport-Smith [1977] EG 73 at 89; Cf Kerchiss 
v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 240 -241 where goodwill was related to the protection of trade secrets 
this is also unnecessary; Trebilcock 93 accepted that there was some confusion in this area; Botha y Carapax 
Shadeports (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 202 (A) 212 is not always satisfactory; Rautenbach & Reinecke 555 stated that 
goodwill may lie at the foundation of most protectable interests but not all goodwill will always be protectable. 
122 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
describe the positive attitudes of customers towards a business as "goodwill" 277. But it is 
imprecise 278 to say that it is goodwill that may be protected when customer connections are meant 
279. 
It is even more unacceptable to aver that goodwill, in the wide sense, can be protected in post - 
employment cases 
280 
Heydon 231 contended that only customer connections and trade secrets can be protected in sale of 
business cases. But this is not supported by the authorities. Only Pellow 282 is open to such an 
interpretation, yet this case has not been followed. Heydon is not able to draw his approach 
through consistently 
283. 
He comes very close to accepting the view expressed here, but he 
struggles to cut the gordian knot because he uses false conceptual tools. 
12. The protection of trade secrets in sale of business or sale of trade secret cases 
Parties to a sale of a business will seldom rely on the protection of a trade secret because: 
- Trade secrets are seldom transferred in these cases. 
275. Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 857 at 862 quoting Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 
All ER 1227 at 1228; GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 542; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 502, 509. 
277. SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 640 -641; Gurry 210; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 
33 at 37; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 510 -511; Paragon Business Forms 
(Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 444 the court referred to Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) 
SA 537 (A) 542. 
278. Routh v Jones [ 1947] 1 All ER 758 at 760 where the court accepted that it did not use the word accurately. 
279. The court a quo in Whitmore v King (1919) 119 LT 533 stressed that a restraint was made for the protection of 
goodwill and was part of the goodwill; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 164, 168; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All 
ER 182 at 189; Cf Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 there was a qualification in 
the restraint that customers could only be solicited in so far as it interfered with goodwill but that will not add much 
to validity of the clause; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 12 this might lie at the basis of 
some dicta that are too wide, Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1228, 1229; Spencer v 
Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 396; Briggs v Oates [1991] 1 All ER 407 at 409; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v 
Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452; Walker 187 in his discussion of sale of business restraints mentioned goodwill but 
he incorrectly equates this to business connections; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220 although 
the dictum can also be interpreted more narrowly; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 794; Nachtsheim v 
Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C); Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 74; Biografic (Pvt) Ltd 
v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 350. 
280. 
Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 454 the emphasis on goodwill will be unacceptable today; The 
emphasis in Pieterse v Cilliers 1945 (2) PH A.31 53 at 53 -54 cannot be accepted; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) 
Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 573; The confusion in the arguments of counsel in Humphrys v Laser Transport 
Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 403 was correctly rejected by the court. 
281. 
Heydon 184 et seq. 
282. 
Pellow v Ivey (1933) 49 UR 422, Cf Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 489 where Pellow was 
emphasised in the application of law to facts. A more acceptable view was taken in the theoretical discussion; Cf 
8gme Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [ 1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1229 although the case is not clear. 
. Heydon 186 and 192. 
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- Goodwill may accompany secrets, and wider protection can often be obtained if goodwill is 
simply relied on as the protected interest 
284. 
Still, there are cases where restraints in sales of businesses have been upheld on the basis that they 
are aimed at protecting trade secrets 285, and there are cases where the separate protection of trade 
secrets has played an important role 286. This issue will often come to the fore where the strongest 
or only element of sale is an important trade secret 287. However, in the Iast mentioned type of 
case one should perhaps talk of a sale of a trade secret rather than a sale of a business. 
Systems Reliability 288 even suggested that wider protection of information will be possible in sale 
cases. It will be noted from the discussion above that the court in Faccenda 289 accepted that only 
trade secrets proper could be protected by restraint. However, Harman J contended that this 
limitation will not apply in sale of information cases because the information itself is sold. But 
what distinguishes a trade secret from other confidential information is that it is a proprietary 
interest and not mere personal skill and knowledge. It is impossible to see how the proposition 
that the sale of information should change its legal status can be justified. 
13. Seller -related aspects in sale of business restrictions 
Goodwill - and sometimes trade secrets - are the object of protection in sale of goodwill cases. 
But the buyer cannot protect any goodwill or trade secret that he holds against the seller. The 
covenantor must have been the seller of the trade secret or goodwill that is protected 290. The 
covenantor cannot be restricted from interfering with goodwill or trade secrets that the covenantee 
already has or will obtain in future from another source. 
284. Turner 116 -117; Pellow v Ivey (1933) 49 TLR 422 contended that trade secrets will receive wider protection 
but see the criticism supra 11. 
285. Bryson v Whitehead (1822) 1 Sim & St 74; Hagg v Darley (1878) 47 LJCh 567; Heydon 185. 
286. 
Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 384ff. 
287. 
Cf Maxim- Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch 630 at 660 where the court 
argued that restrictions in sales of trade secrets should even fall outside the doctrine. Christie Encyclopaedia 596; 
Turner 117; Winfield (1946) 326; Cf the example in the minority judgment Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v 
Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1113. 
289. Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 384. 
Supra 5. 
290. 
Nordenfelt 540 -541; Mason 737; Herbert Morris 708; British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v 
Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 575 although the court did not clearly rely on goodwill as an interest, Cf also the 
rejection of Smedley's Ltd v Smedley (note added to the case); D Bates & Co y Dales [1937] 3 All ER 650 at 
654- 
655; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [ 1988] IRLR 60 at 64; Treitel 402; Gloag 572; McBryde 
601; Walker 187. 
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The courts should not, however, take a rigorous view of goodwill as at the time of transfer. 
Included in goodwill is its ability to expand 291, and this will also be protectable 292. It has been 
acknowledged that the buyer can protect himself from competition by the seller in respect of more 
than the existing customers 293. This point is correct, although it would be more acceptable to 
describe it with reference to the object of protection, namely goodwill 294. Hence, expansion of 
goodwill that was not inherent in the goodwill as and when it was sold should not be protectable 
295 
This principle does not constitute a breach of the rule in English and Scots law that the restraint 
must be judged at the time of the conclusion of the contract 296. The court will not ask whether 
actual expansion has occurred; it will simply inquire whether it was foreseeable that the goodwill 
itself would expand. In South Africa, the principle that the validity of a restraint should be 
determined at the time at which the court is asked to enforce the restraint, may cause some 
difference in application. But the time principle mostly will be less important than in post - 
employment cases. Sales of goodwill will often come before the court before future development 
has taken place. Only the point of departure will differ. The courts will allow the restraint if they 
can predict that future expansion will take place and if they are satisfied that it will be an 
expansion of the goodwill as sold. 
Wider protection of future expansion will be possible in sale of business cases than in post - 
employment cases, because goodwill will often have great inherent potential for expansion. 
Conversely, expansion possibilities will be wider in post- employment cases, because expansion 
291 
See outside the doctrine: Maxim's Ltd v Dye [1977] 1 WLR 1155 at 1160, My Kinda Bones Ltd (t/a Chicago 
Rib Shack) v Dr Pepper's Stove Co Ltd (t/a Dr Pepper's Manhattan Rib Shack) [1984] FSR 289 at 315. 
292. 
Trebilcock 241; Treitel 403, Gooderson 421422 with reference to Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips 
(1904) LT 363 although it deals with a post -employment covenant; Olds v Tollgate Holdings Ltd 1970 (4) SA 343 
(T), Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 107 -109; Commercial and Industrial 
Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 232 -233. 
293 
Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] MLR 60 at 64-65; All future expansion provided for 
by Articles of a Company cannot be protected Dumbarton Steamboat Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 at 997 
and 998; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 867 -868, and 870, See Heydon 186 although he took an incorrect 
view of the object of protection in these cases; Kerr 509, 517; Lubbe and Murray 261; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) 
SA 863 (C) 868, See also 870; Cf in partnerships: Lindley 10 -179, Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 at 12 
although heavy weather was made of explaining a completely wrong interpretation of Macfarlane v Kent [1965] 2 
All ER 376. 
294 
Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 107 -109. 
295. 
Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64 -65; Heydon 186 -187 although his 
view is muddled, see the criticism supra; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 
226 (ZS) 232 -233 although it did not always clearly distinguish earnings as a means of valuing goodwill and the 
future ability to attract customers, See also 236, Cf also the criticism of 239 infra Ch 8.5.2. 
296. 
See infra Ch 13. 
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during employment can be protected while there is not such an interim period in sale of goodwill 
cases. 
14.Interests that cannot be protected in sale of business restraints 
Mere competition is not a legitimate interest in sale of business cases 297. Personal skill, as such, 
also may not be protected here 298. Wider interference than with post- employment restraints will 
however be possible, as a result of the wider scope of goodwill protectable here. 
15.Interests in another business to the one that the employee works in or the one that 
is sold 
Some authorities have stated that the covenantee may not normally protect the interests of another 
business in which he has an interest, but in which the covenantor was not employed in a post - 
employment restraint case 299 or with which the seller did not have a connection in the case of sale 
of a goodwill restraint 300 But this test might produce nice problems, especially in post - 
employment cases. It was of greater importance in pre -Mason law when narrower principles had 
not yet developed, but it has now become obsolete. The problems discounted by it can be more 
accurately accommodated within the requirement that legitimate interests only will be protected. 
Yet, it will not be wrong to continue to apply this test, as long as some care is taken. In Henry 
Leetham Sot the employee worked for one particular company. It was contended by the employer 
that the covenant had been concluded for all or any of the companies in a group. The test that is 
discussed here was applied, but the court merely equated company law divisions with business 
divisions. The question whether "another business" was being protected was not really addressed. 
Today it might often be that the business in which the employee works is operated by more than 
one company. In such cases fastidious reliance on formal divisions will be unrealistic. The result in 
Henry Leetham is probably correct, but the court could have been more careful in achieving it. 
297. Supra 8.1. 
298. 
In so far as Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 589 is open to this view it cannot be accepted. See Turner 
114; See Turner, 117 118 and 119 -120 with reference to Kerchiss At Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235. 
299 Morse v Fowler (1899) 44 Sol Jo 89; Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone -White [1907] 1 Ch 322 
especially at 327. See Winfield (1946) 327; Bromley v Smith [1909] 2 KB 235 at 241 although the other business 
otected was a future business; Anson 326; Chitty 1208; Christie 442; Kerr 510. 
British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 576 -577 and the discussion of 
30enry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone -White [1907] 1 Ch 322 at 326. 
. Henry Leetham & Sons Lt Johnstone -White [19071 1 Ch 322 at 326 -327, Cf the different view of the facts a 
quo Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd 
v 
v Johnstone -White [1907] 1 Ch 189 and the reservations of Neville J will disappear 
when current law is applied even if the approach followed on appeal is not applied. 
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16. The principles underlying the protection of the hitherto recognised interests 
There is at least some infringement of freedom of work where a contract falls within the doctrine. 
The aim of the restraint of trade doctrine is to protect the ability to work, as an important public 
policy value, against infringement in cases where it does not constitute a net benefit to the 
community. The question in these cases will accordingly be whether such net benefit exists. The 
courts have had to translate economic acumen and social policy into legal principles, and they have 
addressed the conflicts between legal principles within the broad milieu of public policy. 
Judges have found that the most convenient starting point for determining whether infringement is 
justified is the interests of the covenantee. They have accepted that it is economically necessary 
that certain interests be protected 302, and they have delineated interests that can, in terms of public 
policy 
303, be regarded as justifying infringements with freedom of work. The freedom of work 
principle has been regarded as so important that the courts have been slow to recognise that any 
interests of the covenantee may justify interference with it. Only interests that are of clear social 
and economic importance have been allowed. But is there a general principle that underlies all 
protectable interests? 
It might be argued that confidentiality and acquired knowledge is the basis for protection. There is 
also some historical justification for this 304. But the principle would be both too wide and too 
narrow. Confidentiality in its widest sense has not been protected as it stifles personal skill and 
knowledge to an unacceptable degree, while other interests that cannot be directly related to 
confidence have been regarded as protectable. 
It might be argued that broad market- related principles should lie at the basis of protectable 
interests. But the role of free -market notions in the area of restraint of trade should not be over- 
estimated 305 It will promote protectability where it is shown that the legal guarding of a certain 
interest would promote the free market. Yet it will not be conclusive. 
Only one yardstick has been consistently used. It has been often stated in post -employment and 
sale of goodwill cases that only proprietary or exceptional proprietary interests will be protectable 
302 
Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322 at 326 -327. 
303. 
Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin [19661 1 All ER 126 at 139 see however the criticism infra; Blake 650- 
651. 
304 
Lubbe and Murray 260 -261; See supra 4.5 on the notion that confidentiality also underlies customer 
connection. 
305 
See supra Ch 3.6.2. 
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306 (although it might be more precise to talk of patrimonial interests in South Africa 3 °', and 
perhaps also in the other legal systems), while mere commercial interests cannot be the object of 
protection in the traditional cases 308. In Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 309 it is said that a 
proprietary interest or some other legitimate interest such as a right to work must be proved by the 
covenantee, but proprietary interests of the covenantee are here balanced against the right to work 
of the covenantor. The interests of the two parties are confused. What the covenantee has to 
prove is that there is an interest that will counterbalance the infringement. 
The courts have drawn an analogy with the concept of property. But it is not property in the sense 
of the law of things that is normally regarded as legitimate interests. Hence, it is difficult to 
306 Mason 740 -741 started to compare protectable knowledge to "possession of material goods "; Herbert Morris 
710, 713, 714; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 15, 25, 34, See also the basis on which 
arguments were put forward 8 -9; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 590; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 
642; Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 215; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 181, 183; M & 
S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 815; Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 192; 
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 344; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 
273 at 281; George Silverman Ltd v Silverman (1969) 113 Sol Jo 563; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400, 401 and 
407; Chitty 1198, 1203, Cf also 1212 stated that a restraint in a sale of business is necessary to create a "property 
right ". It is probably less confusing to talk of proprietary interests; Collinge 420; Heydon 85, 261, 264; Trebilcock 
67 -70; Winfield (1946) 326; Treitel 402, 404, 405; The argument of counsel Group 4 Total Security Ltd IT Ferrier 
1985 SC 70 at 72; Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116; Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT 
ShCt 89 at 90 counsel for the defender argued against a restraint as it attempted to "protect a proprietary interest in 
the professional skills of the covenantee ". This is an unacceptable merger of concepts; Christie Encyclopaedia 595; 
Scott Robinson 161; Walker 187; Woolman 254; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 774, 775 and 776; Estate 
Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 312; Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 110; Holmes v Goodall 
and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 42; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220 referred to in Baldwin 
& Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 501; Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 478; Arlyn Butcheries (Pty) 
Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) SA 308 (W) 310; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA i (R) 2 -4; 
Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 347 -348 with reference to Cheshire Fifoot and 
Furmston, 349, 353; Biografic (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 349; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 
(2) SA 64 (C) 67; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 500; Highlands Park 
Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 200; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 
358, 362; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 858 -859; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real 
Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 687; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 
502, 503; See the remarks Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 769; Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) 
SA 537 (A) 541; The Concept Factory v Heyl 1994 (2) 105 (T) 112; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 
1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 442; Christie 443 and 444 stated this aspect "may still be relevant "; Lubbe and Murray 258; 
Schoombee 140 although the author did not distinguish proprietary and commercial interests; Cf Collinge 410 
stated that the courts do not really want to weigh the different issues and that they therefore merely hide behind 
proprietary interests but Collinge did not take a proper view of the principles underlying the doctrine. 
07. Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 245, Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 
(0) 687; Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 511; Van der Menve 158; Cf Domanski 
442; Cf Otto 209 he merely talked of "substantive interests "; Rautenbach & Reinecke 555. 
308 
Heydon 85 and the reference to Treitel (3rd ed) 382; Heydon McGill 339 -341 especially the analysis of Bray CJ 
in Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Ltd; Treitel 405, 419 although he thought that 
some extension may be possible; It might be protectable in newer types of restraints see e.g. Lord Wilberforce in 
Esso 340, Heydon supra but this has not always been properly distinguished from traditional cases: Collinge 
119; Schoombee 140. 
09. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406. 
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interests have been protected merely because it can be shown that it might in some direct 
or indirect manner actually promote the ability to work. The clearest proof of this is that 
the courts have thus far refused to protect investment in human capital in employment 
cases 314. It will probably go some way towards showing that an interest is proprietary if it 
can be shown that it will merely undermine the principles underlying the doctrine if 
protection is not allowed. However, the principle cannot stand on its own feet. It is too 
vague and uncertain. Courts must not be buffeted about by the decisions of commercial 
men. They must also lay down the principles for acceptable behaviour in the market -place. 
The notion that only proprietary interests should be protected is indispensable for that 
purpose. 
Similarly, it has been argued in sale of goodwill cases that a covenant will be acceptable if it 
ensures that the covenantee will realise the best price in the contractual exchange 315 
However, this again cannot be a principle underlying the recognition of interests. It has 
been acknowledged that this tenet does not apply in post -employment cases 316 
restriction in a sale of business case will not be allowed merely because it will realise a 
higher price. Protection against mere competition will still not be protectable even if paid 
for. This justification again presupposes that protectable interests are determined on 
another ground. It is merely an additional justification for allowing the protection of 
proprietary interests. It may again play a role in showing that an interest is proprietary and 
the courts have utilised this argument in justifying refusal to investigate directly the 
interests of the covenantor 317. But it cannot be of wider relevance. 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400; Christie Jur Rev 287, 302, 303; Christie Encyclopaedia 583; Herbert Morris 
701 quoted with approval in Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 41; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 
(2) SA 575 (W) 579; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; Commercial and 
Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd y Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 236 referring to Nordenfelt 552 and Diner; 
Comments (1951) University of Chicago Law Review 19 97 at 101 and see similar arguments in employment cases; 
Notes (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 347. 
314 
Supra 8.3; See also the criticism Notes "Enforceability of contracts not to compete after a term of employment" 
(1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 81 at 85ff. 
15 
Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1915] 2 Ch 75 at 90; Herbert Moms 707; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v 
Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 394 with reference to 
Herbert Morris 707; Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270, See Trebilcock 232; Bridge v 
Deacons [1984] AC 705 at 713; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64; Systems 
Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 382; Anson 323; Atiyah 340 although he clearly discussed it 
in terms of property; Kales (1917) 198; Giblin v Murdoch 1979 SLT ShCt 5 at 6; McBryde 601; Diner v Carpet 
Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 435; 
This aspect was apparently also stressed by Lubbe and Murray 260; See Woker 333 in the light of the Bill of Rights 
in the Interim Constitution in South Africa. 
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- Treitel noted that protectable interests are all, to some extent, protectable ex lege 318. He creates 
the impression that this lies at the base of the notion "proprietary interest ". But this is not 
acceptable. Customer connections in post- employment cases will not be protected ex lege 
though they might be proprietary. Goodwill in a sale of business will be proprietary but it 
will not be ex lege protectable as a whole 319. It will show that an interest is proprietary if it 
is also protected without a restraint, but the concept "proprietary interest" is also wider 
than the protection of such interests. 
Rautenbach and Reinecke in South Africa suggest that the interests protectable here are merely 
those that will be protected ex delicto on the grounds of unfair competition 320. But the 
position between the parties is refined by the contract. Sometimes more and sometimes less 
has been protected. The principles of unlawful competition may be utilised to clarify some 
notions in this area, but the two fields cannot be equated. The examples mentioned by the 
authors concern the only areas in which they overlap. 
In Sir WC Leng 321 it was argued that bona fides, to an extent, forms the basis for protection. The 
exposition in this case is narrow, as the court equated bona fides with confidentiality 
322. But it can 
be asked whether a wider concept of bona fides - especially in South Africa - should not be 
regarded as lying at the basis of the interests that can be protected 323. It might not lead to the 
protection of vastly different interests. The proprietary interest question will probably still be 
central to the investigation of bona fides. But it might infuse flexibility into restraint of trade law, 
and theoretically it might be more in accordance with standard contract law principles. 
16.1. Relative proprietary interests 
No consistent theoretical pattern for the description of proprietary interests emerges from the 
cases. 
- It may be accepted - whether the three terms are used in a wider or narrower sense - that trade 
secrets, trade connections, and goodwill only have to meet covenantee -related 




Heydon 264 -265. 
320. Rautenbach & Reinecke 561. 31. 
Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [ 1909] 1 Ch 763 at 774. 
3222, 
Blake 668 -669 mentioned in Lubbe and Murray 260 suffers from a similar defect. 
323. 
In South Africa Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd y Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (\V) 335, Domanski 233ff emphasised bona 
fides as the principle underlying the ex lege protection of trade secrets. 
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further narrowing down. These kinds of quasi -property will only be protectable under 
certain circumstances 324 
- A narrower view of proprietary interest can be taken. Here customers over whom the employee 
has acquired influence, and trade secrets of which the employee has gained knowledge, will 
be proprietary in post- employment cases. Only goodwill as sold will be a proprietary 
interest in sale of business cases. 
It is difficult to determine which of the two possibilities is preferable. It is perhaps no more than a 
matter of semantics, but this question might be important to the consistent application of the 
doctrine and the further development of legitimate interests. The second approach accords more 
with the general methodology in restraint of trade cases. Protection here is relative to a particular 
relationship. This relational dimension of proprietary interests is directly portrayed by the second 
approach. It is only in this relative sense that questions of quasi -property can be answered. 
- In post- employment cases trade connections do not become proprietary just because they can be 
regarded as connections of the employer. They are still free game for third parties. 
However, courts regard them as belonging to the employer as a proprietary interest where 
the employee stands in a certain relationship to such customers. 
- Any undermining of the value of a trade secret is not protectable. Trade secrets may only be 
protected in so far as knowledge of them may be exploited. Again, it is the particular 
relationship between the parties that establishes the proprietary nature of the interest. 
- Goodwill is not property in that it may be devalued by competition of third parties. However, a 
particular relationship between the parties, namely that of buyer and seller, may transform 
it into an interest that the court will regard as proprietary because of the sale. 
16.2. Proprietary interests and the unprotectability of certain interests 
Freedom from possible future competition has not been regarded as a proprietary interest. This 
principle has often been jumped upon by advocates of the notion that the main purpose of the 
restraint of trade doctrine is to promote competition or trade in general 
325. But much more 
fundamental principles underlie this tenet. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 
326 
it thus: 
"The possibility that the servant may be a competitor in the future is not a danger 
against which the master is entitled to safeguard himself. On the contrary, it 
324 
See also supra 4.4 and 5.1. 
325. 
Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin [19661 1 All ER 126 at 139; See supra Ch 3.5; Cf the economic 
analysis of this principle Trebilcock 133 -139 and the very critical approach 146 -148. 
. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 401 and the reference to Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354; 
See also Ch 3.6; Cf McBryde 595. 
132 
Chapter 6: The interests of the covenantee 
accords with public policy that a servant shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or 
the state of his labour, skill or talent ". 
Freedom from competition cannot be said to be an asset that belongs to the covenantee in a free 
market society. The principle that free competition is economically preferable impacts upon the 
tenet that freedom of competition is not a proprietary interest. But freedom of competition does 
not appear to be the underlying principle. 
The proprietary interests concept most conspicuously culminates in the principle that freedom 
from interference by use of personal skill and knowledge of the covenantor is not a protectable 
interest. The other side of the proprietary interest coin is that covenantors also have skills and 
knowledge that are outside the realm of the covenantee. It is through the notion that personal skill 
and knowledge are unprotectable that courts bolster the principle of freedom of work by 
narrowing interest down to only those that can be said to belong to the covenantee. This is 
necessary if courts are to take the protection of freedom of work seriously. It is however 
sometimes difficult to determine what is the property of the covenantee and what personal skill 
and knowledge of the covenantor. 
Heydon 327 contended that personal skill should not be the sole object of restriction because it will 
promote a free labour market and it "enables a man's general skill to be available to all would -be 
employers ". This is correct but too narrow. It allows for the proper protection of the ability of the 
covenantor to work and keeps it intact. A restraint will not be allowed if it merely attempts to 
benefit the covenantee by diminishing the ability of the covenantor to work 328. The covenantee 
will have to show another clear economic proprietary interest that may be balanced against the 
interference with freedom of work. 
It is even trite that the covenantee cannot restrict mere personal skill where it has been acquired in 
the service of the employer or as a consequence of training of the covenantor. But it is more 
difficult to justify the unprotectability of such interests. Here some contribution has been made by 
the employer for the improvement of the employee, and it has often been argued that one of the 
most important reasons why some post -employment restriction should be valid is because it will 
promote training and betterment of employees 
329. Nevertheless, the proprietary interest concept 




Mason 740 -741; Herbert Morris 714; SW Strange Ltd y Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 638 discussed this issue in 
the context of property although it probably went too far here; See also Corbin 1 394 in Heydon 105 -106; Christie 
444; See supra Ch 3.8. 
329. 
Supra 16.1; Trebilcock 129 -132. 
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employment becomes part of him, and this has remained an important aspect of the doctrine. The 
protection of freedom of work will be rather empty if it does not also bolster the use of acquired 
skills and knowledge. Hence, Schoombee calls the protection of investment in employees in 
Magna Alloys 330 "pernicious and feudalistic" 331 
The notion that these interests cannot be protected because they are not proprietary is not an 
absolute. It is merely a result of a policy position based on a certain perception of public interest 
and policy. It would be possible to allow the protection of these interests. However, it would 
make severe inroads into the freedom of work. It would mean that the freedom of work is 
subservient to almost any interest of the covenantee. 
There are cases where protection should be allowed though one of these interests lies at the basis 
of the restraint 332. But it is probably still in accordance with modern mores that these interests 
should not be regarded as protectable per se. 
17.Are there any legitimate interests beside the traditional ones? 
It is difficult to discern from the authorities whether only the hitherto recognised interests will be 
protectable in the classic restraint of trade cases. Most of the cases are inconclusive. On this point, 
the courts merely stress the trite interests, and the question whether others may be protected has 
not been given any real attention. 
Some authorities accepting that there is no closed category of interests are unhelpful, because such 
statements are made without paying proper attention to the special problems of classic restraints 
333. 
The restraints in classic cases do not apply during work relationships, and such restraints can 
create severe inroads upon the ability to work, as no concomitant and contemporaneous work 
benefit will arise. 334 In Eastham Wilberforce J was prepared to protect interests beyond the 
traditional, and he then took a wider view in the particular case 335 But he was at pains to limit the 
import of his decision to the special sports body case before him. 
330 
Magna Alloys 904 -905. See supra 8.3. 
332 
Schoombee 142; Cf also Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 200. 
332 
See infra Ch 9.12. 
333 
Guest 8; Heydon 259ff; Kerr 509; Cf the somewhat more careful view Chitty 1198 but see the criticism infra 
Ch 9.12; Guest 8 although the view of the author that these wider interests are protectable because of modern mores 
cannot be accepted. 
334 
See Anson 323; Supra 6.1. 
335. 
Eastham y Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413 at 432, Sales 610 -611; See also Greig v Insole 
[19781 3 All ER 449 at 496 -497 Slade J casuistically applied the Eastham case as this case also concerned a sports 
controlling body; Treitel 405 did not properly consider the qualification in Eastham; Walker 188 with reference to 
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A conservative stance was taken in some South African cases. Franklin AJ in Tension Envelope 336 
correctly accepted that the extension of protectable interests in Eastham was based on the 
particular facts of the case. He then stated: 
"I have not been referred to any decided case of a master and servant relationship 
in industry in which a proprietary interest deserving of protection has been held to 
extend to something other than the two categories ... ". 
This narrow approach was again followed in the more recent South African case of Sibex 337 
These decisions must be balanced against the contrary opinion of Eksteen JA in Basson 338 in an 
even more recent Appeal Court case, but this case is open to criticism. 
- The court seems to have suggested that it would not even always be necessary to rely on 
proprietary interests or even interests. 
- It stated that a more dynamic view had to be taken because public policy is itself dynamic; but 
the court over -estimated the changeability of public policy. 
- The judge did not even mention the Sibex case and that case was, accordingly, not expressly 
rejected. 
Moreover, Nienaber JA in Basson 339 returned to the more careful but flexible approach that 
preceded Sibex. He merely assumed that wider interests could be protected in the particular case. 
There is no settled authority on whether other interests are protectable, and the question 
accordingly will have to be approached from a theoretical perspective. Interests can, theoretically, 
be extended. Courts normally do not look beyond the protection of standard protectable interests. 
But the delineation of these interests represents a relatively recent episode in the development of 
the restraint of trade doctrine 340. The courts have often stated that there is a wider principle 
underlying the recognised interests; other interests should accordingly be protectable as long as 
they are in accordance with these principles. 
The narrower view taken by the court in Sibex 341 is probably a consequence of the onus issue in 
South Africa. There the onus is on the person who attempts to prove unreasonableness 342. A 
Eastham argued that other interests will probably be protectable in post -employment cases but the case must be 
ffroached with care. 
. Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 348 -349. 
337. 
Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 505 -506, See also 502. 
338 
Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762. 
339 
Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 770 although some of the cases mentioned are not authority for this 




Sib ex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 505 see supra. 
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negative aspect has to be proved. He will be in a difficult position if he has to prove that interests 
do not exist although he does not even know what those interests should be. It will simplify his 
position if he just has to prove that a numerus clausus of interests does not exist. The wider 
approach suggested here should be applied in South Africa with one qualification. There should at 
least be a duty on the covenantee to adduce evidence that will again disturb the balance of 
probabilities if it is proved that the covenantee does not have sufficient trade secrets or customer 
connections to support a particular restraint . 
The more complex question, however, is: to what extent should further interests be recognised? 
Or, to put it in the current context, to what extent is the proprietary interest principle cast in 
stone? The notion of proprietary interests is not a necessary basis for determining interests that can 
be protected. It is the result of judicial policy. It depends on the priority that the court gives to the 
principle of freedom of work. Freedom of work will be seriously undermined if courts extend 
interests beyond those that are proprietary. 
Some relaxation of the rigid application is necessary. But it would be best, under current 
conditions, to extend protection through a different channel. Non -proprietary protectable interests 
should not be created, but interests that are not proprietary should be protected on the specific 
facts of the case after investigation of wider reasonableness aspects 343. Such an approach is more 
subtle and gives room for the fine balancing act that has to take place in cases that concern non- 
proprietary interests. Schoombee 344 is correct in submitting that the proprietary interests principle 
is too narrow, but simplistic extension by merely creating wider protectable interests will not be 
satisfactory. All attempts to extend protection beyond proprietary interests have thus far failed. 
The same approach would probably still be maintained in South Africa. In Magna Alloys the court 
was prepared to allow protection of investment in human capital, but this departure from 
traditional principles was not properly justified in the case 
345 Schoombee 346 has argued that 
certain wider interests such as social utility, when it advances stability or rational control, may in 
future be protectable in terms of the Magna Alloys approach, but the proprietary interests 
requirement has now been confirmed for the purpose of South African law in Basson 347, by 
Nienaber JA, who took the most acceptable view on the law 
348 
342 Infra Ch 11. 
343. 




Supra 8.3 and 16.2. 
346 
Schoombee 142 although he also strongly argues that this should not go too far. 
347. Basson v Chiiwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 771. 
348 
See infra Ch 7.2.3. 
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Hence, the most important constraint on the recognition of new interests in the traditional cases 
will be that only proprietary interests will be recognised. Although no further proprietary interests 
have been admitted in the courts, it is still possible that other proprietary interests may exist in the 
infinite number of factual permutations that come before the courts. 
- A patent may probably be protected by restraint 349 
- In Hepworth 
350 a film actor was restricted by the producer for whom he worked. The producer 
argued that a restraint should be allowed as it protected the value of existing films. The 
covenantor would not be able to work in films of low quality that would devalue the 
existing films of the producer. The court decided that the restraint here was too wide for 
the protection of such an interest 351, and held that the interest would not be undermined 
on the facts 
352; 
but it never denied that such an interest could be protected in certain 
circumstances by a properly phrased restriction. 
- An admittedly tenuous interest may exist in post- employment restraints where protection is 
sought against poaching of employee contacts 353 A poaching restraint of this nature exists 
where (A) concludes a restraint with (B) according to which (B) is restricted from 
poaching employees of (A) for a certain time after leaving the service of (A). It may be 
said that the ties with employees in such cases are proprietary and that they are protectable 
in so far as the covenantor may interfere with them because of influence that he has gained 
as an ex- employee of the covenantee 354 Sales 355 stated that these interests will not be 
proprietary. According to him, personal skill and ability of employees can never constitute 
a proprietary interest. However, he did not properly realise that the protected employees 
are third parties for the purpose of the restraints. The problem of the freedom of work of 
these third parties will still have to be dealt with 
356 But the employee connection is 
proprietary between covenantor and covenantee, and for the purpose of the reasonableness 
inter partes requirement. 
- Courts may in future allow the protection of trade secrets and confidential information of 
customers that become known to the employer's business in the exercise of their normal 
activities. These are not truly proprietary trade secrets of the employer, but it is essential to 
349 
See Electric Transmission Ltd y Dannenberg (1949) 66 RPC 183 at 192 where the restraint was too wide for 
this purpose. 
350 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd y Ryott [ 1920 1 Ch 1. 
352 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd y Ryott [1920 1 Ch 1 at 15, 25, 31. 
352 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd y Ryott [1920 1 Ch 1 at 15, 25. 
353 
For clauses where the contract contained such a clause but where its reasonableness was not in issue: Aetiology 
Today CC t/a Somerset Schools y Van Aswegen 1992 (1) SA 807 (W), Basson y Chiiwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 758. 
354 




See infra Ch 10.5.2. 
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the exercise of the business that such information should be protectable. It still constitutes 
a type of proprietary interest that the employer necessarily requires for conducting its 
business. But the issue has not been properly analysed by the courts 357 
The judicial methodology in delineating legitimate interests and the development of these interests 
should be analogous to the judicial approach and development of categories of contracts that fall 
within the restraint of trade doctrine. Courts should recognise that certain interests are protectable 
while others are not. They should also admit that the hitherto accepted interests do not form a 
numerus clausus, and they ought to acknowledge that new proprietary interests might be admitted 
in terms of general principles. 
357 
Systems Reliability Holdings plc y Smith [19901 377 at 385 allowed the protection of such information by 
restraint; Knox D'Arcy Ltd y Jamieson 1992 (3) SA 520 (W) 528 where such information was defined as a type of 
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1. The line between sale of goodwill and employment restrictions 
There are many similarities between the rules and principles applying to sale of business restraints 
and those that govern post -employment restraints. However, there are also clear grounds for 
separation. Some distinction was already drawn in pre Mason law I. Yet the most fundamental 
difference became established in the post -Mason era 2. 
Some courts have related the distinction to the different interests that can be protected in sale of 
business and post- employment cases 3, and this distinction can be easily justified in terms of the 
scheme as it has been thus far developed. The protection of interests depends on the relationship 
between the parties in a particular case. A sale of goodwill contract, of its nature, throws up 
different interests from a post -employment contract. The interests that can be regarded as 
proprietary between purchaser and seller are different from those that will fall in this class in post - 
employment cases 4. 
1. See counsel in Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 25 and Dendy v Henderson (1855) 11 Exch 194; Some 
rudimentary distinction was drawn in: Mallan y May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 666, Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont 
(1869) 9 LR Eq 345 at 354 and Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453, 
But see the criticism Gooderson 413; Nordenfelt 543 -544, Cf also 541, See Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick [1939] 2 
All ER 85 at 92, Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 492, 494, Cf Mouchel v William Cubitt & Co 
(1907) 24 RPC 194 at 199 -200 accepted the argument but still followed earlier authorities; E Underwood & Son Ltd 
v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 305 and 310; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 especially 773, See 
Attwood 586; Christie Jur Rev 302; See on the history: Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 582ff, Cheshire 
Fifoot and Furmston 400, Heydon 78, Blake see the conclusion 637. 
2. See except for the authorities mentioned below: Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 806 where 
this issue was not really taken further, Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 190, Farwell 71, 
McBryde 594, Christie Encyclopaedia 590, Halliwell v Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 180, Durban Rickshas Ltd v 
Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 482, Chubb Fire Security (Pty) Ltd v Greaves 1993 (4) SA 358 (W) 364; Blake 646, 639, 
646; See however Williston Contracts (Rev ed) para 1643 was very critical of this distinction. 
3. Herbert Morris 701, 708 -709, 713 -714; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 
571 at 589 -591; British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 575; Hepworth 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 23; Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick [1939] All ER 85 at 92; Jenkins 
v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 478ff, 480; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 238 -239; 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1372; George Silverman Ltd v Silverman (1969) 113 Sol 
Jo 563; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1228 -1229; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 
705 at 713 -714; Anson 322, 328; Davies 491; Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 
150; Kennedy v Clark (1917) 33 ShCt Rep 136 at 139; Christie Encyclopaedia 591; Gloag 570; Gordon v Van 
Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773 -774; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311 -312; Durban Rickshas 
Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 482; Holmes v Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 41; Aling and Streak v 
Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280; Highlands 
Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198. 
4. Herbert Morris 701, 708 -709, 713 -714; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 589ff; Hepworth Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 23; British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 
575; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 492; Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 477ff; Ronbar 
Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270 but see the discussion supra; George Silverman Ltd v 
Silverman (1969) 113 Sol Jo 563; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 713 -714; Systems Reliability Holdings plc 
I/ Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 382; McBryde 600 -601; Christie Encyclopaedia 592; Winfield (1946) 320; Gordon v 
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Nevertheless, a second ground for distinguishing the different types of restrictions has also 
emerged. In many cases the courts have also mentioned that bargaining power lies at the basis of 
the distinction. It has been emphasised that parties to a post -employment restraint will often be in 
a position of unequal bargaining power while they will bargain equally in sale of business cases. 
However, bargaining power will not be consistently equal or unequal in the different types of cases 
5. Hence, bargaining power cannot be utilised today in distinguishing the different types of 
contracts. It will be necessary to investigate the extent to which bargaining power has infused the 
substantive distinction between sale of goodwill and post- employment restraints. 
Admittedly, some courts have emphasised equality of bargaining power in an attempt to explain 
why different interests are protectable in post -employment and sale of goodwill cases. The 
obfuscation in South Africa became so complete that judges simply equated the distinction 
between different contracts with a difference in equality of bargaining power, and this in turn was 
regarded as the basis for the protection of different interests 6. 
However, this line of authority is unacceptable. There is no direct logical and conceptual 
connection between the protection of certain interests and bargaining power. The distinction 
between the interests protectable in sale of business and post- employment contracts can be 
exclusively justified on the basis of general principles underlying the protection of interests. 
In most of the cases that stress bargaining power, the court was not specifically and exclusively 
dealing with the distinction of protectable interests '. Bargaining power, if it has played any role 
Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773 -774; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311 -312; Holmes v 
Goodall and Williams Ltd 1936 CPD 35 at 41; See the cases discussed chapter 6 and infra. 
5. Infra Ch 9.2. 
6. Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 245 -247 although it was accepted that it was too mechanical; Pest 
Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 612; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 578- 
578 with reference to Hepworth Ltd v Snelling 1962 (2) PH A.48, See Arlyn Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) 
SA 308 (W) 309, Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 348; Kerr 507 -508 but see 
the more acceptable approach 510 -511. 
7. The early cases must be approached with caution as the legitimate interests test had not yet been refined: 
Nordenfelt 566, Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453, E Underwood & 
Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 310; Cf the distinction between post -employment restraints and cartels North 
Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 471 although it is not clear; Mason 738 with 
reference to Nordenfelt; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1915] 2 Ch 75 at 84 -85 although the court here took it quite 
far; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 586 compared with, 590 -591; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 
183 -184; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246; M & S Drapers y Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 820 -821 
although the court accepted that bargaining power also be different within a particular type of contract; Although 
mentioned in a different context see T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [ 1974] 1 Ch 129 at 136; Atiyah 340; Cheshire 
Fifoot and Furmston 400; Chitty 1212 (See also 1199 where the author stressed that the different contracts serve 
different purposes although it was not properly related to interests); Heydon 81ff with reference to Blake 646 -648; 
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here, has merely been a secondary ground for protecting different interests in the two types of 
cases. 
But it is possible to go even further. Sale of business and post -employment restrictions have been 
distinguished on different levels. Not only will divergent interests be protectable in the different 
cases, but courts will also be more strict when determining reasonableness in post -employment 
cases. Bargaining power, if relevant at all 8, should apply on the second level. The case of Brenda 
Hairstylers 9 can be mentioned as an example. Both counsel stressed bargaining power. The court 
acknowledged that bargaining power would play a central role, but stressed the more fundamental 
distinction between the different types of contracts in determining in what category a restraint fell 
and in laying down what interests were protectable 10 
The distinction between the different types of contracts is left unscathed by the rejection of 
bargaining power as a basis for distinction in Roffey 11. In casu Didcott J only rejected the notion 
that post -employment restraints should be "approached more critically and condemned more 
readily ", and this should be narrowly interpreted. Cases that tried to read more into this statement 
12 must be rejected. The broader notion that the courts will be more benevolent in sale of business 
cases certainly played some role in establishing the distinction on the level of protectable interests. 
But it has not been indispensable to this fundamental distinction. 
Attempts by Eksteen JA in a recent Appeal Court case in South Africa to revive the bargaining 
power basis for the distinction must be rejected out of hand 13. The judge qualified his view in 
Treitel 404; Walker 187; Scott -Robinson 158; Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 334, 339; Lewin v Sanders 
1937 SR 147 at 149; Schwartz v Subel 1948 (2) SA 983 (T) 987 -988; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 649- 
650; Wohluran v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 762; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 
1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 235 -236. 
8. Infra 9.2. 
9. Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280. 
lo. English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 174 at 181, Quoted with approval in New United Yeast 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd If Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 83; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] 
IRLR 60 at 64; Cf Comments (1951) 19 University of Chicago Law Review 97 especially from 101 where it was 
mentioned that American Courts sometimes recognise differences based on bargaining power but that they still 
"overlook the fundamental differences" that exist between the different types of contracts. See the discussion of 
these issues 101ff. 
Il Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 499, Cf the comments Nathan 38; Similarly the 
criticism Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 72 -73; Christie 440, 447; Schoombee 132, 
142; Nathan 37; Lubbe and Murray 257; See also Turpin Annual Survey (1958) 55 quoted by the court in Malan v 
Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 247. 
12. Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198 and the criticism of Roffey; Recycling 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 257 -258; Van der Merwe 158 on this issue is too 
simplistic. 
13. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 763, See Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 
(SEC) 442. 
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some respects. He accepted that not all post- employment contracts will necessarily be concluded 
unequally. But his thesis remains unacceptable. 
1.1. Distinguishing the different types of restraints 
In determining into which of the two classes a particular contract falls, the courts will, in each 
case, have to determine what the wider objective of a contract is 14. If the main aim of the 
relationship is the sale of a business, then it should be so classed. If the contract is aimed at 
organising a work relationship between the covenantee and covenantor, then a restriction that 
applies after termination of the relationship should be treated as a post- employment restraint. 
But it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether a restriction is of the post- employment or 
sale of goodwill variety t5. Harman J in Systems Reliability 16 stated that: 
"The courts have always to try and apply the test of reasonableness to the 
circumstances and facts of the particular case before them, and classifying them as 
master and servant cases or vendor and purchaser cases is convenient - and no 
doubt provides the academics with a lot of writing to do in learned articles - but is 
not a useful thing for the court which has got to sit down and say: 'What is 
reasonable in this particular deal? "' 
There are deeper underlying principles that manifest themselves in the distinction drawn between 
sale of goodwill and post -employment restrictions. Theoretically speaking, it could be abandoned 
and each case could be treated in terms of broad principles. There is no use in trying to develop an 
entire jurisprudence on the distinction between the two types of restraints. However, it continues 
to be a very useful distinction and still facilitates the application of principles and rules to the facts 
of a specific case. It does not escape the eye that the judge later on made substantial use of the 
distinction between the different types of contracts. 
The distinction will create special problems in cases where the two types of contracts are 
combined. In sale of goodwill transactions the seller is often offered employment with the buyer. 
In most cases this will not influence the essential nature of the restraint; it will generally still be 
regarded as a sale of business 17. However, there will be exceptions. In Bishop 18 the consideration 
14 Supra Ch 6 especially 16; Heydon 201 argued that restraints on retirement have sometimes been treated like 
sales of goodwill but he did not give any authority. It is unacceptable; The question left open Alliance Paper Group 
v Prestwich 1996 IRLR 25. 
15 Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 41, 43; Davies 492; Heydon 202. 
16 Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 383. 
17. For cases of this nature: Marshalls Ltd v Leek (1900) 17 TLR 26; Welstead v Hadley (1904) 21 TLR 165, 
Cavendish v Tarry (1908) 52 Sol Jo 726 where this question was not yet in issue; D Bates & Co v Dale [1937] 3 All 
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for a transfer of goodwill was an employment contract and an annuity (although it appears that the 
annuity was actually consideration for the premises). Scant evidence is available from the report 
and the issue was not really addressed by the court, but this contract looks more like one where an 
employee was brought into employment with the customers that he had beforehand 19. The court 
must look at the substance and purpose of each transaction 20. 
1.2. Restraint of trade and sales of shares or goodwill by companies 
Restraints are often attached to sales of shares or sales of assets of a company 21, and it may be 
difficult to determine the class of contracts into which they should fall 22. The most important 
principle is that courts must look at the substance of the contractual relationship and not at the 
form 23. It has not yet been so discussed, but it would perhaps be most acceptable to deal with the 
whole issue as an area where the corporate veil can in some cases be lifted. The veil should be 
lifted, and the court should treat restrictions of such persons as sellers of a business, if the 
corporate entity is a vehicle used in the effecting of a sale of business between covenantor and 
covenantee. However, the court should deal with the company as a separate entity for the purpose 
of the doctrine where the company itself plays a fundamentally important role as either buyer, 
seller or object of the sale, or where the buying and selling of shares constitute an aim in their own 
right. 
The corporate veil should be lifted where one of the important participants in a company sells his 
shares in it or where a substantial shareholder or group of shareholders sell their shares and it is 
manifest that it is done with the aim of transferring the business carried on by that company. The 
ER 650; Heydon 201 -202; Dumbarton Steamboat Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993; Donald Storrie Estate 
Agency Ltd v Adams 1989 SLT 305, Sterling Financial Services Ltd v Johnston 1990 SLT 111 where the question 
whether the employment contract was an integral part of the sale was important for other reasons; Stirling Park Co 
v Miller (unrep). 
18. Bishop v Kitchin (1866) 38 LJQB 20. 
19 See supra Ch 6.4.1. 
20. Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64; See infra 1.2 the cases where a 
company also enters the scene; Treitel 406; Chitty 1212; Cf Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh - 
Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 233 and see infra. 
21. Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 382; Gooderson 421 in 1963 stated that there were 
no cases on restraints in sale of shares but it has now changed; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v 
Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 233 cannot be accepted. 
22. Nordenfelt 540 -541, 551, 555, 560 is very specific to the facts of the case; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 
(C) 650 the court did not justify its conclusion; See also Gooderson 419421. 
23. Systems Reliability Holdings plc y Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 382 where this has been clearly expressed. But see 
the criticism infra the principles were not correctly applied here. 
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seller should be treated like a seller of goodwill even if he is thereafter employed by the company 
24, and even though he still holds some shares in the company. 
- Control should be pivotal 25. In Systems Reliability the court observed that "the courts would be 
stultifying themselves to hold that only what were called controlling shareholders or 
persons having major investment can be bound" 26 . However, this seems unrealistic. How 
can the covenantor be restricted from interfering with the whole of the goodwill if he only 
has a small proprietary interest in it? The court mentioned that it would be particularly 
important not to refuse such protection in a world where workers are now encouraged to 
acquire shares in the companies for which they work. But, it seems, the opposite is true. 
Should all workers who have some shareholding now be restricted as proprietors? On the 
view taken by the judge, the whole of the goodwill would have been protectable although 
the covenantor had a 1.6% share in the business. The later analogy which the court drew 
with partnerships appears to be more convincing but, it is submitted, the court also erred in 
its application of such principles 27. 
Whether the covenantor is a director will be relevant in answering this question, but Connors 
goes too far in suggesting that a managing director holding shares will be treated in the 
same manner Z8. Mere employment or even directorship does not give the necessary 
proprietary connection to goodwill which makes it protectable against the covenantor. 
The buyer must be buying the shares to get at the business. Commercial and Industrial Holdings 
29 stressed that a person who buys shares on the basis of profitability may protect the 
business against competition by the seller. The terminology used can be faulted but the 
ideas behind it cannot. 
24. Connors Brother Ltd v Connors [1941] 4 All ER 179 at 190 -191, 193 but see the criticism infra; Spink 
(Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink [1936] Ch 544 was too cautious; George Silverman Ltd v Silverman (1969) 113 Sol Jo 
563; Kirby v Thorn EMI plc [1988] 1 WLR 445 could probably have been decided on this basis if the restraint of 
trade had been in issue; Heydon 201 -202; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 103 
and 109 for a wider argument; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 281; See Commercial 
and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 233 placed too much emphasis on the 
specific contract that actually contained the restraint, Cf Chubb Fire Security (Pty) Ltd v Greaves 1993 (4) SA 358 
(W) 363 where a better view was taken on this point, Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 
(C) 404405 the criticism of Chubb is unacceptable. 
25. Treitel 403; Cf David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 435, See however the criticism infra 2.3. 
See Annual Survey (1984) 130. 
26. Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 383, 383, 384. 
27. See Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 383 and the discussion in the next section 
infra 2.3. 
28. Connors Brother Ltd v Connors [1941] 4 All ER 179 at 190 -191, 193 although the court expressly declined 
from laying down general principles; Heydon 191 -192; Cf Nordenfelt supra did not look at shareholding but there 
were other important elements beyond the fact that the covenantor was a managing director. 
29. Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 233. 
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The buyer should be able to defy the corporate veil and bind the real sellers where a company 
controlled by a certain person or persons sells the business out of the company 30. The arguments 
mentioned in Nordenfelt 31 will in similar circumstances play an important role in showing that a 
shareholder could be described as a seller of goodwill. This might, however, create some problems 
where the business is sold into a new company in which the seller still has an important stake 32. 
It will accordingly often be important to show that the veil should be lifted but it should not be 
conclusive for the purpose of protection. There will be cases where protection can be based on 
other grounds: 
- Where a company is sold by shareholders, there might also be goodwill in the hands of the 
shareholder, and this goodwill may also, on the right facts, be independently protectable 33 
- There may also be cases where the shares themselves may be protectable 34. Nevertheless, this 
will probably seldom be the case. It will be difficult to show that a restraint will be 
necessary to protect such shares qua shares. The courts have been strict in recognising the 
link that has to exist between the proprietary interest and the damage that can be caused if 
not for the restraint 3s 
1.3. The need to still draw parallels between post -employment and sale of goodwill 
restraints 
Some authorities have doubted whether it is at all necessary to relate sale of business and post - 
employment restraints to one another 36. It is important for courts and practitioners to be cautious 
when citing precedents that fall into one category in cases where restraints of trade actually fall 
into the other 37. However, the link between the different types of contracts must not be ignored. 
There are still many theoretical similarities, and each still has much to contribute to the 
development of the other and to the common development of classical restraints. Both contain 
30 See Blake v Blake (1967) 111 Sol Jo 715; See the facts of Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 
would today fall in this class, See Heydon 192; See Treitel 403 it might be difficult to frame a suitable covenant that 
will give protection against competition by associate companies; See Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 60 where 
principles were not investigated. 
31. Nordenfelt supra. 
32. Infra 2.3 especially the Biografic case. 
33 Kirby v Thorn EMI plc [1988] 1 WLR 445 at 453 -454. 
34 George Silverman Ltd v Silverman (1969) 113 Sol Jo 563; Although it is not clear it seems that vaguely similar 
ideas also played some role in Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 
233. 
35 See supra Ch 6.16. 
36 Blake 646. 
37. Chitty 1200. 
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restraints that start to bite when there is no ongoing working relationship between the parties. The 
emphasis in both cases will be on proprietary interests 38. 
1.4. The borders of classic restraints 
It will sometimes be very difficult to determine whether a restraint falls in one of the two 
traditional categories, or whether it should fall in a class where different principles apply 39. 
1.4.1. Actor cases 
In the actor cases such as Tivoli Manchester 40, an entertainer is restricted, either before or after 
the performance for the covenantee, from performing for certain competitors. Heydon 41 explains 
these cases on the grounds that the covenantee has customers that he can protect. But people 
attending a particular musical event on a one -off basis cannot be described as customers in the 
sense described in this work. One of the ways in which these restraints can be explained is by 
acknowledging the differences between these and the classical type of post -employment restraint. 
Hence the court in D'Oliviera 42 decided that the services of a band of musicians were hired out to 
the theatre company and that it was not a post -employment case. 
1.4.2. Restraints during and after termination of employment 
In some cases the restraint will operate both while a work relationship is in operation and after it 
has ceased 43. The two aspects of the restraint will have to be distinguished in determining 
reasonableness. This was not always done in the past 44, but it is fundamental 45. 
38. Blake 646 therefore puts it too strongly. 
39 See partnership restraints infra 2. 
40 Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley (1904) 20 UR 437, Empire Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 WLD 289 although 
the cases were not decided in these terms because they were pre- Mason; See also the discussion of the cases supra 
Ch 6.1 and infra Ch 9.12; Cf African Theatres Ltd v Jewell (1918) 39 NLR 1 where interdict was stressed. The 
court merely stated that the restraint was not per se illegal. 
41 Heydon 118. 
42. African Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 at 129. 
43 Mumford v Gething (1859) 7 CBNS 305 at 322, 323 -324, 327; Marshalls v Leek (1900) 17 TLR 26; Eastes y 
Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 474, 479, 489, Heydon 131. 
as For cases where the two aspects existed but where the distinction was not really in issue: Although it is not clear 
George Hill and Co Ltd v Hill (1886) 3 TLR 144, Nicholls v Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42, Palmer y Mallet (1887) 26 
Ch 411, Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478, Haynes v Doman [1899] 1 Ch 13, Townsend y Jarman 
[1900] 2 Ch 608 for a similar partnership restraint, Berlitz School of Languages Ltd y Duchene 1903 6F 181 
although it was regarded for the purpose of the assignability issue see infra, Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v 
Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564, Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estates y Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (E). 
45 See Sainter y Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 at 728 -729, 730; William Robinson & Co y Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451; 
McBryde 594. 
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In George Michael a recording artist was restricted in his activities while the contract was in 
operation, and was also restrained from making re- recordings after termination of the relationship. 
The court made short shrift of this distinction 46. But the broad reasonableness approach followed 
is too broad. The interests of the covenantee and the extent of the restraint should have been more 
closely investigated, and that could only have been properly done if the distinction was recognised. 
In Basson 47 Nienaber JA accepted that wider protection would be allowed for restraints that 
operate during employment relationships. The clear distinctions which he drew have a wider 
significance, and the judge seems to have been conscious of this: 
- The covenantor will still receive his rewards for the duration of the contract. He will receive his 
dues while under restraint. 
- The employee will not be unproductive if the restraint operates during employment, which is 
conceivably not so where the restraint operates after termination. 
- The restraint would only come into effect on narrower grounds if it applied during employment 
48. It could only restrict the covenantor without the concomitant advantages of the 
employment contract where the employee leaves his employment and it would not operate 
if the relationship is terminated for any other reason. The restraint may jeopardise freedom 
of work on much wider grounds if it applies after employment 49 
The distinction was criticised by Van Heerden JA, but his criticisms do not hold water: 
- He argued that payment will not be very important because the employer will not be forced to 
pay the employee if he does not perform his services 50, but this is not a very damning 
criticism. The employer will still be unable to enforce the restraint if he is not prepared to 
pay for it. 
- He mentioned that the employee will still be unproductive when the restraint only operates 
during the employment relationship if the employee refuses to work for the employer 51 
But the point remains that the restraint will at least be tied to a work relationship and the 
employee cannot be restricted unless he is given the opportunity to work. The possibility of 
unproductivity will be reduced. 
46 Panayiotou y Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 378. 
47. Basson y Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 771 -772. 
48. Basson y Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776. 
49 See infra 9.11. 
50 Basson y Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776. 
51. Ibid. 
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- He submitted that Nienaber JA's distinction is too rigid 52. He stated that parties may decide 
against it on the basis that they may conceive that one or more of them may want to leave 
the relationship. But this is no reason for not accepting the solution proposed by Nienaber 
JA. The latter suggested that restraints should rather be concluded to operate during 
relationships of work if the aim is to tie in the skills of a party or parties for a particular 
time. 
Moreover, the most important ground for the distinction was not even mentioned by the judge. 
Wider protection should not only be granted because the interests of the community and the 
covenantor will be interfered with to a lesser extent. It is inherent in the nature of such restraints 
that they will justify wider protection for the covenantee. Work skills can, mostly, only be properly 
harnessed if exercised within a regulated relationship. The proper organisation of the relationship 
becomes an important protectable interest here. 
1.4.3. When will the work relationship be terminated? 
Substantive and jurisdictional questions will depend on whether the work relationship is 
contemporaneous with the restraint. However, restraints aimed at applying during work 
relationships normally run contemporaneously with the contract as a whole, and there may be a 
difference between this contract and the relationship of work s3: 
- The employee can repudiate the contract by leaving the service of the employer for good, and the 
employer can refuse to accept the repudiation 54. The contract will run for the period of 
notice although no work relationship will exist between the parties. 
- Where notice is given the work relationship will often terminate before it has run out (so- called 
garden leave). In such cases the contract of employment will still exist but there will be no 
further relationship of employment s5 
There will probably be no need to consider a discrepancy between the duration of the employment 
relationship and the contract if the contract provides for a short notice period. But it will be 
difficult to ignore such differences in cases where there may be a big discrepancy 56. The employer 
cannot in these circumstances rely on the need for facilitating the proper exploitation of the work 
52. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776. 
53 Cf Kimberley v Jennings (1836) 6 Sim 346 at 349 -350 although remarks were not made with reference to issues 
under discussion here; Cf Ehrman v Bartholomew [1898] 1 Ch 671 at 673. 
54 Evening Standard Co Ltd v Henderson [1987] ICR 589; Cf the facts of Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgaridis 1975 
(2) SA 783 (W). 
55 Provident Financial Group plc v Hayward [1989) ICR 160. 
56 See Provident Financial Group plc v Hayward [ 1989] ICR 165, 167; Cf Ehrman v Bartholomew [ 1898] 1 Ch 
671 at 674. 
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of the employee; during this last mentioned period the restraint will be akin to a post -employment 
restraint. It is tempting to argue that such circumstances will have to be considered in determining 
the reasonableness of the restraint as a whole. 
In South Africa reasonableness will be determined from the moment when the court is asked to 
enforce it. At this moment it will frequently be possible to see whether the restraint will be 
enforced during a working relationship. Post -employment principles should be applied if the 
restraint will have to run while the parties are not in a work relationship any more. If the restraint 
will operate during both the employment relationship and thereafter, then the flexible approach 
which South African courts follow towards severability 57 can be used to deal with the situation. 
However, these issues will be problematic in English and Scots law. In these legal systems two 
issues will stand in the way of discounting the discrepancy: 
- Reasonableness must be determined from the moment of conclusion of the contract. From this 
point it will be difficult to determine what the duration of the working relationship as 
opposed to the duration of the contract will be. 
- The courts will be stricter with regard to severability. The courts will therefore be more cautious 
in allowing a restraint to be reshaped once it is regarded as illegal 58. 
The court will probably only consider the distinction between the contract and the relationship of 
work in English and Scots law if it was foreseeable at conclusion that the two may differ. A 
restraint will be classified as post -employment where the contract has a long period of notice and 
where it was probable that the work relationship would be terminated during this period, or where 
the contract provides for garden leave. But few cases will contain such clear facts. Accordingly, a 
discrepancy between the work relationship and the contract will seldom influence the 
reasonableness question. If a restraint will be reasonable during employment, and if it will probably 
normally apply during a true work relationship, then it will generally be reasonable even if it turns 
out, in the end, that there is a discrepancy between the employment contract and the work 
relationship. 
It is difficult to discern any principles from the cases, as they mostly concern interim relief. It is 
often difficult to distinguish the question whether an injunction should be granted and the question 
whether the restriction was ineffective. In JA Mont 59 a restraint was entered into at termination of 
the contract. The employer agreed to pay the ex- employee what seemed to be equal to what he 
57. Infra Ch 14. 
58. See infra Ch 11. 
59 JA Mont (UK) Ltd y Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 587. 
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would have received during employment. The court emphasised the formal divisions and accepted 
that the distinctions between post- employment restraints and restraints that run during 
employment could not be "blurred ". However, there is perhaps good reason for not taking too 
formalistic a view when it comes to classification. Some of the factors discussed by the court in 
GFI 60 typically belong to the analysis of the legality of post -employment restraints. The court 
stressed that customer connections were protected here. Much was made of the question whether 
the duration of the notice period was necessary for the protection of the covenantee. It might 
therefore be that the courts are in some cases moving towards treating some of these cases in a 
manner that is somewhat similar to their treatment of post- employment contracts. 
2. Post -partnership covenants 61 
The majority of cases concern sale of business and post- employment restraints, but there is 
considerable authority on post -partnership restraints and these clauses can also be described as 
classical. However, they can be discussed only now, as the rules and principles that apply to them 
are constructed on the foundations of the other classical types of restraints. 
There is apparent authority for the view that the partnerships will be dealt with in the same manner 
as sales of businesses 62. Nevertheless this is unacceptable (in so far as it has been expressly taken 
by the authorities 63). It has been argued that partnerships, like sales of businesses, are often 
concluded on an equal footing and that post -partnerships restraints should therefore be treated like 
sale of business restraints. The resemblance has then been contrasted with the position in post - 
employment restraints where the parties are, supposedly, often in a position of unequal bargaining 
power 64. However, bargaining power cannot be useful here. Differences regarding bargaining 
60 GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone FSR [1994] 535. 
61 See also restrictions in partnership agreements: Leighton v Wales (1838) 3 M & W 545; Atkyns v Kinnier 
(1850) 4 Exch 776; Wolmerhausen v O'Connor (1877) 36 LT 921; Issit and Jenks v Ganson (1899) 43 Sol Jo 744; 
Townsend v Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698; Harris v Mansbridge (1900) 17 TLR 21; Rayner IT Pegler [1964] EG 301, 
967; Peyton v Mindham [1971] 3 All ER 1215; Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] AC 720; 
Edwards v Worboys [1984] AC 724; Meikle v Meikle (1895) 3 SLT 204; Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 
454; McBryde 595 -600; Miller Partnership 119 -121; Steyn v Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 50; Savage and Pugh v 
Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N); Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS). 
62. Nordenfelt 566; Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink [1936] Ch 544 distinguished a partnership restraint from a 
post -employment restraint although the court did not say that all partnership restraints will be treated like sale of 
goodwill restraints; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 246; Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 
266 at 272; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400 although the statement is limited to "professional partners "; Heydon 
201; Walker 187; Gloag 571; Miller Partnership 120 -123; See infra. 
63 McBryde 599 -600 noted that such a notion exists but stated that it depended on the facts; Miller Partnership 
120 -123; Christie 443 goes no further than stating that many post- partnership restraints will be goodwill oriented; 
Cf Trebilcock 63 cannot be accepted; There is a suggestion of this in Halliwell v Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 180. 
64 See Nordenfelt 566 and Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 586; Trebilcock 63; It can be deduced from 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400; See counsel in Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 456; McBryde 
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power cannot form the basis of the distinction between restraints in sales of goodwill and post - 
employment restraints 65. The association of partnership restraints with any one of the other two 
types of classic restraints cannot hinge on it. Moreover, where a junior partner joins a partnership, 
he will often not be in a strong bargaining position 66; thus partnership contracts cannot be 
automatically associated with any one of the two other classic types of restraints on this basis. 
There is no other ground upon which partnership restraints can be consistently associated with any 
of the above mentioned two types of restraints 67. In Bridge 68 the court therefore correctly 
discarded the notion that they should be dealt with like either sales of businesses or post - 
employment restraints. 
However, the court probably went too far. Lord Fraser held that legitimate interests that could be 
protected in a particular case had to be determined by looking at the object of that particular 
transaction 69. But it will be helpful to the development of partnership restraints if the vast corpus 
of knowledge that exists on sale of business and post -employment restraints can be applied here 70. 
The Bridge approach should accordingly be qualified. When a partnership restraint comes before 
the court, three possible avenues should be open to the judge. 
2.1. Partnership restraints that should be dealt with like sale of business restraints 
A restraint should, on a substantive level, be dealt with in the same manner as a sale of business 
restraint if it is central to a scheme by which a transfer of business is organised 71. Sale of business 
substantive principles should apply - and the protection of goodwill allowed 72 - if a partner has a 
600; See also on bargaining power: Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 246; Anthony v Rennie 1981 (Notes) 11 
at 12; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 221, Steyn v Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 151. 
65 Supra 1.1. 
66 Cf Bridge y Deacons [ 1984] AC 705 at 716. 
67. The view expressed in New York case of Lynch v Bailey (1949) 90 NYS 2d 359 that all such restraints should 
be treated like employment restrictions is therefore also unacceptable. 
68. Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705 714; See McBryde 600. 
69. Miller Partnership 121. 
70. See Miller Partnership 121 -122. 
71. Miller Partnership 122; In some cases the facts are particularly close to a sale of business: Williams v Williams 
(1818) 2 Swan 253, Rolfe v Rolfe (1846) 15 Sim 88, Price v Green (1847) 16 M & W 346, Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 
E & B 391, Wolmerhausen v O'Connor (1877) 36 LT 921, See also infra Ch 9.2, Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink 
[1936] Ch 544 at 547, Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270. 
72. Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 246, 253 -254, See Lindley 10 -179; Bridge y Deacons [1984] AC 705 at 
714ff although the goodwill issue was not sufficiently emphasised; Kerr v Morris [1987] 1 Ch 90 at 107ff, See also 
114 -115; See Lindley 10 -179; Although not explicitly Anthony v Rennie 1981 (Notes) 11 at 12; Cameron y 
Mathieson 1994 GWD 29 -1740; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 221; Hermer v Fisher 1960 (2) SA 650 (T) 
especially 656; Steyn v Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 151; Malan y Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 250, 252 
although the court took a too narrow view of goodwill. 
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proprietary interest in the business of the partnership and the dominant aim of the restraint is to 
transfer that interest if he leaves the partnership. 
Two aspects that may be relevant to this question have been discussed by the courts. 
- It may be of evidential importance that all partners are equally bound to the restraint, although it 
will neither be a necessary nor a conclusive requirement for treating a post -partnership 
restraint as a sale of business 73. The court in Bridge 74 considered two factors that it 
regarded as important for allowing the protection of goodwill. The restraint applied equally 
to all partners and partners all owned the assets of the partnership. 
- It may be of importance that money is paid by a partner entering the partnership or to a partner 
leaving it, although the importance of this factor will be limited. In Bridge 75 the court did 
not give much weight to the argument that goodwill would be bought for a minimal sum at 
termination of the partnership, because it accepted that the partner also entered the 
partnership without having to pay much. 
Where a restraint mirrors a sale of business restraint and goodwill is protected, one apparent 
theoretical anomaly will exist. The partner does not own all goodwill; how can he be restricted 
from interfering with the goodwill of the partnership in toto? However, this conundrum can be 
solved. The law does not make a concrete distinction, and it will generally be impossible to 
distinguish between one partner's real share of the goodwill and that of another. A partner has a 
percentage share in the whole 76. It might be argued that this can work unfairly in a case where a 
partner is restricted from interfering with any goodwill of the partnership but had only a small 
interest in it. But such cases will more closely resemble post -employment restraints and only 
different, more narrow, interests will then be protectable. 
2.2. Restraints in , artnershi . s that should be dealt with like s ost -em . to ent restraints 
Post -employment principles should be applied to post -partnership restrictions that emulate post - 
employment restraints 77. Only narrower interests should be protectable where the partnership 
agreement is intended to protect the remaining partners against later interference made possible by 
the covenantor's participation in the partnership. An example of such a restraint will exist where 
73. Miller Partnership 122 -123 although the author placed too much emphasis on this issue see supra Ch 6.10. 
74. Bridge V Deacons 
[ 
19841 AC 705 at 716. 
75. Bridge V Deacons 198.1 AC 705 at 716. 
76. Cf Bridge y Deacons 19841 AC 705 at 716 -717; Lindley 10 -180. 
77. See Lindley 10 -176, Bee 10 -179 is unacceptable. 
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the partner does not really share in the assets and control of the partnership, or where the 
partnership is hierarchically structured and the partner is very low on this ladder. 
2.3. Partnership principles and restraints on shareholders 
An analogy with partnership cases will often be apposite where restraints are imposed on 
shareholders in a company. There might be cases concerning restraints of trade where the court 
would lift the corporate veil for the purpose of exposing a partnership 7 8. The position of 
shareholders, especially in smaller companies, will frequently be similar to those of partners, and 
these cases should for the purpose of the doctrine be treated like partnership covenants 79. Courts 
cannot lift the veil as a matter of course, but formalism should be avoided when it comes to the 
determination of public policy questions. A difficult question then arises if the position of a 
shareholder can be compared to that of a partner in a particular case. It must still be determined 
whether the covenantor should be treated as a seller of goodwill or as an employee. 
There are cases where companies are interposed that closely match partnerships of the former type 
8 °. Some judges did not appreciate the resemblance with partnerships that emulate sales of 
goodwill 81. But other courts have accepted that investment could be protected here 82, although 
the proper theoretical analogy was seldom drawn 83. 
There are probably also cases where lifting the veil will expose no more than a partner- employee 
covenant 84. But the courts have not taken an acceptable view in any of these cases: 
- David Wuhl simply equated the restraint with a post -employment restriction 85. This will mostly 
lead to similar answers but it might sometimes be necessary to draw finer distinctions. 
- In Super Safes the court held 86: 
78. See supra 1.2. 
79. See Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 383; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 
1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 786 but see the criticism infra. 
80. WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 216ff; Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R); Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A). 
81. Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 347 -348; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 771 -772, 
See 778. 
82. WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213. 
83. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 757, 764, Van Heerden JA 775 -776 who placed much emphasis on 
these notions, Nienaber JA 766 accepted that the relationship had some partnership elements but it was not built 
upon; Cf Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 238 where a proper 
analogy was almost drawn. 
84. Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 383; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 
427 (W); Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W). 
85. David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 435 -436. 
86. Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 786. 
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"Where it can be shown that shareholders are de facto carrying on a 
partnership by means of the machinery of a limited liability company, it may 
well be that the reasonableness of the restraint as between the shareholders 
and between them and the company will fall to be dealt with as if the 
restraint were one agreed upon between partners." 
Nevertheless, it then argued that there was not sufficient material before it to say that this 
was the position in casu. It is correct to accept that these restraints can be dealt with like 
partnerships; however, the conclusion of the court regarding proof is questionable. Clearly 
the business here closely emulated some sort of partnership. 
- In Systems Reliability ß7 the court accepted an analogy with partnerships and then relied on 
Bridge y Deacons, stating that competition could be restricted. In other words, the court 
decided that the goodwill of the business could be protected against the vendor of shares. 
2.4. The position where the post -partnership restraint does not clearly fall in either of 
the above mentioned categories 
The court will have to fall back on general principles in cases where the partnership restraint is 
quite different from either post- employment or sale of business cases. It will then have to work out 
which interests can be protected in the particular case on the basis of the principles that have been 
expressed above. However, cases of this nature will seldom emerge. Although partnership 
restrictions cannot be completely assimilated with one type of restraint or the other, courts will 
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Chapter 8: The techniques for limiting the scope of restraints of trade 
Techni ues for limitin the a licabili of a restraint to lecritimate interests 
The great advantage of a restraint is that parties will be able to create special enclaves of 
protection that will extend beyond anything that the common law will give t. Courts will have to 
determine the validity of a restraint by looking at the manner in which this has been achieved. 
From the judges' perspectives it will be pivotal to determine if these exclusion spheres correspond 
with the legitimate interests of the covenantee 2. Three aspects of restraints will come under 
scrutiny 3. Restrictions can be limited as to time, space, and activity. 
2. Vagueness and discretions 
The techniques will have to be used in a manner which does not make the restraint void for 
vagueness 4. The general vagueness principles will apply here. The court will have to look at every 
case to see whether the wording is sufficiently precise. 
One possible technique for limiting the scope of restraints has been found to be too vague in all 
cases. A restraint may not be concluded on the basis that it will be valid as far as the law allows 
But policy will also come into it. Marsh 6 submitted that the real reason why such covenants will 
Rautenbach & Reinecke 561 cannot be accepted. 
2. For authorities where this was not properly related to interests: Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 
1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 442, Van der Merwe 158; See Walker 185. 
3. JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 590; Blake 675; Davies 497; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1210; 
Wilkinson v Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 15. 
4. Marshalls Ltd v Leek (1900) 17 TLR 26; Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 UR 8; Reeve v Marsh (1906) 23 TLR 24; 
Whitmore v King (1919) 119 LT 533 at 536; Stride v Martin (1897) 77 LT 600; Mason 730, 736, 743 -744; Bowler 
v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 648; Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v 
Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 946 -948, 949, 959, 963, 967 although the reasonableness and certainty questions were not 
always kept apart; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 189; Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 
481; Electric Transmission Ltd v Dannenberg (1949) 66 RPC 183 at 186, 187; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney 
[1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1376; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 281; Under Water Welders and 
Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 at 504; Spafax (1965) Ltd v Dommett (1972) 116 Sol Jo 711 
and Financial Collection Agencies (UK) Ltd v Batey (1973) 117 Sol Jo 416; See Berlitz School of Languages Ltd v 
Duchene (1903) 6 F 181 at 187; The court in Rodger v Herbertson 1909 SC 256 at 265 did not see its way clear to 
discuss this issue before proof; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 534 and see 531 where the court looked at 
uncertainty as a factor that influences reasonableness; Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 10; Apparently 
Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 73; Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354 at 357; 
WAC Ltd v Whitlock 1990 SLT 213 at 217; Walker 183; Christie Jur Rev 291; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v 
Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 612; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 250; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) 
SA 760 (C) 762; Carthew- Gabriel v Fox and Carney (Pvt) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 598 (RA), See Christie 447, and see 440 
on the possibility of saving such a restraint. 
5. Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 387 -388, 392 -394, 395 -396, 399, Cf a quo 373; Express Dairy Co Ltd 
v 
Jackson (1930) 99 LJKB 181; Chitty 1200; Lindley 10 -182; Notes (1888) 14 LQR 240; Winfield (1946) 327; Treitel 
408. 
6. Marsh 367. 
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not be upheld is that the courts do not want to force a person into performing an illegal contract in 
practice - if not in theory. The author probably meant that such a clause is unacceptable as it 
would allow the covenantee to insist on enforcement without being properly confined by a precise 
contractual clause, and this is certainly an important ground for not enforcing such clauses. Yet, it 
is probably too one -dimensional to state that this second ground is the real reason why such 
contracts cannot be upheld. The issue mentioned by Marsh will be an important further policy 
reason for not upholding them. 
However, this second ground mentioned by Marsh 7 will really come into its own in restraints that 
provide for a discretion or the consent of the covenantee 8. There is considerable authority for not 
upholding a restraint which is unreasonable in other respects if it contains a clause according to 
which a covenantor may perform some of the prohibited work activities with the consent of the 
covenantee 9. It will not make a difference even if it is stipulated that such consent may not be 
unreasonably withheld 10. If such clauses are allowed, it will make the covenantee a judge in his 
own cause and there is a strong possibility that he may refuse to consent to an activity that cannot 
be restricted by a direct restraint 11 
However, this does not mean that such clauses will always lead to the ineffectiveness of a restraint. 
Such a discretion will be valid where it is so limited that it can only be withheld in cases where it 
would, in any event, be reasonable to restrict the covenantor 12. It has sometimes even been 
7. Marsh 367 with reference also to JW Chafer Ltd v Lilley [1947] LJR 231 see infra. 
8. See also Edwards v Worboys [1984] 1 AC 724 infra Ch 15. 
9. 
Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 201. 
10. Perls v Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch 149 especially at 152, 153 and 156; JW Chafer Ltd v Lilley [1947] LJR 231 at 234; 
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 343; Chitty 1203; Heydon 163 -164; Christie 
JurRev 301; Winfield (1946) 327. 
11 For further cases where the court did not even consider consent clauses as a means of saving restraints of trade: 
Baker v Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 520; Woods v Thornburn (1897) 41 Sol Jo 756; Whitmore v King (1919) 119 
LT 533; Reeve v Marsh (1906) 23 TLR 24; Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone -White [1907] 1 Ch 189, 322; 
Morris & Co v Ryle (1910) 26 TLR 678; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413; Hepworth 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1; Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185; Stenhouse 
Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 see clause 6; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273; The Marley Tile 
Co Ltd v Johnson [ 1982] IRLR 75; Randev v Pattar 1985 SLT 270; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 
450; SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362; Sellers v Eliovson 1985 (1) SA 263 (W); Humphrys v Laser 
Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C). 
12. Inherent in Perls ibid; Cases where restraints were upheld despite consent clauses and where the issue was not 
even discussed by the court are: Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322; Whittaker v Howe (1841) 3 
Beav 383; Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653; Hastings v Whitley (1848) 2 Exch 611 where the consent clause 
was considered for other reasons; Richards v Whitham (1892) 66 LT 695; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13; Rannie 
v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969; Showell v Winkup (1889) 60 LT 389 and see the analysis of other aspects of such 
clauses; Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 TLR 325; William Robinson & Co Ltd v Heuer [1898j 2 Ch 451; Gilford 
Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [19741 AC 391; Lawrence David Ltd v 
Ashton [1989] ICR 123; Rodger v Herbertson 1909 SC 256; Taylor v Campbell 1926 SLT 260; GFI Group Inc v 
Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 538; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 
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considered as a factor persuading the court that a restraint, doubtful in other respects, is 
reasonable 13. Hence, it is not acceptable to aver that these clauses are always void for vagueness 
14 
In South Africa the court in Tension Envelopes refused to enforce a restraint where the parties 
agreed that the employer at termination of employment would nominate one competitor for whom 
the employee would not be allowed to work 15. But the judge accepted that this clause was too 
wide because there were no protectable interests. He was apparently not critical of the use of 
discretion. Discretion and consent clauses in South Africa will probably be subject to the same 
rules and principles as in English and Scots law. Reasonableness in South Africa is determined at 
the time when the court is asked to enforce the restraint, but this will probably not impact on this 
issue. The courts should not allow the exercise of discretions that may lead to ineffectiveness, even 
if they are in the end properly exercised in a particular case. 
3. Spatial limitations 
A restraint must be limited to the area where it is necessary for the protection of the legitimate 
interests of the covenantee 16. A restraint will naturally be too wide where it extends beyond any 
sphere of activity and any interest of the covenantee 17. But after Mason spatial restraints will also 
have to be further limited. They will have to be restricted to the legitimate interests of the 
SLT ShCt 33; See also Harben Pumps (Scotland) Ltd v Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 where a consent clause was included 
in an interdict based on the implied duty not to disclose or use trade secrets; Empire Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 
WLD 289; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd IT Martin 1955 (3) 
SA 609 (SR); Sellers v Eliovson 1985 (1) SA 263 (W). 
13. 
Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 240, 241, Cf Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 26, 
Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 448 -449. 
14 
Heydon 164 cannot be accepted; See more carefully Chitty 1204. 
15 
Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W). 
16 
Cf Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 405 did not properly relate interests to the spatial 
restraint. 
17. 
Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 744; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 560; Price v Green (1847) 16 
M & W 346 at 352; The statement in Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 411 is therefore too wide; Davies Turner 
& Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 656; Hooper & Ashby v Willis (1905) 21 TLR 691, (1906) 22 TLR 451; Stuart 
and Simpson v Halstead (1911) 55 Sol Jo 598 at 599, Heydon 145; Continental Tyre and Rubber (Great Britain) Co 
Ltd v Heath (1913) 29 TLR 308 at 310; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 at 423ff; 
Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick [1939] 2 All ER 85 especially 93 -94; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 189; 
Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395; Anson 326; Heydon 145 -146; Minimax Ltd v Geddes (1914) 31 
ShCt Rep 36 at 40; Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 456 -457; See counsel Living Design (Home 
Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71; Cf Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 335 -336 will have to 
be approached with caution; Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 481; U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v 
Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 147 -148; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t/a T -Chem v Sanderson -Kasner 
1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 859; Christie 446, 447. 
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covenantee, which will necessarily mean that restraints will sometimes have to be narrower than 
the sphere of business of the covenantee 18. 
Spatial reasonableness will depend on the facts of a particular case, and parties must be careful to 
lay down spatial limitations with reference to a particular case. In Malden 19 a spatial restraint was 
placed on a branch manager. The spatial restraint was related to the branch where he was 
employed. However, he then became area manager and the restraint, to an extent, became 
senseless, because the area in which he worked took on a completely different nature. 
Where the restraint is aimed at protecting customer connections, it must only restrict the employee 
in an area within which he can interfere with customer connections of the employer as a result of 
his previous position as employee. There are post- employment cases that fall into this category 
where the courts accepted that the area had to be limited to the geographical sphere within which 
the employer operated 20. But such protection will be acceptable only where all customers will be 
customer connections 21, or where interference within the whole area of the business will create 
the possibility that customers are taken away because of influence gained over them by the 
employee during employment 22. Clauses based on the sphere of activity of the employer will 
clearly be too wide for the protection of trade connections in cases where the covenantor only 
operated in a particular section of that area 23, or where the duration of the contract was too short 
- or would foreseeably be too short in England and Scotland - for the employee to strike up 
contacts with customers throughout the area 24. 
18. Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd If Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 688 -689 cannot be accepted. 
19 
Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 733. 
20. E.g. Hayward v Young (1818) 2 Chit 407, Delius v Muller (1901) 45 Sol Jo 737; See Heydon 144 -145, Blake 
642 -643; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 614. 
21. 
See e.g. Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 274 -275. 
22. 
Cf Steyn y Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 150 at 152 although it is a partnership case. 
23. 
Cf already the restraint of trade clause Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322; Mason 734 but the 
principle had not yet fully developed, 743, Cf also the comment 737; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490 where 
the foundation was laid; Clarke Sharp & Co Ltd v Solomon (1920) 37 UR 176 at 177f although not discussed in 
terms of customer connections; Scorer v Seymour Jones [ 1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1422, 1424, 1427; The Marley Tile 
Co Ltd v Johnson [1982] MLR 75 at 77; Blake 660 and especially 680; Heydon 146ff; Although not yet fully 
developed see British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68, Mulvein v Murray 
1908 SC 528 at 532; Remington Typewriter Co v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168 at 170; Kilgour v McNìcol 1961 SLT ShCt 
8 at 10; Cf Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248 where a wider restraint was justified on other 
grounds; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 223; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 
62 (C) 75; Cansa (Pry) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 68 although it may also have been illegal because it 
was wider than any interest of the covenantee, See Kerr 517; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t/a T -Chem v Sanderson - 
Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 859 but see the argument here. 
24. 
Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 at 223ff, But see the criticism infra Ch 9.9. 
160 
Chapter 8: The techniques for limiting the scope of restraints of tradc 
In sale of business cases the restraint may not be spatially wider than the interests of the buyer 25. 
But this will not be the only requirement. Where the protectable interest is goodwill, the restraint 
must not be geographically wider than the goodwill of the business sold 26. Wider geographical 
operation than in post- employment restraint for the protection of customer connections often will 
be allowed where the restraint of trade is aimed at protecting goodwill in a sale of a business 27. 
Where the aim is to protect customer connections or goodwill, one of the factors that will have a 
marked effect on the justifiable geographical width of the restraint is whether business requires 
direct personal contact with customers 28. Where personal contact is required, the spatial limits of 
the restraint will probably have to be more narrowly drawn, and this may become particularly 
important in the electronic age. 
If the parties aim at protecting a trade secret, the covenant will have to be limited to the area 
within which that trade secret can be used or disclosed to the detriment of the covenantee. In these 
cases the court will frequently allow wide geographical restriction 29. Use and especially disclosure 
of a trade secret within a very wide area will often still interfere with the legitimate interests of the 
covenantee, while it will be very difficult to guard trade secrets in any other manner than by 
geographical restriction of wider work activities 30. Blake 31 argued that spatial limitation will play 
no role here because a trade secret will be destroyed wherever it is disclosed. However, this 
cannot be accepted as a general principle. In some cases trade secrets will have to be substantially 
25. 
Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292 at 297, 298 -299, 300; Dumbarton Steamship Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 
1 F 993 at 996 -997, 997, 998. 
26. Nordenfelt 548 -549; British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 574; Pellow 
v Ivey (1933) 49 TLR 422 at 423 but a too narrow view of goodwill was taken; D Bates & Co v Dale [1937] 3 All 
ER 650 at 654 -655; Connors Brothers Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 192 -194; Atiyah 340; Cheshire Fifoot 
and Furmston 412; Trebilcock 239; Apparently Kennedy v Clark (1917) 33 ShCt Rep 136 at 138; Estate Fisher v 
Bradley 1931 CPD 46 at 48; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 614; Schwartz v Subel 1948 (2) SA 983 (T) 
989; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 870 some provision will especially be allowed for future expansion; 
See Berger v Osher 1965 (1) SA 558 (W) 559; Cf Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 650 where no final 
decision was made; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 108, 109; Wohlman v Buron 
1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 252. 
27. Connors Brothers Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 194; See however Heydon 195 with reference to Harms 
v Parsons (1862) 32 Beav 328; Wohlman 254 although it is not always clear; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 
62ff; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 869 -870. 
28. 
Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 744, Heydon 196; See Isitt and Jenks v Ganson (1899) 43 Sol Jo 744. 
29. Bryson v Whitehead (1822) 1 Sim & St 74, Allsopp v Wheatcroft (1873) LR 15 Eq 59 64-65, See Heydon 156, 
Lindley 10 -181; White, Tomkins and Courage v Wilson (1907) 23 TLR 469; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 
109 LT 385 and see the appeal 109 LT 587, See Gooderson 422; Forster & Sons Ltd v Suggett (1918) 35 TLR 87 
discussed Anson 327 -328, Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445, Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks 
Ltd [1960] RPC 235, A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 
1978 SC 16; David Wahl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 437. 
30. Lindley 10 -181. 
31. Blake 679; Heydon 156; Trebilcock 90. 
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hemmed in on the spatial level 32. The court will not allow protection against the remote 
contingency that the covenantor can harm the covenantee by use or disclosure of trade secrets 
through working in a wide area: 
- Only narrow protection will be allowed if the secret is less valuable or important 33 
- It may be asked whether the covenantee will do business in the entire area 34. But too much 
emphasis was placed on this in the courts. 
The courts must refrain from attempting to determine reasonableness with too much precision. 
The spatial sphere within which an interest will exist can seldom be precisely delineated Some 
useful rules of thumb have developed. 
The interests will not normally have to exist in every nook and cranny of the restricted area . It will 
merely have to be shown that it had sufficient prevalence in the area. In sale of goodwill cases, 
courts have accepted that it is not necessary to show that the trade has been practised in all parts 
of the restricted area 36, and the point has also been made in post- employment cases although it 
must be approached with more caution there 37. Wide restraints will be justifiable where a wide 
area is sparsely populated by customers and potential customers in sales of goodwill, or 
protectable customers in employment cases 38, and this will be particularly true where the 
customers are valuable 39. However a restraint will not be allowed over an area where there are 
many potential customers for the covenantor who are not protectable as either goodwill in sale of 
32. 
Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 644 -645; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 




Cf Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 450; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [ 1960] 
RPC 235 at 241; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 426 -427; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 
1978 SC 16 at 22 -23; Gurry 213 -214, See also 217; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299. 
35 
Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 369; Christie 447. 
36 
Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 369; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 
179 at 194 see the discussion Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 409; Heydon 193 -194, Cf 145; Walker 185; Diner v 
Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 108. 
37. Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 542; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 2.41, 
Discussed Gurry 214 but see the criticism supra; Cf U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 
1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 147 -148. 
38. 
Population was already regarded as important in Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 33; Contra Mallan v 
May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 667; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 191; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors 
[31940] 4 All ER 179 at 194; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 153; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763. 
9. 
Nordenfelt mentioned in Lindley 10 -181; Harvey v Corpe (1885) 79 LT Jo 246; See Kerchiss v Colora Printing 
Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 241; The argument of counsel in Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395; 
Heydon 195; Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 335; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 
609 (SR) 614; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 237. 
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goodwill cases or customer connections in post -employment cases 40. The courts will in post - 
employment cases often require narrower types of restraints where this is the position 41. 
In post -employment cases the courts will not allow restrictions over outlying areas where the 
employer has very few protectable customers 42, and the same will probably apply in a sale of a 
business case where there is only limited business or potential business on the periphery 
43. 
The 
parties should refrain from including areas on the periphery of the spatial restraint, where it carries 
on limited activities, if such areas are populous and contain many potential customers for the 
covenantor 44. But protection on the fringes will be allowed, where there are important protectable 
customers in post- employment cases or valuable business in sale of business cases, even if most of 
the activities of the business take place within a smaller area 45. 
Two important types of spatial restraints must always be distinguished. A restraint may exclude 
certain business activities within a particular sphere 46, or a covenantor may be restricted from 
setting up a business from a particular base within a certain area (so- called brass plate covenants). 
The scope of such clauses will differ widely, and reasonableness will be determined differently in 
each type of case, though it may often be difficult to distinguish the different types of contracts 47. 
The first type is most common; the court will in these cases have to determine whether the 
restricted activity will interfere with legitimate interests of the covenantee if carried on within the 
restricted area. In the second type of case a different approach will have to be followed. The court 
will have to consider whether the restricted activities from the prohibited places for setting up a 
40 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1373 -1374, 1376, 1377, Gurry 217; Fellowes & Son v 
Fisher [1976] QB 122 at 129; Blake 679 -680. 
41 
See infra 5.4; Heydon 148 -149. 
42. Probably Great Western & Metropolitan Dairies Ltd v Gibbs (1918) 34 TLR 344; Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick 
[1939] 2 All ER 85 at 93 -94 with reference to Edward & James Ltd v Lakin Senior (1926) July 21 (unreported); 
Lyne- Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299 -1300, See counsel at 1297; Heydon 148; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) 
Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 404 cannot be accepted the position of the covenantor is not relevant here. 
43 
Left open in Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 650; Cf Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 336 -337 
laced too much emphasis on these customers. 
. Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 454; D Bates & Co v Dale [1937] 3 All ER 650 at 654, 655; Heydon 
149 with reference to HJ Willet Ltd v Beasly (1923) 58 L Jo 535; Cf Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 
437 at 438 where populousness and accessibility were considered as factors justifying a performer's restraint. 
45 Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 250, See Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299 -1300 and the 
arguments of counsel 1297; Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 480 although the court was very cautious; 
Heydon 197; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 153. 
46. 
See when this will be the case: Cullard If Taylor (1887) 3 TLR 698; Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All 
ER 857 at 861 -862. 
47. Whitehall v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 253; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299 and the 
reference 
to Robertson v Buchanan (1904) 73 LJCh 408, Cf the criticism Whitehill 242; Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 101; 
Spencer v Marchington [ 1988] IRLR 392 at 395ff where this was not properly recognised by the 
court; Lindley 10- 
182; Spowart- Taylor & Hough 746 -747, 750; Arlyn Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) SA 
308 (W) 310 -311; 
Groenewald v Conradie 1957 (3) SA 413 (C) 415. 
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business will interfere with legitimate interests. In these cases the actual sphere within which 
activities are restricted may be much wider. The most acceptable type of spatial restraint will 
depend on the facts of the case. 
It has been stated that distance will be determined as the crow flies where a restraint operates 
within a distance from a certain fixed point 48. However, this rule should not be slavishly followed. 
It was deduced from the interpretation of clauses, and courts should bow to a clause that is open 
to a different interpretation It may change depending on the words used in the contract or the 
circumstances in which the contract is concluded 50 
4. Temporal limitations upon the operation of a particular restraint 
Time restrictions will be pivotal in ensuring that restraints do not exceed legitimate interests. Some 
authorities have not made a clear connection between interests of the covenantee and the 
reasonableness of duration 51. But the most acceptable approach theoretically is to link them 52. A 
restraint may only endure for as long as it will take for the "risk of injury to be reasonably 
moderated" 53 
It is, frequently, almost impossible to determine precisely the duration for which an interest will 
exist. In Stenhouse Australia Ltd 54 Lord Wilberforce stated that: 
"It is for the judge, after informing himself as fully as he can of the facts and 
circumstances relating to the employer's business, the nature of the employer's 
48. Leigh v Hind (1829) 9 B & C 774; Duignan v Walker (1859) Johns 446; Mouflet y Cole (1872) 8 LR Exch 32 at 
33; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1524; Heydon 152; Winfield (1946) 331; Lindley 10 -181; Chitty 
1209; Cf the earlier authorities contra: Woods v Dennett (1817) 2 Stark 89, Leigh v Hind (1829) 9 B & C 774 per 
the majority; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 792; Kerr 522; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v 
Sgol1 1986 (1) 673 (0) 689. 
. Atkyns v Kinnier (1850) 4 Exch 776 although the decision in this case was probably meant to be of wider 
import; Mouflet v Cole (1872) LR 7 Exch 32 especially at 36; Kerr 521 -522; Cf as to cases where the parties 
expressly adopted different means of measurement: Robertson v Buchanan (1904) 73 LJCh 408, Smith v Hancock 
4 1894] 2 Ch 377; Heydon ibid. 
°. Kerr 522 with reference to Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) especially 251 -252, See Christie 446. 
51. 
Hooper & Ashby v Willis (1905) 21 TLR 691 at 692 although it might be the brevity of the report; Davies 
Turner and Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 534; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v 
Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 23; Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 at 35; Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 at 
153 -154. 
52. 
Eastes v Russ [ 1914] 1 Ch 468 at 476, 487; Scott Robinson 160 stated that duration should "to some extent be 
linked to the interests to be protected" (my italics). But it can be more strongly put; Sibex Engineering Services 
4Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503. 
3. Blake 677. 
54 
Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 
1159 see counsel. 
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interests to be protected, and the likely effect on this of solicitation, to decide 
whether the contractual period is reasonable or not. An opinion as to the 
reasonableness of elements of it, particularly of the time during which it is to run, 
can seldom be precise, and can only be formed on a broad and common sense 
view." 
Woolman 55 argued that general guidelines should be laid down. However, the decision on the 
exact length of one restraint can only be marginally relevant in another 56. 
Two issues will be important where trade connections are protected. The restraint may not be 
longer than the foreseeable duration (although the issue will be determined from a different point 
in South Africa) of customer relationships with the employer 57. Yet this will not be sufficient. The 
courts should consider how long it will take for the covenantor to lose the hold gained over 
customers because of his employment 58. The view expressed by the court in Stenhouse Australia 
Ltd 59 should be kept in mind: 
"The question is not how long the employee could be expected to enjoy, by virtue 
of his employment, a competitive edge over others seeking the clients' business. It 
is rather what is a reasonable time during which the employer is entitled to 
protection against solicitation of clients with whom the employee had contact and 
influence during employment and who were not bound to the employer by contract 
or by stability of association ". 
In this equation it will be important that the restraint should be for "no longer than 
necessary for the employer to put a new man on the job and for the new employee to have 
a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his effectiveness to the customers" 60 
55 
Woolman 258, See 255 is also sometimes too rigid; Cf Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 152 -153. 
56 Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 163 and 166 -167; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814; Dairy 
Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 94 -95 and the criticism of the court a quo; Farwell 69; Heydon 161; McBryde 
601; Christie 446 -447; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1105. 
57. M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 819 -820; Luck v Davenport-Smith [1977] EG 73 at 90 
although the argument was not fully developed here; Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 9 -10; Kemp Sacs & 
Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 688. 
58. Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 490; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 163 -166 although the court took a too 
wide view; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] MLR 483 at 486; Anson 327; David Wuhl 
(Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436 although the argument was introduced by counsel and though the court 
had some doubt about the factual support; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 688 
although other aspects were more important here and though this aspect was not properly considered; Rawlins v 
Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 544. 
59 
Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402, Cf Trebilcock 104 -106 does not appear to take an 
acceptable view of this dictum. 
60 
Blake 677; Already mentioned: Middleton v Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 413, See Heydon 158, Proctor v 
Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20; Inherent in Herbert Morris 743 accepted in M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All 
ER 814 at 816; Heydon 158; Heydon McGill 347; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 
148 at 153; Cf also Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 511. 
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Some basic principles for the protection of trade secrets can be deduced from the authorities, 
although the courts have not, up to now, taken a precise view of the allowed duration of restraints 
that gain their validity from such interests 61. Trade secrets do not justify keeping a man out of his 
trade indefinitely 62: 
- Where trade secrets are protected the restraint may endure for as long as such information 
constitutes a trade secret in the hands of the covenantee 63; this will be for as long as the 
knowledge remains secret, reasonably up to date and valuable. 
- The trade secret may only be protected while it constitutes a useful trade secret in the 
covenantor's hands 64. 
The notion that post -employment restraints will not be ineffective merely on the basis of duration 
65 must accordingly be rejected: 
- Older cases where lifelong restraints were accepted, cannot prevail 66 after Mason 67. The more 
refined interests were not yet acknowledged in these cases. Many of these older authorities 
61 
See e.g. Under Water Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 at 504. 
62. Anson 327; Heydon 161, Cf Blake 678 asserted some restraints will lose their enforceability even when the trade 
secret still exists but this is doubtful; Trebilcock 91 -92; Cf Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 
1160 although it was not finally decided; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 687 -688 
although the issue was not finally decided. 
63 Cf Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 385; Heydon 161; Blake 672; Trebilcock 91; 
Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 762; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 
494 (N) 498, 501 and Blake 678 although they place too much emphasis on the perspective of the covenantor; See 
the discussion of the duration of trade secrets supra Ch 6.5.5. 
64 Farwell 69; Heydon 161; Trebilcock 91. 
65 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 366 -367; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 23 -24; Eastes v Russ 
[1914] 1 Ch 468 at 482ff; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486 see counsel; 
Winfield (1946) 325. 
66 
Chesman v Nainby (1726) 2 Str 739; Hayward v Young (1818) 2 Chit 407; Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 
438 at 454; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 especially 560; Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653; Nicholls v 
Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42, (1847) 10 QB 346 see especially counsel 353; Hastings v Whitley (1848) 2 Exch 611; 
Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 411; Mumford v Gething (1859) 7 CBNS 305 and the exchange between 
bench and bar 317; Giles v Hart (1859) 1 LT 154; Gravely v Barnard (1874) LR 18 Eq 518; Jacoby v Whitmore 
(1883) 49 LT 335; Webb v Clark (1884) 78 LT Jo 96; Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 390 although the 
comment is made in the context of the now rejected partial general distinction; Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein 
[1896] 1 QB 478; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 at 587; Hood and Moore's Store Ltd v Jones (1899) 81 LT 169, 
Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 30, Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 TLR 325; Delius v Muller (1901) 45 Sol Jo 
737; Barr v Craven (1903) 20 TLR 51; Watson v Neuffert (1863) 1 M 1110; Macintyre v MacRaild (1866) 4 M 
571; Meikle v Meikle (1895) 3 SLT 204; Chapman v Swan 1912 EDL 150. 
67. 
See already in Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 TLR 8; SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 369 is 
over -optimistic; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 768, 771, 774; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 
468 at 476-477 and 482; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 34; See Wyatt v Kreglinger and 
Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 810; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 189 in combination with area; Jenkins v 
Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 480; Electric Transmission Ltd v Dannenberg (1949) 66 RPC 183 at 192 although 
other aspects were more fundamental here; See Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 281; Cheshire Fifoot 
and Furmston 410; Trebilcock 91; See already British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 
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emphasised the general partial test that did not really allow temporal and other activity 
restrictions to realise their full potential 68. 
- Many of the more modern cases that allowed such covenants must be condemned 69. Customer 
connections and trade secrets will be protectable, and both will often be ephemeral. It is 
theoretically and practically likely that a restraint in an employment case may be invalid for 
the sole reason that it is too long in duration 70. 
- In Dempsey 71 Gutsche J relied on Hitchcock 72, where it was accepted that a restraint may 
extend beyond the life or involvement of the covenantee in the business, as that may 
increase the value of the business. But this argument presupposes that there are protectable 
interests that will exist for the whole period, and this will seldom be the case in post - 
employment cases. 
- It has sometimes been stated that unlimited restraints that only operate within a restricted area 
will be acceptable because the public will still be able to utilise the services of the 
covenantor outside the area 73. But this argument over -simplifies the principles underlying 
the doctrine. The deprivation of the public of particular skills is not the only reason against 
maintaining a restraint. It will be better to stress the interests of the covenantee in 
determining duration. 
The only worthwhile point that can be made is that the courts should probably see precise spatial 
restrictions as a more important source for limiting restraints than precise temporal restrictions 74. 
A different picture emerges if these broad principles are applied to sale of business restraints. 
Goodwill will be protectable for as long as such goodwill exists. The passage of time will normally 
not reduce the ability of the covenantor to interfere with goodwill 75. A wide approach - though 
SLT 67 at 68 although the restraint was also too wide on other grounds; Pratt v Maclean 1927 SN 161; Cramond 
(Cash Register Terminals) Ltd v Reynolds 1988 GWD 8 -310 was critical of unlimited restraint; Fraser 92 was 
critical of Stalker v Carmichael 1735 M 9455; A similar caveat is also voiced by Walker 185 although the point 
here is made with regard to area and duration; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 152; Pieterse v Cilliers 1945 (2) PH 
A.31 53 at 54; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 348 although the issue was not 
finally decided 354. 
68. 
See e.g. Christie Jur Rev 292 with reference to Hinde v Gray (1840) 1 Scott NR 123; Nordenfelt 666. 
69. 
Fitch v Dewes [19211 2 AC 158 especially from 163, Cf Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) 
SA 333 (W) 348; Gifford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935, Distinguished M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 
All ER 814 at 817, Cf the critical approach of the court a quo 949; Anson 327; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 410 





Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 337 see also the argument 338. 
72 
Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 455 (wrongly cited in the case). 
73. 
Hood and Moore's Store Ltd v Jones (1899) 81 LT 169; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 18; Fraser 91; 
Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 338 relying on Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226. 
74. 
Cf however Heydon 158 ibid. 
75. 
See Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241 at 259 although the explanation should not apply in employment cases. 
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too much cannot be read into it today - was already followed in the 19th century 76 and the same 
approach is correctly continued up to the present 77. 
The goodwill will probably only be eliminated if the business to which it relates is discontinued for 
a sufficiently long period. Yet in England and Scotland a restraint will seldom, if ever, be reduced 
on this ground as reasonableness must be determined from the moment of conclusion of the 
contract 78. There will be very few occasions where it will be foreseeable that the goodwill will not 
exist for the life of the seller. Unlimited restraints will probably be allowed even where a restraint 
is laid down by NHS practitioners who cannot transfer goodwill. The goodwill in these cases can 
still be continued through partnership In South Africa the court might have a clearer idea of the 
status of the goodwill at the time when the restraint comes to court 80. However, the South 
African and Anglo- Scottish points at which reasonableness should be determined in sale of 
business cases will often not be far removed from one another. 
Some authorities have not properly considered the almost absolute justificatory function of 
goodwill when it comes to duration. The discussion of this issue by Heydon 81 is founded on the 
misconception that protection in the case of sale of business restraints is also based on customer 
connections. His appeal for a stricter approach towards time restrictions in these cases is therefore 
misplaced. Time restrictions will probably only have a broad attitudinal impact in most of these 
76. Williams v Williams (1818) Swan 253; Archer v Marsh (1837) 6 Ad & El 959; Wallis v Day (1837) 2 M & W 
273; Pemberton v Vaughan (1847) 10 QB 87; Price v Green (1847) 16 M & W 346; Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 
241; Atkyns v Kinnier (1850) 4 Exch 776 (although this was a partnership case); Turner v Evans (1852) 2 De GM 
& G 740; Avery v Langford (1854) 1 Kay 663; Harms v Parsons (1862) 32 Beav 328; Brampton v Beddoes (1863) 
13 CBNS 538; Bird v Lake (1863) 1 Hem & M 338; Dales v Weaber (1870) 18 WR 993; Wolmerhausen v 
O'Connor (1877) 36 LT 921; George Hill and Co Ltd v Hill (1886) 3 UR 144 at 145; Nordenfelt; Stride v Martin 
(1897) 77 LT 600; Marshalls Ltd v Leek (1900) 17 TLR 26; Dunman IT Trautman (1891) 9 SC 24; Coetzee v Eloff 
1923 EDL 113. 
77. Connors Brothers Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 195; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 251 -252; 
Trebilcock 241 -242; Estate Fisher v Bradley 1931 CPD 46 at 48; Wilkinson v Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 12; Forman v 
Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 64; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 221 -222; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 
613; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 870 -871; Kin v Sharneck 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 536; Schwartz v Subel 
1948 (2) SA 983 (T) 989; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280 -281; Diner v Carpet 
Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 109; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763; Commercial 
and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 237 but see the reservations infra; Christie 
448. 
78. 
Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241 at 259 -260; Robertson v English (1867) 4 WW & AB 238; Jacoby v Whitmore 
(1883) 49 LT 335 at 337; Townsend v Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698 at 703; Gooderson 423 did not take proper notice of 
this factor; Cf the criticism of Heydon 133 -134 although the principle can be justified on other grounds; See infra 
Ch 13. 
79. Whitehill 
v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 253 -254. 
80 
PJ Visser (1985) 17 De Jure 194 at 197 see the example mentioned here, See Kerr Tribute 189. 
81. 
Heydon 198; Pellow y Ivey (1933) 49 TLR 422 at 423; Atiyah 340; Randev y Pattar 1985 SLT 270, See also 
McBryde 601; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 497; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 871 
investigated the relationship between doctor and customer for this purpose. 
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cases 82. Although it was intended more generally, the statement in Bridge 83 to the effect that 
"there appears to be no reported case where a restriction which was otherwise reasonable has been 
held to be unreasonable solely because of its duration" should only apply to sale of business 
restraints 84. 
Since early on the courts have considered that a restraint may transcend the covenantee's actual 
holding of the interest 85. The reason, translated into modern parlance, is that protectable interests 
may be valuable beyond the covenantee's holding of it. They will often be transferred to a 
successor, and the mere transfer does not affect the protectability of the interest; in fact it will 
increase the value of the business when it is transferred S6. The only real problems that will exist in 
these cases will be to determine whether the rights in terms of the restraint have been transferred. 
Finally, a restraint will be unacceptable if it might be extended to a period that will be too long in 
England and Scotland 87. In South Africa the law is more problematic. It might be argued there 
that the restraint should still be regarded as reasonable if the discretion has actually been 
reasonably exercised when the court is asked to enforce it. But the courts will probably not accept 
this view. 
5. Activity limitations 
82. 
Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 613; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 871. 
83. Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705 717, Chitty 1197. 
84. 
Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 195, See Chitty 1214, Heydon 198 although his criticism 
cannot be accepted see supra; Lindley 10 -182 with reference to Pandit v Shah mentioned in Lindley; Probably 
Cameron v Mathieson 1994 GWD 29 -1740; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 222; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) 
SA 603 (0) 613; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 870 -871; Kin v Sharneck 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 536; 
Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 237; Cf Dempsey v Shambo 
1936 EDL 330 at 337, 338 with regard to a restraint in a lease of a business and goodwill. 
85. 
Contra Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 744; Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 455 -456; 
Pemberton v Vaughan (1847) 10 QB 87; Hastings v Whitley (1848) 2 Exch 611; Atkyns v Kinnier (1850) 4 Exch 
776 at 783; Smith v Hawthorn (1879) 76 LT 716; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 483; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 
AC 158 at 168; Kales 195 -195, 204; Rodger v Herbertson 1909 SC 256 at 261 where effectiveness was not even 
discussed; Fraser 92; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 314; Thompson v Nortier 1931 OPD 147 
at 153 -154 misused this principle, See the distinction between old and new customers made by Kerr 511 is 
unhelpful 
86. 
Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 455 -456; Atkyns v Kinnier (1850) 4 Exch 776 at 783; Townsend v 
Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698 at 703; Jacoby v Whitmore (1883) 49 LT 335; Fitch y Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 168; See 
Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241 at 259 -260 and the role of this on English principles for the time of the 
determination of reasonableness. 
87. 
Heydon McGill 346; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 453 accepted that the words "at 
least" in this case would not be effective but it was stated that it would not affect the rest of the clause, See 
Dumbarton Steamship Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 where it was not discussed. 
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The courts will also look at the activities that are restricted. The activities of the covenantor, apart 
from their temporo -spatial dimension, may be no further restricted than is necessary for the 
reasonable protection of the legitimate interests of the covenantee. Some authorities have stressed 
time and space restriction almost to the exclusion of this aspect 88. However, activity restrictions 
will often be most effective in ensuring the validity of a restriction 89. Thus a restraint not to do 
any business within a certain area for a certain time, however limited, will be impossible to justify 
90 
The different activities that may be limited by the restraint will depend on the facts of the case and 
the extent to which other limiting techniques are used. The permutations are theoretically endless. 
Restraints have taken on wide ranging and sometimes esoteric forms. Only some of the most 
important activity restrictions will be analysed. 
5.1. As principal or as employee 91 
It might be difficult to determine whether a person is restricted as employee and/or as principal 92. 
The question may be important in establishing the scope of protection, but will also be 
fundamental to the determination of reasonableness. 
88. Putman v Taylor [ 1927] 1 KB 637 at 642; Blake 675; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 409; Pest Control (Central 
Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 614; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t/a T -Chem v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) 
SA 850 (W) 858 although activity restraints played an important role in argument; Sibex Engineering Services 
gty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503. 
. Although it was called by different names: Herbert Morris 715 "subject matter "; Anson 326, Treitel 408, 
Trebilcock 90 and 103 "scope "; Heydon 121 "the trade controlled by the covenant "; Gloag 569 -570 "must refer to a 
particular trade or profession "; Walker 186 "the extent of restriction "; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 867 
"scope of activities "; Christie 441 "nature ". 
90 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 187; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 559; See also Vernon v 
Hallam (1886) 34 ChD 748; Baker v Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 520 at 522; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 at 
580 -581, 586 -587, 588, 589 -590; See Perls v Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch 149; Woods v Thornbum (1897) 41 Sol Jo 756 
and Ehrman v Bartholomew [1898] 1 Ch 671; Hood & Moore's Store Ltd v Jones (1899) 81 LT 169; Anson 326; 
Morris & Co v Ryle (1910) 26 UR 678; Cf Christie Jur Rev 300 who still discussed this issue in terms of the 
partial general distinction; Heydon 137; Lindley 10 -179; Watson v Neuffert (1863) 1 M 1110 at 1112 -1113; 
Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531, 534 but see the more restricted interpretation 532; See Kennedy v Clark 
(1917) 33 ShCt Rep 136 the court seems to accept this; Gloag 569 -570; Walker 186; Empire Theatres Co Ltd v 
Lamor 1910 WLD 289 at 291 -292. 
91 
See also restraints against working for clients they have not really been discussed in the courts: Ixora Trading 
Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251, Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [ 1994] IRLR 69. 
92. 
See e.g.: Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 551 -555; Rolfe v Rolfe (1846) 15 Sim 88 at 90; George Hill and 
Co Ltd v Hill (1886) 3 TLR 144 at 145; Cade v Calfe (1906) 22 TLR 243; Cavendish v Tarry (1909) 52 Sol Jo 726; 
Ramoneur Co Ltd v Brixey (1911) 104 LT 809; W Williams v Fairbairn (1899) 1 F 944; Taylor v Campbell 1926 
SLT 260 at 261; WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213, See McBryde 600, 606, Lewis v Miller 1994 GWD 23 -1388; 
Stirling Park & Co v Miller (unrep); Scheckter v Kolbe 1955 (3) SA 109 (G) 110 -113, See Heydon 293; Cf Phillips 
v Stevens (1899) 15 TLR 325 at 326 and the partial general restraint distinction. 
170 
Chapter 8: The techniques for limiting the scope of restraints of trade 
A restraint against employment would have to be limited at least to competitors. These restrictions 
will always be too wide if they are not limited to the competitors or potential competitors of the 
covenantee 93. Yet the matter does not end there 94. Only such employment with competitors as 
will interfere with legitimate interests may be protected, and here restraints for the protection of 
the different types of legitimate interests will part ways. 
Employment will have to be restricted to employers who interfere with true customer connections 
95 Only employment activities that will interfere with such connections may be prohibited 96. It 
was accepted in Marion White 97, a hairdresser case, that work as a receptionist for another 
hairdresser after termination of employment would also interfere with customer connections of the 
previous employer, but work as a bookkeeper would not. The restraint was interpreted as relating 
only to the prohibition of active participation in the hairdressing business. 
The covenantor cannot be prohibited from working for persons who do not compete in the field 
where the protectable trade secret exists 98 and is useful 99, even if the potential new employer is a 
competitor in other fields of activity. The covenantor may only be restricted from being employed 
in a capacity where trade secrets can be divulged or used. The employment will have to be limited 
along very similar lines to restraints for protection of customer connections if protection is merely 
sought against possible use 100, although it has not been properly distinguished from the problem 
93. 
White Tomkins and Courage v Wilson (1907) 23 TLR 469; Spence y Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 
TLR 390 at 395 although it was not area in the traditional sense that was relevant here; British Reinforced Concrete 
Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 571 and see the discussion between bench and bar 569; Routh v 
Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 182 and Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 at 762; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks 
Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 240; JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 581 -582; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd y 
Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 334, But cf 332 is confusing; See Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd y Griffin 1978 (4) SA 
353 (W) 360 -363; See Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 572 and the scepticism of 
"indirect competition "; See also the discussion of trade secrets infra. 
94. 
Cf Francis Delzenne Ltd v Klee (1968) 112 Sol Jo 583 although no reasons were given for it in the report. 
95 Davies Turner & Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 656 will not be acceptable today; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd y 
Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 332 but see the criticism infra Ch 5.4; Cf Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du 
Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) 444 -446 did not properly relate the techniques used to the interests that could be 
$rotected. 
6. 
See e.g. Mason, Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227. 
97. 
Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 857 at 863. 
98. 
Vandervell Products Ltd v MacLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 192 -194, 194 -195, 196 -197; Commercial Plastics Ltd v 
Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 especially 645 -646, See the criticism Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 
WLR 1472 at 1480 -1482, 1489; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd y Chahryn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 343; 
Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1482 -1483, 1489; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 
All ER 418 at 426 -427, 433, 435; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299 is unacceptable on this 
oint. 
9. 
Cf the argument of counsel Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 although the court was sceptical of 
this interpretation 733. 
100. JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 590. 
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of disclosure tot However, a restraint against being employed will be particularly apt in cases 
where fear of disclosure of a trade secret to a competitor is the main problem 102. A restriction 
may include a wide range of operations here. A trade secret can be divulged even if a person is 
employed by his new employer to perform different functions from those that strictly concern the 
trade secrets. In these cases it will often be enough, for the purpose of the activity restraint, to 
restrict the covenantor from working for competitors 103 But this principle should perhaps also 
not be absolute. There is no real authority for the notion that these restraints will have to be 
limited to specific types of employment 104 Yet it is suggested that such wide restraints should be 
allowed only if there is a reasonable chance that the secrets may still flow from one part of a 
competing business to the other. 
In sale of business cases the goodwill sold can also be protected by clauses against being 
employed. However, the covenantee may only protect himself against the covenantor working for 
competitors of the business sold, and not competitors of other businesses owned by him 105 
Moreover, the activities of the covenantor will have to be further restricted to ensure that they will 
not interfere with goodwill or trade secrets if performed in the service of a competitor 106 The 
courts have not really taken up this issue, but it is suggested that there might be cases where 
prohibition against employment in an established business of a competitor will have little or no 
effect on the goodwill of the covenantee. It might be that the courts will in future be more critical 
of such restraints. 
lot JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 590; See failure to draw the distinction: Spence y Mercantile 
Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 395, Littlewoods Organisation Ltd y Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1479. 
102 
MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1468. 
103 
See British Mannesmann Tube Co Ltd v Phillips (1903) 48 Sol Jo 117 where these arguments already played 
an important role; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 395; Marchon Products Ltd y 
Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 448; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 240; Littlewoods 
Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1479; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 22, 28 -29, 
But see the narrow view 24 -25, Cf the criticism of Forte 22; See SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36- 
37 see also the remarks made with regard to the granting of interdict 37; It is only on this basis that A & D 
Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299 can be explained; See Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 
70 at 72 -73 although different issues came into play here see infra; Cf Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 
1977 SLT 38 at 40 did not properly investigate it; Scott Robinson 159; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd y Griffin 1978 
(4) SA 353 (W) 363. 
04 E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 314 although the case concerned the protection of 
information; Left open in Commercial Products Ltd y Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 646; Technograph Printed 
Circuits Ltd y Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 343 but the argument here was narrowly related to the fact that the 
restraint was not limited to competitors that could use the trade secret, See Heydon 142; JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills 
[1993] FSR 577 at 581 and the arguments of counsel apparently accepted by the court. 
05. British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 574 -575 not following Smedley 
Ltd v Smedley (1918) unreported; Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 269. 
106. 
See D Bates & Co v Dale [1937] 3 All ER 650 counsel for the covenantor 651 the argument apparently found 
some favour with the court 655. 
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5.2. Restraint not to compete or interfere with the business of the covenantee 
These types of restraints have met with a mixed fate in post -employment cases 107. It must be 
possible to determine the limits of the business of the covenantee that may not be competed or 
interfered with, and such restraints in post- employment cases have on occasion been described as 
too vague. It will often be very difficult for the covenantor to determine what he is obliged not to 
do 
108 
Moreover, there will be difficulties with the reasonableness of such clauses. The reasonably 
protectable interests of the covenantee should still occasionally justify such wide protection, for 
instance, in the case of a trade secret that permeates the whole business of the covenantee 109 but 
it will have to be approached with caution. Reasonably protectable interests will seldom be broad 
enough to justify such wide activity restrictions. The courts have mostly accepted such clauses 
after narrowing down their field of operation through contextual interpretation 110 In Group 4 111 
the restraint was aimed at protecting trade secrets and restricted the covenantor from being 
concerned in a competing business. The court referred to the trade secret cases where it was 
accepted that a person could be restricted from being employed in any position with a competitor 
112 However, those cases are unhelpful in this context. It should have been asked whether the 
restraint would go further than restricting the covenantor from competing in the sphere where the 
trade secrets would be relevant. It might be that the trade secrets here would have been valuable to 
all competitors, but there are some indications from the case that this was not so. 
In sale of business cases, restraints against competition will generally be regarded as acceptable 
113 
Here goodwill is protectable, and it will often justify such wide restraints. The restraint will 
107 
See Reeve v Marsh (1906) 23 UR 24 although the issue was not finally decided on this basis; Cf also Hinton 
& Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 where it was common cause that a restraint against entering into 
"conflicted" activities was too wide; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 572. 
108. 
Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 TLR 8; Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147; See the difficulties in 
Vandervell Products Ltd v McLeod [1957] RPC 185 at 197; British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v 
Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68 although the court thought that the restraint could be more narrowly interpreted; 
Contra Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 73 however it did not really discuss it. 
109 
Cf the facts of Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 where the restraint was invalid for other 
reasons. 
110. 
Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 TLR 8 although the interpretation of Heydon 140 is not justified by the case; Barr 
v Craven (1903) 20 TLR 51, See Heydon 128; Reeve v Marsh (1906) 23 TLR 24, See Christie Encyclopaedia 604; 
British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68. 
111 
Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 72 -73. 
112 See supra 5.1. 
113. Marshalls Ltd v Leek (1900) 17 TLR 26; See Castelli v Middleton (1901) 17 TLR 373 although the clause itself 
was not so phrased; Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 especially at 271; Allied Dunbar (Frank 
Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [19881 IRLR 60 at 64; McBryde 601; Cf Brooks and Wynberg it New United Yeast 
Distributors 1936 TPD 296 at 305 where the court accepted that such a restraint in a combination case was not too 
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however still have to be limited to the protection of goodwill sold. Heydon 114 accepts that a seller 
cannot be restricted from being involved in any business for the time being carried on by the buyer 
as not all future activities are protectable, and this view seems theoretically justifiable. It was 
subjected to some unwarranted criticism in Commercial and Industrial Holdings 115, but the court 
in the end interpreted the restraint in compliance with the principle as expressed by Heydon. 
5.3. Activity restrictions based on activities previously performed by the business which 
the employee worked for or activities performed by the business sold 
The activity restriction will sometimes be based on certain or all of the activities of the business for 
which the employee worked, or certain or all of the activities of the business sold 116 A restraint 
will often be ineffective for being wider than the protection of any interest of the covenantee if it 
restricts wider activities than those exercised by the business of the employer, in post- employment 
cases, or the business sold, in sale of business restraints 117. This is not an immutable principle. 
There will be some exceptions He. In all cases the scope of restraints will depend on the type of 
business and the type of relationship of which it forms a part. Yet parties will have to think very 
carefully about restraints that go beyond the activities of the covenantee. 
The sphere of business is more important than the actual business carried on. In a sale of business 
restraint the sphere of business can be defined as "floor covering" where a carpet manufacturer 
only makes certain types of carpets but where the business will compete with other types of 
manufacture of floor covering 119. However, this has sometimes been exaggerated 120. The activity 
restraint here comes very close to being too wide. 
vague; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) especially 239; Cf 




Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 239 
116. 
On how a restraint not to practise similar business should be interpreted see: Heydon 293 with reference to 
Automobile Carriage Builders Ltd v Sayers (1909) 101 LT 419, Christie 446 with reference to Capnorizas v 
Webber Road Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1967 (2) SA 425 (A). 
117 
Avery v Langford (1854) 1 Kay 663 at 665 but see the interpretation; Rogers v Maddocks [ 1892] 3 Ch 346 at 
358 -359; Hooper & Ashby v Willis (1905) 21 UR 691 at 692; See Morris & Co v Ryle (1910) 103 LT 545; 
Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292 at 297 -298, 299, 300 -301; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker & Foreman [1914] 1 
Ch 413 at 424425; Whitmore v King (1918) 87 LJCh 647; Heydon 138; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 
651 -652; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 239 -240 but see the 
limitation by interpretation. 
118 
See e.g. Heydon 142. 
119 Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 106ff. 
120 
Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 541 -542; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 
(C) 80. 
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Where the protected business is a medical practice or legal firm the restraint will have to be limited 
to practising as a doctor or lawyer . A narrow view has been taken of the types of medical practice 
that will harm the covenantee if practised by the covenantor after termination of his association 
with the covenantee 
121. Wider restraints on lawyers have been allowed 122, but greater specificity 
might be required today 123. 
Many other types of limitations have also become common. The covenantor cannot be restricted 
from any business connected to the wood business where the covenantee bought and sold timber 
from certain sources 124. The courts have recognised the distinction between wholesale and retail 
125 although it cannot be clearly drawn in all types of business 126. It has been recognised that 
there is a distinction between selling and manufacturing 127, although the spheres of business will 
again overlap in certain types of businesses 128 
5.3.1. Restraints based on activities of the employer in post -employment restraints 
In earlier cases courts often did not discuss the issue whether such clauses were acceptable and 
short shrift was even made of suggestions that clauses could not be so phrased 129. However, such 
cases will have to be approached with caution in modern restraint of trade law. 
121 Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 182 and especially 183, On Appeal Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 
see the more careful approach 761 -762; Jenkins y Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 481; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 
236 especially 248 -249; See MacFarlane v Kent [1965] 2 All ER 376 at 381, See the criticism Peyton infra 1224- 
1225; Lyne- Pirkis y Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 1301 and 1299; Peyton y Mindham [1971] 3 All ER 1215 especially 
1222ff; Clarke v Newland [1991] 1 All ER 397 at 401ff and 405 the court used limitative interpretation; Heydon 
138 and Heydon McGill 345; See the precise restriction in Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11; McBryde 600; 
Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307, Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 151 cannot be accepted today; 
See Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 866 -867 the court must not become too strict; Rogaly v Weingartz 
1954 (3) SA 791 (D); Hermer v Fisher 1960 (2) SA 650 (T) 656; Stevn v Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 150 at 151 
where this was not discussed; See Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 252 -253 and the narrowing down by 
interpretation. 
122. Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770. 
123 
Fellowes & Son v Fisher [ 1976] QB 122 at 129, 142; Dallas McMillan y Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 456; 
Walker 186. 
tea 
Whitmore v King (1919) 119 LT 533. 
125. 
Cf Moenich v Fenestre (1892) 67 LT 602; Cowan y Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 650 -651. 
126. 
Rogers v Maddocks [1892] 3 Ch 346 at 354 -355, 357, 358, See Heydon 139. 
127. 
Josselyn v Parson (1872) LR 7 Exch 127 especially 129; Cf also Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 27 TLR 
236; Heydon 296; See Brooks and Wynberg v New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1936 TPD 296 at 305 with 
reference to British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v 
Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 334. 
128. 
Harms v Parsons (1862) 32 Beav 328 at 331 -332; Cf Castelli v Middleton (1901) 17 TLR 373 will probably 
today be too wide. 
129 
Nicoll v Beere (1885) 53 LT 659; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik y Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447; 
Moenich v Fenestre (1892) 67 LT 602; E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 306 -307, But see the 
narrower view of the minority 314; Cf Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 560 where there was uneasiness with 
such a clause. 
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Restraints will today often have to be much narrower because the covenantee cannot protect his 
business as a whole; he can merely protect legitimate interests 130 The covenantor -related 
requirements will, in many cases, call for narrower delineation of activities 131 Such wide restraints 
will only be acceptable if certain very specific requirements are met. 
- The activities carried on by the employer may be used as a basis for the protection of customer 
connections if all the activities so carried on will interfere with them when executed by the 
employee after termination of employment 132. This will be the case with a small business 
where all types of activities were carried on by the covenantor and where all or the vast 
majority of activities are related generally to the customers of the business. 
- The trade secret must be of such a nature that any activity performed by the business will, if 
performed by the covenantor, jeopardise that trade secret 133. The chances of success for 
these activity restraints will be greater in trade secret cases than in customer connection 
cases. Trade secrets often pervade the activities of a business to a much greater extent 134 
Not only restriction of activities carried on by the business that would allow use of the 
trade secret, but also prohibition of activities that would cause a risk of disclosure to the 
detriment of the employer, should be allowed. Yet, there will be cases where not all 
activities carried on by the employer will have this effect 135 
Heydon 136, in his discussion of restraints for the protection of customer connections states that: 
"a covenant which restrains the employee from carrying on the employer's business, 
but which extends further than the job in which the employee was in fact engaged is 
too wide ... ". 
It will be more conducive to the validity of a restraint - especially in the case of customer 
connection restraints - if the activity elements of that restraint are based on the activities, or some 
130 
Cf Clark v Electronic Applications (Commercial) Ltd [1963] RPC 234 at 238 where interests were not properly 
evaluated. 
131 
See Great Western & Metropolitan Dairies Ltd v Gibbs (1918) 34 TLR 344 accepted that the form used here 
would be more apt in a sale of goodwill case although this point was not clearly made; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 
KB 571 at 579 -580, 593, See Christie 442; Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 654 and see infra; Bull y 
Pitney -Bowes Ltd [ 1967] 1 WLR 273 at 281 and the concession of counsel; Rentokil Ltd v Hampton 1982 SLT 422, 
See Woolman 255; See Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 223 although the reasonableness of that 
part was not more widely discussed; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) common cause 
between the parties; The Concept Factory v Heyl 1994 (2) SA 105 (T) 111, 114. 
133 
Heydon 140 relying on Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 TLR 8 but the case does not support him. 
133 
See Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 at 388 apparently did not have problems with this 
aspect. 
134. 
See Continental Tyre and Rubber (Great Britain) Co Ltd v Heath (1913) 29 TLR 308 at 310 although 
knowledge and not trade secrets was stressed, Cf Heydon 140; Inherent in Rentokil Ltd y Hampton 1982 SLT 422. 
136 
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of the activities, performed by the employee within the business 137. But this can be no more than a 
ruler of thumb. Depending on the facts, only narrower restraints will sometimes be allowed while 
wider restraints may sometimes be effective. 
5.3.2. Restraints based on the activities of the covenantee in sale of goodwill restraints 
In sale of business cases it will generally be sufficient, for the purpose of activity restriction, to 
base the covenant on the activities performed in the business sold. In Weinberg 138 it was accepted 
that restriction may take place "with regard to activities normally falling within the confines of the 
type of business bought by the purchaser ". Restraints based on these activities are common 
practice in sale of business cases 139 The mere fact that the covenantor did not perform all these 
activities will not be relevant 140. It might be suggested that the covenantor may only be restricted 
from performing those activities of the business sold that pertained to goodwill or trade secrets. 
However, restriction of activities that were performed by the business sold will generally be 
allowed, even if all such activities are not interest -related, because it will seldom be practicable to 
formulate a narrower restraint that will still provide proper protection 141 Even mundane 
administrative tasks will not generally be performed in isolation. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that 
there might be some clearly separable activities that will not impact on legitimate interests, and in 
such cases the restraints cannot merely be based on the activities of the business sold. 
5.4. Non -dealing and non -solicitation of customer restraints 
The term "non- solicitation" is sometimes used in the pregnant sense to include non -dealing 
142, 
but 
here the former will be separated from the latter. The effect of non -solicitation and non -dealing 
restraints do not differ much, but there are two points of separation 143: 
137. 
See already Morse v Fowler (1899) 44 Sol Jo 89; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 592 -593; Heydon 139- 
140. 
138. 
Weinberg v Mervis 1953 3 SA 863 (C) 868, See Kerr 509. 
139. Williams v Williams (1818) ) 2 Swan 253 and along similar lines Leighton v Wales (1838) 3 M & W 545; 
Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241; Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391; Harms v Parsons (1862) 32 Beav 328; 
Brampton v Beddoes (1863) 13 CBNS 538; Hagg v Darley (1878) 47 LJCh 567; Stride v Martin (1897) 77 LT 600; 
British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 
All ER 179 and see infra; Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) 
Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60; Dumbarton Steamboat Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993; Arljn Butcheries 
(Pty) Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) SA 308 (W); Pito v Deeb 1967 (1) SA 166 (0). 
. See Heydon 192 with reference to Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 269 and the notion 
that a person who was a partner could also be restricted as employee; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 867- 
868, See Kerr 509. 
141 
See the related argument of Heydon 192. 
142. 
Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 733; Heydon 144ff; Chitty 1206. 
143 Spowart Taylor & Hough 750 on a further public interest distinction. 
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- In non -solicitation cases the covenantor may still do business with the customers of the 
covenantee in the field in which he was employed by the covenantor, but he may only deal 
with customers who come to him out of their own accord; he may not attempt to convince 
them to change allegiance 144. The impact of non -dealing restraints will be wider. Business 
with a customer is prohibited even if that customer comes to the covenantor spontaneously 
145 Non- solicitation restraints will gain wider acceptance than non -dealing restrictions 
because they will have a more limited impact on the freedom of work of the covenantor 146 
- Where only trade secrets in the form of information about the identity of customers are in issue, 
non -dealing, as opposed to non -solicitation, restraints might sometimes be problematic 
because no abuse of trade secrets will take place if customers come to deal with the 
covenantor out of their own volition. Wider restraints will probably only be allowed if it 
will be difficult to police solicitation. Nevertheless, this issue will seldom be of importance 
as limitations that go beyond solicitation and dealing with customers will often be allowed 
in these cases 147. 
Non -solicitation and non -dealing restraints deserve separate attention because of one important 
and peculiar feature which they frequently display. Non -dealing 
148, non- solicitation 149 and non- 
144 
For the interpretation of the word solicit: Cullard v Taylor (1887) 3 TLR 698; Horton v Mead [1913] 1 KB 154; 
Reeve v Marsh (1906) 23 UR 24; Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds [1994] FSR 52 at 58 -59, Tolgate Holdings Ltd 
v Olds 1968 (2) PH A.78 (W); Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 350; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 
1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 307, 308; Simaan v SA Pharmacy Board 1982 (4) SA 62 (A) especially 76; Sellers v Eliovson 
1985 (1) SA 263 (W) 265 -266, Discussed Christie 446 and Kerr 521. 
145 
Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] AC 720 at 723; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v 
Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64; Morris Angel & Son Ltd v Hollande [1993] ICR 71 at 75; Austin Knight (UK) 
Ltd v Hinds [1994] FSR 52 at 59. 
146 
Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All 
ER 1227 at 1235; Cf Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248 with reference to Mulvein v Murray 1908 
SC 528 although it was exaggerated here. 
147. 
Supra especially 5.2 and infra 5.5; Cf SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 642 where non - 
solicitation was stressed. 
148 
Nicholls v Stretton (1847) 10 QB 346, (1843) 7 Beav 42; May v O'Neil (1875) 44 LJCh 660; Mills v Dunham 
[1891] 1 Ch 576; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 ChD 154; Lewis & Lewis v Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 64; Jenkins v 
Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471; Financial Collection Agencies (UK) Ltd v Batey (1973) 117 Sol Jo 416; MacFarlane v 
Kent [1965] 2 All ER 376; Edwards v Worboys [1984] AC 724; Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705, See Dallas 
McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 456 although it is too strict; Macintyre v MacRaild (1866) 4 M 571; Hinton 
& Higgs (UK) Ltd y Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 453; Scottish Agricultural Industries plc v Richard 1990 GWD 13- 
640; Hall Advertising Ltd v Woodward 1992 GWD 26 -1688; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219; Petre & Madco 
(Pty) Ltd t/a T -Chem v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W). 
49. Ward 
v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548; Batho v Tunks [1892] WN 101; Gophir Diamond Co v Wood [1902] 1 Ch 
950; Reeve v Marsh (1906) 23 TLR 24; Morris & Co v Ryle (1910) 26 TLR 678; Pearks Ltd v Cullen (1912) 28 
TLR 371; East Essex Farmers Ltd v Holder [1926] WN 230; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182; M & S Drapers 
(a firm) v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [19641 2 All ER 10; Under Water 
Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498; Spafax (1965) Ltd v Dommett (1972) 116 Sol 
Jo 711; Financial Collection Agencies (UK) Ltd v Batey (1973) 117 Sol Jo 416; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips 
[1974] AC 391 at 401; Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 101; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger 
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interference 150 restraints are frequently limited to all or certain identified or identifiable customers 
of the covenantee. In fact, non -dealing and non -solicitation covenants are often combined for this 
purpose 151. Such restraints will have to be so limited that only dealings with customers who may 
be reasonably protected are included 152 
It has been stated that it will not be necessary to inquire into the geographical width of such 
restraints 
153. That does not mean that there will be no spatial restraint here. Incidental to the 
activity restraint will be a spatial delimitation that is so specific that it will often not be necessary 
to consider separately whether it is related to an area within which interests can be reasonably 
protected 154 Moreover, many of the factors that are normally important when determining the 
spatial reasonableness of a restraint will not be relevant here. Restriction will not be over an entire 
geographical area but will be limited to certain customers who may be scattered to such an extent 
that it will allow the covenantor still to work in the lacunae 155 However, although their role will 
be much reduced, further spatial restraints may still be relevant. 
[1988] IRLR 60; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483; Business Seating 
(Renovations) Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729; Bristol Clothing and Supply Co (Glasgow) Ltd y Dickie (1933) 49 
ShCt 70; Allen & Leslie (International) Ltd v Wagley 1976 SLT ShCt 12; Steiner y Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 at 
35; Rentokil Ltd v Hampton 1982 SLT 422; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 see the discussion 298; 
Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114; Donald Storrie Estate Agents y Adams 1989 SLT 305; Malden Timber Ltd y 
Leitch 1992 SLT 757; Although it is not clear from the report what the restraint entailed see the interdicts in 
Hutchison & Craft y Burns 1994 GWD 26 -1547; Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355; Stewart Wrightson 
(Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) although it is not clear; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 
(3) SA 250 (SEC); Sellers y Eliovson 1985 (1) SA 263 (W); Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van 
Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C). 
150 
Great Western & Metropolitan Dairies Ltd v Gibbs (1918) 34 UR 344. 
151 
Bannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576; Dubowski & Sons If Goldstein 
[1896] 1 QB 478; Konski v Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935; Rayner y Pegler 
[1964] EG 301, 967; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227; Marion White Ltd v Francis 
[1972] 3 All ER 857; T Lucas and Co Ltd y Mitchell .[1974] Ch 129; Stenhouse Australia Ltd y Phillips [1974] AC 
391; Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92; John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332; Austin 
Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds [1994] FSR 52 see especially 58; Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354; Geo 
A Moore & Co Ltd v Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868; Douglas Llambias Associates Ltd y Napier 1990 GWD 39 -2243; 
Snap -on -tools Ltd y McCluskey 1991 GWD 7 -367; Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] 
IRLR 69; NCH (UK) Ltd v Mair 1994 GWD 34 -1986; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd y Borrowman 1979 (3) 
SA 1092 (T); Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C); Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset School y Van 




Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1929) 46 UR 147; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13; 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1375; Chitty 1209; Treitel 407; Malden Timber Ltd v 
McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 733 although with some hesitation; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 
1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1120; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd y Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 307; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t/a T- 
Chem v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 858; Christie 447; Kerr 517. 
154 
See however Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452, Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v 
Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 862. 
155 
Geo A Moore & Co Ltd y Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 
1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1105 -1106 but see infra. 
179 
Chapter 8: The techniques for limiting the scope of restraints of trade 
They can, in certain cases, still play a role in limiting protection to those customers of the 
business who exist within a particular area. Thus it may play a role in delineating customers 
especially where the employee's sphere of activity was geographically defined 156. Cases 
that did not properly appreciate the significance of such limitations 157 must be approached 
with caution. 
- Sometimes the covenantor is not only restricted from dealing with customers while they are 
customers of the business. It has been contended that a spatial restriction will be needed if 
the covenantee only operates within a certain area because that will allow the covenantor 
to deal with those customers in areas where dealings will not be in competition with the 
covenantee 158. This seems in line with general principles. Yet, in GW Plowman 159 the 
court maintained that a covenantee may still wish to keep a connection even outside his 
sphere of business. This may be the case, but the nature of the business and the nature of 
the customer will mostly show that there are still vast areas where there will be no interest 
in maintaining such connections. The issue was not properly discussed in GW Plowman. A 
more important argument is probably that wider geographical restriction will often be 
unnecessary as it is unlikely that the employee will meet the customers outside the sphere 
of influence of the covenantee 160. Accordingly further geographical limitations will 
probably seldom be required. 
It will still be important for the determination of the attitude of the courts towards the restraint if 
the effect of the non -dealing restraint is that it is very wide or world -wide 161 
It has been maintained by some of the authorities that duration limitations will not carry much 
weight in these cases 162, but this view cannot be accepted. These types of restraints will not have 
the same type of incidental impact on duration as it will have on space. It will still have to be 
limited separately 163. These narrow non -dealing and non -solicitation restraints on the one hand 
and temporal restrictions on the other will only impact upon each other in a much more general 
manner 164. The cases invoked in support of a contrary principle by Chitty 
165 and Heydon 166 
156 
The Marley Tile Co Ltd v Johnson [1982] IRLR 75; Scottish Agricultural Industries plc v Richard 1990 GWD 
13 -640; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C). 
157 Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248, See Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355; Malden 
Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 733; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33; See infra. 
158 
Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 481. 
159. 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13, Mentioned Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds [1994] 
FSR 52 at 57. 
160 
Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 at 976 -977, 978, 978 -979; Home Counties Dairies Ltd If Skilton [1970] 
1 All ER 1227 at 1233, 1234 -1235. 
161 
See infra Ch 9.10. 
163 
Heydon 152; Chitty 1209. 
163 
Blake 675; See e.g. Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531 did not ignore the time restriction; McBryde 596. 
164 
See infra 6. 
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cannot be accepted. The wide approach in pre Mason cases 167 will today be unacceptable. Most 
modern authorities relied on concerned different issues 168. Gilford actually enforced a lifelong 
restraint, but the length of the restraint was not discussed 169 
In these cases the most important question will be: Which customers can be protected? Customers 
will be the standard, and the validity of the restraint will depend on whether such customers are 
protectable. Dealings or solicitation may only be prohibited against customers if they or 
knowledge about them constitute legitimate interests of the covenantee. 
The type of trade secret that is usually protectable here is customer information. A wide view of 
the customers that may not be dealt with or solicited in such cases was taken in Gilford, but the 
views expressed there cannot be accepted 170. Customers may only be protected in so far as their 
names or other information about them form part of the protectable secret. Moreover, those 
customers may only be protected against a particular employee if that employee had knowledge of 
the customer secret 171. However, courts should not ignore the fact that an employer at conclusion 
does not know which customers would be protectable, because the employee would have 
information about them 177. 
Some confusion as to which customers can be protected has also arisen in cases where customer 
connections are protected by non -solicitation and non -dealing restraints 173. The theoretically most 
acceptable view, which is also accepted in the Austin Knight case 174, is that, as a general rule, 




166 Heydon 152. 
167. Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548; Nicholls v Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42, (1847) 10 QB 346; May v O'Neil 
(1875) 44 LJCh 660; Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478; Lewis & Lewis v Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 
64. 
168 Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478 at 483; Mason at 734, 741; East Essex Farmers Ltd v Holder 
[1926] WN 230; Konski v Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530 at 538 -539; GW Plowman & son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10. 
169. Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935, But see the court a quo 949. 
170 
Gifford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 964, 968, See the more acceptable approach 948 -949, See 
Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v Hinds [1994] FSR 52 at 56 and the explanation cannot be accepted; SOS Bureau Ltd v 
Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 see supra. 
171. 
See Geo A Moore & Co Ltd v Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868; See supra Ch 6.5.1. 
172 
This seems to have played a role in Gilford Motor Co Ltd y Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 962, 967 -968 although the 
dictum is confusing. 
173 
Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1231. 
174. 
Austin Knight (UK) Ltd y Hinds [1994] FSR 52 at 56 -58, See supra Ch 4.4. 
175 
Spafax (1965) Ltd v Dommett (1972) 116 Sol Jo 711; Financial Collection Agencies (UK) Ltd v Batey (1973) 
117 Sol Jo 416; See Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401; The Marley Tile Co Ltd v Johnson 
[1982] IRLR 75; See already British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68; 
Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd y Brodie 1986 SLT 354 at 356; See Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 where this 
view was apparently preferred; See National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 
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There are many cases which may create a different impression, but only a handful must be rejected 
outright 176. Most of the cases in which restraints have been condoned by the courts can be 
explained away, although they extend beyond the customers with whom the covenantor had 
contact 17. Some of these cases were decided before the narrow principles that apply today had 
properly developed 178. Others actually concerned the protection of wider information about 
customers, whether in the form of trade secrets or otherwise 179 
Most importantly, an exception to the general principles will exist on the ground of pragmatism 
180 At conclusion of the contract the covenantee in a post- employment or partnership case might 
find it difficult to determine which customers would be protectable vis -à -vis the employee. This 
will be considered by the court in determining reasonableness in England and Scotland 181. The 
terms are laid down at conclusion of the contract and reasonableness is determined from this point 
of view 182. The real position with hindsight may be quite different from the facts as perceived 
from the moment of conclusion. The employer can at least look at what is likely if he, at 
conclusion, knows that the employee will get into contact with customers, but it is impossible to 
determine exactly which customers. 
In South Africa problems of this kind will probably be solved along a different route. Here the 
reasonableness will be determined when the court is asked to enforce the restraint. The restraint 
will be regarded as unreasonable if it is shown that the customers that could be protected differ 
especially 1109 -1110 where a restraint was so limited by interpretation; Cf Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v Botes 
1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 862 where the reasons given are unacceptable; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t/a T -Chem v 
Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 858 -859; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 438. 
176 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13F, See the criticism of Heydon 154; Business Seating 
(Renovations) Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1373, 1376, 
1377 although some passages may also be more narrowly interpreted; Smith & Wood 139. 
177. 
See McBryde 596 -597. 
178. 
Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531, 532, 534. 
179. 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 14, Cf also the explanation Austin Knight (UK) Ltd v 
Hinds [1994] FSR 52 at 57 -58, See the criticism supra Ch 6.4.5; John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 
332 although it was not properly investigated; Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248; Malden 
Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 733; Probably Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116, See McBryde 
599; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) 
SA 399 (C) 405 -406; See Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 457; 
See the criticism supra Ch 6.4.5. 
181 
See Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 366 on the practical difficulties. 
181 
GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13D -E, 14; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 
1 All ER 1227 at 1235. 
182 
See infra Ch 13. 
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considerably from the customers that were protected. However, the court should allow partial 
enforcement in such cases 
183 
However, another obstacle will not be insurmountable in these cases. Courts were initially 
sceptical of restraints where restricted customers were not known to the covenantor 184. But today 
it will not sway the English and Scots courts towards invalidating a restraint if all other 
requirements are met 
185. The court in GW Plowman gave two reasons for this conclusion: 
- An interdict or injunction specifically against dealing with unknown customers will not be 
granted 186. 
- The covenantor can ask potential customers whether they are customers of the covenantee. 
A different approach appears to have been followed in South Africa 187, but the English and 
Scottish approach is a fairer solution to a difficult problem. 
Still, lack of knowledge about customers will not be completely without effect. It will be relevant 
in the granting of interdict, and it may play some role in determining the attitude of the court 
towards the restraint in general 
188. Moreover, the principle must not be taken out of context. It 
does not provide justification for a restraint that is otherwise too wide. It only entails that lack of 
knowledge will cause no further objection to reasonableness if the restraint is in other respects 
reasonable 189 
Finally, courts have sometimes preferred restraints that prohibit solicitation or dealings with 
customers of the covenantee as opposed to restrictions that limit wider business activities within a 
restricted area. Judges have submitted that the narrower types of restraints will increase the 
likelihood for reasonableness 190 They have suggested that a non -dealing or non -solicitation 
183 
See infra Ch 14. 
184. Ramie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 although it was not clearly discussed; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 ChD 
154 at 156 although the point was not clearly made here either; Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478 at 
482, See contra 486; Konski v Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530 at 539; Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 481; See Treitel 
405. 
185 
Doubt was previously expressed about such a principle: Konski v Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530 at 539; Gilford Motor 
Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 949; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 14; Business Seating 
(Renovations) Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 733 -734; Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248; 
Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116; Aramark plc v Sommerville 1995 GWD 8-408 is perhaps too wide; 
Hutchison & Craft v Burns 1994 GWD 26 -1547; McBryde 597. 
186 
See Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 964, Cf 949 where it was not regarded as conclusive. 
187. Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 862; Cf National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1110 this question was avoided by interpretation. 
188 
Treitel 407 stated that the courts are more likely to enforce a restraint where it is limited to known customers. 
189. 
Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248 cannot be accepted. 
190 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 366; Heydon 150; Davies 493. 
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restraint would have been reasonable where wider restraints were found to be wanting 191. It has 
even been accepted that non -solicitation or non -dealing of certain customers of the employee 
would be the only acceptable technique for limiting certain restraints 192. But there are also cases 
where the courts have accepted that wider protection is justified 193 The lenient 1 9th-century 
approach 194 will not be acceptable today, but wider restraints can still be justified on certain 
grounds. 
In sales of businesses goodwill, as a protectable interest, will generally justify wider protection 195 
In Allied Dunbar 196 Millett J accepted that a restraint could be widely framed, as a narrower 
restraint would be too difficult to police. 
Wider restraints will normally be justifiable where confidential information lies at the basis of 
protection 197. In SW Strange 198 the court accepted that a restraint against non -solicitation could 
be exacted for the protection of information about the names and addresses of customers. 
However, a restraint against carrying on wider business activities within the whole area where 
customers existed was rejected. But the problem will frequently still be disclosure of information 
about customers. SW Strange can only be explained on the basis that customer connections and 
trade secrets were not properly distinguished. 
Many complex issues will have to be considered in determining whether only narrower restraints 
will be accepted where the protectable interest is customer connections. The strictest approach 
was followed here. 
Two aspects have been pivotal: 
191. 
Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 491; See Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 404; Spencer v 
Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 396; Chitty 1206; Although a clear view was not expressed Steiner v Breslin 1979 
SLT (Notes) 34 can be contrasted; Ex parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 479. 
192. 
See infra; Blake 663 and especially 681; Heydon McGill 345. 
193. 
See the careful opinions Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 578, 597; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 
at 642; Trebilcock 93 and the discussion 99 -103; Ex parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 479 although it was not 
justified on the facts in casu. 
194 Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 and the exchanges between counsel and Tindal CJ; Davies v Davies 
(1887) 36 ChD 359 at 366. 
9 See Heydon 186 but see the general criticism supra Ch 6; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 650. 
196. 
Allied Dunbar (Frank Wessinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64 -65. 
197. 
SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 35 -36, 37; McBryde 596. 
198. SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] i WLR 629 at 642, See SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37 
although the cases cannot simply be justified on this basis. 
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- The court will have to ask whether it was practically possible to frame a covenant that was only 
related to some or all customers. Where the covenantee's business concerns the general 
public, it will often be very difficult to delineate the customers that may be protected 199 
- For the covenantee, one of the great advantages of a geographically limited restraint (as opposed 
to some of the more limited activity based restrictions) is that the covenantor can be 
prohibited from performing clearly definable and conspicuous activities within a certain 
area. Such covenants will be more easily policed zoo 
The question whether customers are for credit or on the books will be particularly relevant under 
the second rubric 201. It has been accepted that the more narrow restraints will not be sufficient in 
cases where cash customers form a substantial part of the business 202, while conversely courts 
have sometimes insisted on narrower non -solicitation or non -dealing restraints where customers 
are on the books or where they deal with the business for credit 203. Nevertheless, the question of 
the existence of cash customers must not be exaggerated. It remains only one factor, albeit 
important, in the determination of whether only a narrower restraint should be allowed. The 
various different issues must be considered as a whole and have to be balanced 204 
In Nachtsheim 205 one of the grounds upon which a wider restriction was accepted was that the 
covenantor, who was a hairdresser, could still attract customers if employed by a rival concern 
even if he personally carefully avoided dealing with or soliciting customers. It was accepted that 
the covenantor could still be used as an "instrument for diverting customers" e.g. through 
advertisements that the covenantor is now connected to the rival business. This may be a ground 
for wider protection in some cases, although it will have to be shown that there is a likelihood that 
customers can be so attracted by a rival. Thus in SW Strange Z06 Stamp J was prepared to allow a 
199. 
Blake 661; Heydon 150; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 642. 
200 
Putsman v Taylor [ 1927] 1 KB 637 at 642; T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [ 1974] 1 Ch 129 at 135, See Gurry 
216; This is inherent in the arguments of the court in Scorer v Seymour Jones [ 1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1427, Heydon 
McGill 346; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 157; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 
1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 150; Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 274- 
275. 
201 
T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [1974] Ch 129 at 135; Heydon 150. 
202. 
Empire Meat Co Ltd v Patrick [1939] 1 All ER 606 at 610 affirmed [1939] 2 All ER 85 at 94. SW Strange Ltd 
v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 640. 
203 SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 641; MacFarlane v Kent [1965] 1 WLR 1019 at 1024 was 
inclined to the view that only non -solicitation or non -dealing restraints would be allowed; Chitty 1209; Heydon 
McGill 345. 
204. 
Cf SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 640; This issue could have swayed the argument for the 
covenantor in Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 (SEC) see the observations of the 
coun 444. However it was not discussed in the case. 
205. Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 274; See SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 37. 
206. SW Strange Ltd v Mann [ 19651 1 WLR 629 at 640. 
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restraint of wider activities on this basis. However, he held that the covenantor in casu would not 
have this ability. 
The spread of customers through a particular area may be of significance. Courts will often require 
non -dealing or non -solicitation restraints based on protectable customers if they are spread out 
over a wide area that is densely populated with other possible customers 207. Again this will have 
to be weighed against factors like the ability to identify customers. 
Non -dealing and non -solicitation restraints, based on customers, will allow for the closest possible 
delineation of especially customer connections and trade secrets in the form of customer 
information. By using techniques like these, the covenantee can almost secure the validity of a 
restraint. However, the negative factors must be kept in mind by covenantees who opt for this type 
of protection: 
- These restraints are more precise but because of their precision greater accuracy of delineation of 
interests will probably be required before an interest will be regarded as reasonable. 
Clauses must be drafted carefully. 
- Greater precision means smaller scope. The restraint might therefore not provide sufficient 
protection for the covenantee 20ß. 
5.5. Non -disclosure and non -use of trade secret covenants 
A covenantor may also be restricted from using or disclosing trade secrets 209, and these 
restrictions can be discussed together, although they also differ in some respects: 
- There may be cases where non -use restraint will not be allowed even though non -disclosure and 
other types of restraints might be enforced 210 
- Non -disclosure still leaves the covenantor free to use trade secrets 211. Where a trade secret is of 
such a nature that it can be abused by the covenantor through use, a non -disclosure 
restraint will provide no real protection for the covenantee. 
207. 
See already Proctor y Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd V Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 
1373 -1374, 1376, 1377, Cf Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd y Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 331 -332 where Gledhow was 
uoted although the case concerned a different issue; Blake 679, 681; Heydon 149; Heydon McGill 345 -346. 
$. Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd y McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 157; McBryde 596. 
209. 
Cf also Chitty 1206 on a restraint not to sell trade secrets. 
211 
See supra Ch 6.5.6. 
211. Haynes y Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 29; Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd y Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 at 207- 
208, See McBryde 599, Systems Reliability Holdings plc V Smith [1990] IRLR 377 384 -385; MacQueen Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1467; On the meaning of disclosure see Clark y Electronic Applications (Commercial) Ltd [1963] 
RPC 234. 
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Neither covenantees nor the courts have been enthusiastic about non -disclosure and non -use 
restraints as a means for protecting trade secrets. 
These types of restraints will have to comply with the same reasonableness requirements as other 
types of restraints 212. It was not always appreciated 213, but the restraint will have to be limited to 
use and disclosure of trade secrets 214. However, they will often be acceptable in terms of the 
restraint of trade doctrine 215, and this will seldom be in issue as the covenantee will, mostly, still 
be able to rely on an implied term for protecting non -disclosure or use 216 
Moreover, courts will often be reluctant to enforce these types of restraints. It will be very difficult 
for a covenantor to determine which elements of knowledge are trade secrets if the protectable 
trade secret in a particular case is not clear and separate from other information. The covenantor 
may be placed in an impossible position if the covenant prohibits use or disclosure, and the courts 
will often refuse to enforce such terms, whether express or implied 217. 
Finally, non -disclosure and non -use of trade secret restraints, whether express or implied, will 
seldom provide proper protection even if reasonable and enforceable by interdict or injunction 218: 
212 
Mainmet Holdings plc v Austin [1991] FSR 538 at 542. 
213 Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447; Forster and Sons Ltd v Suggett 
[1918] 35 UR 87; Under Water Welders and Repairers Ltd v Street & Longthorne [1968] RPC 498; Marks v Lantz 
1915 CPD 712 
eta 
Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 215, 216; Clark v Electronic Applications (Commercial) 
Ltd [1963] RPC 234 at 237 -238 where the clause was narrowed by interpretation; GD Searle Ltd v Celltech Ltd 
[1982] FSR 92 at 101; Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251 at 259; Blake 669; Gurry 204ff; Treitel 408 and 
the discussion of Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123; See the clause in Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd IT 
Brodie 1986 SLT 354 although the issue was not discussed; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734; 
Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 although it was not attacked on this basis here; Malden Timber 
Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 762 -763; McBryde 599; See the clause Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 
577 -578 where the interdict was not granted for other reasons. 
215 
Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 and 
587; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13; Herbert Morris 715; Forster & Sons Ltd v Suggett (1918) 35 TLR 87 
although it was not discussed; See Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 LT 538 at 543; Clark v Electronic 
Applications (Commercial) Ltd [1963] RPC 234 at 236; Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 
193 at 208, 209 but see supra 6.5.1, 6.5.2.3; PSM International plc y Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 but see how the 
interdict was limited 281; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 24; CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) 
Ltd v McKeag 1987 GWD 1 -2; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 453, Cf also Balston Ltd v 
Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 351 there are cases where such restraints will also be unreasonable for being 
too long. 
216. 
Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71 and the concessions of counsel. 
218. 
Supra Ch 6.5.6. 
Cf already Hagg v Darley (1878) 47 LJCh 567 with reference to Allsopp v Wheatcroft (1873) LR 15 Eq 59; Cf 
the narrow aproach towards use of a trade secret Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 350 -351; 
See Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1160 although this must not be confused with the other 
distinctions mentioned here; Woolman 255; See also the criticism Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v 
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- It will often be very difficult to police these restraints 219 Many, if not most, trade secrets can be 
ascertained through independent research by competitors 220, and it will often be almost 
impossible to determine through which avenue a competitor has acquired the secret. The 
covenantee will find it difficult to anticipate a breach without wider restraint 221. It will be 
impossible to determine exactly when trade secrets are used by the covenantor 
222 
and 
proof of breach will be a Herculean task 223 when the covenantor is afterwards employed in 
a position where utilisation of the trade secret will be useful to his new employer. 
- The risk of circumvention is enormous. It will be very difficult for the covenantor to refrain from 
using or disclosing trade secrets if he performs functions that may require the use of similar 
information. The potential for intentional and even inadvertent breach is just too great 224. 
6. Interaction between the different techniques for limiting the scope of a restraint 
Although the different techniques have been discussed separately, it must be underlined that each 
seldom stands alone. A restraint will consist of a combination of techniques. Thus the court will 
have to determine the validity of a restraint by looking at the totality of limiting techniques 
employed by the covenantee 
225. It has been said that a restriction which is geographically too 
wide, or too wide with regard to activities prohibited, cannot be saved by a substantial temporal 
limitation 226, and this is correct. Where one aspect of a restraint is too wide, it cannot be saved by 
Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71 infra Ch 15; Cf also Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 
482 (T) 511 is too simplistic. 
219 BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57 -58. 
220. 
See supra Ch 6.5.2.1. 
221. Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 449; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 
28 See MacQueen Stair Encyclopaedia 1468. 
222. Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 354; Gurry 204; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 
33 at 36; McBryde 596; BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57. 
223. Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 449; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 
WLR 1472 at 1479, Quoted in a case of a different nature Provident Financial Group plc v Hayward [1989] ICR 
160 at 166, See Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v Kruger 1979 (4) SA 337 (W) 340; JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] 
FSR 577 at 581 and the view of the court a quo the Littlewoods infra passage is also often quoted at 581, 587, 590; 
BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57. 
224. 
Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 29, See JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 587; Spence v 
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 395; See Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] 
IRLR 377 at 385; Blake 669 -670; Gurry 204; SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36; BHT Water 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57 -58. 
225. Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 642; Blake 675; Trebilcock 92; Wilkinson v Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 16; 
Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 336, 337; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 
614; Christie 446; Cf Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 403, McBryde 604 on the cumulative 
effect of different restraints. 
226. 
SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 at 423; Financial Collection Agencies (UK) Ltd 
v 
Batey (1973) 117 Sol Jo 416; Heydon 158; Minimax Ltd v Geddes (1914) 31 ShCt Rep 36 at 39; Fraser 92; Federal 
Insurance Corporation of SA Ltd v Van Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940 at 944; Cf Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings 
Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 406. 
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another. But temporal limitation will play an important role in determining whether a restraint is 
otherwise too wide where the position is not clear Z27. All limiting techniques play a role in 
ensuring that a restraint corresponds to protectable interests but they also interact on a second 
level 
228. The narrow scope of certain techniques should ensure that the court is more positively 
disposed towards other techniques 229, and conversely the court should be careful in determining 
the reasonableness of other elements where one aspect such as duration is very wide 230. Thus, 
duration restrictions may still play some role in determining reasonableness in sale of business 
cases where other factors are in doubt, although such restrictions will seldom be necessary in these 
cases 
231 
7. The factual matrix 
The impression should not be created that the determination of reasonableness in terms of 
legitimate interests is a mechanical process. It is often even more difficult to apply principles and 
rules to specific restraints than it is to apply principles to facts in most other areas of private law. It 
is fundamentally important that each case be decided on its own facts 232. The courts have 
substantial leeway in determining when a restraint will go no further than to protect a legitimate 
interest 233. The legal rules and principles must be flexibly applied 234 
Yet, courts will be assisted by the factual matrix 235. When they determine reasonableness in terms 
of the test explained above, they are confronted with considerable opacity. However, important 
factual aspects will be taken into consideration in applying the above mentioned rules and 
principles to facts, and greater precision, consistency, and predictability can be achieved by 
formally recognising the influence of these factors. 
227. 
Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 33; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 at 
423; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 189; Fraser 92; Heydon 158; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 
613; Berger v Osher 1965 (1) SA 558 (W) 559, See Kerr 515. 
228. 
Supra further on the interaction between spatial and temporal restraints supra 4. 
229. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1105; Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) 
Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 544, Kerr 515 referring to Kin v Shameck 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) although this point was 
not explicitly made in the case. 
23 °. 
Cf Winfield (1946) 325 with reference to Eastes v Russ [ 1914] 1 Ch 468 probably at 490 -491. 
1.
See supra 4. 
232. 
Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 33; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 12; Estate 
Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 314; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 868 -869; Berger v 
Osher 1965 (1) SA 558 (W) 559; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 4; Commercial 
and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 239; Kerr 514; Supra. 
233. 
Davis v Mason (1793) 5 Term Rep 118 referred to by Wilberforce Campbell and Elles 145; Homer v Graves 
(1831) 7 Bing 735 at 743; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 245; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 
at 1425; Woolman 253 but see the criticism infra Ch 9. 
234. 
Cf Esso 593, See Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402, IvlcBryde 593. 
235. 
Lindley 10 -183. 
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Some certainty can be infused into the system by considering the type or nature of a business 236 
the general or usual practice among businessmen in a particular industry 237, the opinions of 
mercantile men about certain industries 238, and the position and role of competitors 239 in 
determining the validity of all different kinds of restraint. Furthermore, the consideration of the 
type of employment as well as the duties and the position of the employee 24° will be important in 
determining the reasonableness of any restraint on an employee, while the type of customers 241 
will be particularly germane when considering the reasonableness of restraints based on trade 
secrets in the form of customer information or customer connections 242. 
Finally, the width of the restraint will play an important role in establishing reasonableness. Courts 
have often stated that it will be more difficult to show that the restraint is reasonable where it is 
236 Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 454; Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20; See the answer of 
counsel in Nicholls v Stretton (1847) 10 QB 346 at 353 -354 to the question from the bench; Badische Anilin und 
Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 452; Rogers v Maddocks [1892] 3 Ch 346 at 356; Sir WC 
Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 770, 772; Mason 732; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 474, 486; 
Millers Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 TLR 413 at 416; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 13; 
Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 48 TLR 613; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 946, 947, 966; 
M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 817; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 
1373; Chitty 1200; Farwell 68; Gurry 215; McBryde 602; Empire Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 WLD 289 at 291; 
Berger v Osher 1965 (1) SA 558 (W) 559; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; 
Ackermann -Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 70 -71; Christie 447; Kerr 515 with reference to David 
Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436, 437, Kerr 516. 
237. Benwell v Inns (1857) 24 Beav 307; Catt v Tourie (1869) LR 4 Ch App 654; Cornwall v Hawkins (1872) 41 
LJCh 435; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 24; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 768, 770 
and 773; Mason 732; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 at 426; Millers Ltd v Steedman 
(1915) 31 UR 413 at 416; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 11; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 
All ER 182 at 189; Luck v Davenport-Smith [1977] EG 73 at 90; See Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle 
[1978] 3 All ER 193 at 210, See Turner 128 and the lament in Merryweather v Moore [1892] 2 Ch 518 at 521; 
Lindley 10 -183; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 405 -406; Cf however Heydon 162 and the discussion of Farwell 69- 
70; Cf however Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1115; McBryde 602; Estate 
Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 150, 152; Schoombee 150. 
238 
Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le 
Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 at 389. 
239 
Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623; McBryde 602. 
24°. 
Horner If Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 744; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 770 see 767; 
Pearks (Ltd) v Cullen (1912) 28 TLR 371 at 372; Millers Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 TLR 413 at 414; Putsman v 
Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 648; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 946, 962, 966; Dickson v Jones 
[1939] 3 All ER 182 at 188; JW Chafer Ltd v Lilley [1947] LJR 231 at 233; Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 
48 TLR 613 at 614; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [ 1956] 3 All ER 814 at 815, 817; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash 
[1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13; SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 640; On Bridge y Deacons [1984] AC 705 
at 714; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd y Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; Anson 327; Blake 661 -662; 
Chitty 1206; Farwell 68; Gurry 215; Heydon 110, 115 -118; Selwyn 387; Smith & Wood 140; Walker 188; Estate 
Matthews y Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 312; Christie 447 and Kerr 514. 
eat. 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 408 -409; Chitty 1207; McBryde 602. 
242. 
See also most of these aspects are mentioned by Anson 323. 
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very wide 
243. The wider the restraint, the more suspicious the court should be, as it takes more 
extraordinary interests to justify expansive restraints. 
243. 
Herbert Morris 715; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 589; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 
814 at 816, 819; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 409; Chitty 1209; McBryde 604; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuvs 
1927 WLD 307 at 311, Halliwell v Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 179, Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 613; 
Spa Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 721; Kerr 514. 
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1. Factors that will influence the attitudes of the court towards a particular restraint 
Reasonableness factors beyond the interests of the covenantee will also have an influence on the 
reasonableness question `. But these factors are not simply weighed against the interests of the 
covenantee. 
The stance that can be gleaned from the decisions cannot really be accommodated within a 
traditional approach which accepts that law is a set of rules applied to factual situations. Opaque 
concepts such as public policy and reasonableness come into play and a more subtle approach will 
have to be followed. The test for reasonableness based on the interests of the covenantee is not 
precise. It leaves wide room for discretion, and contextualisation will take place 2. 
Further factors affect the "attitude" of the court towards interests. Traditionalists might find the 
. concept of "attitude" peculiar, but it is submitted that the development of the restraint of trade 
doctrine cannot be explained without it. The courts have not developed it eo nomine. Yet it can 
still be found behind many veils 3. 
2. Differences in the attitudes of the courts with renard to employer and employee 
restraints on the one hand and sale of business restrictions on the other 
Different interests will be protectable in sale of goodwill and post -employment cases. However, 
the distinction also operates on a second level. Courts have often stressed that a stricter approach 
should be followed in determining the effectiveness of post -employment restrictions and that a 
more benevolent attitude should be taken to sales of businesses 
4. 
Sometimes judges merely intend 
. Supra Ch 6, 7 some of these factors have already been discussed. 
2. Guest 6 -7 although his discussion of the factors that will further influence the doctrine is not always satisfactory. 
3. See infra Ch 11.3. 
4. Mason 737 -738, It was interpreted as being more interest -related in Herbert Morris 713 -714, Mason 731, 734 is 
also sometimes mentioned as authority for the point that the different types of contracts must be distinguished. But 
the principle was not clearly asserted here; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1915] 2 Ch 75 at 84 -85; Great Western 
and Metropolitan Dairies (Ltd) v Gibbs (1918) 34 TLR 344 at 345; English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 
174 at 180 -181; Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink [1936] Ch 544 at 547; Electric Transmission Ltd v Dannenberg 
(1949) 66 RPC 183 at 188 where the court emphasised that it should be strict in interpreting clauses in employment 
cases; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 183 -184; Whitehill IT Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 245 -246; Ronbar 
Enterprises Ltd v Green [ 1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270 where it was stressed in a discussion of severability; Kerchiss v 
Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 238 -239; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd y Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 
1375 -1376; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 136; Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v 
Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 64; Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 382; Anson 328; 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400; Chitty 1203, 1212; Heydon 78; Winfield (1946) 320; Treitel 404; Trebilcock 
64; Kennedy y Clark (1917) 33 ShCt Rep 136 at 140; Randev v Pattar 1985 SLT 270; It was common cause 
between counsel in Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 731, Malden was also accepted in Lux Traffic 
Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1157 read with 1160, The arguments were utilised by both counsel 
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to state that narrower interests will be protectable in sale of goodwill cases, but it seems that a 
wider point is also often made. The reasons for the distinction on an attitudinal level will therefore 
have to be sought. 
Some grounds for distinguishing the different types of restraints cannot be accepted: 
- It has been suggested that the two types of restraints should be distinguished because the public 
will be deprived of the service of an employee in post- employment cases or because the 
employee has the right to earn a living 5. However, all restraints that fall within the 
doctrine do so because they interfere with freedom of work 6, and this principle includes 
both these elements. In goodwill cases the business is transferred but the skill of the 
particular individual is still lost to society. The seller of goodwill receives money in return 
but it may run out quickly, in which case he will still be deprived of a living. 
- It has been noted that the courts should be less strict in sale of goodwill cases because the aim of 
sellers is to retire from the business while this is not the position in employment cases '. 
However, this factor cannot continuously lie at the basis of the distinction between the two 
types of employment. Retirement will be an important factor which the courts should 
consider when determining their attitude towards a restraint, but it cannot be discounted by 
the different types of contracts 8. 
Most importantly, bargaining power cannot be consistently used to distinguish the different types 
of contracts 9: 
- Parties to employment restrictions are often also in a position of equal bargaining, especially in 
the type of case where a restraint of trade is relevant e.g. where a scientist or director of a 
Malden Timber Ltd y Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 760; Christie Encyclopaedia 593 -594; Scott Robinson 158; McBryde 
590; Walker 184, 187; Woolman 254; New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd y Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 83, 
Brooks and Wynberg y New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1936 TPD 296 at 308 with reference to English 
Hop Growers and North Western Salt; Durban Rickshas Ltd y Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 494 and see the discussion 
492; Cowan y Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 649; Diner y Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 
(D) 105; Wohlman y Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 762; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd y Leigh - 
Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 235. 
5. Herbert Morris Ltd y Saxelby [1915] 2 Ch 75 at 90; Great Western and Metropolitan Dairies (Ltd) y Gibbs 
(1918) 34 UR 344 at 345; Whitehill y Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246, Gledhow Autoparts Ltd y Delaney [1965] 
1 WLR 1366 at 1376; Some of the arguments of Heydon's 82 -83; Wilkinson y Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 12; 
Highlands Park Football Club Ltd V Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 198. 
6. See supra Ch 3.7ff. 
7. Cf the argument Wallis y Day (1837) 2 M & W 273 at 280; Nordenfelt 567 quoted in Wyatt y Kreglinger and 
Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 810; Trebilcock 232. 
8. See infra 8. 
9. Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 499, See Otto 209, Aronstam 24, Lubbe and Murray 
257. 
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company concludes a post -employment restraint, or where a person's skills are in particular 
demand and there is a shortage of such skills 1° 
- Trade unions will often look after the interests of the individual in employment contracts even 
where individual parties are not in a position of equal bargaining 11. Atiyah 12 correctly 
observes that restraints will mostly be concluded in non -union fields of activity. But there 
might still be contracts where this is relevant. 
- Parties to sale of goodwill restrictions are not always in a position of equal bargaining. What 
manifests itself as a sale of goodwill might be a big concern buying out small competitors 
13 
There is no need to distinguish between the different types of restraints on this basis and the 
bargaining position of the parties cannot be deduced from the type of agreement 14 
The court in Recycling Industries 15 attempted to revive bargaining power here. It was 
acknowledged that some exceptions would exist, but it was suggested that courts should simply 
compensate for such exceptions. In M & S Drapers 16 Lord Denning also accepted that not all 
restraints on employees would be concluded on an equal basis, but he apparently connected 
bargaining power to the type of contract. However, this approach will be methodologically 
lo. 
See M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 821 distinguished from Gifford Motor Co v Horne 
[1933] Ch 935. The position of a director and a traveller are quite different. This may be one reason for the 
distinction, See also infra for another explanation; Heydon 82; Heydon McGill 342; Treitel 404; Woolman 257 
asked whether it can ever be said in the current employment market that parties are also equal. But the type of 
employees whose services warrant restraints will often be sought after; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 
247, Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 66-67 citing Turpin Annual Survey (1958) 55 -56; 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 72 -73; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) 
SA 353 (W) 359; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258 but see infra; Christie 
440; This appears to be the implication of the question of Lubbe and Murray 257; Kerr 506 -507; For cases where 
the covenantor was in a strong bargaining position: Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 
3 Ch 447, Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 2 Ch 248, Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1978] 1 All ER 
1026 at 1032; On the importance the position of the employee supra Ch 8.7. 
11. 
Atiyah 340; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400; Heydon 81 -82; Heydon McGill 343; Treitel 404; Ackermann- 
Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 72; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 
(SEC) 258 but see infra; Van der Merwe 158; See Nelson's Laundries Ltd v Manning (1956) 51 DLR (2d) 537 at 
545 (BCSC) where the court considered that a trade union had helped to frame a restraint in its determination of 
reasonableness. 
12. 
Atiyah 341; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400. 
13 
Heydon 82; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 72; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258 but see infra; Christie 440 merely states that the possibility of inequality 
exists in all cases. 
14 Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 247 but see the criticism of the case supra; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van 
der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 66; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 72 -73; Roffey v 
Catterall Edwards and Goudre 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 499 -500; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 
399 (C) 403; Kerr 506. 
15. 
Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258; See also Trebilcock 64 -65 who still 
sees bargaining power as being at the basis of the distinction. 
16 M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 820 -821. 
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unacceptable. Bargaining power is separately important with many subtleties. Separate 
investigation will allow for better evaluation of this factor. In reality bargaining power is not 
consistent enough with the distinction to be of much use. In Recycling the court also looked at 
bargaining power separately, despite its professed scheme. At most the type of contract can only 
be used as one factor that will assist the court in determining whether bargaining power is equal or 
not 17. 
However, the distinction between the different types of contracts on an attitudinal level can still be 
justified on other grounds: 
- In the case of goodwill restraints the covenantor consents to a restriction the direct implications 
of which he can see. In post -employment cases the restraint is mostly concluded long 
before the restraint comes into effect. The restricted party often has no way of really 
foreseeing the situation in which he will have to refrain from engaging in certain activities 
of work. 18 . 
- In sale of goodwill cases the restriction will be in focus. In employment cases a restraint is not a 
direct and immediate result of the contract but a remote contingency that will only come 
into effect at some future date The consent of an employee cannot carry the same 
weight as a seller's in a sale of goodwill case even if it is accepted that the parties are on an 
equal footing 20. 
- The role which exchange will play will differ. The restriction in a sale of goodwill will be more 
closely related to direct payment of a consideration 21 (although consideration will play an 
important separate role in determining the attitude of the court towards the restraint 22). 
- Post -employment restrictions will have a wider impact on freedom of work because they will 
also increase the power that the employer has over the employee during employment. It 
severely limits the ability of the employee to find work if employment is terminated 
23. 
i7. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 763; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd y Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 434 
(SEC) 442 and the reference to Basson; Humphrys y Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 404 see the 
criticism infra. 
18. Stenhouse Australia Ltd y Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 401, Schacklock Phillips -Page (Pvt) Ltd y Johnson 1977 
(1) SA 321 (RA) 326 although the argument was not used as a basis for distinguishing the different types of 
restraint. 
19 
Heydon 82, 83 and the discussion of Nordenfelt 536 although he did not clearly discern it. 
20. Woolman 254 is too narrow. 
21. 
Heydon 83 with reference to Herbert Morris 688 at 701 and 709; See Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik y Schott 
Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453, Attwood y Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 590 it was inherent in the arguments; 
Herbert Morris Ltd y Saxelby [ 1915] 2 Ch 75 at 90; See also Heydon 186; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400; Blake 
648; Malden Timber Ltd y McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 730 accepted in Lux Traffic Controls Ltd y Healey 1994 SLT 
1153 at 1157 read with 1160. 
22 
Davies 491 although too much emphasis was more generally placed on this issue; Infra 9.1. 
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- Past experience with such clauses will make courts more benevolent towards sale of goodwill 
restraints. Wider interests can be protected here and these restraints, accordingly, have a 
better chance of succeeding. 
The attitudinal distinction between the two most important types of restraints represents an 
example of how practical experience will translate into principles and rules in restraint of trade 
cases. Not all the above mentioned factors will be prevalent in every case, but on the whole an 
attitudinal distinction between the two can be justified by these factors. The court should be 
prepared to investigate the reasons for distinguishing between the different types of restraints on 
an attitudinal level; however, judges can generally assume that they should be more strict in post - 
employment cases. Didcott J in Roffey therefore also should not be interpreted as excluding the 
attitudinal distinction between the different types of restraints merely because bargaining power 
cannot form the basis of such distinction 24. The judge concerned himself with a narrower problem 
regarding the connection between bargaining power and the different types of restraints. 
3. Attitudes towards partnerships 
The attitude of the courts towards post -partnership restraints relative to the two other types of 
restrictions cannot be consistent because partnerships are not a homogeneous group of contracts 
25. 
The attitude of the courts will be influenced in most cases by resemblance either to sale of 
business or to post -employment restraints. However, a partnership restraint will seldom be exactly 
like any of the other types of restraints, and this will have to be accommodated. The courts will 
have to look at the facts of a case and determine the extent to which the factors determining 
attitude in other cases are relevant here. 
Some factors will cause reluctance to enforce a restraint even if that restraint closely resembles a 
sale of business restraint: 
- Post- employment restrictions are more strictly dealt with because they are concluded at a time 
when it is not really possible to foresee the circumstances in which the restraint will come 
into operation. This factor is also frequently prevalent in partnership restraints. Hence in 
23. M & S Drapers v Reynolds [ 1956] 3 All ER 814 at 820; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [ 1920] 1 Ch I 
at 11, 25, 31 -32; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 400; Heydon 84; Gloag 572 a restraint could not merely be 
concluded to make it difficult for the covenantor to find employment; Walker 187. 
24. 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 499 and supra Ch 7.1.1. 
25. Supra Ch 7.2. 
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Spink 26 the court stated that it would have preferred to treat the restraint like a partnership 
restraint concluded at the end of the partnership. 
- In partnership cases exchange for goodwill will sometimes not be at the core of the agreement 
even if it matches a sale of business 27. In such cases the court should compensate for such 
differences. 
4. Acceptance of reasonableness clauses 
The parties sometimes add a term to their contract wherein they acknowledge that the restraint is 
reasonable or include an acceptance that a particular requirement for reasonableness will be met. 
Reaction to these clauses has been mixed. 
In Scotland Lord Dervaird in Hinton & Higgs 28 tentatively decided that such clauses were 
ineffective because they constituted an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. But he went 
too far. There may be acknowledgement clauses that fall foul of his criticism but they, generally, 
are merely intended by the parties to be indicative of the way in which they saw a particular factual 
situation at conclusion of the contract. 
In South Africa the courts have taken some notice of such clauses 29. They are often added to a 
contract where the covenantor is not in an equal bargaining position, and in such cases the court 
should ignore them. However, courts should consider acknowledgement clauses between equal 
parties who realise what the effect of a restraint will be. They should at least have an attitudinal 
impact in cases where parties are in a relatively equal bargaining position 30. 
26 
Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink [1936] Ch 544 at 548 although the court here probably over -estimated the 
importance of this factor, See the criticism supra Ch 7.2.3. 
27. 
Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705 at 718. 
28. 
Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450, MacQueen 343; See also counsel Dallas McMillan & 
Sinclair v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 456 although the court did not discuss it. 
29. 
U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 147; See Kemp Sacs & 
Nell Real Estate (Pty) Ltd v Soll 1986 (1) 673 (0) 688 the court found it unnecessary to determine the weight that 
should be attached to this; Magna Alloys 905, See the criticism Lubbe and Murray 257 -258, Schoombee 142 and 
150; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 650; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767 -768 with reference 
to Magna Alloys 488, See Rautenbach & Reinecke 555. 
30 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 499, But see the questions Lubbe and Murray 257- 
258; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 404 -405; See BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v 
Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 57 on the role of a later acceptance; Christie 441; Cf the courts in David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd 
v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 434 and see Annual Survey (1984) 130, Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 160 
and Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488 were too careful, David Wuhl 435 
was also wrong in saying that such clauses will always carry less weight in employment cases as bargaining power 
is unequal. 
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It is however, ironic that these clauses will probably play a theoretically more limited role in South 
African law after Magna Alloys. The new approach to the time at which reasonableness should be 
determined will diminish the weight that can be attached to an acknowledgement clause where the 
foreseeable circumstances when the restraint is concluded differ from the actual circumstances 
when the court is asked to enforce the restraint 31 
5. Systemic undercurrents and their influence on the reasonableness test 
The general preference of a legal system may play an attitudinal role. There are several cases that 
have been decided one way or the other with stress on either the principle of sanctity of contract 
32, or freedom of trade. It is dangerous to generalise, as decisions will also depend on their 
peculiar facts and as priorities may change 33. Yet, there are general preferences that pervade the 
different legal systems. 
In England freedom of trade has the strongest historical and systemic roots 34. Sanctity of contract 
reached its apotheosis in the 19th century and during this period restraints of trade were often 
strictly enforced. However, this did not last for long. 
In South Africa a different road has been taken 35. Botha JA in Basson 36 contended that the 
preference for the underlying principle of freedom of contract has no relevance beyond 
determining onus. However, priorities will play an important attitudinal role. The broad preference 
of a legal system is very general and will often be overridden by more specific factors in a 
particular case. But the general priority of principles will still be of some relevance 37. 
It is difficult to discern any general trends from the Scottish cases. In 1985 Woolman found 
apparent partiality for the enforcement of restraints in Scotland 38. However, his general view is 
31 
Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488. 
32. 
See e.g. Middleton v Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 412; Continental Tyre and Rubber (Great Britain) Co Ltd v 
Heath (1913) 29 UR 308 at 310; Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453; 
Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940 at 945. 
33. 
Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 581 -582; Gooderson 414. 
34. 
Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 43; Collinge 410. 
35. 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 504 -505; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 
1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 317; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 506, Domanski 
241; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762 although no clear preference was expressed; Lubbe and Murray 
255 doubted whether the courts properly discussed this issue; Schoombee 130, Cf 139 -140 was also critical of the 
courts; Nathan 36. 
36 Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776 -777. 
37. Supra Ch 2, Ch 5, Ch 6. 
38. Woolman 
253, 257 -258. 
199 
Chapter 9: Wider reasonableness issues 
now open to doubt More recent cases again lean the other way. There is a need for a clearer 
expression of priorities 40. It has sometimes been asked whether Scots law differs from English law 
41. No clear answer has been given to the question. But differences, if they exist at all, will more 
probably apply on this level. Scots lawyers in their weighing of priorities may look at South 
African law, as the two systems have considerable common points at their conceptual roots. 
6. Reasonableness in the interest of the covenantor 
It has been oft stated that the position of both the covenantor and the covenantee should be 
considered 42 in determining the reasonableness of a restraint. This has been taken more seriously 
in some of the South African and Scottish cases But the authorities frequently only pay lip 
service to the interests of the covenantor 44. It has been argued that a restraint will also be in the 
interests of the covenantor if it does no more than reasonably protect the legitimate interests of the 
covenantee 
45 
39. MacQueen 345 suggests that the position had changed in Scotland; Infra Ch 11.5.1. 
4°. Woolman 253; See the general criticism of Forte 23; Cf the appeal for expression of principles Du Plessis and 
Davis 102. 
41. 
Cf Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1159 and the argument of counsel but the point was not taken up by the 
court, See Christie Jur Rev 294; See supra Ch 3.3 and Ch 2.4.2.1. 
42. Cf Croft v Hawe (1836) Donnely 82 the restraint was "harsh and oppressive" and not appropriate in the case. 
The court did not elaborate on this, Cf however Heydon 119 is not acceptable; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1915] 
2 Ch 75 at 77; Herbert Moms 700 with reference to Leather Cloth Co v Lorsont (1869) LR 9 Eq 345 at 353, 707; 
Millers Ltd v Steedman (1915) 31 TLR 413 at 416; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 
394 quoting Herbert Morris 707; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 589 and the answer to Henry Leetham 
supra; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 163; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 187; M & S Drapers v 
Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 816; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 241; Gledhow 
Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1372; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] 
RPC 339 at 343; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1228, 1232; Anson 323; Chitty 
1203; Fanvell 69; Heydon 84, 265 -266 although this is confusing because the author tried to develop a unitary test 
for all restraints; Winfield (1946) 319 -320; Wilberforce 209; Blake 649ff; Gloag 570; Walker 185; Gordon v Van 
Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773; New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 82; Lewin v 
Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 153; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 613 with reference to Fitch; Schwartz y Subel 
1948 (2) SA 983 (0) 987 with reference to New United Yeast; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 578; 
HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 2; Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 478, 
479; Arlyn Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) SA 308 (W) 309; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 
245; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258. 
43 
See the balance of convenience test in Scotland infra Ch 15.2.2; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 774 -775; 
HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 4; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767 
discussed infra. 
44. Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 486 -487; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 163. 
45 
Herbert Morris 707 -708, See the reference in Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 at 394; 
Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1228 at 1232; Anson 323; Chitty 1203 who thought 
that wider reasonableness issues will be dealt with in terms of the public interest leg of the test for legality of the 
restraint but that is unacceptable infra Ch 10; New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 
82. 
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Some authorities have even averred that a restraint of trade will be effective if it can merely be 
shown that the legitimate interests of the covenantee have been reasonably protected in post - 
employment and sale of goodwill cases 46. In Allied Dunbar 47 Millett J criticised "the concept of 
proportionality ", i.e. the concept that the interests of the parties can truly be balanced, on the basis 
that it was "a novel and dangerous doctrine ". 
Yet there are many specific aspects regarding reasonableness towards the covenantor that have 
been considered by the courts. Heydon 48 contended if the courts are prepared to ask whether a 
restraint exceeds that needed to protect certain interests, why can not they ask whether a restraint 
unduly infringes the liberty of the covenantor ", and there is a superficial logic to this argument. 
But the interests of the covenantee and covenantor play different roles within restraint of trade 
relations. 
In Recycling 49 the court accepted that a restraint which protects a legitimate interest will only be 
enforced if it is otherwise fair between the parties. However, these issues will not be extrinsic and 
fundamental standards in the same manner as the interests of the covenantee. They will be thrown 
in the balance with the broader test that emphasises certain interests of the covenantee. None of 
the cases have rocked the traditional emphasis on interests of the covenantee. The one exception is 
restraints that may come into effect on breach by the covenantee, but this issue is in many respects 
exceptional 50 
7. Inequality or equality of bargaining power 
Strong precedent for at least giving some weight to the equality or inequality of bargaining power 
exists in all three legal systems under discussion But it is difficult to determine exactly what role 
this factor should play 
52. 
46 
Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd v Johnstone White [ 1907] 1 Ch 189 at 194; Heydon 199 with reference to Leighton 
N, Wales (1838) 3 M & W 545, Heydon 265 -266 although he was critical of the approach; Poolquip Industries (Pty) 
Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 363; Du Plessis and Davis 93 and 97; Schoombee 141 - with reference to 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 73 put this forward as the view that was taken in 
English 
law and in South Africa before Magna Alloys. 




Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd y Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258. 
50 Infra 11.2ff. 
51 
Heydon McGill 342; Woolman 258; Cf A & D Bedrooms Ltd If Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299 counsel 
emphasised inequality but it was not discussed; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 62 stated that it would be 
legitimate to start with the equality issue; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 777 Botha JA merely accepted 
that bargaining power will be one of a multitude of factors that will be relevant here; Christie 440 -441; See supra 2, 
Ch 7.1. 
52. Wedderburn 
152 stated it is a practice and not a doctrine. But this is too narrow. 
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In E Underwood 53 Lindley MR was dismissive of equality of bargaining power arguments. He 
stated that inequality of bargaining power: 
"cannot be a ground for holding his bargain invalid, unless some unfair advantage is 
taken of his position; and, so long as his bargain is reasonable, having regard to the 
protection of the employer, it cannot be truly said that unfair advantage is taken of 
his position ". 
Yet bargaining power will also play an important role in actually establishing whether 
reasonableness exists. The two questions cannot be separated in this manner. 
In Drewtons 54 Van den Heever J described bargaining power as irrelevant, and Tebutt J also had 
some problems with its investigation. However, the judges did not discuss all the contrary 
authorities and did not really justify their views. The submissions of Van den Heever J consist of 
generalisations about a shortage of skilled labour and are too abstract. The further criticism of the 
emphasis on bargaining power in the court a quo concerns other aspects of reasonableness 
towards the covenantor, and has nothing to do with bargaining power arguments. Her conclusion 
can only be explained against the concept of public policy which she attempted to develop 55, but 
that concept is also completely unacceptable. South African courts can now probably examine 
relative bargaining power to a greater extent than before. It was admitted in Roffey that bargaining 
power has a separate relevance, while the reasonableness question generally has been left more 
open in Magna Alloys. 
Yet the authorities that hint at thrusting the notion of equality of bargaining power to centre stage 
as a touchstone for determining reasonableness of a restraint have been overridden by the 
multitude of cases that emphasise the interests of the covenantee. It is an over -simplification to 
say, as Bell did 56, that the restraint of trade doctrine in post -employment restraints must merely 
balance the bargaining power of the parties. Kerr definitely put it too strongly when he stated that 
equality of bargaining power would create an assumption of reasonableness It is not the acid 
test for determining the effectiveness of a restraint. The doctrine is based on protecting much 
wider public policy principles. The courts can never be bound completely by the parties' 
53 E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 306. 
54 
Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313, 317. 
55 Supra Ch 2.3.2. 
56 
Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) ch 4 and his central thesis. 
57. Kerr 506 -507; Cf also the unacceptable view of Scott Robinson 158. 
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assessment of reasonableness where they are in a position of equal bargaining because of the role 
which the public policy principle of freedom of work plays here 58. 
Moreover, bargaining power does not directly determine the interests that are protectable 59. 
Eksteen JA in Basson 60 decided that mere competition could be restricted once it is accepted that 
the parties are in a position of equal bargaining. But his view cannot be accepted: 
- He relied on combination cases 61. However, the reasons for the wider protection of interests in 
combination cases are more substantial, and it is overly simplistic to accept that mere 
competition was restricted in the cases where combination restrictions were regarded as 
reasonable. 
- He placed too much emphasis on the role of bargaining power as a basis for distinguishing 
different types of classic restraints. 
The other judges in the case did not take the same view of bargaining power 62. 
In George Michael 63 Parker J submitted that courts will be reluctant to substitute their (objective) 
opinion for the (subjective) view of the parties. He then stated that the value of subjective views 
will however be reduced where bargaining was not equal, and suggested that it might even be 
reduced to nil where bargaining power is very unequal. However, this is not acceptable as a 
starting point. Courts have not been reluctant to interfere with contracts once it has been 
established that they are in restraint. Bargaining power may influence the court in both directions. 
58. 
Apparently Mason 741; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 11; Whitehill v Bradford 
[1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246; Lyne- Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299; See the criticism of Texaco Ltd y 
Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 in the more acceptable Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros 
Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 1 ALR 385 at 400401 and 408 -409, Queensland Co- operative Milling 
Association Ltd v Pamag (1973) ALR 47 at 53 and 59 discussed Heydon IfcGi11343; Treitel 409; Dallas McMillan 
& Sinclair v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 457; Woolman 257 -258 merely combined inequality of bargaining power 
with other arguments; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 64; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 612; Kin y 
Sharnek 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 537; Hermer v Fisher 1960 (2) SA 650 (T) 655; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v 
Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280 and the view of counsel; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763; 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 73 although the court was cautious; Poolquip 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 359; Spa Food Products Ltd y Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 718- 
720; Van De Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 571 -572; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 865, 867; 
Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 106; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 
64 (C) 66; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 505; Humphrys y Laser Transport 
Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 402; Christie 441 with reference to Van de Pol: See Du Plessis and Davis 94 -95 
but they again leant too far to the other side. It is wrong to say that equality of bargaining power influences 
reasonableness as a whole while consideration should determine the reasonableness of a restraint; Nathan 4041; 
Schoombee 142 the test is objective; See on acknowledgement clauses supra 4. 
59. Supra Ch 7.1.1 and the discussion of the distinction between post -employment and goodwill restraints. 
60. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762 -763. 
61 
English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 174, New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 
WLD 75. 
62. 
See supra especially the express criticism Basson v Chiiwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 768 per Nienaber JA. 
63 
Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 332. 
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assessment of reasonableness where they are in a position of equal bargaining because of the role 
which the public policy principle of freedom of work plays here 58. 
Moreover, bargaining power does not directly determine the interests that are protectable 59. 
Eksteen JA in Basson 60 decided that mere competition could be restricted once it is accepted that 
the parties are in a position of equal bargaining. But his view cannot be accepted: 
- He relied on combination cases 61. However, the reasons for the wider protection of interests in 
combination cases are more substantial, and it is overly simplistic to accept that mere 
competition was restricted in the cases where combination restrictions were regarded as 
reasonable. 
- He placed too much emphasis on the role of bargaining power as a basis for distinguishing 
different types of classic restraints. 
The other judges in the case did not take the same view of bargaining power 62. 
In George Michael 63 Parker J submitted that courts will be reluctant to substitute their (objective) 
opinion for the (subjective) view of the parties. He then stated that the value of subjective views 
will however be reduced where bargaining was not equal, and suggested that it might even be 
reduced to nil where bargaining power is very unequal. However, this is not acceptable as a 
starting point. Courts have not been reluctant to interfere with contracts once it has been 
established that they are in restraint. Bargaining power may influence the court in both directions. 
58. 
Apparently Mason 741; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 11; Whitehill v Bradford 
[1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299; See the criticism of Texaco Ltd y 
Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 in the more acceptable Amoco Australia Pty Ltd y Rocca Bros 
Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 1 ALR 385 at 400 -401 and 408409, Queensland Co -operative Milling 
Association Ltd y Pamag (1973) ALR 47 at 53 and 59 discussed Heydon ivícGill 343; Treitel 409; Dallas McMillan 
& Sinclair v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 457; Woolman 257 -258 merely combined inequality of bargaining power 
with other arguments; Forman v Barnett 1941 WLD 54 at 64; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 612; Kin y 
Sharnek 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 537; Hermer v Fisher 1960 (2) SA 650 (T) 655; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd y 
Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280 and the view of counsel; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763; 
Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 73 although the court was cautious; Poolquip 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 359; Spa Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 718- 
720; Van De Pol y Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 571 -572; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 865, 867; 
Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 106; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 
64 (C) 66; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 505; Humphrys y Laser Transport 
Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 402; Christie 441 with reference to Van de Pol: See Du Plessis and Davis 94 -95 
but they again leant too far to the other side. It is wrong to say that equality of bargaining power influences 
reasonableness as a whole while consideration should determine the reasonableness of a restraint; Nathan 40 -41; 
Schoombee 142 the test is objective; See on acknowledgement clauses supra 4. 
59 
Supra Ch 7.1.1 and the discussion of the distinction between post -employment and goodwill restraints. 
60. 
Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762 -763. 
61 
English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 174, New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd y Brooks 1935 
WLD 75. 
62, 
See supra especially the express criticism Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 768 per Nienaber JA. 
63 Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 332. 
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The passages from Esso relied upon by Parker J concern the jurisdictional rather than substantive 
question. They are not directly relevant here. 
The restraint of trade doctrine aims at balancing freedom of trade and sanctity of contract. The 
principle of sanctity of contract will be enhanced where the parties are in a position of equal 
bargaining 64 The court, when it has some leeway, will be influenced by bargaining power in 
determining the extent to which a covenantee may protect legitimate interests. It will be of 
attitudinal importance. The courts have often expressed their reluctance to find a restraint 
unreasonable where such a restraint has been concluded by parties who are on an equal footing or 
where the covenantor is in the stronger bargaining position 65. Courts are slow to enforce 
restraints that are concluded by unequal parties 66 
64. Blake 650; Gurry 206; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 222 referred to New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd y Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 84 where reference was in turn made to English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 
KB 174 at 180 -181; Stern v Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 150 at 151 -152. 
65 
See Mumford v Gelling (1859) 7 CBNS 305 at 320, Benwell y Inns (1857) 24 Beav 307 at 311 although the 
factual question whether the covenantor really had choice in the matter was not discussed; Badische Anilin and 
Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453; Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 437 at 
438; Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 365; Woodbridge & Sons -v Bellamy [1911] 1 Ch 
326 at 332; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1915] 2 Ch 75 at 84 -85 it will be some evidende although the court was 
very cautious of this, See also the criticism supra Ch 7.1; Fitch y Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 162; Spink 
(Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink [1936] Ch 544 at 548; Gilford Motor Co Ltd y Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935 at 960; 
Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 243, 244, 246; M & S Drapers y Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 820 and 
the discussion of Gifford; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299, 1301; Marion White Ltd v Francis 
[1972] 3 All ER 857 at 861; Bridge y Deacons [1984] AC 705 at 717 although the court then goes too far; George 
Silverman Ltd y Silverman (1969) 113 Sol Jo 563; Lindley 10 -176 at 214 on the position in partnerships; Blake 
661; Anthony y Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 at 12; WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 217, See Scott 
Robinson 158; Cameron v Mathieson 1994 GWD 29 -1740; African Theatres Trust Ltd v Johnson 1921 CPD 25 at 
27; Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 222 refers to New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 
75 at 84 where reference was in turn made to English Hop Growers y Dering [1928] 2 KB 174 at 180 -181; Spa 
Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 718, See similarly Olds v Tollgate Holdings Ltd 1970 (4) SA 343 
(T) 348; Van De Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 571 -572; Weinberg y Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 865 -866 
although the issue was awkwardly phrased, 867; Kin y Sharnek 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 537; Hermer v Fisher 1960 (2) 
SA 650 (T) 655; Steyn y Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 151 -152 although perhaps too much emphasis is here placed 
on it; Arlvn Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v Bosch 1966 (2) SA 308 (W) 310; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd y Marshall 1968 
(2) SA 277 (0) 280 -281; Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105, 106, 109 -110; 
Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 762 -763 with reference to Van de Pol; Ackermann- Goggingen AG y 
Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 73 -73; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 66; Biografie (Pvt) Ltd y 
Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 346; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 359, Nathan 4041; 
Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 258; Basson y Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A), 
762 -763; Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 513 but see the criticism infra 7.1; Kerr 
506; Nathan 40 -41. 
66 
Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 771 -772 and the argument that the persuasive power of 
freedom of contract arguments may sometimes be diminished, Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147 
at 148. See the discussion of these cases Christie Encyclopaedia 587 -588; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All 
ER 814 at 820; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 10 at 13 the case was distinguished from Gilford 
on the basis that the covenantor there was a director, See M & S Drapers. See supra for another explanation; 
Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 at 12 the judge took a different view on the facts but it seems he would 
have been prepared to took at inequality if it existed; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 
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7.1. The facts that the courts will look at in determining bargaining position 
One of the biggest criticisms against investigating equality of bargaining power in restraint of trade 
cases has always been that it produces difficult problems of proof. However, these problems can 
be overcome. 
- The courts should only consider bargaining power where it is either substantially equal or 
unequal. This is much easier to determine, and there will probably be greater consensus in 
extreme cases 67. 
- If equality of bargaining power is attitudinal, the degree of equality or inequality can, to a much 
greater extent, impact on the extent to which it will influence reasonableness. 
Equality of bargaining power can be fathomed by looking at the contract emerging from the 
bargaining 68. Thus in Anthony fi9 the court considered that a partnership agreement bound all 
partners equally, which will give at least some indication of equality of bargaining. A court may 
compare the actual terms concluded with the terms that parties would have concluded if they were 
in a position of equal bargaining power 70. This test will only be workable as long as the courts 
merely attempt to determine clear equality or clear inequality, and the circumstances in which the 
restraint is concluded will probably be more important 71. 
The reasons for the conclusion of the contract should be one of the important factors which courts 
should consider 72. Judges can examine the urgency with which the contract was concluded. South 
African courts previously refused to consider that one of the parties was in a position of great 
urgency 73. However, these matters should now be open for investigation. In Coin 74 the court 
considered that the covenantor was in a ghastly financial position, although it nevertheless 
359; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 402 -403 showed sympathy for argument of 
counsel although it took a different view of the facts; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 332; 
Nathan 4041; Schoombee 142. 
67. Bargaining power should be neutral in a case like Savage and Pugh v Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N) it seems that 
this is approximately how the court saw it at 156. 
68, 
Silvertone Records Ltd v Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 at 158, 162 -163. 
69. 
Anthony v Rennie 1981 (Notes) 11 at 12; See also supra Ch 7.2.1. 
70. 
Kerr 507 and the discussion of Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C); Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v 
Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 403. 
. Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 235 and the categorisation; 
See also the facts in Cramond (Cash Register Terminals) Ltd v Reynolds 1988 GWD 8 -310 enough details are not 
given but circumstances like these might be relevant in determining inequality. 
2. 
Kerr 507; E Underwood & Son Ltcj v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 306 although the case is probably too narrow 
today; On urgency see also Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1167. 
73 
. Van de Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 572; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 250. 
74. 
Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edens) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 569. 
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regarded this as inconclusive. Spoelstra J contended that this will only be relevant if the 
covenantee also knew of it. However, it is possible that the covenantor can bargain from a weak 
position even though the covenantee was oblivious of his situation. The covenantee's knowledge 
should not be relevant. The view of Spoelstra J presupposes some abuse by the covenantee, but 
this is unnecessary. On the other hand the court should not accept urgency too easily. In 
Humphrys 75 an important employee concluded a restraint with the buyers of a business in which 
he worked. The court maintained that the parties were in a position of unequal bargaining because 
the appellant was dependent on keeping his job. But the employee was fundamentally important to 
the success of the business purchased and that should have been an important balancing factor. At 
best for the covenantor the bargaining power should have been a neutral issue 76. 
The existence and feasibility of alternatives will influence bargaining power. It might be asked 
whether the covenantor could have gained other employment 77, and whether other terms could 
have been concluded in the particular contract 78. In Cansa 79 it was suggested by counsel that the 
contract was standard and did not provide the employee with any alternatives. Vos J considered 
that the covenantor could in the same circumstances take up employment with another employer if 
he did not want to be bound by the restraint. However, the whole issue was determined 
superficially and in abstracto. The alternatives -argument can only succeed where there is a demand 
for the skills of the covenantor, but the court did not really investigate this. In Recycling Industries 
80 
it was accepted that the employee had to take it or leave it, and this weighed heavily with the 
court. Blake 81 stressed the extent to which parties are allowed to tamper with a form contract. In 
Drewtons 82 the court a quo considered that the covenantor had no opportunity to influence the 
terms of the agreement. This approach was criticised on appeal by Van den Heever J, but her 
criticism is unacceptable 83. Yet this issue might sometimes have the contrary effect on the attitude 
of the court. Judges will be critical of covenantors where other evidence shows the parties to be in 
75. Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 404 the court here placed too much emphasis 
on the fact that the covenantor was an employee, Cf the different view in M & S Drapers supra 7. 
76. 
See the court a quo in Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 404. The criticism on 
ápß peal cannot be accepted. 
. Mumford v Gething (1859) 7 CBNS 305 at 320 although it is doubtful whether the actual fact can be 
considered; Blake 650; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd if Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 359; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) 
Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 403. 
78. 
Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 857 at 861; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 
353 (W) 359; Diner y Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 109 -110; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) 
Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 403. 
79. Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 66 -67. 




Drewtons (Pty) Ltd y Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313. 
83. Supra 7. 
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a position of equal bargaining. In such cases agreements will weigh even more heavily with courts 
because the covenantor should have realised the seriousness of the restraint 84. 
Judges may ask whether a restraint clause was actually evaluated thoroughly by the parties 85. The 
court will look at the knowledge and skill which the different parties had in bargaining for terms in 
the contract 86. Whether the covenantor had legal or other independent advice, or whether the 
covenantor has legal knowledge, will be considered 87. 
It might be relevant to look at the class of contract in which the restraint falls. However, this 
aspect must not be over -emphasised; courts must not fall back on the rigid approach of old. This is 
only one of many aspects that should weigh with them 88. 
8. Restraints in English law and the doctrine of valuable consideration ß9 
In England restraints of trade will only be subject to the normal rules regarding valuable 
consideration 90. Only minimal sufficient consideration will now be required 91. The courts initially 
84. Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 513 although the court did not properly 
investigate whether the parties would otherwise be in a position of equal bargaining; Cf also Tivoli Manchester Ltd 
v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 437 at 438. 
85. Middleton v Brown 47 (1887) LJCh 413; Nicoll v Beere (1885) 53 LT 659 at 660; Stuart and Simpson y 
Halstead (1911) 55 Sol Jo 598 it was accepted that the covenantor understood the agreement but it was not weighed 
in with reasonableness issues; Cf Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 238 the fact that a 
document was taken away and read will only play a role when the question is whether the covenantor was cheated. 
But it is submitted that it may also be relevant here; Cf also Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 
446 where it was noted that a copy was given to the covenantor and that it was read and understood but it was also 
not taken into account in the determination of reasonableness. 
86. Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 771 -772, Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 
147 at 148; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 243, 246; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] i WLR 1293 at 1301; 
Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 857 at 861; Blake 661; Wilkinson v Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 14; Allied 
Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 332; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 
(SEC) 258. 
7. 
Woodbridge & Sons v Bellamy [1911] 1 Ch 326 at 332; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 162; Whitehill v 
Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 246; Cf Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 238 and the criticism 
supra; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1301; Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705 at 717; Cf Anthony y 
Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 at 12 where the court considered that the contract by which a person was accepted as a 
partner was drawn up by the partnership solicitor. Here it was not accepted as a reason for regarding the 
relationship as unequal but there might be cases where it will have that effect; Diner y Carpet Manufacturing Co of 
SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 109 -110; David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 434; Systems 
Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 380 it might even be relevant that the covenantor was given 
the opportunity to obtain advice. 
88. 
Anthony v Rennie 1981 (Notes) 11 at 12 see the submissions of counsel although the court did not accept it on 
the facts; See Supra 2 this issue must be approached with care. 
89. 
British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 570 on the impact of failure of 
consideration on remedies; Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 ChD 351 at 363 where reference was made to 
consideration arguments but it was not taken further. 
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demanded adequacy 92, but they decided that it would be too problematic to weigh up the 
obligations of each party in every case They emphasised freedom of contract and the principle 
that parties are the best judges of their own interests 94. Heydon 95 argued that adequate 
consideration should, for the doctrine of valuable consideration, be required in restraint of trade 
cases. However, the marrying of these issues has led to unnecessary rigidity. There will only be 
one possible exception to the normal application of the doctrine of consideration in restraint of 
trade cases. It might also apply where a restraint of trade is contained in a contract under seal 
(although there is no clear authority for this point) 96 
9. Adequacy of consideration and reasonableness inter partes in the three legal 
systems 
Some of the cases that rejected the requirement of adequate consideration went very far 97, and the 
courts have sometimes been critical of the role of consideration 98. But adequate consideration will 
90. Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 456 -457; Archer v Marsh (1837) 6 Ad & El 959 at 967; Leighton v 
Wales (1838) 3 M & W 545 at 551; Hutton v Parker (1839) 7 Dowl 739; Pilkington v Scott (1845) 15 M & W 657 
at 660; Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716; Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 410; Green v Price (1845) 13 M 
& W 695 at 698; Benwell v Inns (1857) 24 Beav 307 at 311; Clarkson v Edge (1863) 33 Beav 227 at 230; Gravely 
v Barnard (1874) LR 18 Eq 518; Collins v Locke (1879) 4 App Cas 674 at 686; Buxton and High Peak Publishing 
and General Printing Co v Mitchell (1885) Cab & El 527; Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 365 -366, 381, 
397; Middleton v Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 413; Nordenfelt 565; Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 TLR 325 and 
the discussion of Young v Timmins infra by counsel; Howard v Danner (1901) 17 TLR 548; Tivoli Manchester Ltd 
v Colley (1904) 20 TLR 437 at 438; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 589; Kales 196; Blake 639ff; Winfield 
(1946) 325; Christie Jur Rev 293; Heydon 167 argued for a more active determination of consideration but see infra 
10. 
91 
Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 453; Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 559 but see the criticism 
of the case infra; Gravely v Barnard (1874) LR 18 Eq 518; Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716; Benwell v Inns 
(1857) 24 Beav 307; Mumford v Gething (1859) 7 CBNS 305 at 318, 323, 326 -327; Middleton v Brown (1878) 47 
LJCh 411 at 413; Hood and Moore's Store Ltd v Jones (1899) 81 LT 169; Howard If Danner (1901) 17 TLR 548; 
Woodbridge & Sons v Bellamy [1911] 1 Ch 326 at 332 -333; Jenkins v Reid [1948] 1 All ER 471 at 480; Luck v 
Davenport-Smith [1977] EG 73 at 84; Marshall v NM Financial [1995] 1 WLR 1461; Heydon 165; Treitel 402; 
Notes (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 347 at 348ff see especially 349. 
92. 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 186; Chesman v Nainby (1727) 2 Str 739 at 744; Davis v Mason 
(1793) 5 Term Rep 118; Gale v Reed (1806) 8 East 80; Shackle v Baker (1808) 2 Ves Supp 379; Homer v Ashford 
and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322; Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 although there are also statements to the 
contrary in this case see Heydon 21; Young v Timmins (1831) 1 Cr & J 331, See Esso 294 the court accepted that 
the conclusion was correct although the grounds would not apply anymore, Nel v Drilec (Pty) Ltd 1976 (3) SA 79 
(D) 84 accepted that the ratio would not apply in South Africa; Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517 at 530; 
Chitty 
1190; Trebilcock 10 -12, 21; See Wilberforce 208 and the discussion of the newer types of restraints. 
. Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 457; Middleton v Brown (1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 413. 
94. 
Archer v Marsh (1837) 6 Ad & El 959; Trebilcock 21ff. 
95. 
Heydon 164 and 167ff. 
96 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 193; Homer v Ashford and Ainsworth (1825) 3 Bing 322; Mallan v 
May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 665; Gravely v Barnard (1874) LR 18 Eq 518; Heydon 165; Chitty 1194; Christie 
Jur Rev 293. 
97. 
Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 453, 457 -458; Archer v March (1837) 6 Ad & El 959; Sainter v 
Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 at 729; Mouchel v William Cubitt & Co (1907) 24 RPC 194 at 201. 
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still have a considerable role to play in the determination of reasonableness 99, and this role of 
consideration must be clearly distinguished from its role within the doctrine of valuable 
consideration 100 
Despite contrary dicta 101 the doctrine of valuable consideration has not been accepted in South 
Africa and Scotland, and it can have no separate relevance in restraint of trade cases. Arguments 
in English law to the effect that only minimal consideration will be required to satisfy the doctrine 
of consideration are therefore irrelevant in these legal systems. But the question of adequacy of 
consideration is still important in these systems. The question of consideration has not merely been 
tied to the doctrine of valuable consideration, and there is no reason why consideration cannot be 
relevant in determining reasonableness in South Africa and Scotland 102 
Hence the courts have considered consideration in many situations: 
- In Bridge y Deacons it was regarded as significant that all partners to a certain partnership were 
subject to the same restraint 103, and the court went to some trouble to explain why the 
restraint was reasonable although minimal direct consideration was paid 1°4. 
- The courts have sometimes looked at the quantum of indirect rewards which the covenantor has 
received in exchange for accepting the restraint when determining whether the restraint is 
reasonable 105 
98. Herbert Morris 707; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 169, See the reference Spence v Mercantile Bank of 
India Ltd (1921) 37 UR 390 at 394; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 816. 
99. Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 559 took an incorrect view on how this would take place; Nordenfelt 565; 
Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 at 589 where the court still quoted Herbert Morris 707 but Younger LJ placed 
a narrow interpretation on it; Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 43; Bridge y Deacons [1984] AC 705 
at 717 -718; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 329 -330; Anson 324; Chitty 
1195; Treitel 401; Trebilcock 21, 69 is too open and shut; Wilberforce 208; AL Corbin Corbin on Contracts para 
1395. 
100 Supra 9 and the reference to Heydon where this was not done. 
101 Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd y Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1112, and probably also 1115; Stewart v 
Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1163, 1169 left the question open, See the answer Christie Jur Rev 293 cannot be 
accepted; Christie Encyclopaedia 589; Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226; SA Breweries v Muriel 
(1905) NLR 362 at 366 -367 cannot be accepted. 
02. Gloag 572 -573, Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 612 cannot be accepted. 
103 
Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 716 and see the Australian case of Geraghty v Minter (1979) 142 CLR 
177 at 198; Lindley 10 -181; Hensman v Trail The Times Oct 22 1980 which Lindley called a severe case (not 
overruled on this point in Kerr v Monis [1987] Ch 90), Atiyah 341 placed too much emphasis on this; Anthony v 
Rennie 1981 (Notes) 11 at 12; Woolman 257; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Brothers 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 
171 the court in Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280 -281. 
104 Bridge v Deacons [ 1984] 1 AC 705 at 718. 
tos 
Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735 at 742 -743 similar factors will today play a role in determining 
reasonableness; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453 and see the 
Canadian case of Mills v Gill [1951] 3 DLR 27 (Ont HC); Howard v Danner (1901) 17 UR 548 at 548 -549 
although the court took a too narrow view of consideration, See Heydon 167; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 487; 
Pellow v Ivey (1933) 49 TLR 422 at 423 although it is not clear exactly how the court considered this issue; 
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- It has been accepted that the reasonableness of a restraint will be promoted if the covenantor 
received considerable direct rewards, in the form of remuneration, for being subject to the 
restraint 106 
- The duration of the employment which the covenantor receives in exchange for the restraint may 
be of importance 107. There is only pre -Magna Alloys authority on this point in South 
Africa. But it will be straightforward now. The actual duration of the contract 108 may be 
considered as one of the factors that will influence the reasonableness of the restraint. It is 
suggested that courts should in future investigate it. The position in the other legal systems 
and in pre -Magna Alloys South African law does, however, produce nice problems. The 
courts are only allowed to look at the possible minimum duration as viewed from the 
moment of conclusion. Indiciae are scarce but it might be important to look at the duration 
of notice. Some courts simply ignored short notice 109 In other cases very short notice was 
regarded as sufficient for satisfying the doctrine of consideration and the issue was then left 
at that; duration was not considered for the purpose of reasonableness 1i0. And in yet 
further cases judges doubted the importance of duration of notice for the purpose of 
reasonableness 111. But there are more acceptable authorities where support can be found 
for the notion that the length of notice should be considered within the reasonableness test 
Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1115 but see the criticism supra; Schwartz v Subel 
1948 (2) SA 983 (0) 989, Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 250; Although it is not clear what effect it 
had on the decision the court in David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 434; Cf Louisiana law as 
discussed by Hines 608ff and especially 616. 
106. 
Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 453; Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v 
Spink [1936] Ch 544 at 548; Marchon Products Ltd v Thornes (1954) 71 RPC 445 at 448 -449; Kerchiss v Colora 
Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 241; Heydon 168; Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248, 
McBryde 595; Living Design (Home Improvements) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 the submission of counsel was 
not discussed; Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1115; Woolman 255; Schoombee 
141. 
107 
Heydon 168 -169; Cf also the comparisons of Woolman 255 of A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297, 
Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16; Cf the position in Louisiana law as discussed by Hines 608ff. 
los 
See also supra Ch 6.7; Heydon 169 also preferred this approach. 
109 
Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20; Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716; Benwell v Inns (1857) 24 Beav 
307; Cornwall v Hawkins (1872) 41 LJCh 435; Nicoll v Beere (1885) 53 LT 659; Fellows v Woods (1888) 59 LT 
513; Phillips v Stevens (1899) 15 UR 325; Howard v Danner (1901) 17 UR 548; Heydon 168. 
lto 
Leighton v Wales (1838) 3 M & W 545 at 551; Jacoby v Whitmore (1883) 49 LT 335; Middleton v Brown 
(1878) 47 LJCh 411 at 413 although the court here looked at the fact that the contract had gone on for a year; 
Gravely v Barnard (1874) LR 18 Eq 518 at 522 with reference to Davis v Mason 5 TR 118 and 120. 
111 
Evans v Ware [1892] 3 Ch 502 at 504 but the court did not see it as a general rule. It was accepted that it was a 
"fair point" to argue that a restraint was unreasonable on this basis; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 
814 at 816 on the basis that adequacy of consideration was not relevant with reference to Herbert Morris; See Home 
Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1232, 1235 where a decision on whether this issue was 
relevant was avoided. Cf Cross LJ accepted that the issue might never be relevant; See also Francis Delzene Ltd v 
Klee (1968) 112 Sol Jo 583 "There was no authority for the proposition that there must be a mathematical 
correlation between the length of notice ... and the time for which the restraint was to be operative ". 
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112 Yet the duration of notice should not be conclusive. The court must look at all the 
circumstances of the case and determine the likely length of the contract 113 It will for 
instance be of importance that the employment had already run for some time when the 
restraint was concluded 114. The court must consider whether the covenantor will at least 
probably be ensured of a proper term of employment in exchange for binding himself into a 
restraint of trade, and the duration of notice will probably only play a limited role in this 
regard 11s 
Heydon 
116 mentioned that the courts will look at the fact that the covenantor otherwise would not 
have been able to conclude a contract of employment as an aspect regarding adequacy of 
consideration. However, it cannot be a very important matter in the determination of 
reasonableness. The authorities on which he relies are not germane 117. This factor will be 
fundamental in determining whether there is sufficient consideration in terms of the doctrine of 
consideration, but it will be unimportant in determining reasonableness 118 
9.1. The impact of adequacy or inadequacy on the question of reasonableness 
Since Hitchcock 119, the courts have not simply invalidated contracts where there is no adequate 
consideration. However, there are many examples of cases where adequacy of consideration has 
played a role in determining reasonableness. This factor will probably help to lay down the attitude 
to the restraint. Where there is adequate consideration, courts will be more benevolent towards 
protecting the covenantee. However, where adequate consideration is lacking the courts will 
meticulously ensure that only clear legitimate interests are protected 
120 
112 
E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 314; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 476; Mason 741; 
Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 129; Heydon 165, 168 and especially 169; Cf Heydon McGill 343; 
Remington Typewriter Co v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168 at 170 although it is not clear whether the court considered it 
with consideration in mind, See also Ch 6.7; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 312. 
113 
Heydon 136; See also supra Ch 6.7; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 70; Roffey v Catterall 
Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 501. 
114 
Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1232, 1235, M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 
All ER 814 at 820, Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 69. 
115 
Cf Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 643 where the court stressed that the duration of employment will 




Howard v Danner (1901) 17 TLR 548 contains no statement to this effect, Tivoli Manchester Ltd v Colley 
(1904) 20 TLR 437 at 438 made some tentative points on this issue. 
t8. 
See supra 9. 
119 
Hitchcock V Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438. 
120 
Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 at 589 can possibly be so interpreted; Christie Encyclopaedia 589, See 
also infra Ch 11.5.3; Notes (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 347 at 348 -349 is unacceptable; Cf Treitel 409 -410. 
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In George Michael 121 Parker J accepted that consideration will be relevant in determining 
reasonableness inter partes. Yet he over -estimated the importance of this factor. He accepted that 
"there are some types of restraint which will be unenforceable no matter how large the 
consideration for them ". But he stated that buying off competition would be acceptable if the 
consideration makes it reasonable. This is unacceptable, and the authorities relied on do not 
support it. This view can only be explained on the ground that the court was not dealing with a 
traditional restraint (although it clearly attempted to make a general point). 
In JA Mont 
122 the employee agreed to be subject to a very wide restraint for one year. He was 
given almost all the benefits which he had received as employee during this period. Counsel for the 
employer argued that the huge consideration showed that the restraint had to be treated as if it 
operated during employment and that much wider and more flexible protection could be gained. 
The court correctly rejected this submission. It would create very difficult problems, and be 
contrary to authority and thus far accepted principles. Direct consideration has only played an 
attitudinal role within the reasonableness test. 
The courts abandoned examination of adequacy of consideration within the doctrine of valuable 
consideration because of the difficulties in determining adequacy 123. It will be difficult to 
determine when consideration will exactly match the value of the restraint. However, no precision 
will be required if adequacy is considered within the reasonableness test as described above. 
Courts will merely take adequacy of consideration into account if there are strong pointers either 
positively towards adequacy or negatively towards inadequacy. More flexibility will be infused 
because adequacy of consideration will, even then, not be conclusive. 
10.Further reasonableness factors 
The courts have also considered other factors that may impact on reasonableness 
124. It will be 
relevant if the restraint, for any other reason beyond adequate consideration and equality of 
bargaining power, causes hardship for the covenantor, on the one hand, or if it is palpably fair 
towards him on the other. 
The width of the restraint on the three levels already mentioned will be relevant 125: 
121. 
Panayiotou y Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EIALR 229 at 329 -330. 
123. 
JA Mont (UK) Ltd y Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 587 -588. 
See supra 9. 
124. 
Heydon especially at 164 et seq tried to force in too much under the rubric of adequacy of consideration. 
125. Winfield (1946) 320; Agma Chemical Co Ltd y Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248 although it is not clear; Supra 8.1. 
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- Courts have been slow to recognise restraints that are world -wide, almost world -wide, nation- 
wide, or in any other sense so wide that it will make severe spatial inroads into the 
covenantor's ability to work. It has also been considered that such restraints should be 
dealt with strictly because they constitute severe inroads upon freedom of work 126 
Conversely, a restraint that is spatially narrow will allow the covenantor to trade outside 
the restricted area, and the courts will accordingly be more benevolent towards it 127. 
However, this factor cannot be of fundamental importance. In Prontaprint 128, a franchise 
case, the court placed too much emphasis on it. 
- Restraints that restrict the covenantor for life, or restraints that in other senses make a severe 
temporal inroad upon the covenantor's ability to work, will be treated strictly. It is possible 
that such restraints will radically interfere with the ability of the covenantor to work 129. 
Courts will be more favourably disposed to restraints that are of shorter duration 130 
Activity restraints will also have a wider impact if the scope of a restraint is more limited, 
because it will allow the covenantor still to use his ability to work outside the narrowly 
defined field 
131. 
Conversely the courts will be slow to allow wide activity restraints 
because it will make greater inroads into the covenantor's ability to work. 
Facts peculiar to the particular circumstances of the case may influence the reasonableness 
towards the covenantor 132 
126 Ward v Byrne (1839) 5 M & W 548 at 562; May v O'Neil (1875) 44 LJCh 660; E Underwood & Son Ltd v 
Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 314; Suggested by counsel Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 at 389 but 
not supported on the facts; Herbert Morris 698 -699, 706 and 718; Vandervell Products Ltd IT MacLeod [1957] RPC 
185 at 191 and at 190 the discussion of the judgment of the court a quo; Dumbarton Steamboat Co Ltd v 
MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 at 997; It played some role Remington Typewriter Company v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168 at 
170; Woolman 257 but see infra Ch 11.5.1; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 778 -779. 
127. 
Dubowski v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478 at 486; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 see Swinfen Eady LJ 481 -482; 
Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1112 although it was here wrongly considered under 
the public interest leg; Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1169; Fenner -Solomon v Martin 1917 CPD 22 at 23; 
Savage and Pugh v Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N) 156; Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 274, 276; Rogaly v 
Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 794; Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 544. 
128. 
Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 325. 
129 
On lifelong restrictions see supra 8.4 especially Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 476; The minority in Stewart 
v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1167 although too much stress was probably placed on these factors; In Pratt v 
Maclean 1927 SN 161 it looks as if the court saw this factor as conclusive. 
130 Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 513. 
131 
Moenich v Fenestre (1892) 67 LT 602 at 603; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 13, 
24 -25 where the enforcer argued that the restraint still left wide activities open to the covenantor but the court did 
not accept this on the facts; Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 UR 390 at 395; Blake 676 -677; Ex 
pane Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 479; Savage and Pugh v Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N); Pest Control (Central 




Blake 650, 685 -686; Heydon 171. 
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- In England and Scotland the courts should take a more positive stance towards a restraint if the 
parties at conclusion contemplated the protection when the covenantor retires or where it 
is realistic to expect that he will retire from a certain field of business on the restraint 
coming into effect 133. South African courts should be more benevolent towards a restraint 
if it actually has this effect. 
- The possibility of finding alternative employment will be relevant. The courts will be more 
sceptical of a restraint if the labour market in which the covenantee acts is of such a nature 
that realistically he will find it difficult to get work in the field in which he was trained 134. 
The court will be more benevolent towards a restraint where the covenantor will easily find 
alternative employment outside the fetters of the restraint 135. In Steiner 136 the court did 
not really discuss the importance of the fact that the restraint, although not wide, would 
exclude the covenantor from practising within an area of Glasgow where all skilled 
hairdressers had their businesses, but it was not unsympathetic to such an argument. In 
Herbert Morris 137 the court considered that the covenantor would have to leave a long 
established home to find work elsewhere. But the impact of this in England and Scotland 
should be limited by the time at which reasonableness can be determined. 
- It might be of some importance that the covenantor will not be impoverished while subject to the 
restraint (although this last mentioned factor should not carry too much weight) 138. It will, 
moreover, be necessary in South Africa to look at the manner in which an employee was 
treated during employment. In Magna Alloys 139 it was accepted in the court a quo that it 
was unreasonable for the covenantee to enforce the restraint because the covenantor, a 
salesman, was not provided with enough products for sale. Rabie CJ did not accept this 
argument on the facts. However, this factor may in future be regarded as relevant where 
unreasonableness can be shown. 
133 
Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181; Wallis v Day (1837) 2 M & W 273; Nordenfelt 567; Cf Wyatt v 
Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 807, 810 acknowledged that it was not necessarily the aim of the 
covenantor; Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink [1936] Ch 544 at 548; Turner 120 said such questions will only 
come before the court if the covenantor has in fact started working again and that it was therefore irrelevant but this 
is doubtful; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 867; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 763. 
134 
Heydon 171; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313 placed too much emphasis on this; Cf 
Biografic (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 346. 
. Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 at 251; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 363 
where the court was hesitant to consider such factors; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313 see 
however the criticism supra; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 764, But see the criticism 778 -779; 
Schoombee 141. 
136 
Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34; Woolman 255; See also the mention made of this issue in SOS Bureau 
Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36 where the court accepted that important competition took place in the centre 
of the city but that there was still considerable business outside the centre in which the covenantor could take part. 
137. 
Herbert Morris 706. 
138. 
Anthony v Rennie 1981 (Notes) 11 at 12 where this was considered in determining the balance of convenience. 
139. Magna Alloys 905; Cf British Mannesmann Tube Co Ltd v Phillips (1903) 48 Sol Jo 117 although it is 
doubtful whether this could have been considered. 
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- A difficult problem that has been posed on several occasions is: To what extent will the cause of 
termination of an employment or partnership contract influence the restraint? This is so 
important and the problems here are so intricate that it deserves separate discussion. 
11. Reasonableness towards the covenantor and the mechanism by which a restraint 
comes into effect after contracts of employment or partnership 140 
The reasons for termination of an employment contract that brings a restraint into effect may play 
some role in determining its effect, and these issues need to be discussed in some detail. However, 
the position in post- employment contracts must not be confused with the type of cases where a 
business is sold and the covenantor agrees to work for the covenantee, with a full restraint coming 
into effect when the employment comes to an end 141. In such cases the restraint will be based on 
the sale of business and not on the employment. The causes for the termination of employment will 
mostly be insignificant and restraint may come into effect even on breach by the covenantee 142_ 
The employment relationship in such cases will merely defer the restraint. 
11.1. Mechanisms outside breach by the covenantee 
Post -employment or partnership restraints will normally come into effect where the main contract 
is terminated on notice 143. But they may also come into effect along other avenues If the 
employment is terminated by agreement, the contract that contains the restraint and the one that 
ends the relationship must be interpreted to determine whether the restraint in the first contract 
still stands 144. The restraint will have full effect even where an employment contract is cancelled 
due to the breach of the covenantor unless this is clearly excluded by the contract 145 
144). 
See Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) where the fact that the restraint would work 
differently depending on the manner in which the main contract operated was not really discussed. 
141 
See supra Ch 7.1.1. 
142. 
See infra 11.3. 
143 
See Giles v Hart (1859) 1 LT 154 at 155; The court in Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh - 
Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 238 overlooked this. 
144. 
See Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 infra; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 944 -946, 
961, 965, 969 
145 'Croft 
v Hawe (1836) Donnely 82 where counsel argued that the restraint came into effect when the contract 
was cancelled because of breach but the court did not discuss it; Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 32 and 
the question to counsel 29; Although there is not enough facts probably Howard v Danner (1901) 17 TLR 548; 
Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 2 Ch 248 at 255; See Hadsley v Dayer -Smith [1914] AC 979 at 981 where 
the contract expressly provided for "expulsion "; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 
(4) SA 226 (ZS) 238. 
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In England and Scotland these grounds for the termination of the employment will play no more 
than an attitudinal role 146 It may be of some relevance that the contract has been terminated by 
the employer. There are very persuasive reasons for dealing more strictly with restraints if they 
also deprive the covenantor of his freedom to choose whether he wants to work for the employer 
or be restrained. However, the courts in these legal systems will not be able to look at the actual 
reason for termination. There will be few cases where the facts of the case at conclusion will give 
the court any assistance in determining this issue. It will therefore be mostly neutral, although 
there might be some exceptions. 
The position will be different in South Africa. In Edgecombe i47 De Villiers CJ doubted whether a 
restraint would be enforced if the employment contract was terminated by the employer. But it 
was not necessary to decide the issue in this case, and it seems that the court was discussing the 
question whether an interdict could be granted. The problem in these types of cases was not 
properly discussed in later decisions 148. But all kinds of new avenues have been opened for South 
Africa by Magna Alloys. Here reasonableness will be determined from the moment when the court 
is asked to enforce the restraint. The reasons why the restraint came into effect will often be one 
of the factors that the court may consider 149 They may now give effect to the priorities of the 
principles underlying the restraint of trade doctrine 150 
11.2. Breach by the covenantee in England and Scotland where the parties have not 
particularly provided for it 
The position will be wholly different where the contract of employment is terminated by the breach 
of the covenantee. It was initially accepted in Proctor that a breach of the covenantee would be 
irrelevant to the enforcement of the covenant 151 But this view has been reversed 152. The courts 
146 
Cf the argumentation of the court Moenich v Fenestre (1892) 67 LT 602 at 604; Cf Blake 685 states that 
reasons for termination per se will often impact upon the question whether an equitable remedy can be granted; 
Smith & Wood 143 it is still an open question how unfair dismissal will influence reasonableness. 
147 
Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 225. 
148. 
Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 349; U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself 
(Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 148; Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v Kruger 1979 (4) SA 337 (W) 339. . 
. Capecan (Pty) Ltd da Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 461 there are indications 
that the court would have considered this as relevant if it could be proved. 
150 
See supra Ch 3. 
151 Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 32, although it was accepted that proper performance was averred 
35; Cf Curtis v Sandison (1831) 10 S 72 at 74 per Lord Moncreìff regarded the breach question as irrelevant for the 
purpose of interdict. 
152. 
Heydon 299; Cf Rayner v Pegler [1964] EG 301 where this issue was not finally decided because there was a 
dispute about repudiation. 
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in Scotland and England have accepted that a restraint will not come into effect if the contract is 
terminated in this manner, although the reasons given for the approach are difficult to grasp 153. 
On appeal in Measures Brothers 154 Cozens -Hardy LJ decided that the covenantee could not get 
equitable relief where he himself did not perform his side of the bargain, although he regarded it as 
unnecessary to determine whether the obligations were "strictly interdependent ". But many cases 
will fail on more fundamental grounds. 
Joyce J at first instance, and Kennedy LJ on appeal in Measures Brothers 155, relied on Billposting 
156, but they seemed to have drawn another conclusion from it. Joyce J stated that: 
"the plaintiffs are not entitled against this defendant to specific performance ... 
without performing - and they cannot perform - the clauses which that agreement 
contains in favour of the defendant. In my opinion it would be inequitable if the 
plaintiffs could have that relief, and I decline to give it." 
It is difficult to determine what the courts intend here, but it seems that they thought that the 
restraint could not be enforced because counter obligations had not been performed. However, 
this notion is a red herring. The question here is not simply whether there is mutuality between 
obligations so that one party may refuse to perform where the other has not properly performed. It 
is rather whether a restraint, intended to come into effect on termination of the relationship 
between the parties, survives the termination for breach. The mutuality of obligations might assist 
in showing that an obligation would not survive the contract, but it cannot be the point of focus 
here. 
In Billposting 157 both Lord Robertson and Lord Collins stated that the contract was breached, 
that it was rescinded and that further performance was no longer necessary. Lord Robertson added 
153 
Davies 493; The principle was apparently accepted in a series of cases where it was found that no breach 
occurred: Howard v Danner (1901) 17 TLR 548 at 549 wrongfulness that would cause an injunction to be refused 
not shown on the facts, Apparently Automobile Carriage Builders Ltd v Sayers (1909) 101 LT 419 at 420 although - 
the theoretical issue was not discussed, Konski v Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530 at 538, See Chitty 1201, Dickson v Jones 
[1939] 3 All ER 182 at 184 -187, Heydon 299, Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 42; Spencer v 
Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395, Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 484, 
485486, Geo A Moore & Co Ltd v Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868, Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355 and 
Hutchison & Craft v Burns 1994 GWD 26 -1547; Cf SW Strange Ltd v Mann [1965] 1 WLR 629 at 637 although 
the connection which the court made with these cases was somewhat oblique; Cf also Symphony Group plc v 
Hodgson [1994] QB 179 and the arguments of counsel although the case turned on other issues; McBryde 594 did 
nt 
1 
properly appreciate the problems in this area. 
. Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 2 Ch 248 at 254, Cf 262 although Kennedy LJ also looked at what he 
regarded as more fundamental issues; Chitty 1202. 
. Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 1 Ch 336 at 345 -346, Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 2 Ch 248 at 
262; Christie Encyclopaedia 596 seems to combine both the last mentioned two views; Gloag 573. 
156 Infra. 
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that the restraint was ancillary to the employment contract. But this begs the question. All post - 
employment restraints rise from the ashes of terminated contracts. Restraints normally spring from 
termination. It was shown above for instance that the restraint would not fall away if the contract 
is rescinded on breach by the employee and this defence can accordingly not apply absolutely. 
In Briggs 158 the court declared that the restraint would not survive the cancellation on breach and 
that the result "would not depend on the construction of the contract ", but this is unacceptable. As 
a general point of contract law there is no reason why the parties cannot agree that a certain 
obligation will endure cancellation. Davies 159 stated that a restraint would not survive cancellation 
if such cancellation was ex lege and not rooted in consensus. But this is not a sufficient answer. 
Many ex lege consequence of a contract can also be altered by the parties. 
Kennedy LJ in Measures Brothers 16o at least accepted that the question of whether a connection 
existed must be determined with regard to "the intention of the parties and the good sense of the 
case ". Still, it is suggested that a different intention must be sought and the good sense should be 
investigated on a different level than the one suggested by the court. 
The best approach would be to focus on the termination and to accept that a termination for 
breach will normally also terminate the restraint 161. But that does not mean that the principle will 
be absolute. It cannot limit the survival of the restraint after termination on breach if the parties 
clearly intended it to do so. 
11.3. Breach by the covenantee in South Africa where the parties have not specifically 
provided for it 
In South Africa the position is also confusing 162 In U -Drive 163 the court combined the two 
arguments in English law mentioned above. It first stressed that such clauses could not be 
157 
General Biliposting Co Ltd v Atkinson [1909] AC 118 at 121, 122; Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 2 Ch 
248 at 255 -257 took a similar view of the law although it was decided that it did not apply on the facts; Briggs v 
Oates [1991] 1 All ER 407 at 416 -417 stressed both these points and held that they were different ways of saying 
the same thing, See the criticism Davies 494; See Rock Refrigeration Ltd v Jones Times October 17 1996, but see 
the more acceptable view of Philips LJ; Chitty 1201; Heydon 299; Winfield (1946) 320. 
158 
Briggs v Oates [1991] 1 All ER 407 at 417; See Rock Refrigeration Ltd v Jones Times October 17 1996, but see 
the more acceptable view of Philips LJ. 
159 Davies 494. 
160 
Measures Bros Ltd v Measures [1910] 2 Ch 248 at 262. 
161. Infra 11.5. 
162 
Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 401 where the covenantor argued that the restraint 
would not come into effect on breach by the covenantee but the court did not accept that it had taken place. 
163 
U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 149450. 
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enforced because of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, but it then went on to mention the 
point that the restraint would fall away on cancellation for breach. This judgment is subject to all 
the criticisms of the English law mentioned above. 
In Drewtons 164 Watermeyer JP took it even further. He held that restraints that were intended by 
the parties to come into effect even if the contract was terminated by breach of the covenantee did 
not influence reasonableness, because a restraint could not come into effect after termination on 
breach by the covenantee. This is unacceptable unless it can be said that the court thought that the 
clause should be narrowly interpreted 165, but the judge more likely attempted to make a general 
point 
166 
It was correctly held in Capecan 167 that a restraint may, by agreement, be extended beyond 
termination even on breach. The judge submitted that the principle was too widely stated in 
Drewtons, although she acknowledged that breach by the covenantee may be a defence on the true 
construction of some contracts. As regards the question of restraints that are not extended beyond 
breach by the parties, the case contains only one problematic element. The court noted that 
Watermeyer JP in Drewtons 168 had presumably relied on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus as 
the basis upon which enforcement should not be allowed, and this is probably a correct 
interpretation of Drewtons. However, the latter case is unacceptable in so far as it was accepted 
that the exceptio could play a role in these cases. The problem here is, rather, that the contract has 
been terminated and that the restraint has not survived the termination. The court in Chubb 169 was 
led astray by the notion that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus comes into play here. It again 
did not see the principles expressed in Drewtons as absolute (although this aspect of Drewtons was 
not expressly discussed). But the restraint in casu was regarded as still prevailing on the basis that 
the obligations here were not reciprocal. The court was probably correct in its conclusion that the 
restraint would survive the contract, but the emphasis should have been somewhere else. 
It is hoped that the South African courts will in future properly assess the legal issues that come 
into play here. The question whether obligations are reciprocal should only be of evidential value. 
The courts will have to look at the intention of the parties to determine whether they have also 





Cf the more acceptable view on this point in Chubb Fire Security (Pty) Ltd v Greaves 1993 (4) SA 358 (W) 
362. 
167 Van Den Heever J in Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 459. 
. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 308. 
. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 308. 
168 
169 
Chubb Fire Security (Pty) Ltd v Greaves 1993 (4) SA 358 (W) 363 -364. 
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11.4. Clauses that extend the operation of a restraint to cases of breach by the 
covenantee 
The next question accordingly is: what will be the position if the parties expressly agree that the 
restraint in post -employment and partnership cases should come into effect even if the contract is 
cancelled for the breach of the covenantee? 
11.4.1. The English and Scottish approach 
In English law the court in Briggs 170 was confronted by a clause that the restraint would come 
into effect if the contract "shall have determined for any reason whatever ". The court also refused 
to enforce the restraint because it would be unreasonable between the parties. 
This will carry matters much further where the restraint was intended to apply on breach 171. There 
will be good grounds for finding that a restraint is unreasonable if it will allow the covenantee to 
breach the contract and then come back to enforce the restraint. Scott J put it thus: 
"A contract under which an employee could be immediately and wrongfully 
dismissed but would nevertheless remain subject to an anti -competitive restraint 
seems to me to be grossly unreasonable. I would not be prepared to enforce the 
restraint in such a contract ". 
If this view is accepted there will be at least one ground upon which a contract can be found to be 
unreasonable merely because it is grossly unfair to the covenantor. 
However, the approach is also open to criticism. On a formal level there is, except for Briggs, no 
real authority for this point. In John Michael Design 172 the restraint explicitly provided that it 
would come into effect even on breach by the covenantee, but this issue was not taken up. On a 
substantive level the arguments in Briggs and the Scottish cases can be countered on the grounds 
that: 
- The covenantee will often still have interests that he should be able to protect in these cases. 
- The only real loss for the employee will be that he will not have the buffer provided by notice. It 
might be that this buffer does not provide much further protection anyhow. 
170. Briggs v Oates [1991] 1 All ER 407 at 417; D v M [1996] IRLR 192. 
171 
Living Design (Home Improvements) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71, Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 
1994 SLT 1153 at 1160. But see the criticism infra 12.5. 
172. 
John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332. 
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- The loss of notice might be adequately compensated by a claim for damages 173 
- The approach is very rigid. Reasonableness must be determined from the moment of conclusion. 
The question is whether the contract extended to cases of breach as reasonableness is 
determined from the moment of conclusion 174. The contract in the Briggs case was 
determined by the breach of the covenantee. But there are cases where this principle will 
work harshly. In Living Design the suggestions by counsel that the contract had been 
unlawfully terminated by the employer were not investigated. In Lux Traffic 175 counsel for 
the pursuer pointed out that the contract was not actually unlawfully terminated, but this 
was again not discussed by the court. Hence in Rock Refrigeration 176 Philips LT regarded 
the possibility of repudiation as too remote a contingency. 
There is great difficulty in choosing between the possibilities and the court should, therefore, not 
take an uncompromising position either way. These issues were not properly discussed in the 
cases. The most acceptable solution would probably be to balance the minimum duration of the 
contract if terminated by legitimate means with the possibility that breach can occur immediately. 
A restraint that would also come into effect on breach should be unreasonable - even if there is no 
real prejudice on the facts - in a case where it is foreseeable that the covenantee can place the 
covenantor in a very difficult position, i.e. where the contract can only be legally terminated after a 
considerable time but where the contract provides that the restraint will also come into effect on 
breach. It is an inflexible position, but English and Scottish courts are forced into it because of the 
rules regarding the time at which reasonableness should be determined and because of a narrow 
approach to severability 177. The courts, confronted by two unsatisfactory possibilities, probably 
followed the most acceptable general principle. 
11.4.2. The approach in South Africa 
Southern African courts have been too benevolent towards restraint of trade clauses that might 
come into effect on breach by the covenantee 178. 
- Commercial and Industrial Holdings proposed that reasonableness should not be influenced by 
such clauses but that damage should be recovered in an action based on the breach 179. Yet 
173 
Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 32 discussed supra 11.4; Cf also Commercial and Industrial 
Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 238 discussed infra. 
174. 
Briggs v Oates [1991] 1 All ER 407 at 417. 
175 
Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1159. 
176 Rock Refrigeration Ltd v Jones Times October 17 1996. 
177. 
Infra Ch 13, 14. 
178. See also Amalgamated Retail Ltd v Spark 1991 (2) SA 143 (SEC) 147 decided that it was not necessary to 
determine whether a franchise contract was terminated by breach or because of notice of cancellation. 
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a restraint often causes more than pecuniary loss and it will be very difficult to provide 
proper monetary compensation. 
- In Capecan 180 Van den Heever J held that it would not be unconscionable to uphold a restraint 
even where the employment was terminated by the breach of the employer. But this 
viewpoint has been criticised 181. The judgment seems to beg the question that is relevant 
here and it is also too rigid when the basic post Magna Alloys principles are considered. 
The court argued that all such restraints are collateral agreements that are intended to have 
an existence independent from the employment. But the big question here is: to what 
extent should such independence be allowed to exist? These types of restraints may 
constitute severe inroads upon the covenantor's freedom of work. The argument of the 
court did not take it much further. 
It therefore seems that cancellation on breach by the covenantee should still affect reasonableness 
in South Africa. However, in post Magna Alloys South African law, the legality of the restraint is 
considered at the moment when the court is asked to enforce the restraint 182. It must be asked 
whether this new approach will affect the position. 
A restraint will now be reasonable if full enforcement on the facts as they exist when the court is 
asked to enforce it will be reasonable 183. Yet a restraint will still be ineffective if it will not be 
reasonable to enforce it to its full extent on the facts at this point, and it will not make a difference 
if the enforcer can only rely on part of that restraint. A part of a clause will only be enforced if the 
whole is also enforceable, or if the part that is to be enforced can be separated in accordance with 
the principles of partial enforcement 184 
But the situation under discussion does not clearly fit within this scheme. Here the facts may cause 
part of the clause to fall away. Hence two possible views can be taken: 
- On a formalistic view the changes made in Magna Alloys would be irrelevant. The courts may 
remain interested in the manner in which clauses are framed. Thus they would still not 
179 
Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 238, See supra 11.4.2 and 
the view in Proctor v Sargent. 
t8° 
Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 460 accepted by Kerr 505. 
181 
Christie 445 although Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) on which he relied concerned a 
different issue; Magna Alloys 905 suggested that it would have made a difference if the covenantee was in breach 
by not supplying the covenantor with sufficient sales articles. But the precise effect was not analysed; Bonnet v 
Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 160 the problems of whether a restraint would outlive breach was not discussed. See 
on the interpretation of this clause infra 11.5; Cf also Botha v Carapax Shadeports (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 202 (A) 
215 where the question of correctness was left open. 
182. 
See infra Ch 13. 
183 
Infra Ch 15.1. 
184. Infra Ch 14, 15. 
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allow parties to conclude these clauses on the basis that they were aimed at applying in 
certain situations in which they would necessarily have been ineffective. 
- On the second or objective view, the all- important factor is that the court must ask whether the 
clause, which the court is asked to enforce, is ineffective on the facts when the courts are 
asked to enforce it. Here the time at which the court is asked to enforce the restraint is 
pivotal. That the clause would necessarily have been ineffective on another mutually 
exclusive set of facts also provided for in the contract is then irrelevant. 
Both views have much to commend them. However, the emphasis which the courts have placed 
on the notion that enforceability is fundamental will make the second alternative preferable. 
Botha J who, in National Chemsearch 185, piloted the new approach to the time at which 
reasonableness should be determined, certainly followed this approach, although he did not 
properly evaluate the arguments against it. The problem is that courts would want to discourage 
clauses that will in certain circumstances always be unreasonable. The strongest form of 
discouragement would be to reject all such clauses. But it seems that the National Chemsearch 
approach is probably still more acceptable. More subtle possibilities will exist if this alternative is 
accepted. The courts will not look at the possible causes that may bring the restraint into effect, 
but the real reasons for its coming into being, and the real circumstances surrounding the 
termination of the contract will be relevant. 
- The restraint will not be unreasonable merely because it may come into effect on breach by the 
covenantee if this contingency does not materialise. 
- A restraint will not necessarily be unreasonable if it does come into effect on the breach of the 
covenantee. The court will be able to look at the facts of the particular case to a much 
greater degree. The actual effect of the breach can be considered. 
11.5. When can a clause be interpreted as also coming into effect on breach by the 
covenantee? 
It will be difficult to determine when a clause can be interpreted also to come into effect on breach 
of the covenantee. Some cases will be simple. In Living Design 
186 the clause was clearly too wide. 
It was explicitly provided that the restraint would come into effect whether the employment was 
185 
National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1108; That makes the first 
interpretation of Howard v Danner (1901) 17 TLR 548 supra 11.2 a realistic possibility in South Africa. 
186 
. Living Design (Home Improvements) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69; See also NCH (UK) Ltd v Mair 1994 
GWD 34 -1986 where the court held that the clause did not "require to be read as extending to unlawful 
termination" although the clause itself was not stated in the report. 
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lawfully or unlawfully terminated. But it will in most cases be very difficult to discern any clear 
intention. 
The court should be reluctant to accept that clauses are so widely phrased. The purpose of a post - 
employment restraint is to protect the covenantee after ending of the work relationship with the 
covenantor. But restraints flow from preceding relationships, are closely tied to them and 
dependent upon them for their usefulness and validity. It sounds somewhat extraordinary for the 
covenantee to defy the contract but rely on the restraint 137. Courts have always been slow to 
extend restraints by interpretation and it is suggested that this reluctance should be continued here. 
Clauses where the parties merely talk of the restraint coming into effect on "termination ", 
"cancellation" or "on the contract being ended" normally should be interpreted as excluding 
cancellation on breach by the covenantee 188. In Bonnet 189 it was agreed that the restraint would 
come into effect "after the termination of employment ". The court decided that the restraint in this 
case came into effect on termination of the actual work relationship even if the contract was still 
not terminated. Broome J so interpreted the contract, because he wanted to avoid difficult 
problems concerning the time of termination of the restraint that would otherwise arise. However, 
it is suggested that they cannot be avoided unless the parties clearly evince the intention to 
establish a restraint that operates from the moment where the relationship is at an end. Words like 
these are mostly used to denote termination of the contract even if the contract itself is not 
mentioned 190. 
In Briggs 191 the court did not think it necessary finally to interpret the clause that was to the 
effect that the restraint would come into operation "for any cause whatever ". However, the issue is 
of fundamental importance. The "for any reason whatever" phraseology is almost standard in 
restraint of trade cases. Before the recent spate of cases the courts in England and Scotland have 
never doubted the validity of restraints merely because they contain such phrases 
192. If the third 
1ß7. The qualification in Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) would therefore be a 
clause ex abundanti cautela. 
188. 
A clause will be narrower if it is only agreed to come into effect on termination see Aramark plc v Sommerville 
1995 GWD 8-408 where Lux Traffic was distinguished. 
189 Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 160 -161. 
190 
Cf Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 346 -347. 
191 
Briggs v Oates 119911 1 All ER 407 at 417. 
192 
Some clauses were enforced although they contained clauses that stated that restraints would come into effect if 
the contract was terminated for any reason: Moenich v Fenestre (1892) 67 LT 602, Davies Turner & Co v Lowen 
(1891) 64 UR 655, Rogers v Maddocks [1892] 3 Ch 346, Welstead v Hadley (1904) 21 TLR 165 although this 
concerned a sale of goodwill, Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (GB) Ltd v Heath (1913) 29 TLR 308, Putsman v 
Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637, Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472, Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton 
[1989] ICR 123, Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729, Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70, 
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point of the court in Briggs is applied to such cases they will suddenly be ineffective! However, it 
is submitted that the courts can simply interpret "any reason whatever" clauses narrowly. 
Cancellation for "any reason whatever" would then only mean legal cancellation or cancellation 
because of breach by the covenantor. Accordingly the rejection of the clause in Lux Traffic cannot 
be accepted 
193 The restraint here would come into effect "however such employment may be 
determined "; the court should have placed a narrower interpretation on it. In Hutchison 194 it was 
held that "The phrase 'howsoever arising' on its own could not be interpreted as an attempt to 
avoid the mutuality of contracts rule ", and this appears to be a more acceptable interpretation. 
In some cases in South Africa the issue was also not touched upon 195 In other cases the court 
leaned towards limiting the effect of such clauses to cases where the contract ceased for reasons 
other than the breach of the covenantee 196 However, there is also considerable authority for the 
view that such clauses will include breach by the covenantee 197. In Chubb Fire Security 198 the 
court again decided that these contracts should be interpreted as including breach by the 
covenantee. The contract specifically enumerated the grounds for termination, but the court 
accepted that this did not influence the meaning of the "termination for any reason whatever" 
clause in the restraint. This is strange, especially if it is considered that the court acknowledged 
that there were cases where it was accepted that such clauses should be interpreted narrowly. The 
clause in this case should have been analysed in context. The covenantor sold a business to the 
covenantee and then agreed to work for the business. The case accordingly deals with a sale of 
Remington Typewriter Company v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168, Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34, A & D 
Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297, SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33, Geo A Moore & Co Ltd v 
Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868 here there was a question about the legality of termination but this clause was not 
brought into issue; In other cases restraints were not upheld, but not on the basis of the "any cause whatever" 
clauses: Gophir Diamond Co v Wood [1902] 1 Ch 950, Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 48 TLR 613, SV 
Nevanas Ltd v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413, Rentokil Ltd y Hampton 1982 SLT 422, Reed Stenhouse 
(UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354. 
93 Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1160. 
194 
Hutchison & Craft v Burns 1994 GWD 26 -1547. 
195 
Federal Insurance Corporation of SA Ltd v Van Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 
151; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D), Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C); Humphrys v Laser 
Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C); Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A); Cf Meter Systems Holdings 
Ltd v Venter 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 416 and the suggestions of counsel on the meaning of the clause where it was 
determined that the restraint would come into effect on "his [the covenantor's] termination of his employment with 
the company for whatsoever reason" but it was not discussed. 
196 
Biografic (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 349 is not clear on this point. The court used very wide 
language but the example mentioned still falls within the interpretation set out above; In Stewart Wrightson (Pty) 
Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 406 with reference to Biografie. 
197 
Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 238 although it was not 
really discussed because the court felt that a restraint would come into effect on breach anyway; Poolquip Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 362 seems to interpret Biografie as also including determination due to 
breach; The interpretation itself was not attacked in National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) 
SA 1092 (T) 1108; Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 459 -460. 
198 
Chubb Fire Security (Pty) Ltd v Greaves 1993 (4) SA 358 (W) 362. 
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business restraint. In such cases the reasons for termination of the employment will be of lesser 
importance because the restraint is not based on the employment. This weighed heavily with the 
court 199. The English and Scots approach should also be applied in South Africa with regard to 
true post- employment restraints. 
12.A more extensive role for the interests of the covenantor: conclusions and 
predictions 
The interests of the covenantor often dovetail into the covenantee -oriented legitimate interests test 
in the wide penumbra of uncertainty that surrounds the firm nucleus of that test. But in all three 
systems the wider approach to newer types of restraints may provoke a rethink. Moreover. in 
South Africa the latest developments have also created some scope for a wider reasonableness 
test. The Magna Alloys case, with its vague discussion of reasonableness inter partes, may. in 
general terms, provide some impetus for wider consideration of reasonableness issues 200 although 
this wider possibility has not yet been utilised by courts. In Basson 201 Nienaber JA formulated a 
new test that has been echoed in several later cases 202. He suggested that the interests of the 
covenantee should be weighed quantitatively and qualitatively against the interest of the 
covenantor in being economically active, and this may also opaquely contribute to a wider 
approach, although it is not directly aimed at balancing the actual position of the covenantor with 
that of the covenantee. 
It has already been shown that a restraint which clearly does no more than reasonably protect the 
legitimate interests of the covenantee will mostly be legal, and it is hard to think that this apple cart 
can be upturned where the restraint will cause hardship to the covenantor. In this sense a restraint 
that is reasonable in the interest of the covenantee will also be reasonable in the interest of the 
covenantor. Only clear unreasonable inroads on the ability to work, such as some clauses that 
come or may come into effect on breach of the covenantee, should be sufficient to disrupt the 
validity of the contract in such cases 203. Hardship for the covenantor will mostly play a role as an 
attitudinal factor. 
199 




Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767. 
202. Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 512. 
203 
Cf Heydon although he only briefly touched on this subject 262. He stated that it will require "undue 
harshness "; See 11.4. 
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But should it necessarily settle the matter if the restraint only protects interests, although not 
legitimate interests, of the covenantee 204? There is a strong argument for also considering wider 
reasonableness issues when determining reasonableness in some cases. The restraint should 
perhaps also be held to be reasonable where it is very important for the protection of another 
interest 205 of the covenantee and is clearly fair towards the covenantor. The court will have to 
investigate the position of the covenantor to a much greater extent in these cases, and the same 
importance cannot be attached to the interest of the covenantee as in the case of proprietary 
interests. A much more direct weighing of the interests of the different parties will have to be 
undertaken. Protection should only be allowed where the restraint is neither oppressive, nor even 
merely neutral, but where it is clearly fair towards the covenantor. 
In the classic restraint of trade cases the courts have stood on proprietary interests for very 
important reasons. There is no other work relationship between the parties when the restraint bites 
and it is fundamentally important to guard freedom of work. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why 
the court should insist on proprietary interests where the restraint is clearly fair towards the 
covenantor 206 
The objections to this approach can all be answered: 
- It can be argued that the restraint may still interfere with freedom of work in a manner that is 
contrary to the public interest. But the separate public interest requirement can be used to 
deal with this 207. 
- It is important that the restraint of trade doctrine instil certain fundamental values into the market 
place. It should send a message to the market place, which is that freedom of work should 
not be easily interfered with. The strict requirement that only proprietary interests will be 
protected does much to promote this. However, extension of the reasonableness concept 
will not severely undermine it if such extension takes place along the lines proposed here. 
- It may be argued that widening reasonableness inter partes would cause uncertainty and greater 
complexity in an area that is already inaccessible. However, certain safeguards are built 
into the system to ensure the maintenance of a core of certainty. The covenantee can still 
plan for the reasonableness of the restraint by heeding certain relatively simple principles. 
The covenantor cannot argue that widening would be unfair towards him because it will 
204. 
See this distinction supra Ch 6.16.1. 
205 
See Heydon 261 on the different types of interests although he did not properly keep newer and traditional 
restraints apart. 
206 
Agma Chemical Co Ltd y Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248 is the ideal starting point for modernising the restraint of 
trade doctrine in Scots law; The seeds of this are inherent in the approach of Van Heerden JA in Basson y Chilwan 
1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 773 -774. 
07. 
See infra Ch 10. 
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remove his ability to plan, since it is regarded as morally reprehensible to plan for 
unreasonableness 208. 
The cases where the notion of proportionality was rejected can therefore be answered if the 
weighing of the different positions of the parties is so undertaken. None of the cases contemplated 
the halfway house suggested here. The doctrine in classical cases is in danger of becoming 
stultified if some proportionality is not considered, but it is suggested that it should be done under 
these controlled circumstances. 
A restraint will be reasonable inter partes in this wider sense if there is no abuse of bargaining 
power, if it is clearly reasonable towards the covenantor, and if it does not go beyond the interests, 
although not legitimate proprietary interests, of the covenantee. Thus where commercial interests 
are protected, the court should be prepared to uphold some restraints if the covenantor receives 
proper payment while he is subjected to the restraint. 
A restraint should not be upheld merely because it is not unreasonable towards the covenantor or 
because it is in the interest, although not the legitimate interests, of the covenantee. Nor should 
equality of bargaining power or mere adequate consideration, of itself, be conclusive for allowing 
a restraint. The courts should in each case have a discretion to determine whether the freedom of 
work of the covenantor is properly guarded, and the extent to which positive fairness will have to 
be proved will depend on the gravity of the protectable interest and the width of the restriction. 
The view of Chitty 209 that a restraint should be reasonable for the purpose of the restraint of trade 
doctrine if it is fair between the parties - even if the restraint merely protects competition or no 
interest at all - is therefore too wide and should be qualified. The only authority which Chitty can 
mention is the A Schroeder case but different considerations applied there 210. The restraint applied 
during a work relationship and the interests of the parties were still intertwined. In Scotland 
Woolman 211 has argued that the fairness test of the A Schroeder case should be applied to classic 
restraints. He argued that this will ensure greater reasonableness towards the covenantor, but it is 
suggested that such a wide approach is not acceptable here. It will cause even more uncertainty in 
an area that is already very slippery. The proprietary interest test provides minimum guidelines. 
Change, to provide wider protection for the covenantor and covenantee, can probably be achieved 
208. 
Otto 209, Roffey y Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 506 although he may protest 
about the uncertainty regarding his position, See infra Ch 13.4.2. 
209. 
Chitty 1198; Heydon 265 -266; See also Schoombee 140 who argued in this direction. 
210 
Supra Ch 6.1. 
211. Woolman 257. 
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by qualifying it, rather than abandoning it completely. The compromise position suggested here is 
as far as the courts should go. 
It has been suggested that the interests of the covenantor test should be extended 212. However, 
the approach described here is much more flexible and practical. Not only is it very difficult to 
determine which interests should be protectable beyond proprietary interests, but extension should 
be determined by weighing broader reasonableness elements, because further interests will not be 
as fundamental as proprietary interests. 
The position as it has thus far been set out can be summarised. The restraint will be effective if it 
protects legitimate interests of the covenantee. The covenantee can generally enforce such a 
restraint although the court may still in extreme cases find it to be unreasonable. The interest of 
the covenantee can be invoked as one of the attitudinal factors utilised to help the courts in making 
what are often very difficult decisions. Restraints which do not exceed protection of proprietary 
interests will mostly be upheld, and this will provide the pivot of certainty around which the 
doctrine will revolve. 
The courts should be able to uphold a restraint where it exceeds the reasonable protection of the 
legitimate interests of the covenantee in certain limited circumstances: 
- The restraint will still have to protect an interest, although not necessarily a legitimate interest, of 
the covenantee. The law of contract should establish certain principles in the market place, 
and one such important principle is that freedom of work should not be interfered with if a 
restraint is wider than any advantage to the covenantee. 
- The court will have to exercise its discretion in favour of the covenantee. It can be proved that 
the restraint protects a very important although not proprietary interest of the covenantee, 
and that it is not unreasonable towards the covenantor. The covenantee may also protect 
weak interests if it can be shown that the restraint is clearly fair towards the covenantor. 
212. 
Schoombee 1.12. See supra Ch 6.16.1. 
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Chapter 10: The public interest requirement 
I. The requirement that the restraint must not be unreasonable in the public interest 
According to the Nordenfelt test a restraint of trade must not only be reasonable in the interest of 
the parties, but must also not be against the interest of the public. This has been accepted in all 
three legal systems 1. The public interest requirement has survived the overhaul of restraint of 
trade law in South Africa in Magna Alloys, although the test has been differently phrased. The 
question in general will be whether the contract is against the public interest. The restraint will 
then probably be in the public interest if it is reasonable 2. 
Kerr 3 argued that the court in Kemp 4 was wrong because it determined public interest issues 
before looking into reasonableness. He submitted that it was not the intention in Magna Alloys to 
change the order in which these issues are determined. That is correct, but there is no reason why 
the order in which these issues should be determined must be cast in stone. 
2. Public interest, public policy and reasonableness inter partes 
Many authorities state that the restraint must not be unreasonable in the public interest. But it is 
suggested that the word unreasonable in this context can only cause confusion. The practice here 
will therefore simply be to talk of the requirement that the restraint must not be contrary to the 
public interest. 
The new approach in South Africa may cause some confusion when it is compared with its English 
counterpart. The broad principle underlying the doctrine, and public interest as a direct 
requirement for a restraint, are both called public interest in Magna Alloys and subsequent cases 5. 
But the tests still have the same basic traits. 
The public interest requirement has led some authorities to believe that the reasonableness 
requirement is unrelated to public policy, while public policy is represented by this second leg. 
However, the entire substantive restraint of trade test is based on public policy 6. 
1. Nordenfelt 565 see also 549; In some of the older cases the court placed considerable emphasis on the public 
interest: Horner v Graves (1831) 7 Bing 735, Whittaker v Howe (1841) 3 Beav 383, May v O'Neil (1875) 44 LJCh 
660; George Walker & Co v Jann 1991 SLT 771 at 773. 
2. Magna Alloys 893, Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 762. 
3. Kerr Tribute 195. 
4. Kemp Sacs and Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 687. 
5. See also for use of this phraseology in England: Mason 740, Instone v A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd 
[1974] 1 All ER 171 at 176, 177, 178, A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 
621, See the confusion Treitel 419 -420. 
6. See supra Ch 5.3.1. 
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Broad public policy or public interest alone is too wide as a test 7. A more specific reasonableness 
test that will resolve many of the problems in this area has been developed, and it is important to 
keep the two aspects apart. 
The first leg of the restraint of trade doctrine is public policy crystallised into clearer rules. The 
second leg is a check- and -catch -all test. It allows for the consideration of relevant public policy 
elements that have not been discounted by reasonableness inter partes 8. 
- The person who argues that the restraint is ineffective can put forward arguments showing that 
the restraint should not be upheld because of the interest which the public has in freedom 
of work. Only public policy surrounding freedom of work and the question whether 
freedom of work should be protected are important within the restraint of trade doctrine. 
Thus the freedom of work principle should here be approached from a direct public policy 
perspective 9. 
- The enforcer may put forward wider public interest arguments to show that the restraint will 
have to be enforced. These arguments will then have to be compared with the fundamental 
notion that freedom of work should be protected. 
3. The public interest requirement and judicial scepticism 
The courts will be slow to accept that a restraint is ineffective for being contrary to public interest 
if they have already found the clause to be reasonable inter partes lo. It has been accepted that 
7. Supra Ch 2.3ff. 
8. Nordenfelt 566; The confusion of issues in Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 will accordingly not be followed 
today; See the criticism of the Wyatt case infra 3. 
9. Treitel 411; Heydon 267ff is based on a too wide view of the public policy that should come into play; Chitty 
1199 is too wide. 
10 E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 305; Attorney General of Commonwealth of Australia v 
Adelaide Steamship Co [1913] AC 781 at 785; North Western Salt Company Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd 
[1914] AC 461 especially at 469 -470, 471, 477 -478, 479 -480, 481, Cf (1918) 30 Jur Rev 5 -6; McEllistrim v 
Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 563 although the court stated that 
it is not difficult to conceive of a case where public interest would come into play; Cf Joseph Evans & Co Ltd v 
Heathcote [1918] 1 KB 418 at 427, 429 and 433; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 195; 
Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 239, Cf also 241 although it is doubtful whether actual 
damage must be proved; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] Ch 126 at 138; Anson 324 and 327, Anson 329 -330; 
Atiyah 345; Blake 650, 686; Cheshire Fifoot and Ftuznston 404, 412; Chitty 1199; Collinge 410 -411, 412, 423; 
Heydon 29, 172; Haslam 92, 110 -111; Hickling 35, 43; Woolman 255; MacQueen 345 stated that the defender in 
WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 put forward public interest issues but it was not even discussed. He probably 
refers to the discussion of balance of convenience 218, See infra Ch 15.2.2; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1211 and 
the final conclusion 1213; Gloag 575 -576; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 172; 
Nathan 41, 42; Lubbe and Murray 261. 
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there are only two cases, namely Wyatt and Bull 11, that have been decided on this point 12, 
although even these cases were apparently solved along different lines 13 
Many of the objections to considering public policy will reappear again 14, while there will also be 
special problems with the public interest requirement: 
- Reasonableness has become clearly settled into rules and principles. The second leg will be «ider 
and more discretionary; there are few principles and even fewer rules to go by 15. Social 
and especially economic theories will have to be considered, and they not only conflict but 
also change constantly 16 
It is in the public interest that contracts should be kept, and courts will be hesitant to avoid them 
on the basis of vaguer notions of public interest. Judges will be slow to hold a contract 
ineffective in terms of the public interest leg of the restraint of trade test 17. Sanctity of 
contract will not be as important as it was in the 19th century but it will still be of 
relevance, particularly where public policy is woolly and not generally accepted. In Mitchel 
18 the court accepted that it would not "set aside a man's own agreement for fear of an 
uncertain injury to him and fix a certain damage on another ". 
Reasonableness inter partes discounts many of the public policy factors that are relevant in the 
field of restraints of trade 19. The courts should refrain from looking at reasonableness inter 
partes under this rubric to avoid repetition and distortion of public policy 20. 
11. Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273. 
12. Goodhart Note (1933) 49 LQR 465; Heydon 173, 267; Anson 328, Heydon 267, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 
410, Spowart Taylor & Hough 748; Treitel 410 
13 Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 Lord Macnaghten at 799 stated that the agreement was on the 
face of it too wide to be reasonable, Scrutton II 807, Greer LJ 808 and Slesser LJ 810 emphasised the generality of 
the restriction; The public interest argument was put forward to show that the contract was in restraint: 798 -799, 
806 -807, 808, 809 -810 although it is not clear, Anson 327 -328 at least accepted that the restraint was also regarded 
as unreasonable inter partes; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 281, 284 285 accepted the validity of 
Wyatt and the scope issue was in the forefront here. The substantive issues were not discussed in any detail but they 
were dispatched on the basis that the contract was not reasonable; See how these cases were understood Sadler v 
Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 391 where the emphasis was again placed on the 
jurisdictional issues in Bull and Wyatt. 
14 Heydon 172; See supra Ch 2. 
15 Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 445 mentioned by Heydon 172; Nordenfelt 566, 567 with reference 
to Davis v Mason (1795) 5 Term Rep 118 and Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 413. 
16 Spowart Taylor & Hough 749; Supra Ch 2, 3, Infra 5.1. 
17. Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1857) LR 19 Eq 462 at 465; E Underwood & Son Ltd v 
Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 305 -306 although Vaughan Williams LJ 309 stressed that the public interest 
requirement would still be part of the law; Heydon 29, 267 although it is confusing, 273; Tool Metal Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 1 at 13. 
18. Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 191. 
19. Contra Dottridge Brothers Ltd v Crook (1907) 23 TLR 644 but the reasonableness test has undergone much 
refinement since the case; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] Ch 126 at 138; Heydon 25, 172, 200; Chitty 1199; 
Blake 686 -687; Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 240 but see the 
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- The parties will not bring all the relevant evidence before the court. In court there is merely a 
dispute between the parties. They may attempt to hijack public policy for their own private 
purposes, and the public will not be properly represented 21. 
- The court may feel that it does not have the necessary qualifications for dealing with such issues, 
and that problems of this nature should rather be referred to specialist institutions In 
Esso the court had the advantage of a Monopolies Commission report, but this will seldom 
be the case 223. 
Hence, it has been suggested that the public interest test here is merely tautologous and that a 
restraint which is reasonable inter partes will always be reasonable in the public interest N. 
However, good reasons for maintaining the second leg of the doctrine exist 25. 
4. Factors that may enhance the role of public interest arguments 
In Esso 26, where a new type of restraint was concerned, it was stated that lawyers should today 
be more energetic in looking at broader issues of public policy. This will probably rub off on the 
attitude of the courts towards the old types of restraints. Yet the above mentioned obstacles will 
guarantee a limited application of this requirement. The Esso case has not led to any real 
expansion of the public interest requirement. Lord Hodson was the only judge in Esso who 
criticism infra 5.2; Alberts 295 accepted that the position inter partes will often not differ from the interests of the 
public. 
20. For cases where too much emphasis was placed on this: Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 at 729; E 
Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 314 although it is not clear; Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd 
v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1112, See the more acceptable Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1163. 
21. Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 827 and 828; Atiyah 347; Chitty 1199; 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 404; Heydon 30, 272 and the cases mentioned there. 
22. Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 826 -827; Cf United Shoe Machinery Co of 
Canada v Brunet [1909] AC 330 at 344 although the court probably did not address its arguments to this point; 
Chitty 1199; Anson 334; Atiyah 346, 347; Collinge 410; Heydon 30, 272; Korah JBL 254; Woolman 256; Allied 
Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 332. 
23. Esso 300; 320, 322; Chitty 1217; Heydon McGill 350 and 353 see also the documents used in Sherk v Horowitz 
(1971) 25 DLR (3rd) 675 (Ont HC); Collinge 423; Turpin 104; J Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions 160- 
162; 171 -173; For further discussion JTC Cases and Comments (1967) 12 Jur Rev 73ff and 76; Whiteman 5O7û, 
520; Korah JBL 253; Schoombee 151. 
24. Cf already Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 at 729; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 182 was highly 
critical; Chitty 1199, See Supra Ch 3.6.2; This is often done in reaction to perceived problems with the case of 
Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 see infra 5.2. Collinge 423 seems to argue for a pregnant concept 
of reasonableness 412 and 423. 
25. Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [ 1967] 1 WLR 273 at 276 discussed by Treitel 410 but see supra, Treitel 420. 
26. Esso 300 -301, 318 -319, 321, 324, 330, 340 -341; Anson 324; Chitty 1199; Heydon McGill 343; Treitel 411, 420; 
Heydon McGill 343; Heydon 39, 41; See Heydon 260 he said that Lord Wilberforce tried to promote public interest 
in a series of cases including Esso; Guest 7; Perrins 67; Scott Robinson 161; Smith & Wood 137; Treitel 420; 
Turpin 106, 111 -112; S2owart- Taylor & Hough 748 -749; Wedderburn 150; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1211, 1213 
although the author in Lie end accepted that its application will remain narrow. 
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Texaco 33 called "abstruse economic arguments" cannot in themselves be a ground for finding that 
a restraint should be contrary to public policy. Such arguments will often lack precision 34, and 
courts will find it impossible to rule on rival economic theories 35, while furthermore what is 
regarded as in the best economic interest may vary 36. The court in Texaco 37 stated that "such 
business and economic judgements are by their nature matters of policy decisions by business 
administration, government or parliament ". There are specialist institutions where these matters 
can be more properly evaluated 38. 
The Court of Appeal decision in Dickson shows some support for such arguments. The case 
concerned limitations by the Pharmaceutical Society on the type of products that could be sold by 
pharmacies. Sachs LJ based his decision on public interest 39, and held that the restraint would: 
- Decrease the number of small pharmacies and pharmacies in small villages where there also may 
be a great need for them. 
- Limit the possibilities of competition by stopping second pharmacies from opening in some 
towns. 
- Decrease the amount of suitable entrants into the profession and it might reduce the number of 
new pharmacies opening. 
- Increase the prices of medicine because profits from other sources would be reduced. 
But these points are very woolly and the reliance on them unprecedented. 
A more careful approach was followed in the House of Lords. The question of public interest was 
left open by Lord Reid 40. Lord Morris 41 argued that restraints of this nature also have to be in the 
public interest, but he only looked at this when he discussed the wider interests that can be 
protected. There are no concrete public interest arguments in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce 42. 
He illustrated the scepticism of the court, although he purported to give reasons why this restraint 
354, 398, 407, 408 but it must be seen in the light of his view of the role of the doctrine; Treitel 411; Whish Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1213 criticised Texaco; Cf Grunfeld 64 on the problem of actual and economic consequences. 
33 Texaco Ltd y Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [ 1972] 1 WLR 814 at 827. 
34 Treitel 411; Atiyah 337 -338. 
35 Anson 334; Schoombee 151; Atiyah 347 on the problems here. 
36 Petrofina (GB) Ltd y Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 138. 
37. Texaco Ltd y Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 826; United Shoe Machinery Co of Canada y 
Brunet [1909] AC 330 at 344 although the court was probably not concerned with substantive issues. 
38. Treitel 411; Supra 3.6.2. 
39 Dickson y Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 558 at 574; See also Koh 73. 
40 The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain y Dickson 1968 2 A ER 686 at 690. 
4ZThe 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain y Dickson [1968 2 A. ER 686 at 695. 
The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain y Dickson [1968 2 Al ER 686 at 707. 
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was contrary to the public interest 43. Lord Wilberforce expressed doubts about accepting the 
argument that the restriction would cause a reduction of pharmacies 44 
Schoombee 45 contended that the courts should look at economic rather than ethical issues. 
Heydon 46 criticised Texaco for the narrow view taken of economic arguments in the case. He 
suggested that the contentions uttered in this case were rather tenuous, and that the court went 
too far in its suspicions of economic arguments. Nevertheless, the criticism of both authors must 
be viewed against the backdrop of the overly wide view which they take of the purpose of the 
restraint of trade doctrine 47. Judicial criticism of economic arguments will probably prevail. 
But even juridico -economic arguments should only play a limited role here. The contract denier 
should mostly be restricted to freedom of work contentions. It will cloud the focus of the doctrine 
if the public interest requirement is used for more ambitious purposes. 
Courts have accepted, in some cases, that a restraint could be ineffective in terms of the public 
interest requirement because the restraint of trade doctrine was, or was also, an anti- monopoly 
doctrine 48. However, judges have been conservative. They have mentioned that a restraint of 
trade clearly aimed at establishing a pernicious monopoly will be ineffective even if it is reasonable 
between the parties ' 49. The exclusion of minor competitors or minor potential competitors will not 
be sufficient because it will not generally have a tendency towards monopolisation 50. In sale of 
goodwill cases a restraint could probably only be considered ineffective on this ground if it was 
43 See the reduction of pharmacies issue The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 
686 at 707; Chitty 1199 although the author took it too far when he stated that this will mean that the public 
interest requirement will play no role at all; Cf the discussion of Heydon 260. 
44. Heydon McGill 350. 
45 Schoombee 142. 
46 Heydon McGill 352 -353, Heydon's enthusiasm 350ff for such arguments is misplaced. 
47. See supra 3; See especially the arguments of Schoombee 151; Heydon ibid. 
as Nordenfelt 561 read with 564 monopoly notions played a role in Lord Macnaghten's laying down of a second 
requirement, Stressed by Blake 687; Cf Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 396; Anson 324; Heydon 25ff, 
See also his discussion of the problems with monopoly arguments 29ff; Spowart Taylor & Hough 748; Commercial 
and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 240. 
49. E Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 305; Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 
195; Wickens v Evans (1829) 3 Y & J 318 at 329 and 320 the exaggerated liberalism of the court in this case will 
probably not be followed today; Chitty 1199; Lubbe and Murray 261; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd 
[1972] 1 WLR 814 at 827 -828 and this answers the criticisms of Chitty 1199 mentioned supra; Anson 329 -330; 
Heydon 30 accepted that the courts took a narrow view of combinations. The definition of Heydon 224 taken from 
AL Corbin Corbin on Contracts vol 6A s 1413 283 and the dictum taken from the judgment of Brandeis J in 
Chicago Board of Trade v US 246 US 231 at 238 on when a restraint will be against public interest for 
monopolistic reasons is too wide; See Christie Encyclopaedia 599 with reference to Attorney General of Australia v 
Adelaide Steamship Co [1912] AC at 796; Shell Co of SA Ltd v Gerrans Garage (Pty) Ltd 1954 (4) SA 752 (G) 
757, 758; Christie 441. 
so Heydon 172. 
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part of a scheme aimed at concentrating business in a few (normally the buyer's) hands, and even 
then the courts will probably be reluctant to strike down the restraint 51. A narrow view has even 
been taken in the combination cases 52. In Witwatersrand Steel 53 Ramsbottom J looked at the 
question whether the combination constituted a pernicious monopoly. The court took a strict view 
of pernicious monopoly. It was submitted that the combination would only be illegal if it was 
calculated to enhance prices to an unreasonable extent. The court again accepted that protection 
against cut -throat competition would be important in showing that the combination was not illegal. 
The role which monopolies have played within the doctrine is now theoretically paradoxical. It is 
no more than an anachronism. It is predicted that monopoly arguments under the public interest 
rubric of the restraint of trade doctrine will be continuously reduced. Monopolies must be 
controlled, but the restraint of trade doctrine is an unacceptable mechanism for doing so. 
Competition will today mostly be protected by more refined mechanisms 54 
Collinge 55 averred that monopoly arguments were not properly considered because of a 19th 
century belief in freedom of contract. But his view is coloured by an incorrect view of the 
principles underlying the doctrine. The anti -monopoly issue is actually a hangover of the 19th 
century. The doctrine has developed much but the monopoly elements have become stultified. 
Monopoly arguments will be acceptable if they can be shown to relate to freedom of work 
arguments that have not been discounted in terms of the reasonableness test. But they should not 
play any role beyond this. 
5.2. Freedom of work -related public interest arguments on which the covenantor may 
rely 
The most important public interest arguments for the contract denier will concern freedom of 
work issues. Many arguments concerning this type of public interest have come before the courts. 
51 Heydon 200 with reference to Toby v Major (1899) 43 Sol Jo 778 but see the criticism. 
52. North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 471 -473; Adelaide Steamship 795- 
796; Christie 441. 
53 Witwatersrand Trustee (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 140 at 147ff. 
54 Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 415; Chitty 1199; Collinge 411, 423; Korah JBL 254; Heydon 11lcGill 352, 354, 
357 stated that the doctrine can be a supplement and partial substitute for anti -trust legislation but it is not 
acceptable; Scott Robinson 161 accepted that legislation will now play an important role in promoting public 
interest; For more effective legislative solutions to these problems see: Anson 330 -331, Cheshire Fifoot and 
Furmston 415 -417, Chitty 1199, 1214, 1236, Collinge 423, Treitel 414 -415, Wedderburn 152 -153; Whish Stair 
Encyclopaedia 1215 there are still some lacuna in legislation though. 
55. Collinge 410. 
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Hardship to third parties, through interference with the right to work, must be considered under 
the public interest leg of the restraint of trade test 56. The interests of employees who are the 
object of anti -poaching contracts - restraints where the covenantor agrees not to employ 
employees of someone else 57 - will have to be protected by utilising the public interest 
requirement 58. A restraint may be contrary to public interest if it merely interferes with the 
interests of a particular outside group even if the restraint is not contrary to the interests of society 
as a whole 59. Sales 60 submitted that this will best be dealt with under the reasonableness inter 
partes rubric, and that the cases sometimes tried to accommodate too much under reasonableness 
inter partes 61. But this cannot be accepted. 
These cases should fall foul of the public interest requirement unless it can be shown that they are 
reasonable towards third parties. The restraint will be reasonable, in this public interest sense, if it 
goes no further than the protection of legitimate proprietary interests vis -à -vis such third parties 62. 
The courts have emphasised that the restraint must not exceed the protection of trade secrets 63 or 
customer connections 64. 
Public interest will here be relevant where the restraint clearly interferes with a third party's ability 
to work, and the wide public interest arguments mentioned by Sales will probably be considered to 
be too tenuous 65. The consequences of this cannot be that proprietary interests should now be 
protected vis -à -vis all third parties whose ability to work may be interfered with because of a 
56 Treitel 413-414. 
57. Although the cases concerned combinations: Mineral Water Bottle Exchange and Trade Protection Society v 
Booth [1887] 36 Ch 465, Chitty 1232; Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 
108 at 126; Cf the discussion of the cases Gurry 217 -218; Nisbet v Edinburgh and Districts Aerated Water 
Manufacturers' Defence Association Ltd (1906) 14 SLT 178 at 179; See also Davies v Thomas [1920] 1 Ch 217 
especially the unequivocal approach 226, [1920] 2 Ch 189 at 195. 
58. Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 120. 
59 Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 127; Treitel 413; Heydon 266- 
267 and the discussion of Kores where considerable support for this notion is found; Walker 186. 
60 Sales 615 -616. 
61 See the criticism: Esso 300, 319, Cf Wedderbum 150, Smith & Wood 137, 140, Walker 193; The wide remark 
of Heydon 52 must be viewed within this context. 
62. Cf Chitty 1232. 
63 Mineral Water Bottle Exchange and Trade Protection Society v Booth [1887] 36 Ch 465 at 471, 472; Kores 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 122; See Collinge 422. 
64. Nisbet v Edinburgh and Districts Aerated Water Manufacturers' Defence Association Ltd and others 1906 14 
SLT 178 would probably only be in the public interest if salesmen carters were restricted from working in the area 
in which they were previously employed; Smith & Wood 137, 140 accepted that customer connections and trade 
secrets can be protected here. 
65 Sales 608 -609; Russel v Amalgamated Society of Carpenter's and Joiners [1910] 1 KB 506 at 516 is too Iide; 
The courts will probably be reluctant to accept wider public interest arguments like those mentioned in Kores a quo 
1957] 1 WLR 1013 at 1019; See Heydon 248 took an incorrect view of underlying principles; Cf Mineral Water 
Bottle Exchange and Trade Protection Society v Booth [1887] 36 Ch 465 at 471 and especially 472 where the court 
apparently emphasised the freedom of third parties to work. 
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restriction. However, the parties should not grab by indirect means what they cannot have directly 
66 This strict application of the restraint of trade doctrine for the protection of third parties will 
only have a very limited scope. 
Several possibilities will accordingly exist in non -poaching restraints whether in employment or 
combination contracts, and it will perhaps be useful to summarise them: 
- In cases where non -poaching restraints are in employment contracts 67, the connections between 
employers and employees may be protected as proprietary interests. In such cases only 
those employees over whom the covenantor has influence through his previous 
employment may be the object of restriction. 
- In non -poaching restraints in combination agreements, the wider interest in having a stable 
workforce can also sometimes be protected. This wider interest in the general ability of an 
employer to maintain a stable and competent workforce will merely constitute a 
commercial interest. In a post- employment non -poaching restraint this interest cannot be 
protected without more. 
- The importance of the public interest requirement will be enhanced where non -poaching 
restraints are concluded. Proprietary interests will, mostly, have to be protected vis -à -vis 
third parties to save the restraint from being contrary to public interest. 
Treitel 68 contended that public interest will come into play where the public is deprived of a skill 
that is particularly important from a public interest perspective, even if the restraint is reasonable 
as between the parties fi9. The interest which the public may have in dealing with a particular 
individual will not be protected. The courts are here concerned with cases where the restriction of 
that individual will necessarily also take away the service he provided 70. It is doubtful whether this 
66 Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 126; Heydon 248; Treitel 413; 
This should also be remembered when too wide statements like the one in Russel y Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters and Joiners [1910] 1 KB 506 at 516 is considered; Cf also Davies v Thomas [1920] 2 Ch 189 at 204 the 
court found that restrictions on third parties were not in restraint. But it also stressed that the term would not be in 
restraint of trade if concluded directly with the third party and the court looked at a clause that was mooted between 
such parties; See the emphasis that was placed on this point by Wedderburn 150. 
67. See supra Ch 6.17. 
68. Treitel 410 -411, Treitel (1966) 2nd ed 322 and 323; Spowart Taylor & Hough 748; Cf Blake 684 -685 he did not 
clearly distinguish this from reasonableness; Cf Giles y Hart (1859) 1 LT 154 at 155 where the court apparently did 
not regard this issue as important. 
69. But see Heydon 172. If there is a wide shortage of the particular skill it will also be possible to practise it outside 
the restricted area. 
70. It will not be enough to show that the employee was highly skilled Whittaker v Howe (1841) 3 Beav 383 294; 
Nordenfelt 567 with reference to Davis y Mason (1793) 5 Term Rep 118 infra, 574; Cf Lewis & Lewis v Durnfard 
(1907) 24 MR 64 at 65 and the reasonableness issue; See the criticisms of Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 
KB 793 and Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273: Anson 327 -328, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 404-405, 
Chitty 1203, Notes (1933) 49 LQR 465 especially 467, Trebilcock 108, Treitel 410, The Australian Howard F 
Hucson Pty Ltd v Ronayne (1972) 46 ALIR 173; Dillon LJ in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) 
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public interest factor will ever be sufficient in cases where the covenantor is restricted by an 
otherwise reasonable restraint that does not exceed restricting dealings with customers of the 
covenantee. 
In Nicholls 71 Lord Langdale MR accepted that courts have been reluctant to grant a remedy for 
the enforcement of a restraint on a professional. Such restrictions might deprive third parties of the 
services of those in whom alone they had confidence. But the court finally accepted that the 
difficulty has been passed over, and it seems that the issue has also not been regarded as important 
in terms of the restraint of trade test: 
- It has been accepted that a medical man may be restricted even though the public will be 
deprived of his services 72. 
- In Oswald Hickson Collier 73 Lord Denning stressed that a restraint against dealing with clients 
would prohibit the solicitor from continuing his confidential relationship with clients. He 
continued that this would be particularly problematic in cases of ongoing litigation. Yet the 
courts immediately started to backtrack. In Edwards 74 Dillon LJ noted that Oswald 
Hickson Collier concerned an interlocutory injunction. He interpreted the dictum of Lord 
Denning narrowly and placed stress on the more careful judgment of Kerr U. Thus, he 
concluded, the judgment merely stated that there was a serious issue to be tried on this 
notion. The Privy Council in Bridge then sounded the death knell for this thesis 75. It was 
stated that there is much contrary authority 76, that many contracts would fall within this 
class, and that the result would accordingly be too far reaching. It was stressed that a 
professional man was generally free to end his relationships with clients and that there was 
Ltd [ 1985] 1 WLR 173 at 179, See the Case Note (1985) LQR 308; Kales 201 took a too optimistic view regarding 
the ability of others to perform the tasks of the covenantor, Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 although it was 
rejected on other grounds; Kin v Sharnek 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 536; Magna Alloys 904 although the criticism of the 
court a quo is unjustified. The court a quo probably merely intended to say that the restraint was unreasonable and 
therefore against public policy. 
71. Nicholls v Stretton (1843) 7 Beav 42 at 44. 
72. Davis v Mason (1793) 5 Term Rep 118; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 482; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 
179 at 182; Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 106 -107; Cf Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 
and the reasonableness questions surrounding choice of a doctor especially on the choice of third parties 1111, 
1116; See Trebilcock 109 -119; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 151; Nathan 42 -43. 
73. Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] AC 720 at 723; Canadian case of Sherk v Horowitz (1971) 
25 DLR (3d) 657 (Ont HC) 678 discussed Heydon McGill 352. 
74. Edwards v Worboys [1984] AC 724 especially at 727 and 728. See also how it was distinguished ongoing 
litigation would not be affected here. 
75 Bridge v Deacons [ 1984] AC 705 at 719 -720; Treitel 410; Cf also George Walker & Co v Jam 1991 SLT 771 at 
772 where this aspect of the Bridge decision was mentioned by the court; Dallas McMillan & Sinclair y Simpson 
1989 SLT 454 at 456 and the arguments of counsel. The issue was not discussed by the court, 457, Cf MacQueen 
345 who suggested that there might have been a public interest argument here but the court was dealing with 
reasonableness. 
76. Spowart Taylor & Hough 745 -746. 
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no reason why he could not be allowed to end them because of a restraint. It was finally 
emphasised that the clients were clients of the firm and not of the particular solicitor 77. 
It has been accepted that it is not against public policy for professional men to sell their goodwill 
and recommend successors to customers. Lord Ellensborough in Bunn accepted this point 78, and 
the principle was also accepted in English Equity, albeit with some reluctance 79. It has now been 
confirmed in Allied Dunbar 8 °. 
\Voolman 81 contends that courts may accept that a restraint on a medical doctor will be against 
public interest because the court will want to ensure the best possible medical care. In Allied 
Electric 82 the court assumed that it was probably not in the interest of the public to enforce a 
restraint on a technically skilled person when there was a shortage of such people in South Africa 
at that stage. But it is suggested that more concrete arguments on the facts of a particular case will 
be required. In Allied Electric the court finally decided the case on the basis of reasonableness, 
and it is suggested that it should not be enough to show merely that there is a general shortage of 
skilled persons, although it can perhaps in future play an attitudinal role 83. The courts must look 
at the activities being restricted in the particular case 84. 
In KWV 85 the court held that a restraint may be against public policy if it is prejudicial to 
consumers with regard to a legitimate article of commerce (although the issue was not developed, 
as the court found that the restraint was wider than necessary for the protection of interests). But 
it will probably have to be shown that such goods or services cannot be reasonably acquired from 
someone who is not a party to the contract. It will not weigh as heavily with the court today, as it 
did in Collins y Locke 86, if the restraint merely restricts the public's freedom of choice. 
77. But see the criticism of Spowart Taylor & Hough 748 -750 there is much in the suggestions of the authors. 
78. Bunn v Guy (1803) 4 East 190 at 194ff, See Heydon 20, 182 -183. 
79. Candler v Candler (1821) Jac 225; Bozon v Farlow (1816) 1 Mer 459; Whittaker y Howe (1841) 3 Beav 383 
although it was in the end allowed here; Gilfillan v Henderson (1833) 2 Cl & Fin 1; Thombury v Bevill (1842) 1 Y 
& C Ch Cas 554; Heydon 20, 182 -183; Cf on the view of Scots courts about goodwill in sale of doctor practices 
Rodger v Herbertson 1909 SC 256. 
80. Allied Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 at 65. 
81. Woolman 256 with reference to the facts of Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11. 
82. Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 332, Cf Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 
1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 499 where the court held that the interest of the public separately from reasonableness would 
not be damaged by the restriction on an estate agent. 
83. Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 493 where the court correctly found an 
even more restricted statement to be too wide. 
84. Commercial and Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 240 is not entirely 
acceptable. It is not acceptable to say that the court can never strike down a restraint where there is a shortage of a 
particularly important skill. 
85. KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 437. 
86. Collins v Locke (1879) 4 App Cas 674 at 688. 
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However, there might still be cases where this issue will be conclusive. Anson mentions the 
example of a scientist with particular skills who is restricted from activities important for society 
87. In Stewart Wrightson 88 the court seems to have been prepared to regard a restraint as contrary 
to public interest if the covenantor could prove that the service he provided could not be 
performed by anyone else. 
That the public will be deprived of the services of a particular individual may be of some 
importance on a second level. Freedom of choice of particular services might be important for 
reasons that are not market -related: 
- In Sir WC Leng 89 the court accepted that it was not in the public interest to restrict a reporter, 
because it is important to have many competing sources of information. But the restraint 
here was also unreasonable inter partes, and it is not clear what weight the court would 
have otherwise placed on this public interest issue. It is suggested that it would probably 
have been merely attitudinal. 
- In Aetiology Today 90 teachers working for the applicant private school started another school in 
competition with the applicant. One of the interdicts for which the covenantee asked was 
that respondents should be prohibited from registering any pupil of the applicant's school 
on the basis that it would constitute unlawful competition. The court refused to accept this 
on the basis that it was in accordance with public policy that parents should have choice 
with regard to the school to which they sent their children 91. The respondents were 
furthermore placed under restraints to the effect that they would not "solicit any ... clients 
or employees ". In this respect the court found that it was not proven by the covenantors 
that the restraint was contrary to public interest. However, the notion of choice in 
education may play an attitudinal role in some cases. 
It may be of importance that the covenantor will become a burden upon society. In Nordenfelt 92 
the court did not show much sympathy for such an argument, as the covenantor was paid a large 
sum for the restraint. Moreover, many of the elements of this aspect of the freedom of work 
87. Anson 328. 
88. Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd y Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 406. 
89. Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd y Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 774; Cf also on newspaper issues Dempsey y Shambo 
1936 EDL 330. 
90. Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset Schools y Van Aswegen 1992 (1) SA 807 (W). 
91. Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset Schools y Van Aswegen 1992 (1) SA 807 (W) 817ff in the context of unlawful 
competition. 
92. Nordenfelt 574. 
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principle will be discounted in terms of the reasonableness inter partes rubric. Hence this factor 
will probably play an attitudinal role. 
Finally, a contract may be contrary to public interest in terms of a statutory regime 93. In Kerr y 
Morris 94 the court considered a restraint on a partner to an NHS medical practice and found that 
the statutory regime here did not transform the restraint into one that was contrary to public 
interest, though it gave patients a right to be served by a particular doctor 95. In George Walker & 
Co y Jann 96 the question was whether a statutory duty of a Messenger at Arms would impact 
upon the acceptability of a restraint. Lord Cullen decided that the public interest leg of the 
restraint of trade doctrine did not come into play here. He stated that the restraint of trade 
doctrine "is concerned with the effect on the public of the restriction on the freedom to trade ". He 
continued that no attempt was made to pursue this line of attack. The clause was still upheld and 
the reasons for holding the contract to be in accordance with public policy would also have been 
sufficient to show that the public interest requirement in terms of the doctrine was satisfied. But 
perhaps the public interest requirement of the restraint of trade test should also be shaped by 
legislation, and perhaps it could have been considered under the public interest requirement of the 
restraint of trade test. 
6. Public interest and the enforcer of the restraint 
Authorities normally only mention that public interest can lead to a restraint being ineffective even 
though it is reasonable as between the parties. But can a restraint be enforced even if it is not 
reasonable in the interests of the parties? Nienaber JA in Basson 97 accepted that it would probably 
be possible for public interest to play this reverse role. This seems to be acceptable. But the court 
will be hard pressed to find that public interest is so important. It is difficult to think of examples. 
Otto 98 mentioned the case of the government employee working on a highly secret programme 
for the government. However, the restraint that will restrict the disclosure of information in such a 
93 This is something different from a contract that is contrary to a statute Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90; Cf Heydon 
McGill 352 and the discussion of Sherk v Horowitz (1971) 25 DLR (3d) 657 (Ont HC); See Bull v Pitney -Bowes 
Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 276 and the consideration of legislation; Cf BMTA v Gilbert [1951] 2 All ER 641 at 644 
and the government approval argument. 
94. Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 104 -106, 113, 116 overruling Hensman v Traill (1980) 124 Sol Jo 776. 
95. See generally on NHS patients and restraints McBryde 600, Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236, Macfarlane v 
Kent [1965] 2 All ER 376; Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 at 12 where this was not even considered. 
96. George Walker & Co v Jann 1991 SLT 771 at 773. 
97. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 767. 
98. Otto 211; LI van der Merwe "Die funksie van die reels ter beskerming van handelsvryheid" 1988 TSAR 252. 
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case will also be reasonable inter partes 99. Thus public interest will probably only play an 
attitudinal role here. 
- The courts have accepted that a covenant in restraint of trade is more appropriate where it is 
placed on a person who is not subject to any professional controls 100. This may play some 
role where the restriction is aimed at organising the industry. 
- It has also been contended that the public has a strong interest in law partnerships taking on new 
partners, and that wider restrictions should be allowed if they are aimed at facilitating. this 
process 101 These arguments might be of some importance where a restraint is aimed at 
pensioning off employees at a reasonable age to allow young recruits to take their places 
102 
Arguments regarding the economic effect of a restraint may be of some significance. The purpose 
of the doctrine is not to produce the utmost economic advantage. But in restraint of trade cases, it 
must be determined whether freedom of trade outweighs the reasons for upholding freedom of 
contract. Some economic arguments might still be important in showing that circumstances 
militate against protecting the correctly interpreted principle of freedom of trade in a particular 
case. 
However, the courts will probably still find general economic arguments difficult to deal with 103 
Hence, they will mostly still decide these economic issues on the basis of principles internalised in 
the legal system. Even these juridico- economic arguments will have to be balanced against the 
strong support which the legal system gives to freedom of work. Ungoed- Thomas J in Texaco 104 
maintained that freedom of trade should be protected subject to "reasonable limitations which 
conform with the contemporary organisation of trade ". He relied on Lord Wilberforce in Dickson 
105, where it was stated that it is "the normal proposition that the public has in the absence of 
countervailing considerations an interest in men being able to trade freely ". Moreover, concrete 
countervailing economic arguments will be discounted in terms of the reasonableness inter partes 
leg of the test. Yet, it is still possible that some economic arguments might play an attitudinal role 
under this heading: 
99. Kerr Tribute 195. 
10o Scorer y Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1423; Chitty 1207. 
101 Fitch y Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 165 -166; Bridge y Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 718 -719; Treitel 410; 
McBryde 599; Woolman 256. 
102 Treitel 410. 
103 Supra 5.1. 
104 Texaco Ltd y Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 829. 
los The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain y Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686; See also on the problems with 
public interest supra 3. 
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- It will be relevant if a restraint will prevent overstocking of a skill in a certain area 1 °6 
- Kales i07 argued that a court will take a more favourable view of a restraint in a sale of business 
that is aimed at averting destructive competition. This may be taken into consideration by 
the court although it will probably often be difficult to determine when competition will be 
of this nature. 
7. Status of public interest arguments 
The public interest requirement will not have a wide sphere of operation as a second and separate 
test. But it cannot be abandoned, as it may still play such a role in extraordinary cases while it will 
also fulfil many other functions. 
Courts often consider broader public interest issues without regarding them as conclusive. Thus 
the public interest requirement will probably also play a dual role. Sometimes public interest 
factors will be so imperative that they will override the reasonableness test. At other times such 
factors will merely be important for determining the attitude of the courts towards a specific 
restraint 108. On the second level considerable interaction between the public interest requirement 
and the reasonableness requirement will exist 109 
In Herbert Morris 11° the court held that public interest factors ought not to be considered in 
determining reasonableness inter partes, but that should not exclude public interest, as a separate 
rubric from impacting on the attitudes of the courts towards reasonableness as between the 
parties. 
The public interest requirement rightly provides the restraint of trade doctrine with open -ended 
development possibilities. Public policy is in constant flux, and this can often be translated through 
the public interest requirement. The public interest test is a reminder of the broad public policy 
basis of the doctrine, and changes to the doctrine will often be effected by utilising it. 
106 Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181. 
107 Kales 206. 
1 °8. Cf Heydon 174, Blake 650 show some sense of this. 
109 Lubbe and Murray 261 also seem to foresee the possibility of such interaction. 
11° Herbert Morris 708. 
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Chapter 11: Onus rules in the restraint of trade doctrine 
1. Onus and its different aspects 
Writers and courts so emphasise onus that it has sometimes dwarfed the substantive aspects of the 
doctrine I. This is not acceptable. But onus remains a difficult concept that operates on many 
levels. 
2. The evidentiary onus 
Onus can firstly be explained according to traditional law of evidence principles. The onus bearer 
will have a burden to start adducing evidence 2, and the case will be decided against him if the 
facts are not conclusive one way or the other. Hence this type of onus will not be of much 
importance in restraint of trade cases 3. No specific facts have to be proven. Reasonableness can 
often be determined on the facts before the court 4, although there might be exceptional cases 
where onus will be conclusive. 
3. The phantom onus 
The "phantom onus" 5 is a more important concept. The onus may also have an impact on the 
attitude of the court towards the restraint 6. The restraint of trade doctrine is an area of law where 
courts have considerable freedom when they apply law to facts. The distinction between law and 
facts becomes opaque, and this has led to a considerable fusion of the onus and the general 
attitude in the application of law and principles. The concept of onus is used by practical lawyers 
who have difficulty in expressing attitude notions in terms of existing legal jargon. It lies in the no 
man's land between the evidentiary onus and the principle that direct evidence as to reasonableness 
or unreasonableness will not be accepted 7. Hence a court will be more reluctant to find for a party 
who bears the onus when it applies law to facts. 
t. Kahn 391; Schoombee 143; Du Plessis and Davis 98; Van der Merwe 157 n128 the onus rule was called a 
doctrine but it is not correct. The onus rules form part of a doctrine. 
2. Heydon 42. 
3. Heudon 40. 
4. Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 475, 487; Herbert Morris 699, 707; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- 
Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 562; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 at 763; Lord 
Pearce in Esso 323 -324; This is also inherent in Esso per Lord Hodson 319. But see the more important aspects 
infra 5.1., See Anson 322, Chitty 1199; Dickson v The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 
558, 574 at 567 and especially 573; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 822; Poolquip 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 360; Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh - 
Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 232; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 331. 
5. Schoombee 143. 
6. See supra Ch 9.1 on attitude. 
7. Tallis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 413; Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 668; Haynes v Doman [1899 
2 Ch 13 at 25; Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 368; Dowden & Pook Ltd v Pook [19041 
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It is difficult to find any clear expressions of the phantom onus in the cases. The phantom onus has 
surreptitiously entered and left the minds of lawyers without giving them an opportunity to identify 
it. There are statements that inadvertently deny its existence. In Basson g Botha JA stated that 
"The incidence of the onus in a case concerning the enforceability of a contractual provision in 
restraint of trade does not appear to me in principle to entail any greater or more significant 
consequences than in any other civil case in general ". But there is more acceptable authority that 
seems to point the other way. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Herbert Morris 9 clearly distinguished 
the onus to put special circumstances before the court (the factual onus), but the court also stated 
that "if such facts and circumstances be relevantly set forth, the onus of proof is upon the party 
averring them to satisfy the Court of their sufficiency to overcome the presumption [of 
ineffectiveness] ". 
It is often generally stated that there is an onus to show reasonableness. Most of these dicta are 
probably shorthand and imprecise expressions of the factual onus. But these may also in some 
cases be explicit recognitions of the phantom onus. The criticism by Kahn 10 of the use of such 
expressions in South Africa must accordingly be rejected, although there are also cases where 
more narrow statements have been made 11 
1 KB 45; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 766 in the argument of counsel, 770, 772; United 
Shoe Machinery Co of Canada v Brunet [1909] AC 330 at 341; Attorney -General of the Commonwealth of 
Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 797; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co 
Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 470, 471, 475; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 426; Mason 732- 
733; Palmolive Co (of England) Ltd v Freedman [1928] 1 Ch 264 271; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- 
Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 602; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 642; 
Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [ 1940] 4 All ER 179 194; Routh v Jones [ 1947] 1 All ER 179 at 183; Tool Metal 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 7 at 11; Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok 
Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 120; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1371; 
Dickson v The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 558 at 567; Stenhouse Australia Ltd v 
Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 402; Heydon 39, 4447; Anson 321; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 405 -406; Chitty 1200; 
Treitel 412; Christie Encyclopaedia 587; See Gloag 575; McBryde 603; Trimble v Jameson & Co (1903) 24 NLR 
53 at 61 with reference to Tallis; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 490, 493; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd y 
Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 171; National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 
1102; But see Magna Alloys 902, 905 see the criticism Schoombee 150, See the more careful view 897; Cf Mouchel 
v William Cubitt & Co (1907) 24 RPC 194 at 201 is too wide. 
g. Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 776 -777; Gero v Linder 1995 (2) SA 132 (0) 135. 
9. 
Morris 715; Apparently Esso 323 -324 see infra; Cf the definition Christie 436. 
10. Kahn 392 with reference to Van de Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 572, Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd y 
Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280; Du Plessis and Davis 99; Schoombee 143; Treitel 412; Heydon 39. 
11. Kahn ibid relied on: Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 493, Witwatersrand Trustees (Pty) Ltd y 
Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 140 at 150 -151, Nursing Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Clarke 1954 (3) SA 394 
(D) 394 -395, Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 501; The view that the onus is about placing 
evidence before the court was also expressed in: Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 772 -773, Halliwell v 
Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 178, 180, New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 82 -83, 
Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220, Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 612 -613, Spa Food 
Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 717, 721, Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 478, Rogaly v 
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The phantom onus currently plays an important role within the restraint of trade doctrine. The 
duality of the concept must accordingly be borne in mind in the further discussion of onus. But the 
phantom onus must be related to other attitude issues. Many other aspects will also play an 
important role in determining the attitude of the court. The phantom onus should be a prima facie 
determinant of attitude. It should determine the broad and general attitude of the court towards 
restraints, although there are many aspects that may either displace or enhance this initial position. 
The general initial attitude should perhaps in future be separately and explicitly dealt with 12. The 
phantom onus does not always fit in easily with the way in which the term "onus" is generally 
understood. 
4. The jurisdictional incidence of onus 
The onus to determine whether a restraint falls within the doctrine will, in all three legal systems, 
probably be on the party who wants to rely on the doctrine. There are no cases where this issue 
has been pertinently decided but the authorities point in this direction, and it is the most acceptable 
theoretical solution 13 This will not be a problem in the classic cases, but it might be a hurdle 
where the contract contains one of the newer restraints. 
In the Encyclopaedia L4 it is stated that the onus to show the ineffectiveness of a restriction which 
operates during employment is on the party who alleges ineffectiveness. This cannot be accepted, 
but an onus to show that the restriction falls within the doctrine will rest on the contract -denier in 
such a case. 
Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 792, SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 
(D) 787 -788; Emphasis was also placed on the proof of facts in: Shell Co of SA Ltd v Gerrans Garage (Pty) Ltd 
1954 (4) SA 752 (G) 755, Nel v Drilec (Pty) Ltd 1976 (3) SA 79 (D) 85, Cf Groenewald v Conradie 1957 (3) SA 
413 (C) 415, National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1099, Sibex Engineering 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 499; See also the English cases that emphasised special 
circumstances: Stuart & Simpson v Halstead (1911) 55 Sol Jo 598, Herbert Morris 700, 707, 715 but see Lord Shaw 
supra, McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 572 at 572, 
Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 650, Palmolive Co (of England) Ltd v Freedman [1928] 1 Ch 264 at 271, 
Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 192, Dickson v The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 
41967] 2 All ER 558 at 567, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406, Chitty 1200. 
2. 
See supra Ch 9.5. 
13 
Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 7 at 11; Shearson Lehman Hutton 
Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [ 1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 613; Although not conclusive Pharmaceutical Society 
of Great Britain y Dickson [ 1968] 2 All ER 686 at 695; See Heydon 44; Dawson 459 can only be so understood. 
1 
. Christie Encyclopaedia 596. 
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In National Chemsearch 15 Botha J said that "There are many kinds of contracts operating 
effectively 'in restraint of trade' to which the notion that they are prima facie void is never applied, 
even in English law ". He contended that this position is illogical in English law, because it is there 
accepted that some restraints are prima facie void. But he overlooks the first stage of onus. It will 
often be necessary to show that an agreement falls within the scope of the doctrine, in the legal 
sense, before the principle that the contract is prima facie ineffective will apply. 
5. The substantive incidence of onus 
When it comes to onus, a schism between South Africa and the other legal systems has appeared. 
The discussion of this legal system will have to be separated, and the reasons underlying the 
distinction will thereafter be discerned. 
5.1. England and Scotland 
A restraint will now be prima facie ineffective 16. It is settled in Scots and English law - although 
courts on occasion took a different view - 17, that the onus to prove that the restraint will be 
15. National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1099 -1100. 
15 Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 191 -192, But cf Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 397 -398; 
Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 665 but see Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 383 thought there was 
no presumption either way; Sainter v Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716 at 730; Nordenfelt 565 but see supra; E 
Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 309; Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co v Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 
at 368 on general restraints; Beetham v Fraser (1904) 21 TLR 8; Stuart & Simpson v Halstead (1911) 55 Sol Jo 
598; Herbert Morris 715; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 
548 at 581; Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 26; Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 
650; Pellow v Ivey (1933) 49 TLR 422 at 423; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 946, 957, 958, 966; 
Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 187; Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 215; Connors Bros 
Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 192, 195 but see supra; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 181; M & S 
Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 815, 819; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 
339 at 343, 344; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 238; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash 
[1964] 2 All ER 10 at 12; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] QB 514 at 544; Home 
Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1232; Peyton v Mindham [1972] 1 WLR 8 at 14; Greig v 
Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 at 495; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 713, Referred to George Walker & Co v 
Jann 1991 SLT 771 at 772 and see the criticism infra, Woolman 257 cannot be accepted; Rex Stewart Jeffries 
Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; R v General Medical Council, Ex parte Colman [1990] 1 
All ER 489 at 509 refused to regard powers exercised in terms of legislation as prima facie contrary to public 
policy; Watson v Prager [1991] 1 WLR 726 at 750; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 397, 399, 400, 404; 412; Chitty 
1190, 1197; Collinge 411; Farwell 66; Treitel 401; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452; 
Christie Encyclopaedia 587; See McBryde 603 argued that it was not settled. He relied on: Anthony v Rennie 1981 
SLT (Notes) 11 at 12 where Whitehill v Bradford was quoted but Whitehill probably did not intend such a wide 
point, Fitch v Dewes but this case has been rejected; Walker 184 -185; Contra Woolman 253ff but see infra. . Tanis v Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391; Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 ChD 351 at 365; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 
Ch 576 at 586 and see also 587; Nordenfelt 566, See Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 192, 
Gooderson 413. But the famous quote Nordenfelt 565 might create a different impression: Heydon 37, Trebilcock 
70 -71 and see more carefully 45, Mason 733 in Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 475 although it can also be 
differently understood; Swaine v Wilson (1889) 24 QBD 252 at 257; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott 
251 
Chapter 11: Onus rules in the restraint of trade doctrine 
reasonable is on the person who asserts the contract, while the denier will have to show that the 
restraint is against public interest once reasonableness is proved 18 
Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 at 451; Haynes If Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 17, 30 -31; Cf Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v 
Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 771 -772 felt that the onus for reasonableness of a restraint would be cast on the 
plaintiffs because the restraint was imposed on a minor; Osborne v Amalgamated Society of Railway Sen-ants 
[1911] 1 Ch 540 at 556 but see 553, 565; Caribonum Co Ltd v le Couch (1913) 109 LT 385 at 388 -389; Continental 
Tyre and Rubber (GB) Co Ltd v Heath [1913] 29 TLR 308 at 309 -310; See also Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 
Cozens -Hardy LJ 475 left the issue open although he was critical of it, Swinfen Eady LJ 487 -488 also did not give a 
final answer but he was even more critical of the notion that the onus of proving reasonableness could be on the 
enforcer in cases of partial restraints; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 162; Palmolive Co (of England) Ltd v 
Freedman [1928] 1 Ch 264 at 271 did not decide it but was critical of the view expressed in the court a quo: Cf 
Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 192 where the court stated that the reasonableness onus in sale 
of goodwill cases need further elucidation, Heydon 40; Heydon 37; Trebilcock 23; Treitel The lmv of contract 
(1987) 345ff; Van der Merwe 157; Christie Jur Rev 293; Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 
1105 at 1115; Cf Geo A Moore & Co Ltd v Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868 the onus was placed on the defender but it 
concerned the issue whether the contract had been lawfully terminated. 
18. Cf Attorney -General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 796 on 
the onus to show that a contract establishes a monopoly, See North Western infra 472 -473, 480; North Western Salt 
Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 470; Mason 733, But see Eastes v Russ 488, Gooderson 413, 
Cf Lord Shaw in Mason 741 quoted the contrary opinion in Tallis v Tallis 740 but some statements may also be 
differently interpreted, Cf Lord Moulton 742 did not clearly choose sides although he couched the question here in 
words which indicate that the onus should be on the denier; Herbert Morris 700, 707, 715; Great Western and 
Metropolitan Dairies Ltd v Gibbs (1918) 34 UR 344 at 345; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 584 -586. 587- 
588; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 572, 589; 
Rawlings v General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635 at 644 on the second leg; Bowler v Lovegrove [1921] 1 Ch 642 at 
650; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 642, 645; Gifford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 946; 
Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co Ltd v Vancouver Breweries Ltd [1934] AC 181 at 189; Empire Meat Co Ltd 
v Patrick [1939] 2 All ER 85 at 92; Dickson v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 182 at 187, 190; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All 
ER 179 at 181; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 at 763, 764 although the court also considered the position 
where the onus is the other way; Whitehill v Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 242; Vandervell Products Ltd v MacLeod 
[1957] RPC 185 at 191, 194; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 815, 819; Kores Manufacturing Co 
Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 120; Kerchiss v Colora Printing Inks Ltd [1960] RPC 235 at 
238, 239; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 640, 645; Eastham v Newcastle United Football 
Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413 at 439, See the interpretation Greig v Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 at 496; Gledhow 
Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1372, 1374; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 
139, 142; Regent Oil Co Ltd v TI' Leavesley (Lichfield) Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1210 at 1214; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] QB 514 at 544 -545; Esso 311 -312, 313, 319; 323 -324, See the criticism of 
Korah 253 although it seems unfounded; Dickson v The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 
558 at 567, 573; The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686 at 707, Left open 
although the court was critical of these principles in professional society cases 690, Criticised 698, Left open 695; 
Peyton v Mindham [1972] 1 WLR 8 at 19; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 822; A 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 618; Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca 
Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [1975] AC 571 574; Littlewood Organisations Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 
1472 at 1468; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; Shearson Lehman Hutton 
Inc v Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 613; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) 
Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 328; Anson 320 -321; Atiyah 345; Bowman 572; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406; 
Chitty 1199, 1203; See Christie Jur Rev 293 with reference to Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181; Heydon 37; 
Farwell 66; Collinge 420; Hickling 36 -37 trade union cases, Cf also Kahn- Freund 202; Trebilcock 70 -71, 235 -236 
and the criticism; Treitel 412, 419; Winfield 327; Pratt v Maclean 1927 SN 161; In Taylor v Campbell 1926 SLT 
260 at 261; Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 151, 157; Bellshili and Mossend 
Co- operative Society Ltd v Dalziel Co- operative Society Ltd 1958 SC 400 at 418; MacIntyre If Cleveland Petroleum 
Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 101; Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd y Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 39; SOS Bureau Ltd y 
Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 35; Rentokil Ltd v Hampton 1982 SLT 422 at 423; See counsel Agma Chemical Co 
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Although this is not always appreciated 19, the onus for the determination of reasonableness and 
public interest may differ. Lord Hodson in Esso 20 said that it will seldom arise, "since once the 
agreement is before the court it is open to the scrutiny of the court in all its surrounding 
circumstances as a question of law." However, this is not acceptable 21. Other facts will often 
influence public interest, and those facts will still have to be put before the court, and the change 
will affect the phantom onus. 
But how will the switch work? It is accepted that the onus for reasonableness will be on the 
enforcer while the onus for public interest will be on the denier, but this has to be refined. The 
entire onus will be on the enforcer, and the presumption of ineffectiveness will exist unless 
reasonableness as a whole is proved 22. The enforcer will have to show that the contract is in the 
public interest if he attempts to argue the case in terms of public interest rather than 
reasonableness before the reasonableness issue has been settled. However, the onus will reverse 
once reasonableness is proved 23 
Woolman 24 accepted that, in Scotland, "It is an article of faith of the law of contract that 
restrictive covenants are prima facie void and unenforceable ", but he then stated that the recent 
cases take a different view. He continued: "If the onus were truly against the covenantee fewer 
clauses should be upheld than actually occurs in practice ". However, his view cannot be accepted: 
- He averred that the success of a greater number of restraints in Scotland cannot be the result of 
improved drafting, because there are no guidelines by which drafting can be improved. But 
this argument is overly simplistic. There are certainly rules and principles that may guide 
parties to a legal restraint. Restraints are often drafted by lawyers who are influenced by 
past judgments. 
Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 247; Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 456; Christie Encyclopaedia 587 
although no Scots cases are referred to, See also the discussion 595 although 596 is unacceptable; Gloag 570, 571; 
Walker 191; McBryde 603 -604 but see supra; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1210, 1211. 
19. Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1938] Ch 211 at 215, See Trebilcock 71 cannot be accepted infra 5.3; Tool 
Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd (1954) 71 RPC 7 at 11; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd 
v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 343; Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 857 at 862; Luck v 
Davenport -Smith [1977] EG 73 at 85; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 713. 
20. 
Esso 319; Korah JBL 253. 
21. 
This view must be set against the generally wide view which Lord Hodson took of public interest see 321. 
22. 
Heydon 270 is confusing. 
23. 
Esso 319 seems to accept the distinction although it was stated that the reasons for it is obscure, See the 
criticism infra 5.3; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 328; Chitty 1199; 
Korah JBL 253; Treitel 412; The understanding of the Esso case in Basson v Chiiwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 761 
cannot be accepted. The court was critical of the distinction but it was certainly not rejected. 
24. Woolman 253ff accepted with reference to Burn- Murdoch 297 that a different approach was initially followed. 
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- Whether a restraint is upheld or not will depend on the facts of the particular cases. Woolman 
drew his conclusion on the basis of too few cases (although the courts were quite pro - 
freedom of contract in some of the cases relied upon). More recent decisions seem to 
create a different impression. Many have not been upheld since the article was written 25. 
At the most the view of Woolman can be taken as a criticism of a couple of judges during a certain 
period, relating to the manner in which they have neglected the phantom onus or, preferably, the 
traditional initial preference for freedom of trade 26, 
5.2. South Africa 
In South Africa some courts also initially placed the onus on the party who argued against legality 
27. However, the lower courts adhered to the principle as expressed in modern English law 28. 
They accepted that restraints were prima facie ineffective 29. The onus for proving reasonableness 
25. MacQueen 345. 
26. 
See supra Ch 9.5. 
27. SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 371; Fenner -Solomon v Martin 1917 CPD 22 at 23; Empire 
Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 WLD 289 at 291; African Theatres Trust Ltd v Johnson 1921 CPD 25 at 26; 
African Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 at 129; Kahn 396. 
28. Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 772 -773; KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 437 although the 
court 436 -437 justified it on the facts; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 311 -312; Halliwell v 
Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 178, 179, 180; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 481 -482, 493 -495. 496; 
Wilkinson v Wiggill 1939 NPD 4 at 12; Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 334, 339; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 
147 at 150; Witwatersrand Trustees (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 140; Vermeulen v Smit 
1946 TPD 219 at 221, Schwartz v Subel 1948 (2) SA 983 (T) 987; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 612; Ex 
Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 475 (C) 478; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 649; New United Yeast Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 82 accepted in Brooks and Wynberg (Pty) Ltd v New United Yeast Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd 1936 TPD 296 at 304 -305; Spa Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 717, 721; Weinberg v 
Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 865; Henri Viljoen (Ply) Ltd v Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 172; Shell Co of 
SA Ltd v Gerrans Garage (Pty) Ltd 1954 (4) SA 752 (G) 755; Nursing Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Clarke 1954 (3) SA 
394 (D); Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 792; Savage and Pugh v Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N) 155 with 
reference to Lindley 531; Groenewald v Conradie 1957 (3) SA 413 (C) 415; Muller v Harris 1958 (2) SA 344 (N) 
347; Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 501; Kin v Sharneck 1959 (3) SA 534 (E) 536; Filmer v 
Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 579; Berger v Osher 1965 (1) SA 558 (W) 559; Arlyn Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v 
Bosch 1966 (2) SA 308 (W) 310; Nachtsheim v Overath 1968 (2) SA 270 (C) 271; HE Sergay Estate Agencies 
(Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 2; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280; 
Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 762; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 
348; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 245; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 
71; Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 (R) 441; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der 
Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 66; Biografic (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 346, 347; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v 
Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 785; Nel v Drilec (Pty) Ltd 1976 (3) SA 79 (D) 85; U -Drive Franchise Systems 
(Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 139; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 220; 
Highlands Park Football Club Ltd Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) especially 199 -200; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v 
Meyer 
1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 329; Aronstam 20 -21; Du Plessis and Davis 98; Kahn 396; Woker 331. 
29. 
KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 437, 438; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 
(0) 171; Christie 434; Van der Menve 157. 
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was on the enforcer. The onus to show that the contract was against public interest was on the 
denier once reasonableness was proved. 
The Appeal Court did not finally settle the issue 30. In Van de Pol Greenberg JA merely assumed 
that the position would be the same as in English law In Steyn Beyers JA 32 accepted that it was 
common cause between the parties that the onus would be on the enforcer of the contract in 
restraint of trade. 
A strand of thought then started to develop. In a seminal review, Suzman suggested that the onus 
should always be on the party who relied on the illegality of the restraint The point was mooted 
by Kahn, considered by several Supreme Court judges 34 and finally accepted in Roffey in Natal 35 
and Drewtons in the Cape 36. In National Chemsearch, Botha J in the Transvaal 37 personally 
preferred a change of onus as a matter of opinion, and he accepted the reasoning of the court in 
Roffey on principle, but the court still bowed to previous authorities 38. The differences needed to 
be settled by the Appeal Court, and this was done in Magna Alloys 39. Rabie C7 decided that the 
See Savage and Pugh v Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N) 155, Magna Alloys 888 -889, Roffey v Catterall Edwards & 
Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 506, Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 405, 
Aronstam 25, Kahn 397, 398, Oosthuizen 386. 
31 Van de Pol v Silbermann 1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 569 -570; Cf also Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v BN Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 
(1) SA 398 (A) 439 where all the different possibilities were considered but sides were not taken. 
3 
. Steyn v Malherbe 1967 (2) PH A.43 150 at 151. 
33 
Suzman 90 at 91; See Lubbe and Murray 255 and AJ Kerr (2d ed) 105, Cf infra 5.3. 
34 Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 103 -104; Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Griffin 1978 (4) SA 353 (W) 359 -360, See Nathan 41; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 308 -309, 
315 -317; Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 232; SA Wire Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1868 (2) SA 777 (D) 787 -788, See Annual Survey (1968) 99, See Aronstam 
22. 
35. 
Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 501 -507 and especially 505, Cf also Madoo 
(Pty) Ltd v Wallace 1979 (2) SA 957 (T), Aronstam 22 -23, Du Plessis and Davis 99 -100 although their criticism 
cannot be accepted, Lubbe and Murray 255 and the questions asked, Nathan 35ff. 
36 
Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313, See Oosthuizen 383, See the criticism Kerr 186, Du 
Plessis and Davis 98; Crimpers Salon (Pty) Ltd v Thomas 1981 CPD (unrep); Cf Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v 
Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 405. 
37. 
National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1099ff; Lubbe and Murray 255; 
Oosthuizen 383. 
38. Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 189ff, See Nathan 38 -39, Recycling Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 257; Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 
861- 862,863. 
39. 
Magna Alloys 893, 897, See Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 640ff, 646, Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 
742 (A) 761 -762, Annual Survey (1984) 129, Christie 436, Kerr Tribute 187, 190, Rautenbach & Reinecke 558 -559 
although they were not sure whether the principle does not only create a so- called "weerlegginglas ", Schoombee 
143 -144, Woker 332. 
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onus of proving all aspects of illegality will be on the person who relied on it 40. The onus to show 
that the restraint is unreasonable or against public interest for other reasons will be on the denier. 
The reasonableness and public interest onus will no longer be distinguished in South Africa The 
onus will simply remain on the denier once reasonableness is proved. The enforcer will probably 
bear no more than an evidentiary burden to show that the restraint is not illegal for being against 
public interest if the restraint has been shown to be unreasonable. The overall onus will still be on 
the contract denier 
42. 
5.3. The factors that underlie the incidence of onus 
The aspects that underlie the incidence of onus are complex . The general principle is that he who 
avers must prove 43, although this is sometimes unhelpful. The principle was used in African 
Theatres to place the onus on the denier 44, it was utilised in Allied Electric to reach an opposite 
conclusion 45. Distinguishing rebuttal and averment is difficult. Incidence of burden of proof will 
accordingly often depend upon "undefined reasons of experience and fairness" 46. But some 
"reasons of experience and fairness" can be discerned. 
40. Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 685; J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 
1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 243; Bonnet v Schofield 1989 (2) SA 156 (D) 158; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 
1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 795; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 485 -486, 499, 
502 -503, 505; Amalgamated Retail Ltd v Spark 1991 (2) SA 143 (SEC) 150; Aetiology Today CC tía Somerset 
Schools v Van Aswegen 1992 (1) SA 807 (W) 824; BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 
52; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 330, 331; Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 
1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 540, 542; Mparadzi v Mangwana HC- H- 637 -87 (unrep); Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v 
Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 569; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 753, 767; The Concept Factory v Hey' 
1994 (2) SA 105 (T) 112; Waltons Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 (4) SA 507 (0) 511; Humphrys v Laser 
Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) 400, 407; Paragon Business Forms (Pty) Ltd v Du Preez 1994 (1) SA 
434 (SEC) 444 -445; Fisher v Salon Mystique 1995 (2) SA 136 (0) 142; Interest Computation Experts v Nel 1995 
(1) SA 174 (T) 179; Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 784 see also 786 -787 the Interim 
Constitution does not impact on this position, See Rautenbach & Reinecke 559ff; Kerr 477 -478, 506; Van der 
Merwe 157; Lubbe & Murray 255; Cf Aercrete SA (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 (4) SA 814 
(D) 816 seems to imply that the mere fact that a clause is a restraint will bolster its enforceability. It is 
unacceptable. 
41 Van der Merwe 157. 
42. 
Schoombee 144 with reference to Smit v Bester 1977 (4) SA 937 (A) 942. 
43 
SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 787 mentioned by Kahn 393. 
44. African Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 at 129; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 649 -650, the 
game will apply to special defence issues 651. 
5_ 
Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 329. 
46. Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 647; Schoombee 143 with reference to Wigmore. 
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The relative weight attached to each of the principles underlying the doctrine should impact on 
onus The court will want to confine the onus on the contract enforcer if it regards sanctity of 
contract as more important 
48. 
It will undermine sanctity of contracts if the enforcer has a 
comprehensive burden of proving facts showing that the contract does not suffer from any 
deficiencies. A legal system that prefers sanctity of contract will be in favour of the enforcement of 
contracts where a conclusive decision cannot otherwise be made: 
- Dominance of sanctity of contract in South Africa was vital to the argument of Rabie CJ in 
Magna Alloys 49. 
- Dumbutshena CJ in Zimbabwe 50 mentioned the discussion of the notion that restraints are prima 
facie unenforceable in Pest Control 51. He then decided that "it is not only a question of 
selecting the idea which takes precedence over the other in the eyes of the law ". However, 
he later placed considerable emphasis on sanctity of contract 52. 
Schoombee 53 argued that sanctity of contract cannot be a determinant of onus in South Africa. He 
stated that public interest will now be the acid test for restraints, and he went on to ask "Why 
would the covenantor's agreeing to a restraint render it likely that enforcement would not 
prejudice the public interest ?" But the answer is simple: sanctity of contract as a public policy 
principle will have an important influence on the substantive and formal aspects of the doctrine. 
There will be stronger reasons for saddling the enforcer with the onus if the law places priority on 
the protection of freedom of trade It will make it more difficult to protect freedom of work if 
such protection is precluded by the contract denier's placing of facts before the court. It will 
undermine freedom of work if restraints in inconclusive cases are upheld. 
Yet, other issues outside the weighing of these broad principles may also be relevant in 
determining onus. 
47. Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 30, Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468; National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1100 -1101; Cf however Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 
(C) 405; The terminological argument Rautenbach & Reinecke 561 does not contribute much see supra Ch 5.1. 
8. Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 ChD 351 at 365, Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 30 -31; Trebilcock 45; 
Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1115. 
49 
Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313, See the criticism Kerr (1982) 185, See obiter 315ff, Cf 
the criticism supra Ch 2; Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 504 -506; Magna 
Alloys 893; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 499; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) 
SA 742 (A) 761 -762, 776 -777; Van der Merwe 157; Suzman 91. 
50. 
Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 650. 
51. 
Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 614. 
52. 




Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 199 with reference to Kerr (2nd ed) 105; Van 
der Merwe 157; Kerr (2nd ed) 105 felt that these issues were not properly considered by the authorities, where the 
new view was taken. 
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It would create greater systemic coherence if the restraint of trade doctrine was treated like all 
other manifestations of illegality in contracts 55. The court in Magna Alloys stressed that 
effectiveness of a restraint of trade is a public policy issue. Rabie CJ said that it would be 
illogical and inappropriate to take the English view if it is accepted that the general 
principle is that a contract will be enforced unless it can be proved to be illegal and against 
the public policy 56. This exaggerates the point, but it illustrates the need for systemic 
coherence. 
Courts would prefer to place the onus on the person who has to prove the unusual; it simplifies 
and reduces litigation on such points, and it will more likely produce a fair result where the 
case has not been proven either way It will be important to determine on what side the 
general factual situation that comes before the court, will fall 58. The knowledge that 
restraints will often today be normal incidences of commerce could play some role in 
determining the onus 59. 
It might be important to determine who has personal knowledge of the facts that need to be 
proved 60. This issue was previously emphasised by Kerr 61, but Schoombee is correct in 
cautioning that the significance of this factor must not be exaggerated 62. Kerr 63 now also 
accepts that the potential problems that may be caused by this will not be insurmountable 
providing the onus rules are applied judiciously. The author suggests that a burden to 
deduce evidence in rebuttal may be placed on the enforcer if the denier can put forward a 
prima facie case. Evidence that is peculiarly within the knowledge of the enforcer can be so 
extracted. 
Finally, in their discussion of onus, South African courts have stressed that the rule that a restraint 
is prima facie unreasonable is English, and not part of Roman Dutch law 64. However, this in itself 
55 
SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1868 (2) SA 777 (D) 787; Roffey v Catterall Edwards 
& Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 503 -504; Magna Alloys 893; Implicit in Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) 
Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 499; Oosthuizen 386; Otto 210; Schoombee 143; Van der Merwe 157, 159; 
Woker 332. 
56 
Magna Alloys 893. 
57. 
Heydon 40-41 seems to think that this played a role in determining the onus with regard to public interest. See 
both the second and third points; Kerr (2nd ed) 105. 
58. 
McBryde 603 although he did not clearly distinguish this from the weighing of principles. 
59 
Cf Schoombee 143; Perhaps Rautenbach & Reinecke 561 should be so understood. 
60. Kerr (2nd ed) 105; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 199 with reference to Kerr 
(2nd ed) 199; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 255 -256; See Du Plessis and 





63 Kerr 190 -191. 
64. To mention but a few of the cases: Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 103 -104, 
SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 777 (D) 788, Roffey v Catterall Edwards & 
Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 504ff but see the criticism supra Ch 2.3, Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v 
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is no reason for rejecting English onus principles. The point has mostly been made to show that the 
orthodox incidence of onus is systemically incompatible with underlying contract law principles in 
South Africa. 
Factual aspects outside proof of reasonableness have been regarded as "increasing" or 
"decreasing" the onus 65. But they have not been perceived as factors that will actually change the 
onus 
66 
Bargaining power has been mooted as an issue that should impact on incidence of onus 67. 
However, it cannot determine onus. Relative bargaining power will differ widely in a range of 
restraint contracts. It will be impossible to delineate categories by whether bargaining will be equal 
or unequal. It will be one of the aspects on which facts will have to be placed before the court. 
The English and Scots courts have accepted that the onus changes when it comes to public 
interest. Lord Hodson in Esso 68 held that the reasons for this change were obscure, but it is 
believed that it can be explained on the basis of the above mentioned factors. The two most 
important ones are: 
- If the restraint was shown to be unreasonable, then the onus to show that it is not contrary to the 
public interest will be on the covenantee. It will change the priority of general principles if 
the restraint is reasonable between the parties. The importance of freedom of trade will be 
reduced once the restraint is reasonable. 
- The possibility of success will be reduced once reasonableness is proved. 
Again it could be mooted that bargaining power should have a similar effect. It can be argued that 
the onus should change once it is shown that the parties are in a position of equal bargaining, in 
Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 405, Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 650, Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) 
Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 499; Suzman 90 at 91; Aronstam 22; Kahn 393ff; Nathan 35 -36; Oosthuizen 
382ff; Van der Menve 156 -157; See Lubbe and Murray 255, Christie 436. 
65 
Attorney- General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 797. See 
Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v Kolok Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 108 at 120; Herbert Morris 715; Attwood 
589; Esso 324 where the court stated that the onus in certain cases will be easily discharged; Connors Bros Ltd v 
Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 192; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814, 816, 819; Anson 324; 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 409; Gurry 212, 213, 216; Estate Matthews v Redelinghuys 1927 WLD 307 at 312 
with reference to Herbert Morris; Heydon 39; Halliwell v Laverack 1929 WLD 175 at 179; Spa Food Products Ltd v 
Sarif 1952 (1) SA 713 (SR) 717, 721; Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 613 with reference to Herbert Morris; 
Shell Co of SA Ltd v Gerrans Garage (Pty) Ltd 1954 (4) SA 752 (G) 757; Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) 
Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 232; Kerr 514 -515. 
66 
The discussion of McBryde 604 is not always clear but it is unacceptable in so far as he believed that the width 
of the restraint will impact upon the incidence of the onus. 
67. 
Schoombee 139 -140; Heydon 39 -40. 
68. 
Esso 319; Trebilcock 71; McBryde 603. 
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the same way that the onus changes after reasonableness has been proved in England and 
Scotland. However, courts should avoid the chaos that may ensue upon an overly fragmentary 
approach towards onus. The onus of proving effectiveness or ineffectiveness should be determined 
by broad principles unless the case clearly enters a new phase. But proof that the bargaining power 
favours the bearer of the onus will only be an attitudinal factor; it is normally not important 
enough to lead to a transfer of the onus. A switch should only take place where reasonableness 
inter partes as a whole has been dealt with 69. 
Finally, it must be asked whether the parties may vary the onus by agreement 70. The general 
principles that underlie the doctrine are the main determinants of onus, and it therefore must be 
determined whether the parties may alter the general preference of the legal system. 
- In England and Scotland the onus will reflect a preference for freedom of trade. Change of onus 
clauses will certainly not alter the onus where the parties are in a position of unequal 
bargaining power and it is even doubtful whether clauses of this nature will be of more than 
attitudinal value where the parties are in a position of equal bargaining 71. 
- In South Africa more emphasis is now placed on the principle of freedom of contract. Courts will 
probably accept a variation of onus clause if the parties are in a position of equal 
bargaining, although it is doubtful whether such clauses will often be included in contracts. 
6. Partial enforcement and the new approach to onus in South Africa 77 -2 
In South Africa the onus of showing unreasonableness will be on the person who wants to escape 
the effect of the contract. But who will now bear the onus to show that partial enforcement is 
possible 
73? 
Schoombee 74 argued that one of the parties will bear the onus to show how much reduction will 
make a restraint reasonable. But two aspects must be distinguished 75: 
69 
See Du Plessis and Davis 100 -101 although their argument is not acceptable. 
70. See the clauses: Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edens) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0), Madoo (Pty) Ltd v 
Wallace 1979 (2) SA 957 (T). 
71. 
Cf supra Ch 9.4 on acknowledgement clauses. 
72. 
On partial enforcement see infra Ch 14.5. 
73. Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 795 -796 did not concern onus, See BHT Water 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 53, The interpretation of Harms J in Sibex Engineering Services 
Tty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488 cannot be accepted. 
. Schoombee 144 -145. 
75. 
These aspects have never been clearly distinguished in the courts: They were separated in National Chemsearch 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) but both were treated similarly, BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v 
Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 52ff although the court noted that the enforcer will generally have to put forward the 
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- The requirements for partial enforcement. 
- The requirements of reasonableness in terms of the restraint of trade doctrine. 
The enforcer should put forward a clause that it wants to enforce partially 76, and the onus to 
prove reasonableness must be distinguished from this. Only if these two issues are discerned will it 
allow for the proper answering of both. 
It may be contended that this separation is impossible because the issues are too intertwined, and it 
is true that they cannot be kept apart completely. Some facts may be relevant under both heads. 
But a court can still ask if a certain reduction of a clause should be allowed without going directly 
into the question of reasonableness. Three different scenarios can be gleaned from the analysis of 
Schoombee, and the issue will be discussed with reference to them. 
The first two possibilities can be discussed together. The enforcer may admit or the denier may 
prove that the original restraint is too wide. The enforcer will then bear the onus to show that 
there is a more limited restraint that will satisfy the requirements expressed in Chemsearch. The 
facts before the court may, especially where the reasonableness issue has been fully argued, then 
show whether the reduced restraint will be reasonable or unreasonable. But what is the position if 
this is not the case? 
- It may be submitted that the onus here should be on the enforcer. The wider clause has, after all, 
been rejected. It has been shown that there are public policy problems with the clause. The 
denier has discharged the onus placed upon him. 
- It can be averred that the same reasons that applied in placing the initial reasonableness onus on 
the denier will also apply here. There is still a contract. The court still prefers freedom of 
contract over freedom of trade. The enforcer will have to satisfy the Chemsearch 
requirements. The denier will then have to show that the restraint is not reasonable. He will 
still be confronted with a clause to which he agreed on the basis that the wider original 
clause will have to include the narrower new proposed clause It may also be contended 
that the reversal of onus to prove unreasonableness will only cause confusion. The denier, 
in partial enforcement cases, will still be given a clear case to answer. He has to prove 
illegality. It will only create problems if this suddenly changes in partial enforcement cases. 
The second argument is the more convincing of the two 
78. Coherence has played an important 
role in the establishment of onus in restraint of trade cases in South Africa, and greater coherence 
restraint that he wants to enforce, Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488, 500, 
501, 503 and 512. 
76. See infra Ch 14.5. 
77. Infra 14.5. 
78. Where it was admitted that a clause was unreasonable: BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 
(W) 52 -54 although the court did not properly distinguish the two relevant aspects; Where the court found the 
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will be achieved if the onus to prove unreasonableness is placed on the denier throughout. The 
other arguments which the courts have used in laying down onus will still apply, albeit with less 
vigour. 
The third scenario will exist where the enforcer comes to court with a reduced clause although he 
does not admit that the whole clause is illegal. There will be even more powerful reasons for 
placing the onus of proving reasonableness on the denier once it is acknowledged that the reduced 
restraint meets the requirements of Chemsearch 79. 
- It will be theoretically more satisfactory because the covenantor has not discharged the initial 
onus yet 80. 
- It will be more conducive to the development of restraint of trade policy. It will motivate parties 
to attempt to enforce only the parts of the restraint that they regard as necessary. 
Schoombee 81 drew a distinction between restraint contracts that consist of different clauses, 
where one clause can merely be blue pencilled out, and restraints that do not. He then maintained 
that the whole of the onus will rest on the denier in cases that fall in the former category but this 
distinction cannot be accepted. It is exactly the type of distinction which Magna Alloys in South 
Africa has rejected 82 
initial restraint to be unreasonable: National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1114 
tentatively accepted that a shift of onus (as later accepted in Magna Alloys) would mean that the onus of proving 
partial enforcement would be on the enforcer, See the criticism in BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) 
SA 47 (W) 53; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503 apparently regarded the 
onus as being on the denier, Contra 488 although this does not say what the enforcer would have to prove. 
79. The contrary view of Schoombee 145 -146 is unacceptable. 




See infra Ch 14.5. 
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1. The status of ineffective restraints: English law 
There are few cases in which the courts have focused on this issue. Some judges talk of ineffective 
restraints as being unenforceable 1, while others have called unacceptable restraints void or invalid 
2. Many decisions even use the phrases "unenforceable" and "void" in the same breath 3. In Mogul 
I. Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 34; Hornby v Close (1867) LR 2 QB 153 at 158, 160; Swaine v 
Wilson (1889) 24 QBD 252 at 257; Mason 737, 742; Herbert Morris 718; McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co- 
Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 562, 587; English Hop Growers Ltd y Dering [1928] 2 
KB 174 at 180; Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 489, 491; Attorney- General of the Commonwealth of Australia v 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd 11913] AC 781 at 794 in discussing the history of restraints of trade said that restraints 
were initially regarded as "contracts of imperfect obligation if not void for all purposes" but the term enforceability 
was used 794, 797; Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 181, 183; Whitehill y Bradford [1952] 1 Ch 236 at 242; 
Eastham y Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413 at 449 -450; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd y Harper's 
Garage ( Stourport) Ltd [1966] QB 514 at 579; Esso 295, 318, 321, 325, 326, 333, See infra; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v 
Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 137, 138, 141, 143, 144 but see the public house cases 142; The Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686 at 695; Lyne -Pirkis y Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1299; 
Amoco Australia Pty Ltd y Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [ 1975] AC 571 at 576, 577, 579, 580 but see 
there were special reasons for it in the case 577, See McBryde 608; Stenhouse Australia Ltd y Phillips [1974] AC 
391 at 403; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 713; Spencer v Marchington [1988] IRLR 392 at 395; Sadler y 
Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 390, 391; Edwards y Worboys [1984] 1 AC 724 at 
728; Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 351; Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc y Maclaine Watson & 
Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 570 at 613 but see the view of the parties; Systems Reliability Holdings plc y Smith 
[1990] IRLR 377 at 382, 383, 385; JA Mont (UK) Ltd IT Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 582. 
2. Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 183, 185, 190, 191, 193; Young IT Timmins (1831) 1 Cr & J 331 at 
343; Wallis v Day (1837) 2 M & W 273 at 281; Hitchcock v Coker (1837) 6 Ad & E 438 at 453, 454, 456; Hinde y 
Gray (1840) 1 Man & G 195 at 202, 207; Proctor v Sargent (1840) 2 Man & G 20 at 32, 33, 36, 37; Mallan y May 
(1843) 11 M & W 653 at 665ff; Price v Green (1847) 16 M & W 346 at 353 has lead to some confusion supra Ch 
2.2; Tailis y Tallis (1853) 1 E & B 391 at 410, 411, 412, 413; Nordenfelt 538, 546, 548, 549, 561, 565, 566, 568, 
575; Swaine v Wilson (1889) 24 QBD 252 at 261 and 262 although the court initially at 260 talked of enforcement; 
E Underwood & Son Ltd y Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 304, 306, 307, 309, 310; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 
23, 24; 25, 26, 27; Sir WC Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 at 769, 771; Eastes y Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 
at 474, 477, 481, 482, 485; North Western Salt Co Ltd y Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 474, but see 
enforcement is mentioned at the start 478; Mason 731, 732, 734, 745; Herbert Morris 699, 700; McEllistrim v 
Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 571, 597; Attwood v Lamont 
[1920] 3 KB 571 at 581, 582, 585, 596; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 at 161; British Reinforced Concrete 
Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563, 576; English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering [1928] 2 KB 174 at 185; 
Connors Bros Ltd v Connors [1940] 4 All ER 179 at 195; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd 
[1966] QB 514 at 552, 567, 562, 569, 570 and 572; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1966] 1 All ER 126 at 131 and 
132, 136 but see on enforcement: 134, 137; Dickson y The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1967] 2 All ER 
558 at 567, 569; The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1968] 2 All ER 686 at 697, 702, 704, 706, 
707; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 at 1229, 1235; Lyne- Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 
1293 1301; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [ 1972] 1 WLR 814 at 817, Greig v Insole [ 1978] 3 All ER 
449 at 495 -496, 503; Edwards v Worboys [1984] 1 AC 724 at 725, 726, 727 although the court 725 also talked of 
enforceability; Goring v British Actors Equity Association [1987] IRLR 122 at 127; Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 
1 QB 122 at 128, 129, 134, 141; Court Homes Ltd v Wilkins (1983) NLJ 133 698; Prontaprint plc y Landon Litho 
Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 325, 327 although it emphasised a quote from Office Overload Ltd y Gunn [1977] FSR 39 
where a more sophisticated view was taken; Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 733, 735; Dairy Crest 
Ltd y Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 94; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Lt y Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486, 488; 
Lansing Linde Ltd y Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 426. 
3. Hornby v Close (1867) LR 2 QB 153 at 160, 159 -160; Collins v Locke (1879) 4 App Cas 674 at 685, 686, 688, 
689; Nordenfelt 551, 552 and 553, 555; Russell y Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [1912] AC 421 at 
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Lord Halsbury LC 4 accepted that ineffective restraints of trade would be void, but he then went 
on also to accept that such agreements will not be enforced. The court acknowledged that 
voidness of the restraint would also lead to it being unenforceable, and this is how the issue has 
been dealt with in many of the cases. However, some courts have simply not drawn a proper 
distinction between void and unenforceable. 
Only a few English authors have focused on this issue 5. Russell believed that a restraint was 
unenforceable or void and he then suggested that the court in Esso did not also mention voidness 
because it was too well established 6. Yet the author accepted that ineffective restraints will have 
effect in so far as parties have acted in terms of them, and most today accept that restraints are 
merely unenforceable '. 
The Trade Union Act of 1871 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 are to the 
effect that ineffective restraints are void or at least voidable 8. But in the type of cases that are 
discussed here this will be of little importance 9. 
The few cases that truly considered the consequences of an ineffective restraint are not consistent. 
Some judges regarded such clauses as void. In Joseph Evans Scrutton and Pickford LLJ 10 
stressed voidness, and this was confirmed by Slesser LT in Wyatt 11. However, these cases cannot 
be conclusive. In Joseph Evans Bankes LJ showed obiter sympathy for the notion that restraints 
437, 439; North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 468, 469, 470; McEllistrim v 
Ballymacelligott Co- Operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548 at 581, 585, 586; Routh v Jones 
[1947] 1 All ER 758 at 764; Home Counties Dairies Ltd v Skilton [1970] 1 All ER 1227 1232 -1233, 1233; Allied 
Dunbar (Frank Weisinger) Ltd v Weisinger [1988] IRLR 60 63, 64, 65; JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 
at 590, 591; Morris Angel & Son Ltd v Hollande [1993] ICR 71 at 76, 78; Cf in the wider field of illegality in 
England N Enonchong "Effects of Illegality: A Comparative Study in French and English Law" (1995) 44 ICLO 
198 -199. 
4. Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor Gow & Co [1892] AC 25 at 39, See also 42, 45-47. 
5. Many of the other authors use the term void although they do not really focus on the issue: Anson, Cheshire 
Fifoot and Furmston, Treitel; Winfield 327 -328 expressly took the view that ineffective restraints were void. 
6. Russell 584. 
'. Dawson 460 -461 with reference to Re Home Insurance [1930] 1 Ch 102, Gurry 219, Nelson 50ff although they 
accepted that a different view was previously taken; Chitty 1190; Collinge especially 411. 
8. See also sec 3 of the Union Act 1871. 
9. See the criticism McBryde 154. 
i0. Joseph Evans & Co Ltd v Heathcote [1918] 1 KB 418 at 425 -428, 435 -438, Cf the criticism McBryde 607 with 
reference to Thomson v BMA [1924] AC 764 at 769. 
h. Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [ 1933] 1 KB 793 at 810 -811, See also Greer LJ 808 although he relied on 
Scrutton LJ see infra. 
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are only unenforceable, although he did not finally decide the issue 12, and there are contradictory 
dicta in Wyatt 13. The more acceptable authorities favour enforceability 14: 
Lord Parker of Waddington in Herbert Morris 15 talked of the consequences of restraints in 
terms of voidness and validity, but he also stated that "it is not that such restraints must of 
themselves necessarily operate to the public injury, but that it is against the policy of the 
common law to enforce them except in cases where there are special circumstances to 
justify them ". (My italics) 
Lord Reid in Esso 16 maintained that "one must always bear in mind that an agreement in 
restraint of trade is not generally unlawful if the parties choose to abide by it; it is only 
unenforceable if a party chooses not to abide by it ". 
The question was of great practical importance in a series of cases that concerned restraints on 
performing artists. Here restraints were part of wider agreements that also included transfers of 
copyrights in songs written by the covenantor songwriter. 
- In A Schroeder Lord Reid started out by referring to the "validity" 17 of a restraint, but apart 
from that it was consistently held that the restraint was only unenforceable and that 
copyright already assigned could not be returned 18. 
- The court in Clifford Davies 19 confusingly held that the restraint was unenforceable but it 
accepted in the same breath that the assignment was invalid. It is hoped that more precise 
language will be used in future. 
- The court in O'Sullivan 20 again clearly accepted the A Schroeder approach. 
The legal status of restraints has not been finally settled in English law, but it seems that the 
stronger opinion now leans towards the unenforceability thesis 21. 
12. Joseph Evans & Co Ltd v Heathcote [1918] 1 KB 418 at 431 -432 but see the role of the Trade Union Act, See 
also Edinburgh Leith and District Master Plumbers' Association v Munro 1928 SC 565 at 569, 573, 575, 576 
although the case decided in terms of sec 4 of the Trade Union Act, See McBryde 607. 
13 Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 807, 810. 
14 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 489; Watson v Prager [1991] 1 WLR 726 at 738, 
742, 751, 750 with reference to Esso 297; Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 42; R v General Medical 
Council, Ex parte Colman [ 1990] 1 All ER 489 at 508. 
15 Herbert Morris 706 -707; Green v Price (1845) 13 M & W 695 at 699. 
16 Esso 305 
17. A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616, Lord Reid 618. 
18. Instone v A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [ 1974] 1 All ER 171 at 176, 177 and especially 181, See 
Dawson infra 4.1; A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd y Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 623, See Lord 
Diplock, The court of first instance probably regarded the restraint as void see Instone 172. McBryde 608 tried too 
read too much into this; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 249. 
19. Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 61 64 -65, 66. 
20. O'Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] 1 QB 428 at 448, 469 per Fox LJ, 470 per Waller LJ. 
21. Contra Zang Tumb Tuum Records Ltd v Johnson [1993] EMLR 61 at 74, 75. 
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Courts should in future refrain from stating that ineffective restraints are void and, more 
importantly, lawyers should not use "void" and "unenforceable" as if they are synonyms. It courts 
confusion to use them in tandem and this will be especially true when, like Russell 22, it is accepted 
that an ineffective restraint has all the traits of what is commonly known as an unenforceable 
contract. 
2. Scottish authorities focused on the legal status issue 
The cases can again be divided into the same three categories that are mentioned in the discussion 
of English law: restraints have been regarded as void 23, unenforceable 24 or unenforceable and 
void 25. 
But the issue has been explicitly considered by McBryde 26. After much discussion he concluded 
that restraints should be regarded as unenforceable at the option of the parties. He submitted that 
voidness is more drastic than unenforceability and he preferred the less drastic alternative. Walker 
is not consistent in his use of the words void and unenforceable. However, in his reference to 
Esso, he emphasised unenforceability 27. It would therefore also be more acceptable to regard 
ineffective restraints as unenforceable here. 
3. The consequences of illegality of a restraint in South Africa 
22. Russell 584. 
23. Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 531, 533 and 535; Kennedy v Clark (1917) 33 Shot Rep 136 at 140; BMTA 
v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 601, 602; Giblin v Murdoch 1979 SLT ShCt 5 at 6; Rentokil Ltd v Hampton 1982 SLT 422 
at 423; Strathclyde Regional Council v Neil 1983 SLT ShCt 89 at 90; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 
727 at 733; Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 763; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 
at 1160. 
24. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants for Scotland v The Motherwell Branch of the Society (1880) 7 R 867 
at 871; Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1167, 1168, 1171, 1172; Minimax Ltd v Geddes (1914) 31 ShCt Rep 
36 at 39; Ballachulish Slate Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1115; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 
532 and 533; Taylor v Campbell 1926 SLT 260 at 261; Kilgour v McNicol 1961 SLT ShCt 8 at 9; Maclntyre v 
Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95 at 98, 99; Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 
39; Nu -Swift International Ltd v Mckay 1987 GWD 30 -1132; Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 457; 
Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452, 453. 
25. Stewart v Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1170; Dumbarton Steamship Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 at 997; 
Remington Typewriter Company v Sim (1915) 1 SLT 168 at 170; Scottish Farmers' Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v 
McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 150, 151; Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 22, 24; SOS Bureau Ltd v 
Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 35, 36, 37; Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248; Fraser 93; Scott 
Robinson 156; Whish Stair Encyclopaedia 1214 and 1215. 
26 McBryde 607 -608 and the general remarks 573; See along essentially similar lines McBryde Thesis 150ff. 
27 Walker 184. 
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In pre -Magna Alloys law a distinction similar to the one drawn above can again be made between 
cases that regarded restraints as unenforceable 28, void 29 or unenforceable and void 30 
Discord existed even in the cases that focused on this issue. The Full Bench of the Transvaal in 
National Chemsearch 31 leaned towards the view that illegal restraints were only unenforceable, 
and its Cape equivalent accepted the notion in Drewtons 32. However, King J in Allied Electric 33 
strongly asserted that illegal restrictions were void. 
The issue was finally and unequivocally settled in Magna Alloys 34. Rabie CJ decided that an illegal 
contract in restraint of trade is unenforceable and not void. Support was found in an influential 
28. Tilney v Rock and Way 1928 EDL 108 at 110; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 147 at 148; Van de Pol v Silbermann 
1952 (2) SA 561 (A) 569 -570 and see also the submissions discussed but not decided; Brenda Hairstylers (Pty) Ltd 
v Marshall 1968 (2) SA 277 (0) 280; Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 66; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd 
v Voulgarides 1975 (2) SA 783 (W) 785; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 254. 
29 Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 226; Trimble v Jameson & Co (1903) 24 NLR 53 61, 62; SA 
Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 370; KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 434, 435, 437, 
438, 440, 441; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773; Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 493; 
Brooks and Wynberg v New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1936 TPD 296 at 303; Lewin v Sanders 1937 SR 
147 at 153; Witwatersrand Trustees (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 140 151; Vermeulen y 
Surit 1946 TPD 219 at 221; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 219, 225; Ex Parte Spring 1951 (3) SA 
475 (C) 478; Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W) 304; Spa Food Products Ltd v Sarif 1952 
(1) SA 713 (SR) 717, but see 722; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Bros 1953 (2) SA 151 (0) 171; Weinberg v 
Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 (C) 865; Rogaly v Weingartz 1954 (3) SA 791 (D) 792; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd 
v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 612; Groenewald v Conradie 1957 (3) SA 413 (C) 415; Baldwin & Lessing v 
Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 501; Kock & Schmidt v Alma Modehuis (Edms) Bpk 1959 (3) SA 308 (A) 317; 
Pieterse v Cilliers 1945 (2) PH A.31 53 at 54; Berger v Osher 1965 (1) SA 558 (W) 559; Wohlman v Buron 1970 
(2) SA 760 (C) 762; A Becker and Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) 417; Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t/a T- 
Chem v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 858. 
3o New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 82; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v 
Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 2; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 72; Highlands Park 
Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 200; Nursing Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Clarke 1954 (3) SA 394 
(D); Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 (R) 441; Roffey v Catterall 
Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 501, 505 and 503, 507, See especially 504. 
31 National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1107 although he did not draw a clear 
distinction, See Schoombee 147, 149. 
32. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313, See Kerr (1982) 186, Schoombee 133. 
33 Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330 with reference to Brooks & Wynberg, Gordon v Van 
Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 773, Wilkinson v Wiggil 1939 NPD 4 and Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) 
SA 62 (C) but see the discussion supra. The point was not clearly taken in this last mentioned case. The same can 
be said about the reference to De Wet & Yeats 80 -81. 
34 Magna Alloys 895; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 485, 503; Powertech 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 330, 331; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 642; Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 31; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 794, 795; 
Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 499ff; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v 
Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 571; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 742, 767; Kerr 477, 506; Christie 443 the 
use of "void" is probably an oversight by the author; Schoombee 147 but see the qualifications; Van der Menve 158. 
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article by Aquilius where it was stated that 35 "a contract against public policy is one stipulating a 
performance which is not per se illegal or immoral but which the Courts, on grounds of 
expedience, will not enforce because performance will detrimentally affect the interests of the 
community ". 
The conclusion reached in Magna Alloys will now prevail. However, Aquilius did not attempt to 
establish a general theory in the quoted passage 36. There was much authority for the view that 
contracts that are illegal for being against public policy will be void 37. Aquilius probably also 
believed that illegal contracts were void and therefore also unenforceable 38. The use of the word 
"unenforceable" here was not significant. 
Accordingly, different types of contracts that are against public policy may arise. Some grounds of 
public policy will lead to voidness, others merely to unenforceability. Some contracts against 
public policy will probably in future be treated in the same way as contracts in restraint of trade, 
but many will remain void 39. A restraint of trade in South Africa will now in many respects be 
treated like an "obligatio naturalis" 40, although no such comparison was drawn in Magna Alloys. 
Some authorities have distinguished between natural obligations and illegal contracts 41. But it was 
only drawn because it was believed that all illegal agreements would necessarily be void 42. 
Obligationes naturales have become a stagnant historical nicety 43, but it may now be in for 
considerable development within the context of illegal obligations. The concept will still have to be 
properly developed 44, but it is now conceivable that illegal restraints and some other illegal 
contracts may be unenforceable, while many other illegal contracts will remain void 45. 
35 Aquilius (1941) 346; National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1107; Allied 
Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330 where it was accepted that this view was taken by Aquilius; 
Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 311. 
36 Schoombee 148 with reference to Aquilius (1941) 344. 
37. Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330 with reference to De Wet and Yeats 80 -81, De Groot 
Inl 3.1.42 and 43, Sande Dec Fris 3.1.1, Voet 2.14.16, Van der Linde 1.14.6. 
38. Kerr (1982) 187 is incorrect in concluding that Lord Halsbury in Mogul and Aquilius are similar in their 
emphasis on enforceability, See supra 12.1. 
39 Kerr 479, Cf 152; This appears to be the view of Van der Merwe 146. 
4o See Lubbe and Murray 261. 
41 See Lubbe and Murray 9 -10; Gibson v Van der Walt 1952 (1) SA 262 (A) 268 with reference to Dodd v Hadley 
1905 TS 439; NJ Van der Merwe (1962) THRHR 275. 
42. Lubbe and Murray 240; Van der Merwe 146. 
43 See the conclusion of NJ Van der Merwe (1962) THRHR 275; See also Joubert Law of Contract 13 -14 on the 
notion that there is a numerus clausus here. 
44. Schoombee 149. 
45 Van der Merwe 139, 146; Kerr 477ff; See the criticism of some authorities Christie 466, 472 -473 and see the 
criticism of the authorities on which the author relied: De Wet & Yeats 290, Van der Merwe 124 and 147 -148, 
Lubbe and Murray 204 -205. 
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Kerr 46 concluded that some restraints will still be void. But this view can be rejected outright. The 
authorities are against it. The author tried to sow doubt about the opinion of the court in Magna 
Alloys where none exists 47. He made several contradictory points, and some of his arguments 
seem irrelevant to his main submission. However, the following main criticisms can be brought 
against his view: 
- Kerr observed that counsel stated that the restraint would be void and unenforceable, and he 
concluded that the court did not see these as alternatives. This may be correct . However, 
he then contended that there are dicta in the judgment where the court also interpreted 
unenforceable as meaning void and therefore unenforceable. This is unacceptable. Kerr 
referred to Magna Alloys 48, where Rabie CJ analysed the English law and stated that "the 
English law is, in short, that every curtailment on the freedom of trade of a party is 
unenforceable (or void as some decisions would say)" (my translation). He then concluded 
that "unenforceable" was here used as a synonym for "void ". But the court was 
commenting on the alternating views taken in English law. 
- Kerr contended that some passages in the judgment indicate that the court used "unenforceable" 
as an abbreviation for "void or unenforceable ". He quoted the passage where Rabie CJ 
stated that "the fact that our common law does not declare that an agreement which 
curtails a person's freedom to trade is void or unenforceable has the consequence that we 
must today take the view that such agreements are in all circumstances enforceable" (my 
translation). But his observations are again based on a misinterpretation. The judge was 
thinking on two levels. He discussed the earlier position using terminology that would be 
most apposite 49. He then moved on to the current position where, according to his own 
decision, restraints are merely unenforceable. 
Kerr finally had to admit that there are passages in the judgment where "unenforceable" is clearly 
not used as an abbreviation for void or unenforceable 50. The author thus concluded that one 
cannot be sure that the word "unenforceable" was so used. This is wrong. One can be certain that 
the court did not use it thus. 
Kerr moreover seems to think that a restraint will be void if there is no possibility, at conclusion, 
that it can ever be in the public interest, while it will only be unenforceable if there is such a 
possibility. But this must be rejected: 
46 Kerr Tribute 192 -193; Cf also the possibility of a wider enforceability discretion: Kerr 477ff, Kerr Tribute 197- 
198, Van der Menve 159. 
47. Kerr Tribute 191 -192; Cf Kerr (1982) 186 and his discussion of Drewtons. 
48. Magna Alloys 886. 
49. Other examples of Kerr Tribute 192 can be similarly criticised. 
5° Magna Alloys 895. 
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- The possibility that a contract may have effect again is, in a sense, a consequence of the principle 
that it is only unenforceable, but there is no reason why it should work in reverse. 
Restraints are regarded as unenforceable rather than void because courts do not condemn 
them to such an extent that they want to undo contractual relationships where the parties 
have chosen to obey them. The mere fact that enforcement will probably never be granted 
by a court does not radically affect the position. The illegality of the restraint is not 
necessarily increased when there is no conceivable event that will make the restraint legal. 
- It is doubtful whether the distinction proposed by Kerr can truly be drawn on the facts of a case. 
According to him a restraint can only be void if it is illegal to such an extent that it can 
never be maintained; but when will this ever be the case? The restraint of trade doctrine 
will become very fragmentary if the distinction proposed by Kerr is drawn. It will therefore 
be important to make a clear distinction between the cases that fall in one category or the 
other. The actual distinction proposed by Kerr does not meet these requirements. He 
stated: 
"If the specified interest is entitled to protection, it will normally happen 
that the operation of the restraint for a limited time in a limited area will be 
held to be reasonable. Restraints are, accordingly, not likely to be declared 
not to have come into existence if the dispute concerns the duration or area 
of its operation. But if the interest sought to be protected is not entitled to 
protection the restraint can never be held to be in the public interest and can 
properly be said not to have come into existence." 
However, there will be restraints that are not made for the protection of legitimate interests 
that may ultimately be maintained while it is conceivable that some restraints, aimed at 
protecting legitimate interests, will be too wide to have a hope of ever being enforced. 
It will place parties in an impossible position if the distinction made by Kerr is followed. All illegal 
restraints in South Africa will only be unenforceable. 
4. Effect of unenforceability 
There are many aspects that will, however, have to be worked out. These issues have been 
neglected by the courts but they may still return to reap both practical and theoretical havoc. 
4.1. Enforcement of obligations that are ineffective because they are not severable from 
ineffective restraints 
It may be contended that counter -performance for unenforceable obligations can be claimed once 
such obligations have been performed. The only requirement, where performance of the ineffective 
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obligation or obligations has taken place, would then be that the obligation which is so enforced 
should not itself be ineffective because it is in restraint of trade. 
In Bishop 51 the court accepted that such counter -performance could be claimed. However, the 
issue was not discussed in any detail by the court. It was again taken up in Joseph Evans but it was 
still not finally settled. Bankes LJ 52 acknowledged that the issue whether the restraint was 
unenforceable or void could play a role in determining the answer, and he showed some 
predilection for the enforceability thesis. Scrutton LJ 53 was critical of the principles expressed in 
Bishop. He believed that the status of an ineffective restraint was also important and was strongly 
of the view that an ineffective restraint was void. Slesser LJ in Wyatt 54 supported his critical view. 
However, the probable principle in Scotland and England, and the definite current view in South 
Africa, will be that restraints are only unenforceable. The ratio for rejecting the Bishop case has 
now disappeared. But it should still be asked whether there are no other grounds for rejecting 
Bishop. 
It might be argued that an unenforceable restriction would, subject to severability 55 and partial 
enforcement notions, permanently taint the other aspects of the contract with unenforceability even 
if it does not make the contract void. This is the effect of a void covenant, and there is no logical 
reason why the same consequence should not ensue in both cases. 
However, there are stronger arguments for taking a contrary view. Courts stress unenforceability 
with the aim of limiting the disruption to working contractual relationships. But a strict application 
of the doctrine may lead to serious injury for the party whose interests are supposed to be 
protected by the restraint of trade doctrine. A party who performs an ineffective obligation will be 
unable to reclaim performance, while he will not be allowed to claim counter -performance either. 
It is submitted that the Bishop principle should be resuscitated. Its rejection was based on a false 
premise. A contract which is unenforceable in restraint of trade will on this principle become 
enforceable in so far as it has been performed. The significance of severability or partial 
enforcement will be much reduced. It will only come into play where the contract has not been 
performed. 
51. Bishop v Kitchin (1868) 38 LJQB 20. 
52. Joseph Evans & Co Ltd v Heathcote [1918] 1 KB 418 at 431. 
s3 Ibid 437 -438; See the same judge Rawlings v General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635 at 646. 
54 Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [ 1933] 1 KB 793 at 810 -811; Winfield 328. 
ss On the interaction between consequences and severability cf McBryde 608. 
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Dawson 56 distinguished between absolute and relative enforceability. He accepted that relative 
enforceability is not unique. He then suggested that restraints should be so dealt with. He 
discussed the problems that could flow from Instone 57. In casu a composer (I) bound himself to 
write songs exclusively for the publisher (A). (I) also agreed to transfer all copyrights to the 
covenantor while (A) in turn agreed to pay royalties. Dawson 58 accepted that the artist would be 
able to claim royalties on the above mentioned grounds for copyrights transferred even if the 
contract was unenforceable in restraint of trade. The most difficult problem that will ensue in this, 
and similar cases, will however not be solved by relative enforceability. The artist would still have 
no control over his copyright and, because the restraint is only unenforceable, the copyrights could 
not be reclaimed. It seems that the covenantor would have to accept that he has no more than a 
claim on royalties. Ultimately the doctrine is aimed at protecting freedom of work, and not at 
establishing complete parity between the parties 59. 
4.2. Rights of a person who has performed obligations that were made in exchange for 
an ineffective restraint 
Difficult issues may arise in cases where performance in exchange for part of the restraint that still 
has to be performed has already been made. Heydon 6° thought that windfalls for the covenantor 
are not a problem because the covenantee has acted in a morally reprehensible way, but many 
restraints are morally neutral. Thus in Esso the restraint was connected to a wider contract that 
also contained a loan of money. Lord Reid ó1 assumed that a restraint tied to a contract of loan 
would have to be performed if the covenantor was not prepared to repay the loan immediately. 
The problems in this field can be solved in the light of the dictum of Lord Reid. An example can be 
postulated. A contract is concluded between (A) the covenantee and (B) the covenantor. The 
restraint is ineffective. There is an obligation on (A) which is unenforceable as it is not severable 
from the restraint (irrespective of whether it is counter -performance for the restraint or whether it 
is merely unenforceable because of the restraint). This obligation has been performed in full or in 
part by (A). (B) now refuses to perform on the basis that his obligations are unenforceable while 
(A) cannot reclaim because the obligation was only unenforceable and not void. It will, in this 
scenario, be very unfair towards (A) if (B) is simply allowed to hold onto performance without 
56 Dawson 462. 
57. Instone v A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd [ 1974] 1 All ER 171. 
58. Dawson 462. 
59 This is the final answer to the problems foreseen by Nelson 51 -52. 
60. Heydon 76 with reference to Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 PWms 181 at 196. 
61 Esso 299; Cf Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [ 1975] AC 571 at 579 where 
a different view was taken although the lease here was severable. 
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giving anything in return. It is difficult to see how this problem can be solved, and there is no 
authority on this point in any of the three legal systems. 
However, a theoretical analysis of unenforceable obligations, and especially of obligationes 
naturales in South Africa, provides some solutions. Unenforceable obligations create legally 
binding contracts that are mainly defective in the sense that courts will not lend its machinery to 
enforcing them (although some of these contracts are also deprived of other consequences 
normally applying to obligations). 
If (B) refused to perform his reciprocal obligation, then (A) will probably be allowed to cancel the 
contract, and one of the consequences will be that restitution will have to take place. Money will 
have to be repaid in loan cases and property will have to be returned in lease cases. The only 
question will be whether the duty of restitution will be tainted by the unenforceability, and it is 
submitted that it is separate enough. (B) will have to perform the restraint to avoid having to bear 
the above mentioned consequences of a terminated contract. 
The terms used by Lord Reid in Esso 62 remain open to some criticism. The judge assumed that if 
"the respondent had not offered to repay the loan so far as it is still outstanding the appellants 
would have been entitled to retain the tie ". The whole issue should work the other way round. A 
covenantor will, even though the restraint is unreasonable, sometimes have to perform it to avoid 
termination of the contract and loss of reciprocal benefits. 
5. The legal status of restraints that are not based on obligations 
So far no distinction has been drawn between true obligations in restraints of trade and other rules 
and conditions in restraint of trade. In general it should also be accepted that such conditions and 
rules will not be void 63, but it is paradoxical to talk simply of enforceability here. The best 
approach would probably be to regard these rules and conditions as simply relatively ineffective in 
a manner which is analogous to the unenforceability of obligations. 
5.1. The legal status of conditions 
62. Esso 299, Cf many cases have been decided on the basis that limitations on redemption are affected by the 
illegality: Esso 314, 321, Maclntyre v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd 1967 SLT 95. This solution would be acceptable 
if an enforceable loan agreement was left standing after severability see Chitty 16 -165 and 16 -168, Cf Diplock L1 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] QH 514 at 580 he thought it an academic question 
as the covenantor was willing to redeem and investment became improvident. 
63 Contra Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd [ 1971] 1 All ER 215 at 219 and see the 
authorities quoted supra 1. Some will be relevant here. 
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Heydon 64 contended that obligations to which conditions in restraint of trade are attached will be 
ineffective if the conditions are ineffective unless the obligations can be severed from the 
conditions. However, this is unacceptable if it is acknowledged that conditions are merely 
relatively ineffective. The obligation to which the condition is tied should only be unenforceable in 
so far as a restraint is unperformed. 
This approach has not been followed by the courts up to now, but it is submitted that this would 
have provided the fairest and best solution to the problems in Wyatt 65. The majority did not take 
an express view but they seemed to think that the restraint merely constituted a condition to which 
the payment of the pension was subject, and this appears most acceptable 66. On the solution 
proposed here, the restricted person would have been able to claim a pension that was subject to a 
condition in ineffective restraint of trade if he was prepared to comply with the condition 67. It 
appears from the decision that he was so prepared and that he complied with it for some time. 
It may be argued that this makes the restraint of trade doctrine irrelevant when it comes to 
conditions. A condition in restraint of trade does not place any obligation on the person who is 
subject to it, and this solution will reduce the relevance of the doctrine in this area. If (A) agrees to 
pay (B) £100 subject to a condition which is a restraint, then the following possibilities will exist: 
- If the condition is legal (A) cannot be required to perform unless (B) complies with the restraint. 
- If the condition is ineffective and (B) has not complied with it, (A) will still be able to avoid the 
obligation. 
Yet it remains important that the court scrutinise these clauses in terms of the doctrine. It is 
possible that the obligations to which an ineffective condition is attached may also be severable 
from such ineffective conditions, and it may allow the person subjected to the restraint to enforce 
the obligation without having to comply with the condition 68. 
64. Heydon McGill 358; See Heydon 203. 
65. Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793, Cf the explanation Chitty 1204. 
66 Scrutton LJ 806 assumed that the restriction did not constitute an obligation, Slesser LJ 809 accepted that it 
would not make a difference whether the restraint was constituted in an obligation or not; See also Bull v Pitney - 
Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 282ff, Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 
390 -391 were inclined towards accepting that the restraint was a condition. 
67. The same would probably be a possibility in Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 if severance was not 
possible although the covenantor here was in breach of the condition; In Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of 
Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 the court was prepared to sever the restrictive condition but this could also have 
provided a solution although the covenantor was not prepared to abide by the restraint. 
68 See Spence v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd (1921) 37 UR 390, In Re Prudential Assurance Co's Trust Deed 
[1934] 1 Ch 338, Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388. 
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1. The time at which effectiveness should be determined 
The question whether a contract is acceptable or ineffective may differ depending on the time at 
which such reasonableness is determined t. 
- Facts may intercede between the making of the contract and the coming to court of the restraint, 
and these may influence the effectiveness of the contract 2. 
- The dynamism of public policy must not be over -estimated 3; too much emphasis is sometimes 
placed on this factor by South African authors 4. Yet changes to public policy may impact 
on effectiveness even if the facts of a case remain more or less similar over time. 
2. The time at which effectiveness should be determined: England and Scotland 
It is trite in England and Scotland that questions of ineffectiveness have to be determined at the 
moment when the restraint is concluded 5. Both reasonableness inter partes and reasonableness in 
the public interest will be so determined 6. 
I. Heydon 133 and the distinction between different time issues cannot be accepted. 
2. Van den Heever J in Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312 seems to overlook this point; See 
generally on stability of circumstances Kerr 197. 
3. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312 but see the criticism supra Ch 2.3.2. 
4. See e.g. Van der Merwe 158. 
5. Already mooted by counsel in the context of a bond in Chesman v Nainby (172 ?) 2 Str 739 at 742. This might be 
one of the reasons for the later formalism; Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517 at 530 although it concerned 
consideration questions; Heydon 135 also mentioned Kimberley v Jennings (1836) 6 Sim 340 at 350 but the 
discussion of time here does not concern the effectiveness of a restraint; Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241 at 260; 
Jones v Lees (1856) 1 H & N 189 at 193; Benwell v Inns (1857) 24 Beav 307 at 311; Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man 
& G 969 at 976 -977; Nordenfelt 573 -574; Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Schott Segner & Co [1892] 3 Ch 447 
at 452 although it is not clear; Townsend v Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698 at 703 ex post facto occurrences would not 
"necessarily" invalidate a restraint; Dowden & Pook Ltd v Pook [1904] 1 KB 45 at 55; Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co 
At Phillips (1904) 91 LT 363 at 367, 369, 370 although the court made an exception; Attorney- General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia It Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1913] AC 781 at 797; British Reinforced Concrete 
Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 574; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 643; Palmolive Co (of 
England) Ltd v Freedman [1928] 1 Ch 264 at 271, 275 and 276; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Home [1933] Ch 935 at 
967; Routh v Jones [ 1947] 1 All ER 758 at 761; Cf however Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric 
Co Ltd [1955] 2 All ER 657 at 687 where the question was left open; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All 
ER 10 at 13; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 644; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 
1 WLR 1366 at 1377; Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1425; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's 
Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] QB 514 at 563; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1301; Texaco Ltd v 
Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 822 -823; A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay 
[1974] 3 All ER 616 at 618; Bridge v Deacons [1984] 1 AC 705 at 718; Rex Stewart Jefies Parker Ginsberg Ltd v 
Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 486; Watson v Prager [1991] 1 WLR 726 at 738, 749; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991 
1 All ER 418 at 426; Briggs v Oates [1991] 1 All ER 407 at 417; Silvertone Records Ltd v Mountfield [1993] 
EMLR 152 at 161, 169; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd [1994] EMLR 229 at 380; Anson 321 
Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406; Chitty 1193; Davies 497ff; Gurry 210; Treitel 401; See Heydon 133; Stewart v 
Stewart (1899) 1 F 1158 at 1166 creates the impression, but see 1168; Although not clear Ballachulish Slate 
Quarries Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 at 1110 -1111 although it was not finally decided; Hinton & Higgs (UK) 
Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1160; Gloag 572. 
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The principle has nevertheless been the root of considerable confusion. On the one hand, a very 
narrow view was sometimes taken '. Some authorities took this notion literally and ignored all 
future events. However, on the other hand, some very wide approaches have been proposed by 
other authorities: 
- Heydon 8 accepted that the extent to which a covenantor has actually learnt trade secrets or built 
up customers should be looked at in determining reasonableness. But it is impossible to see 
on what basis such events should be excluded from the general rule. 
- Lord Denning YfR in Shell 9 decided that reasonableness could also be determined by looking at 
circumstances that were unforeseeable at conclusion of the contract but which had 
impacted on the reasonableness of the clause. Yet his opinion was only a minority view in 
the particular case. 
The most acceptable view expressed in Scotland I° and England 11 is that reasonableness should be 
determined from the time when the contract is concluded. Reasonableness should be determined 
by looking at what was likely from this point. Strong authority does not exist on this point, but 
proper effect can be given to the necessary policy considerations if reasonableness is so determined 
12. Yet this principle must still be flexibly applied: 
- Some extension might be possible. Heydon 13 referred to the Australian High Court decision in 
Amoco where Gibb J 14 held that subsequent events could be considered in so far as they 
throw light on the circumstances existing at conclusion. This is acceptable as long it is not 
used as a means of considering unforeseeable subsequent events by the backdoor. 
6. Heydon McGill 344, Heydon 136; Cf contra Nathan supra Ch 10 but see Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 
335 at 338. 
7. See the criticism of Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 at 967 -968 infra Ch 6.1; Although the decision 
is difficult to understand Luck v Davenport-Smith [1977] 242 EG 73 at 90 but see 88; Nelson 40. 
8. Heydon IfcGill 344. 
9. Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 489 infra 1.3, See Trebilcock 326 -327; See also 
Lyne- Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293 at 1300; Heydon 135, 136 and the questions asked. 
10 Not clearly expressed in Scotland but see Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 
mentioned Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 infra although it is not clear if it was quoted for this purpose; 
McBryde 604; Walker 185. 
11. Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 at 976 -977, 978 accepted that extravagant contingencies could not be 
looked at in determining reasonableness; Nordenfelt 574; Palmolive Co (of England) Ltd v Freedman [1928] 1 Ch 
264 at 284; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 643, See Heydon 134; Vandervell Products Ltd v MacLeod 
[1957] RPC 185 at 191 stated that there was force in the argument; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 
623 at 644; Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1377; Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd 
[1977] 1 All ER 481 where Lord Denning at 488 -489 accepted that this is the orthodox position, See the majority 
view 493 -494 ; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406; Heydon 134 -135, 191 -192, 186. 
12. 
I- eydon 136. 
13 I4eydon McGill 344; Heydon 135 -136. 
to Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 1 ALR 385 at 409 -410. 
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- The discretion of the court to grant interdict may be used to discount some of the problems that 
will follow upon a too strict approach 15 
3. The time at which legality should be determined in South Africa 
The same approach as in England and Scotland was followed initially. Reasonableness had to be 
determined in the light of the circumstances existing at conclusion of the contract 16. The approach 
of the courts in South Africa was also sometimes very narrow 17, although it was similarly 
accepted that foreseeable facts could be considered 18. But a wholly different road has now been 
taken. 
It has been decided that the reasonableness of the restraint has to be determined at the moment 
when the court is asked to enforce it. The view had steadily developed in the Supreme Court 19, 
when Rabie CJ in the Appeal Court in Magna Alloys accepted that enforceability, and therefore 
also reasonableness, had to be determined at the time when the court is asked to enforce the 
restraint 20. This does not mean that the court will only look at events up to this point. Reasonable 
15 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 492. 
16. Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479 at 490, 497; Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330 at 335, 338; 
Vermeulen v Smit 1946 TPD 219 at 222; Schwartz v Subel 1948 (2) SA 983 (T) 989; Aling and Streak v Olivier 
1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 219, 225; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 649; Weinberg v Mervis 1953 (3) SA 863 
(C) 866 but see the interpretation 869 -870; Pest Control (Central Africa) Ltd v Martin 1955 (3) SA 609 (SR) 613; 
Savage and Pugh v Knox 1955 (3) SA 149 (N) 155; Baldwin & Lessing v Muller 1958 (2) SA 500 (T) 502; Filmer 
v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 579; HE Sergay Estate Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Romano 1967 (3) SA 1 (R) 2; 
Diner v Carpet Manufacturing Co of SA Ltd 1969 (2) SA 101 (D) 105; Wohlman v Buron 1970 (2) SA 760 (C) 
763; Tension Envelope Corp (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Zeller 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 348; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v 
Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 71; Biografie (Pvt) Ltd v Wilson 1974 (2) SA 342 (R) 347, See National Chemsearch 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1106; Malan v Van Jaarsveld 1972 (2) SA 243 (C) 245; Cansa 
(Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 67; Nel v Drilec (Pty) Ltd 1976 (3) SA 79 (D) 85; U -Drive Franchise 
Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 140; Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen 
1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 200; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 329; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) 
Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 403; Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 
226 (ZS) 234. 
17. See especially Schwartz, Malan, Aling, Baldwin, Filmer ibid and see the criticism in Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v 
Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330; Magna Alloys 894 presented the earlier view in very narrow terms. 
18. Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330 with reference to Heydon 134; Commercial & 
Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 234; Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 
1979 (3) SA 399 (C) 403; Schoombee 146 with reference to Christie (1st ed) 358 -359. 
19. Mooted but not decided in Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 507, Nathan 42 
and the criticism supra, Aronstam 25; Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 (3) SA 250 (SEC) 259 did 
not decide it; National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1105ff; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v 
Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312, See also 308 -309 and 315 where it was left open. 
20. Magna Alloys 894, 895 -896, 898, Annual Survey (1984) 129 -130; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v 
Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 686; J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 243; Book v Davidson 1989 
(1) SA 638 (ZS) 642; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 795; Sibex Engineering Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 499, 500, 502 -503; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) 
SA 328 (0) 330, 331; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 569; Rawlins v 
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foreseeability from the moment when the courts are asked to enforce restraints will probably also 
play some role 21, and the courts will, where relevant, determine whether a restraint would be 
enforceable during the entire duration of the restraint 22. But courts in South Africa now have a 
completely different point of departure. 
4. The different approaches: a comparison 
There are good reasons why the Magna Alloys approach is preferable to even the wider expression 
of the time principle in English law 23. The restraint of trade doctrine is based on public policy. Its 
main aim is the protection of the interests of the public 24. The English approach may produce 
results that are not founded on the actual public policy position of a given set of facts, and may 
lead to artificial and rigid decisions 25. The court in Aling 26 said it would be artificial and arbitrary 
to look at later factors, but the opposite is true. Lord Denning MR in Shell 27 stated that "the court 
never speculates as to what may happen if it knows for certain what has happened ". This is 
perhaps too strongly put, but it is certainly preferable that a case should be decided on actual facts. 
The temptation to look at unforeseeable events between the trial and the conclusion of the 
contract has always been very big 28, and this illustrates the artificiality of the English approach. 
There have, however, always been some reservations about the approach that is now followed in 
South Africa. It was previously explicitly rejected in South Africa 29. It is one of the shortcomings 
of the latest South African cases that these issues were not dealt with in any detail. Very few of the 
problems with this approach were discussed in Magna Alloys 30, while the Zimbabwean Court in 
Book laconically noted that the new approach would be "logical and just" 31 Some of the 
Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 540; Interest Computation Experts v Nel 1995 (1) SA 174 (T) 179; 
The Concept Factory v Hey! 1994 (2) SA 105 (T) 112; Kerr 477, 505; Kerr Tribute 189; Lubbe and Murray 261; 
Van der Merwe 158; Cf Trebilcock 69, 148 -151. 
21. Magna Alloys 895; Schoombee 146. 
22. Ibid. 
23. See also Hogarth J in Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 1 ALR 385, 
Heydon McGill 344 mentioned the risk that witnesses who could testify to the circumstances at conclusion might 
not be available later. 
24. National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1107, Magna Alloys 894; The court a 
quo in Shell UK Ltd y Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 492. 
25. National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1106 -1107. 
26. Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 219. 
27. Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [ 1977] 1 All ER 481 at 489. 
28. Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 1377; Heydon McGill 344 mentioned dicta where the 
rule was ignored. 
29. Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W); Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Minnitt 1979 (3) SA 399 
(C) 403. 
30. Schoombee 147 with reference to Magna Alloys 895, 898; Lubbe and Murray 261. 
31. Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 638 (ZS) 642. 
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conundra that may be caused by the new approach in South Africa, and possible answers to them, 
accordingly need to be analysed. 
4.1. The less serious objections to the new approach in South Africa 
The court in Allied Electric 32 complained that it would be possible to manipulate facts to ensure 
reasonableness if legality is determined when the restraint comes to trial. King J mentioned the 
example of the employer who provides his employee with a trade secret just to ensure that the 
restraint will be reasonable. But the courts should look at the function and position of the 
employee within the organisation of the employer. The reasonableness of the restraint will not be 
influenced if it is clear that the trade secret was not given to the employee as a normal incidence of 
his employment. Issues like these will not be problematic because the court will have to look at the 
facts as a whole. 
In Allied Electric 33 King J interpreted the notion that reasonableness had to be determined at the 
moment when the court is asked to enforce it as meaning that reasonableness would be determined 
at the time when a case comes to trial. He then urged that this may cause anomalies and injustices, 
because public policy may change from the time when action is instituted to the time when it 
comes to trial. But difficulties of this nature will seldom arise; public policy is not that dynamic. 
His criticisms might be relevant in a very small minority of cases. Events that arise after conclusion 
of the pleadings may, also in some cases, cause the legality to undergo some change. Yet such 
changes can be accommodated by allowing adjustments to pleadings, and the position of the denier 
can be protected by utilising the discretion which the court has in granting interdict 34. 
It has been contended that a contract cannot move from void to valid and vice versa 35. However, 
this problem is solved on a theoretical level by the approach which the courts now clearly follow in 
South Africa. In Magna Alloys Rabie CJ submitted that the question in these cases concerned 
enforceability, and he therefore concluded that the court had to ask whether it would lend its 
machinery to the enforcer at the time when it is asked to do so 36 
32. Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 331. 
33 Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330. 
34 Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 234 see the discussion infra 
Ch 15.1.1; See also on partial enforcement Schoombee 132. 
35 Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1377; See already Benwell v Inns (1857) 24 Beav 307 
at 311; Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 489, 493; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 406; 
McBryde 604; Walker 185. 
36. Magna Alloys 894 -895; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312; Book v Davidson 1989 (1) SA 
638 (ZS) 642 -643; Schoombee 147; Christie 437; See Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [19771 1 All ER 481 at 
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4.2. The importance of the contract as a planning device 
Parties have to be able to plan their contractual relationships for the future on the basis of events at 
conclusion, and it will lead to uncertainty and confusion if later events are considered in 
determining effectiveness. The position of the covenantor is not as problematic. The courts will be 
very critical of a covenantor who plans for ineffectiveness 37 (even though it might be quite 
common in practice). But the planning of the covenantee for an effective restraint from the 
moment of conclusion must not be undermined without good reason. 
The principle that the agreement is only unenforceable 38 is a theoretically satisfying explanation 
for considering post- conclusion events. The emphasis on remedy makes it possible to stress the 
time at which remedies should be granted 39, but it leaves lingering doubts 40. It does not address 
the real practical dilemma mentioned in the other legal systems. Yet there are two ways in which 
these problems can be solved. 
Legality should, firstly, not be determined by only narrowly looking at a precise point in time. 
Unforeseeable facts should be considered on a different plane from foreseeable facts. The courts 
should accept that certain events were not foreseeable from the moment of conclusion. They 
should be more reluctant to base decisions on such issues 41. In J Louw 42 Didcott J carefully 
stated that "account must also be taken of what has happened since then [that is since the time of 
contracting] and, in particular, of the situation prevailing at the time enforcement is sought ". Rabie 
CJ explicitly stated in Magna Alloys 43 that too narrow a view must not be taken of the time at 
which reasonableness should be determined. 
The doctrine will, secondly, have to adapt in other respects if the reasonableness is determined at 
the time when the court is asked to enforce the restraint. A more flexible approach towards 
489, Bridge L.1 did not seem to understand this point as put fonvard by Lord Denning, Russell 584 his criticism of 
Lord Denning cannot be accepted. 
37. Magna Alloys 896; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313; Roffey y Catterall Edwards & Goudre 
(Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 506. 
38. See supra Ch 12. 
39 Schoombee 147 and his comparison with the Roman Praetor and the English Chancellor; Christie 437. 
40. Lubbe and Murray 261 n13. 
41 See Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 489 he proposed a two stage process. 
42. j Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 243. 
43. Magna Alloys 895. 
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severability was taken in Magna Alloys, and this will play an important role in ensuring that 
unforeseeable events are properly accommodated 44. 
The new approach in South Africa may, even with all these protective mechanisms, leave the 
covenantee in an unsatisfactory position in a small minority of cases. In such cases the general 
theoretical position of Rabie CJ in Magna Alloys comes to the fore. Restraint of trade remains a 
public policy issue. The courts should do everything in their power to ensure that the doctrine 
does not work unfairly, but public interest is the conclusive aspect, and that should be the public 
interest at the moment when the case comes to court. Public interest must be determined in the 
most up to date manner, to ensure that such interests are properly and not unnecessarily guarded. 
4.3. Uncertainty 
Parties may be unclear about their legal position at any particular stage after conclusion of the 
restraint because the restraint may oscillate between legality and illegality 45. King J in Allied 
Electrical stated 46: "If a contract is invalid at one point but valid at another point in time the 
contracting parties would be like tennis players playing a game of tennis according to the rules of 
the game but with a constantly moving base line ". The proverbial base line will in most cases move 
very gradually if it moves at all 47. However, it is still conceivable that it will in some cases 
produce foot -faulting parties. 
The theoretical change made in South Africa will play an important role in countering these 
arguments. The restraint will only shuttle between enforceability and unenforceability and not 
between validity and voidness. However, many practical problems will remain: 
- The covenantee may find it very difficult to establish whether the covenantor is subject to the 
restraint at any particular stage. It will be difficult to determine for how long the restraint 
will be reasonable if he regards it as reasonable. The covenantee may find it difficult to 
determine when and if a restraint will become enforceable again if it has been 
unenforceable for a certain period. The enforcer in South Africa can probably attempt to 
enforce the restraint partially to ensure that he gains something from it, but it will still be 
problematic in some cases. 
44 There is an indication that Lubbe and Murray 262 was sensitive to this connection. 
45 Apparently Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241 at 260 at 260; Aling and Streak v Olivier 1949 (1) SA 215 (T) 219, 
225; See also Treitel 401. 
46. Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 330; Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All 
ER 481 at 492. 
47. A case like Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [ 1977] 1 All ER 481 is quite exceptional. 
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- Real difficulties will exist where the denier attempts to plan his affairs at a later stage. He may 
also find it difficult to determine for how long he will be bound if he regards the restraint as 
legal, and he must guard against a restraint that will rise from the dead to haunt him if he 
does not. Difficulty will be enhanced if it is within the power of the covenantee to make the 
restraint reasonable again 48. 
These problems will be cushioned to some extent: 
- The South African courts will firstly, probably not allow partial enforcement where it will 
prejudice the denier unreasonably 49 
- The discretion to grant specific performance may be utilised to achieve a fair result 50. 
- The court will hesitate to accept that certain facts will change the status of a restraint where it 
will be particularly harsh on one party. 
- Uncertainty will be reduced once the parties have asked the court to decide the issue. 
- The behaviour of the parties after conclusion of the contract will have to be considered. 
The last two points require expansion. 
4.4. Final settlement of disputes by the court 
In Shell 51 Bridge LJ maintained that remedies will be problematic in cases where a restraint is 
ineffective but may become effective again. He stated that it will often not be possible for the court 
to show when and in what circumstances the restraint will become effective again. However, the 
new approach in South Africa can accommodate these problems. The changes merely have the 
effect that reasonableness will be determined from the time at which the court is asked to enforce 
it. The court will have to determine reasonableness at this point in the same manner as they used to 
do from the moment of conclusion. They should ask themselves if possible future events that are 
likely to take place after they have been asked to enforce it should make the restraint either 
effective or ineffective, and then they must give one final decision. 
Schoombee S2, although cautious, suggested that the current approach towards the status of an 
illegal restraint and the time at which reasonableness will be determined may make it possible to 
48. Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 493, See Russell 584; Kerr (1982) 187 and his 
reservations. 
49 See infra Ch 14.5. 
50 See infra Ch 15. 
51 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [ 1977] 1 All ER 481 at 494, See also Russell 584; Probably the second 
criticism in Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241 at 260 was aimed at this. 
52. Schoombee 147; See Kerr Tribute 196 -197, See the criticism supra Ch 12.3; Cf Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage 
Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 492 and the interpretation of the decision of Denning U. 
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re -open a restraint of trade case 53. Yet it is doubtful whether this conclusion can be accepted on 
the South African approach. The new stance in South Africa is not that all unforeseeable events 
influencing reasonableness after conclusion of the contract will have to influence the legality of the 
contract at all times. The changes are decision based. This is inherent in the stress which Magna 
Alloys placed on the time at which the court is asked to enforce the restraint. It envisages that the 
most up to date decision on the restraint is made when the restraint comes before the court. It 
gives courts a power to suspend a contract in the sense that a judge may declare a restraint 
unenforceable even if it is clear that there was a time when the restraint was enforceable. It allows 
courts to enforce restraints that were unenforceable at some stage. But it does not give a power to 
suspend previous decisions or the ability to re -open a case if circumstances, which were 
unforeseeable at the first case, take place. To this extent the solution proposed in Magna Alloys 
seems to be an improvement on the suggestions which Lord Denning made on exceptional facts in 
Lostock. 
The policy that underlies the principle of res judicata is probably not sufficiently shifted by the new 
South African approach towards restraints. It will undermine the certainty and effect of court 
judgments if such judgments can be re- opened. Public policy in South Africa must be determined 
as realistically as possible after Magna Alloys, but this probably still means that it must be 
realistically determined in a particular case. Future circumstances can be discounted by looking at 
events that are foreseeable from the time when the court is asked to enforce the restraint 54 
4.5. Events in context 
Future events should be evaluated by looking at the behaviour of the parties after conclusion of the 
contract. There will be no difficulty where the change that has taken place does not alter the 
position between the parties. But complex fairness issues will arise where the parties acted in 
accordance with the legal position that preceded the intervening event. 
An interceding event that in isolation would cause a restraint to be reasonable will often work 
unfairly against the covenantor if the parties had previously and rightly ignored it because it was 
ineffective. The court will probably only consider a change of circumstances if: 
- It would not cause hardship to the covenantor where he organised his affairs in accordance with 
the previous position before it had changed. 
53 With reference to: Le Roux v Le Roux 1967 (1) SA 446 (A) 462 -463, Spencer Bower & Turner The Doctrine of 
Res Judicata (1969) par 172 -173. 
sa Magna Alloys 895; Van der Merwe 158. 
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- Not doing so would place the covenantee in an untenable position because he acted on the 
enforceability at a time when it was already foreseeable that it would be substantially legal. 
An intervening event that would in abstracto cause the contract to be ineffective may cause 
hardship to the covenantee if the parties had previously acted in terms of it. The question of 
hardship to the covenantee will now become a factor that will probably lead to the restraint still 
being enforced at the time when the court is asked to do so. One of the problems for a covenantee 
in a case with facts like Shell 55 would accordingly be to show such prejudice. It will probably be 
difficult to convince the courts of this. 
A specific restraint may theoretically oscillate between acceptability and ineffectiveness an infinite 
number of times. But the basic principles will remain the same. Reasonableness will have to be 
determined at the trial, and it will have to be established with reference to the manner in which the 
relationship between the parties has progressed. The Magna Alloys approach will allow the courts 
to strike the best possible compromise between the interests of the parties and a realistic 
determination of the interests of the public. However, three criticisms can still be levelled at it. 
It may be suggested that this whole process is open to abuse by the sly against the unwary. 
However, the reasonableness issue should also involve the consideration of these issues. It will 
definitely weigh heavily if it is shown that one of the parties cynically tried to abuse the rules and 
principles regarding the time at which reasonableness of the restraint should be determined. 
It may be suggested, with some justification, that the Magna Alloys approach can lead to increased 
conflict in restraint of trade relationships. The above mentioned solutions will serve as little 
consolation to the majority of contracting parties who do not intend or cannot go to court on their 
restraints. But from the point at which their relationships are at a given time the parties will have 
to examine their positions by taking a broad overview of possible intervening events with the 
potential to change the status of the contract. The previous behaviour will have to play an 
important role in the resolution of disputes between them. The way in which the courts will 
approach these cases should also impact on the manner in which parties sort out their conflicts 
regarding restraint of trade clauses when they do not go to court. 
It can finally be said that this approach stacks the odds against the enforcer. It will probably be 
quite easy for the covenantor to show that the change of the status quo position will seriously 
prejudice him where the intervening event in isolation would cause unreasonableness. Yet it will 
ss Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481. 
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mostly be more difficult for the covenantee to show that the restraint should be enforced although 
an intervening event ceteris paribus would make the restraint reasonable. But this cannot be helped 
in a legal system that stresses freedom of work. The work principle and the need for the 
covenantor to be able to organise his work affairs will dominate. Courts should nevertheless keep 
this issue in mind. The interests of the employee must also be carefully guarded. 
4.6. The time at which reasonableness should be determined: a foral conclusion 
It is unrealistic and artificial to expect restraint of trade principles to iron out all the creases that 
exist because a restraint runs over a period of time 56. Parties will merely have to accept that 
legality may be buffeted about by the winds of change. The new approach in South Africa will 
create some problems, but it will be more acceptable than the artificial stance in Scotland and 
England. It might be accepted in these jurisdictions although it would mean defying stare decisis 
57 
56 Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312. 
57. This was a strong objection Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 492, 493. 
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1. The wider impact of ineffectiveness of a restraint or fragments of a restraint 
on the effectiveness of the rest of a contractual relationship 
It is difficult to determine how the ineffectiveness of a particular clause will affect the rest of the 
contract. Three scenarios must be clearly distinguished for the purpose '. 
- It might sometimes be difficult to determine whether other obligations concluded by the parties 
will be effective if the restraint is ineffective 2. It has been stated that the question is 
whether the ineffective restraint is substantial consideration for other promises 3. But this 
test should only be applied in severance of consideration cases 4. A more precise and direct 
test would determine whether the main subject matter has been torn out of the contract'. 
- Courts will sometimes have to determine whether an obligation should be ineffective because it is 
consideration for an ineffective restraint. They must avoid unjustified gains for the 
covenantor 6. Judges have accepted that obligations cannot be enforced if they are made 
t. See the distinctions: Alec Lobb Ltd (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (GB) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173 at 186, 191; Treitel 
446, 451; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 359, 421 -422; Cf also Silvertone Records Ltd y Mountfield [1993] ENILR 
152 at 167 -168, 170 severability will not be allowed if the whole agreement is ineffective although it is doubtful 
whether it was correct on the facts. 
2. Wallis v Day (1837) 2 M & W 273 at 281; Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 at 
312, 314 -315, 318 -319; Rawlings v General Trading Co [1921] 1 KB 635 at 652; Rolfe v Rolfe (1846) 15 Sim 88; 
Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 2 All ER 657 at 688; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 
v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1966] QB 514 at 579 -580; Esso 321, 571 567; Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin 
[1966] 1 All ER 126 at 134, 137, 138; Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [1975] 
AC 571 578 -579 although the court here did not choose between the different possible tests, Cf Boorman 573; 
Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 403; Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (GB) Ltd [1983] 1 
WLR 87 at 107 but see the rejection on appeal 188, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (GB) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 
173 at 180 -181, 187 -188, 191 -192; Cf Gurry 219 stated that contracts will be enforceable in other respects if 
ineffective restraints are unenforceable. This is unacceptable; On the distinction between restraint of trade aspects 
and other aspects of trade unions: Swaine v Wilson (1889) 24 QBD 252 at 257, 260, 261, 263, Hornby v Close 
(1867) LR 2 QB 153 at 158, 159, 160 although it is unclear to what extent the decision was influenced by 
legislation that was relevant here, Sayer v The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (1903) 19 UR 122 
at 123, Burke v Amalgamated Society of Dyers [1906] 2 KB 583 at 590, Gozney v Bristol Trade & Provident 
Society [1909] 1 KB 901 at 910, 912, 918 -919, 921, 925, Mudd v General Union of Operative Carpenters & Joiners 
(1910) 26 UR 518 at 519, Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [1910] 1 KB 506 at 516, 518- 
519, 523 -524, 528, Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners [1912] AC 421 at 435 -437, 437, 441- 
442, Osborne v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1911] 1 Ch 540 at 553, Thomas v Portsmouth "A" 
Branch of the Ship Constructive Association (1912) 28 TLR 372 at 374, Miller v Amalgamated Engineering Union 
[1938] 1 Ch 669 at 685 -686, See the discussion of these cases Chitty 16 -169; Gloag 511; McBryde 590 simply 
accepted that a contract will remain effective even if a restraint is illegal but this is too wide as a general 
proposition, See the more balanced view 606, 608, Cf also the general discussion 619 -620; Walker 191. 
3. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 422, Chitty 16 -170 although the more acceptable question was asked under the 
consideration head; Gurry 219 accepted that "the contract will fail in toto" if it is the whole or main consideration 
on the part of the person restrained; Walker 191. 
4. Treitel 452; See Christie Encyclopaedia 601. 
5. Treitel 451; Chitty 16 -170 but see the criticism supra; See also Anson 359 -360 for a further possible solution. 
6. Cf Esso 295. 
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wholly or substantially in consideration for the ineffective restrictions 7. Conversely, the 
courts should allow enforcement of an obligation where the restraint is clearly insubstantial 
consideration for it. It will be disproportionate to force a covenantor to perform an 
ineffective restraint before he can get any counter -performance if the restraint only plays a 
very small role as consideration. But it might become difficult to draw lines. Enforcement 
of counter -obligations might still work unfairly towards the covenantee if he has to 
perform obligations for which part, albeit a small part, of the consideration has fallen away 
R. It would be ideal if the courts could flexibly reduce counter -obligations, but this will be 
problematic. It will probably be more acceptable, in marginal cases, to take a narrow view 
of this form of severability and to leave these cases to be solved by the notions of relative 
enforceability 9. 
- In the third type of case the question will be whether a restraint may still be effective even though 
parts of it are ineffective for being in restraint of trade. This is the one question to which 
attention will be paid in this chapter. 
2. Severability and partial enforcement of different restraints or different parts of 
restraints 
Severability and partial enforcement issues are extremely problematic. It may, accordingly, be 
argued that severability should be narrowly applied because there are sufficient alternative methods 
for limiting the scope of a restraint; but none of the alternative devices for limiting restraints make 
severability redundant. 
- Interpretation will play an important limiting role, but it will be constrained by the words that the 
parties used 10 
- Implied protection of trade secrets and goodwill provided by law is often inadequate 11 
- Interdicts or injunctions to enforce parts of clauses will only be accepted where the whole is 
effective or the part is severable 12. 
7. Wyatt v Kreglinger and Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793 at 808; In Re Prudential Assurance Co's Deed [1934] 1 Ch 338 
at 341 -342; Bull v Pitney -Bowes Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 273 at 284 -285 although it was not necessary to decide these 
issues in the particular case, See Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 410, Heydon 291; Spence v Mercantile Bank of 
India Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 390 severability was not discussed but the court regarded a restrictive condition as 
severable; Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 at 391 -392 especially 392; Anson 
357 did not properly distinguish this issue; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 422 but see the criticism supra; Chitty 16- 
170; Heydon 280, 291; Treitel 446 -447; Winfield 327. 
Heydon 292. 
9. See supra Ch 12.4. 
10. Trebilcock 74, 243; See on the comparison with interpretation: Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 at 580, 
Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1486. 
11 See the criticism of Kerr (1982) 188 of National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 
(T) 1107. 
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Severability will therefore continue to play a fundamentally important role in the restraint of trade 
field. 
The position regarding severability in Scotland, England and pre Magna Alloys South Africa is 
opaque 13. Ineffective aspects can only be severed from restraint of trade clauses under very 
specific conditions. However, it is unclear what these circumstances are. This is an attempt to 
present this area of law systematically. Some standard phrases, like "blue pencil test" and 
"notional" or "grammatical" severability, have therefore been avoided as they have become 
unmanageable. 
3. The orthodox approach: England and Scotland 
The English courts initially severed parts of clauses that were ineffective without investigating a 
theoretical basis and limits; very formal rules were followed 14. However, more substantive 
grounds have now been laid down: 
- Despite some dissents 15, it is trite that parts that are too wide will only be deleted; words, or the 
word order of a restraint clause, will not be altered 16 
12. Infra Ch 15.1.3. 
13 Carney v Herbert [1985] 1 AC 301 at 309; Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty 
Ltd [1975] AC 571 578; Silvertone Records Ltd v Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 at 168; Anson 357; Christie 
Encyclopaedia 601; McBryde 605 stated that many different tests have been formulated but that no single 
formulation can be made; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1111 -1112. 
14 Chesman v Nainby (1727) 2 Str 739; Mallan v May (1843) 11 M & W 653 at 669; Tallis v Talls (1853) 1 E & 
B 391 at 412 although the severability and remedy issues were not clearly distinguished; Green v Price (1845) 13 M 
& W 695 at 699; Price v Green (1847) 16 M & W 346 at 352, But see the explanation Baker y Hedgecock (1888) 
39 ChD 520 at 522 -523; Nicholls v Stretton (1847) 10 QB 346, But see the discussions Baines v Geary (1887) 35 
ChD 154 at 159 -160, Baker v Hedgecock supra; Bishop v Kitchin (1868) 38 LJQB 20; Davies Turner & Co y 
Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 656, See Hooper & Ashby v Willis (1905) 21 TLR 691 at 692 where a wide view of this 
cases was taken; Rogers v Maddocks [1892] 3 Ch 346 at 358 -359 and Nordenfelt 561, But see the interpretation E 
Underwood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 305; Bromley y Smith [1909] 2 KB 235 at 241 although more 
specific requirements started to surface; William Robinson & Co Ltd v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451 at 459 although the 
court here was probably not dealing with severability proper; Lewis & Lewis v Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 64; 
Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292 at 297 -298, 299, 300 -301; British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v 
Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 572 -573 but see infra, Christie Encyclopaedia 601 -602; For more modern authorities 
where a too wide view was taken: Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 647, Routh y Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 
183. See the criticism of Marsh 364. The court on appeal Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 758 at 760, 763 did not 
confirm or reject the approach of the court a quo but it expressed doubts 764; The principles were not properly 
considered in Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1427, 1422 and 1424; Some parts of Chitty 16 -168; 
See Marsh 352 -355 although the author adhered to a broader interpretation of "formal ". 
15 Cf Bryson v Whitehead (1822) 1 Sim & St 74 at 77 where the restraint in a deed that was executed in terms of 
an agreement was set down in more limited terms than was provided for in the agreement. Both parties were 
willing that the agreement should be so modified; Baines y Geary (1887) 35 ChD 154 relying on Price v Green and 
Nicholl v Stretton ibid although none of them went this far, See Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478 at 
486 where the correctness of this case was doubted, See Continental Tyre and Rubber (GB) Co Ltd v Heath [19131 
29 TLR 308 at 310 accepted that Baines conflicted with Baker y Hedgecock infra, Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson 
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- Courts will only allow severance by deleting if it does not change the meaning of what remains; 
the effective part must be independent 17. 
- Only clauses that the parties regarded as independent may be severed. Severance will only be 
allowed if the parties agreed to separate covenants; it will not take place where it alters the 
"scope and intention of the agreement" 18, or where there is in truth but one and not two 
separate covenants 19 
(1930) 46 UR 147 at 149 also attempted to show that Baines was of doubtful authority see Chitty 16 -168. See the 
narrow interpretations although it is difficult to see how they can be justified: Baker y Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 
520, Perls v Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch 149 at 156 -157, E Undenvood & Son Ltd v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 305, 
Chard v Hammond (1904) 48 Sol Jo 773, Winfield 327: Dubowski & Sons y Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478 at 483- 
484, 483 where Lord Esher decided that he was not bound by Baines v Geary but that he had to decide the case on 
principle. He did however apply Baines v Geary principles, See the criticism Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson 
(1930) 46 TLR 147 at 149; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 532 -533, See however Lord Ardwall 534. See 
Heydon 284 preferred the former. 
16. Baker y Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 520; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 at 580. Although the issue was not . 
decided on the facts here 581 and see the Appeal 587; Woods v Thornburn (1897) 41 Sol Jo 756 although it was not 
discussed in these terms; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 640; Continental Tyre and Rubber (GB) Co Ltd v 
Heath [1913] 29 TLR 308 at 310, Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 477; Konski y Peet [1915] 1 Ch 530 at 539; 
Hepworth Manufacturing Co Ltd v Ryott [1920] 1 Ch 1 at 12; Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147 
at 149 and M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 814 at 820 probably all failed on this ground although 
principles were not clearly expressed; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 647; T Lucas & Co 
Ltd v Mitchell [1974] Ch 129 at 135 -137; Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 at 1486; 
Anson 357; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 422 -423; Chitty 16 -167; Gooderson 424; Trebilcock 73; Treitel 449; 
Although it is not clear British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68; Walker 
191. 
17. Baker v Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 520; Perls v Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch 149 at 156 -157; E Undenvood & Son Ltd 
v Barker [1899] 1 Ch 300 at 304; Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 at 24 -25; Mason 742; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 
3 KB 571 at 593, 577 but see the criticism infra 3.1; Gaumont -British Picture Corp Ltd v Alexander [1936] 2 All 
ER 1686 at 1692 although it was not discussed in detail; Routh v Jones [ 1947] 1 All ER 179 182, 183, See Marsh 
364; Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 385; Chitty 167; See the criticism of Davies 
Turner in Gare The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (1935) and the comments Gooderson 424 who said the criticisms 
were unfair; Gooderson 424; Anson 357; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 423 although this is not properly 
distinguished from further elements; Meikle v Meikle (1895) 3 SLT 204; Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd y 
Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71; The criticism of Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 by Forte 21 -22 is 
too narrow; Walker 191. 
18. Inherent in Mason 745, See Marsh 356; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 580; British Reinforced 
Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Schelff [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 573 but see the criticism supra, Cf also the criticism 
Marsh 361 -362; Clarke Sharp and Co Ltd v Solomon (1921) 37 TLR 176 at 178 Atkin LJ leaned towards this view, 
It is not clear whether Bankes LJ denied severance in this case on this or the previous ground although it seems the 
emphasis was on the previously mentioned ground; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 640; Routh y Jones 
[1947] 1 All ER 179 at 182 -183 although the case can in places be submitted to the same criticism as British 
Reinforced Concrete, See the criticism of Marsh 364; Silvertone Records Ltd y Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 at 
168; Anson 358; Chitty 16 -168; Farwell 70 -71; Gurry 286; Gooderson 424; Heydon 280ff; Treitel 449 -451; 
Winfield 327; Christie Jur Rev 301 said that the courts would separate unless the restriction was framed as a unity. 
This is correct although it is approached from the wrong end; Goldsoll y Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292 is often used to 
explain the modern doctrine: Chitty 16 -168, Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 425 -426, Treitel 449 -450 but the case 
itself was not clearly decided on such grounds, Goldsoll 296 was even critical of Mason, Only Swinfen Eady 301 
came close to discussing further issues, Cf Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147 at 149 where the 
court accepted that the doctrine was applied very liberally in Goldsoll. An attempt was however made in Express to 
justify the wider approach in Goldsoll, See also the explanation Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 
266 at 269 -270 on the basis that Goldsoll concerned a sale of goodwill while Attwood concerned post -employment, 
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Recent English cases have again confirmed these principles. In Systems Reliability 20 the second 
requirement was emphasised, and in Business Seating all the different elements of the severability 
test were clearly set out by the court 21. 
3.1. Is there a further requirement? 
It is, furthermore, problematic to determine whether the law also requires that only trivial parts of 
clauses can be severed. In Mason Lord Moulton 22 stated that: 
"the court may, and in some cases will, enforce a part of a covenant in restraint of 
trade, even though taken as a whole the covenant exceeds what is reasonable. But 
in my opinion, that ought only to be done in cases where the part so enforceable is 
clearly severable, and even so only in cases where the excess is of trivial 
importance, or merely technical and not a part of the main purport and substance of 
the clause ". 
He continued: 
"It would ... be pessimi exempli if when an employer had exacted a covenant 
deliberately framed in unreasonably wide terms, the courts were to come to his 
assistance and, by applying their ingenuity and knowledge of the law, carve out of 
this void covenant the maximum of what he might validly have required ". 
It is, however, not clear whether it was merely perceived as a requirement for determining whether 
a certain aspect was indeed so separate that it could be severed 23, or if it was intended as a further 
requirement. 
See infra 3.1, Heydon 281 merely referred to this case as an example of the principle that the court will only delete 
from a clause. 
19 First mooted in Baker v Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 520 at 523; Caribonum Co Ltd v Le Couch (1913) 109 LT 
385 at 388; SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 at 423; Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 120 
LT 538 at 540; Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 593, 578 although it is not consistent with 577, See Marsh 
360 -361 is too narrow; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 640 -641, 646 -647, Treitel 449 cannot be accepted, 
See Marsh 362 -363; Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 647; T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell 
[1974] Ch 129 at 135 -137, Applied in Anscombe & Ringland v Butchoff (1984) 134 NUJ 37; Stenhouse Australia 
Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 403; Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 487; 
See the criticism of Anson 359; Chitty 16 -168; See Trebilcock 74; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 and see the two 
distinct restraints especially 532, 534, See the comments of Gloag 574 are probably too general; See Hinton & 
Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 453 where there were clearly separate restrictions; This has been 
emphasised by Scottish authors: Gloag 574, McBryde 605, Scott Robinson 156 -157, Walker 191, Woolman 254. 
20. Systems Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377 at 385. 
21. Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 734 -735, Davies 499. 
22. Mason 745; See Marsh 357; See Trebilcock 72 -73. 
23. See Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 646 and SV Nevanas & Co v Walker Foreman [1914] 1 Ch 413 at 
422; See the discussion infra. 
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Younger LJ in Attwood 24 took up the issue. The judge firstly emphasised that the court should be 
slow to accept that a restriction is severable in employment cases. He required that severance 
should not "in the general case be allowed ". But he also went one step further. He noted that 
severability in these cases cannot merely be allowed where severance can technically be made, and 
he then quoted the statement of Lord Moulton in Mason mentioned above. The point made in 
Mason was apparently viewed as a further requirement for severance, although Younger LJ 
expressly limited his decision to employment contracts, leaving open the position as to sale of 
goodwill restraints. 
Heydon 25 therefore accepted that the courts will treat employment contracts differently from sale 
of goodwill agreements when it comes to severability. The author confirmed the existence of a 
further requirement expressed above, although he also acknowledged that the same principle was 
not applied in sale of goodwill cases 26. This last point is correct in so far as it is accepted that the 
third requirement does not apply to sale of goodwill restrictions. The careful limitation of the 
principles in Mason to employment contracts, and the reservations which Younger LJ in Attwood 
had about applying these principles to all contracts, became settled law in later cases. 
Yet it is doubtful whether this principle will still apply even in employment cases. Authority leans 
against accepting a further and separate requirement: 
- Even before Attwood the court in SV Nevanas 27 decided that there would be no further 
requirement if different parts of the clause were expressed in such a way that it amounted 
to severance by the parties. Sargant J contended that a third requirement was not stated in 
Mason, and that the court was merely disclaiming a wider approach. He suggested that the 
second part of the dictum concerning trivial aspects was merely a call for realistic 
interpretation 28. 
- The SV Nevanas case was rejected by Lord Younger in Attwood 29, but Lord Sterndale 30 seemed 
to have been satisfied with it. 
- After Attwood the approach was expressly rejected in Putsman 31 and especially in T Lucas 32, 
where the court was critical of its development. 
24. Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 at 593 -595, See Christie Encyclopaedia 602; See Gloag 574. 
25. Heydon 283; Trebilcock 72, Cf also 242 this was not always done; See Christie Encyclopaedia 602 it would 
"especially" impact on employment contracts. 
26. See British Reinforced Concrete v Shelf [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 572 -573 Younger II did not apply the requirement 
he had himself helped develop; See Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [ 1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270 although it is not 
clear which of the principles enumerated in Attwood is being distinguished, See Treitel 450. 
27. SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman 1914 1 Ch 413 at 422 -423, Marsh 357 -358. 
28. SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman 1191.4] 1 Ch 413 at 423. 
29. Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 at 595. 
30 Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 at 577. 
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Heydon admitted that there are cases where more than trivial aspects were severed 33. He 
conceded in a later article that there probably is no further requirement 34 
Many of the cases that may be invoked to support such a prerequisite can be explained away or 
criticised. 
- Horwood 35 concerned a different type of situation. Here the issue was whether the contract 
could exist if the whole of a restrictive clause was struck out 36 
- In Rex Stewart 37 the dictum of Lord Moulton in Mason was quoted but the court did not apply 
it to the facts of the case. The issue was not specifically decided but Glidewell LJ appeared 
to prefer the authorities where this further requirement was rejected or ignored. The judge 
only emphasised other requirements. 
- In Living Design 38 Lord Coulsfield apparently thought that the further requirement still formed 
part of Scots law, but the court did not look at the further developments that had taken 
place in England since Mason. 
There is some sense in the Attwood case, and this should be built upon: 
- The attitude of courts - and it cannot be more strongly put - towards severability should perhaps 
still be influenced by the relative bargaining and financial strength of the parties 39. The 
relevant factors like bargaining power will have to be investigated as such. 
should be more reluctant to cut down restraints that are drawn up in terrorem, although 
this cannot apply consistently to one type of contract 40 
- Importance of part of a restraint will be a pivotal indicator that the ineffective part is not properly 
severable according to other requirements. 
Yet it would be unacceptable to add triviality as a further requirement. 
31 Putsman v Taylor [ 1927] 1 KB 637 at 640 -641, 643, 645 -646. 
32. T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [1974] Ch 129 at 135 -137; Gurry 224; Treitel 450. 
33 Heydon 283, The test was not mentioned in most of the restraint cases: Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent 
[1965] 1 QB 623 at 647, Scorer v Seymour Jones [1966] 1 WLR 1419 at 1422, 1424, Stenhouse Australia Ltd v 
Phillips [1974] AC 391 at 403, Anscombe & Ringland v Butchoff (1984) 134 NLJ 37, Business Seating 
(Renovations) Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 734 -735; Chitty 16 -172; Anson 356 but see infra. 
34 Heydon McGill 357; Davies 499. 
35 Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 at 318 -319; See also Goldsoll v Goldman 
[1915] 1 Ch 292 at 299 although it is not clear, Marsh 359 does not assist; See also Ropeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 
120 LT 538 at 540; Express Dairy Co Ltd v Jackson (1930) 46 TLR 147 at 149 mentioned but not applied on the 
facts; Jenkins v Reid [ 1948] 1 All ER 471 at 481 where it was not necessary to make any final decision although the 
court doubted it; Heydon 283 relied on this and the Jenkins case. 
36 Marsh 359. 
37. Rex Stewart Jeffries Parker Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [ 1988] IRLR 483 487. 
38. Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [ 1994] IRLR 69 at 71. 
39. Routh v Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 183 -184 although too much emphasis was placed on the 
employer /employee distinction; Cf Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 426; Cf Anson 356. 
ao Silvertone Records Ltd v Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 at 168, 170. 
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3.2. Severability and separate consideration 
In Putsman 41 Salter J accepted that separate consideration would be a distinct requirement 
although he did not have to go into it on the facts of the case. On the other hand Treitel 42 rejects 
this view. He does not elaborate his criticism, but he refers to Goldsoll 43 as a case where 
severance was allowed although there was no separate consideration for the restraint. In Price 44 
the court accepted that consideration was paid for the restraint. It was acknowledged that the 
price paid might have been smaller if the restraint had been narrowed down, but the issue under 
discussion here was not really analysed. The court gave three reasons why severance could still 
take place: 
- The point was only conjecture. This will certainly be a problem in many of these cases. It will 
often be difficult to establish to what extent a restraint relates to consideration. 
- It was a covenant under seal and consideration was not necessary. Consideration is not necessary 
on bonds, but that should be separated from the question whether part of a restraint in a 
bond that is made for a specific consideration can be maintained if it is struck down to the 
extent that it cannot be properly related to consideration any more 45 
- The ineffective part would only be "void" and not "illegal ". This statement is difficult to 
understand and has already been criticised 46. It seems that the court held that the extent to 
which public policy is offended by an unreasonable restraint is not so great that 
consideration could be affected by it. Yet this notion has certainly been rejected by other 
authorities 47. 
There are no cases where these issues were really discussed. However, it is conceivable that it 
may, in some cases, be problematic, and the difficulties will be exacerbated by the demise of the 
requirement that a severable restraint must be trivial. A court will not allow severability where- 
- The restraint was precisely quantitatively related to every aspect of counter -performance. 
- The counter -performance cannot be divided into different parts, or where acceptable and 
ineffective parts of the restraint cannot be alternative sufficient considerations for counter - 
performance. 
41. Putsman v Taylor [ 1927] 1 KB 637 at 640. 
42. Treitel 450. 
43 Goldsoll v Goldman [ 1915] 1 Ch 292. 
44. Price v Green (1847) 16 M & W 346 at 354; See the criticism of Marsh 353 n90. 
45 See Marsh 353. 
46. Supra Ch 2.1. 
47. See supra 1. 
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- Neither the effective nor the ineffective part is clearly substantial consideration for counter - 
performance. The problem may, for instance, come to the fore in garden leave cases where 
an employee is being paid merely for submitting himself to a restraint for a certain time at 
the end of his employment. 
The nature, extent, and function of consideration could accordingly be of great importance in 
determining severability. But it is doubtful whether it will be necessary to state this as a separate 
requirement. The issue of consideration will, conceivably, be an important factor that will be 
considered in answering the third requirement mentioned above. A court will probably find that 
ineffective parts of restraints will not be severable if precise and indivisible consideration is given 
for both the legal and ineffective parts of the restraint. 
4. Severability in South Africa before Magna Alloys and Chemsearch 
Courts in South Africa before Chemsearch and Magna Alloys followed principles that are very 
similar to those that apply in England. It was regarded as the minimum requirement that the court 
would not change or add words to a contract, but it was also emphasised that severance could be 
made if some separation was made by the parties themselves 48. The third requirement proposed by 
Younger LT in Attwood 49 was emphatically rejected in South Africa in Brooks 50, although it was 
incorrectly assumed that the court in that case proposed a requirement for all types of restraints. 
5. The partial enforcement approach: Chemsearch and Magna Alloys 
However, the courts in South Africa have now developed a different approach 51. They have 
accepted that the question in a restraint of trade case is one that pertains to enforceability 52 at the 
time when the restraint is brought before the court 53. Hence they have stressed that the problem 
a8 KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429 at 436 -437 at 441; African Theatres Ltd v D'Oliviera 1927 WLD 122 
at 127 -128; Gordon v Van Blerk 1927 TPD 770 at 776; Empire Theatres Co Ltd v Lamor 1910 WLD 289 at 292; 
New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 81 -82 and Brooks and Wynberg v New United 
Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1936 TPD 296 at 303; Pieterse v Cilliers 1945 (2) PH A.31 53 at 54; Witwatersrand 
Trustees (Pty) Ltd v Rand Steel Products (Pty) Ltd 1946 WLD 140 at 154 where the basis for reasonableness was 
not really discussed; Tolgate Holdings Ltd v Olds 1968 (2) PH A.78 (W); Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (0) 
611 -612; Cowan v Pomeroy 1952 (3) SA 645 (C) 652; Filmer v Van Straaten 1965 (2) SA 575 (W) 579; Christie 
438 -439; Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 80; Schoombee 131. 
49 Supra 3.1. 
50 New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 80ff with reference to Nevanas, Goldsoll and 
Putsman; Cf Tolgate Holdings Ltd v Olds 1968 (2) PH A.78 (W) where it was stressed that a certain part was also 
minor, Annual Survey (1968) 101. 
51 Van der Menve 230; See Heydon McGill 360 also suggested a more flexible approach in other legal systems. 
52. Supra Ch 12. 
53 Supra Ch 13. 
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here is one of "partial enforcement" rather than "severability ". In the Appeal Court in Magna 
Alloys Rabie CJ also supported the partial enforcement principle 54, although the issue was not 
discussed in any detail because it was not relevant in the case. The only qualification mentioned 
was that partial enforcement had to take place in the light of public interest 55. Hence, the general 
principle was really developed in Provincial cases that preceded Magna Alloys 56. Iviagna Alloys is 
only important for accepting partial enforcement in principle. The issue was more deeply analysed 
in other decisions before and after it. 
On the one hand the radical view in Drewtons 57 must be approached with great caution. Van Den 
Heever J took an extreme view on many restraint of trade issues 58, and she then came to the 
conclusion that restraints can be partially enforced. However, she did not discuss the 
circumstances under which this could take place. The judge merely compared the position of the 
court here with the position in maintenance cases. Yet the two are not comparable 59. Partial 
enforcement can never be allowed on the same wide grounds. 
On the other hand the court in Coin 60 followed a too narrow approach. The court held that an 
illegal clause could only be enforced if it did not have to write a new contract for the parties and if 
the unenforceable part could be severed from the enforceable part without changing the intention 
of the parties. The judgment in Coin can be faulted on many grounds. 
Spoelstra J relied heavily on the submission in Magna Alloys that restraints of trade should be 
treated in accordance with the principles that apply with regard to all contracts contrary to public 
54. Magna Alloys 896; Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 686; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd 
v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 31; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 794; Coin 
Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 569; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 
(1) SA 328 (0) 330 -331; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488, 500, 503. 512; 
Van der Merwe 158; Kerr Tribute 189. 
55 Magna Alloys 896; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 796. 
56 National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T), Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) 
SA 305 (C) infra; Cf Roffey y Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 507 where the principle 
was not yet accepted but where the court contended that the existing law was unacceptable, See Nathan 42 and Otto 
211 -212; The cases that proceeded National Chemsearch but preceded Magna Alloys purported to follow it but they 
took a narrow view: Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v Kruger 1979 (4) SA 337 (W), Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 
1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 333, 334, Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 862. Petre & Madco 
(Pty) Ltd O. T -Chem v Sanderson -Kasner 1984 (3) SA 850 (W) 859, See Annual Survey (1984) 130 -131, 
Schoombee 149. 
57. Drewtons (Pty) Ltd y Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312, 313, See the criticism Schoombee 148; Cf also the very 
wide approach of Stegmann J in Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 503, 512. 
58. See supra Ch 2.3.2. 
59 See the criticism Schoombee 133. 
60. Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 569ff; See also a similarly narrow view Gero v 
Linder 1995 (2) SA 132 (Q) 136 and the further explanation of the judge of his decision in Powertech Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0). 
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policy 61. He then concluded that the same severability principles applying to other contracts 
contrary to public policy should also apply here 62. The court showed that the classic severability 
principles were still accepted in another area of public policy in Sasfin 63. However, the dictum 
from Magna Alloys is taken out of context, while the conclusion drawn from Sasfin cannot be 
supported. 
- Sasfin, where quoted, concerned the question whether the contract could exist despite several 
clauses being illegal. Partial enforcement only comes into play where the question is 
whether a certain illegal clause can be limited or cut down 64. This distinction may 
sometimes be difficult to draw, but it is a fundamental aspect of the current South African 
restraint of trade law. 
- The statement taken from Magna Alloys was not made with severability in mind. The court in 
Magna Alloys did not contend that all contracts potentially against public policy should be 
dealt with along the same lines. If this had been the intention of Rabie CJ, then other 
esoteric elements of the restraint of trade doctrine suggested in the case would have had to 
be better explained. 
The principle that these contracts should be judged in accordance with public policy does not 
mean that all diversity under the rubric of public policy will now be jettisoned 65 Differences will 
be acceptable as long as they are based on broad public policy rules and principles, or on the 
distinctions between different sets of facts that may come before the court 65. Here the peculiar 
position which the courts take on the legal status and the time at which reasonableness should be 
determined, and the extraordinary factual and public policy problems of restraints, may justify the 
novel partial enforcement approach. 
The court in Magna Alloys stated that the question would be whether a part of (Afrikaans: 
gedeelte van) a clause can be enforced. Spoelstra J interpreted this as meaning that the question 
61 Magna Alloys 892; See also Schoombee 149 although he did not draw the same conclusion. 
62. Cf New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 80 although it was concerned with the 
problem of the possible further requirement supra 4; Cf also Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637 at 643 and 645 
although the court here was however concerned with the very specific issue. 
63 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 15 but see 31 actually accepted that wider partial enforcement 
would be possible in restraint of trade cases. 
64 Christie 458 -459. See also 464 -465; Kerr 133 -134 is confusing although the most acceptable reading seems to 
be that he thought that the severability in restraint of trade cases was made on similar grounds as in other cases but 
that it was changed by Magna Alloys; Lubbe and Murray 288 also asked whether this distinction should not be 
drawn; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 31; Supra 1. 
65 Christie 459ff. 
66 See Baines Motors v Piek 1955 (1) SA 534 (A) 551 see the narrower approach 539, The distinction was 
probably intended to have wider implication than was thought by the court in National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1108, See Lubbe and Murray 288 they argue that the court irl Baines believed 
restraints to be on a special plane but that does not seem acceptable, See also Christie 459, Ellison Kahn "Lex 
Commissoria, Penalties and the Doctrine of Severance" (1955) 72 SALI 119. 
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would still be whether a physically separate part could be enforced. However, the court in Magna 
Alloys probably referred to an abstract part of a wider clause. The discussion in Magna Alloys of 
the theoretical framework for partial enforcement confirms that the court departed from the old 
severability approach. The decisions to which Rabie CJ referred all accepted a wider view. A more 
comprehensive discussion of this issue in Magna Alloys would have been more illuminating 67, but 
the view that was taken in Magna Alloys is clear enough to exclude the interpretation of Spoelstra 
J. The court in Coin finally had to accept that some of the dicta in Magna Alloys could be 
differently interpreted. Rabie CJ in Magna Alloys chose his words carefully. He preferred to talk 
of partial enforcement, and he probably meant something different by using this phrase. 
Spoelstra J finally contended that almost all partial enforcement would be possible in terms of 
National Chemsearch. However, the court in National Chemsearch did not take a laissez -faire 
view of partial enforcement. The court set down strict rules. It created a mechanism that lies 
somewhere between narrow severability and a wide free -for -all. Spoelstra J in the end applied 
criteria that are mentioned in Chemsearch or come close to those mentioned by Botha J in 
Chemsearch 68. 
The judges in some of the latest decisions also hark back to the traditional view of severability 
where the court has to abide by the intention of the parties 69. The judicial reticence in Coin and 
other cases that proceeded it cannot be justified. The approach of the "new- reactionaries" must 
accordingly be rejected. 
The basic principles that should now apply in this area were laid down in National Chemsearch 70. 
The most important aspect will be that the court will view the entire process in terms of public 
policy 71. The courts should be prepared to restrict a clause whether by adding, deleting, or 
changing words contained in the clause, although partial enforcement will only take place within 
narrow parameters. Botha J at times put it very widely: he stated that the courts will have a 
"general discretionary power" partially to enforce restraints 72. But he later emphasised that 
67. See supra. 
68. See infra. 
69. Interest Computation Experts v Nel 1995 (1) SA 174 (T) 178 -180; The Concept Factory v Heyl 1994 (2) SA 105 
(T) 112, 114. 
70. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd If Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1112ff with reference to Corbin vol 
6A (1962) para 1390 66 -74, Williston Contracts 3rd ed vol 14 para 1638 at 111 -113, para 1647 at 293 -297, Heydon 
283 -291; Schoombee 131, 148. 
71. Van der Merwe 159; Some authorities have doubted whether public policy can play a role: Lubbe & Murray 287, 
De Bruin 1979 De Rebus 202 -203. Other authorities have accepted that public policy should play some role see: 
Beuthin (1968) 85 SALI 194 at 198, Hunt Annual Survey of South African Law (1962) 115 and the cases 
mentioned, But these authorities are discussing different problems that do not come into play here. 
72. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1114. 
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restraints will only be partially enforced in appropriate cases and the following requirements were 
then laid down 73: 
- The party seeking partial enforcement must raise the issue and lay a basis for it. A court will not 
partially enforce a restraint if alternatives are not proposed by the enforcer 74. But it was 
also accepted that there might be some exceptions 75. It was suggested that this 
requirement will not apply if sufficient information as to reasonableness of a lesser clause is 
before the court, and if it does not prejudice the denier if the partial enforcement is allowed 
76. Few other exceptions will probably be made. 
- Reformulation must not be drastic and the clause must not require major plastic surgery 77. 
- Partial enforcement should save restraints that have been clumsily drawn too wide. Courts will 
not partially enforce a clause that is too wide because it is designed to operate in terrorem 
78: "The idea that a party may shoot for the moon, and that the court may freely alter the 
target to the highest tree does not find support in the authorities" (my translation) 79. 
Hence, the courts will probably be keen to enforce a restraint if it is too wide because of 
unforeseen events that intervened since conclusion of the contract 80. 
- The party to be restrained must not be unfairly or harshly affected by the restraint 81. 
73. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1116ff; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd 
v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 331; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 796. 
74. Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 488, But see Stegmann J especially 503 
and 512; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 795 -796; Cf Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
Kruger 1979 (4) SA 337 (W) 339; The Concept Factory v Heyl 1994 (2) SA 105 (T) 112, 114; See Schoombee 132. 
75. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1114, See also 1116, The lenience of 
the court 1116 was probably because partial enforcement was only developed in this case; BHT Water Treatment 
(Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 53; Schoombee 132. 
76. Ibid; Cf BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 53. 
77. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1116 -1117; Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
Kruger 1979 (4) SA 337 (W) 339; This is probably also what the court had in mind in Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) 
Ltd v Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W) 863; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 796; Powertech 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 331, See however the narrow further elaboration of Hattìngh J 
in Gero v Linder 1995 (2) SA 132 (0) 136 and the criticism supra; Van der Menve 230. 
78. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1117; Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
Kruger 1979 (4) SA 337 (W) 339; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 796, 797; Powertech 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 331 -332; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) 
SA 564 (T) 571; Cf Ackermann- Goggingen AG v Marshing 1973 (4) SA 62 (C) 80; This requirement will address 
the problem mentioned in Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 507; See also in 
other jurisdictions Heydon Ä'IcGill 357 -358, Heydon 289 -290; In terrorem terminology was first used Marsh 357, 
See Blake 682 -683, Heydon 289 -290. 
79. Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 572. 
80. See supra Ch 13.4.2. 
81. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1117; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v 
Frühling 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 796, 797 although it is questionable whether the arguments mentioned here should 
be relevant. 
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The South African approach will not necessarily be much wider than the orthodox doctrine, but it 
operates in a fundamentally different and more flexible manner. Christie puts it thus: 82 
"conservatively applied, the new doctrine of restriction enables the courts to do plastic surgery as 
well as amputations, but does not permit them to produce Frankenstein monsters ". 
5.1. The partial enforcement approach: criticism and support 
Some criticisms can be levelled against the new approach in South Africa. Problems exist both on 
a theoretical and practical level. However, most of these reservations are surmountable. 
5.2. Pragmatic problems 
Courts have been mindful of covenantees who deliberately frame their restraints in the widest 
possible terms in the knowledge that the court will narrow them down 83, and they have been 
careful in their attempts to protect covenantors against the risk of unnecessary litigation 84. 
Heydon stated that it will be a drawback of a wider approach that much time will be taken up in 
re- drafting restraints 8s. 
However, these reservations about partial enforcement can be answered. The problems exposed 
are real, but the principles enumerated in National Chemsearch will ensure that these issues 
become specific requirements for partial enforcement. The in terrorem question will now play a 
direct role in the determination of partial enforcement where it has previously only manifested 
itself through the haze of technical rules. There is also a requirement that the court in South Africa 
will not allow major plastic surgery and this will, if conservatively applied, provide some 
protection. The complex and technical orthodox rules are so difficult to apply that they will also 
cause uncertainty and take up much court time 86, and the courts today will be better equipped to 
deal with this more flexibly. Heydon 87 acknowledged that English courts (and for that matter 
Scots courts) have now received considerable powers to re -frame contracts, and he suggested that 
the experience could help them in applying less orthodox principles of partial enforcement. 
5.3. Theoretical problems 
82. Christie 440. 
83. See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 31. 
84. Attwood v Lamont [ 1920] 3 KB 571 594; Mason 745 and 742, 734; Goldsoll v Goldman [ 1914] 2 Ch 603 at 
613; PVB 310; Heydon 287 -288; Blake 682 -683; Walker 191; Kerr (1982) 188; Kerr Tribute 189 -190; See the 
discussion of the in terrorem requirement supra 5. 
85 Heydon 290. 
86. Infra 5.4. 
87. Heydon 291. 
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The orthodox severability doctrine is rooted in broad principles. The courts in all three systems 
have accepted that they cannot rewrite a contract for the parties 88. The idea that contracts are 
voluntarily entered into and made by the parties has caused reluctance to alter the content and gist 
of a contract. Courts have accepted that severance could only be allowed if different parts were 
separated by the parties 89. 
Yet the changes made in Magna Alloys will make a wider approach more palatable from a 
theoretical point of view 90. It seems more acceptable to argue that a narrower restraint will be 
enforced as opposed to saying that the court will have to cut down a clause as agreed to by the 
parties. It will be of particular theoretical importance that the restraint of trade doctrine is an 
expression of public policy. Botha J in National Chemsearch stressed that "when the Court 
enforces a restraint partially, it is not making a new contract for the parties; it is simply tailoring its 
own order in accordance with the dictates of public policy 91 ". 
In law the lesser will often be regarded as being included in the greater 92. It is difficult to see why 
a narrower restraint cannot be accepted, within the parameters expressed in Chemsearch, if the 
parties were prepared to agree to much wider terms 93. The criticism of Chemsearch in Allied 94 is 
too formalistic 95. The court equated the changing of the words of a restraint with the principle 
88. For examples see: Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359 at 387, 392 -393; Baker v Hedgecock (1888) 39 ChD 520 
at 522 -523; Mills v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 at 580; Mason 742; British Reinforced Concrete v Shelf [1921] 2 Ch 
563 at 573; Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 48 TLR 613 at 614; M & S Drapers v Reynolds [1956] 3 All ER 
814 at 820; Chitty 16 -166; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston 422; Gurry 221; Heydon 285; British Workmen's & 
General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68; Dumbarton Steamship Co Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 
993 at 997 -998 and see the concession of counsel Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 72; Mulvein v 
Murray 1908 SC 528 at 533, 534; Scottish Farmer's Dairy Co (Glasgow) Ltd v McGhee 1933 SC 148 at 151 -152; 
Cramond (Cash Register Terminals) Ltd v Reynolds 1988 GWD 8 -310; Christie Encyclopaedia 601; Gloag 574; 
Scott Robinson 156; Walker 191; New United Yeast Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Brooks 1935 WLD 75 at 81 -82; 
Pieterse v Cilliers 1945 (2) PH A.31 53 at 54; Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 329, 331; 
Christie 437; See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 17, 18. 
89. See supra 4. 
90. See how these arguments were stressed in Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 313; National 
Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1114; Magna Alloys 896, See Schoombee 148; 
Christie 440. 
91. National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) especially 1115; Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v 
Carlie 1981 (4) SA 305 (C) 312 must be approached with caution, See the criticism Schoombee 148, Kerr (1982) 
187 it is not a logical necessity. Magna Alloys 896; Powertech Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jamneck 1993 (1) SA 328 (0) 
331; Coin Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 569; Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling 
1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 794; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 500. 
92. Prominent in the thought of Rabie CJ Magna Alloys 896 and Kerr Tribute 190; Cf British Workmen's & 
General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 SLT 67 at 68 expressly rejected this notion. 
93 National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1114. 
94 Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 (4) SA 325 (W) 331. See the discussion of these criticisms Christie 439. 
95. See the argument Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 507; Nathan 42. 
303 
Chapter 14: The wider impact of ineffectiveness on a contract: especially severability 
that the courts cannot lay down obligations on the parties, but the aim of the requirements 
mentioned in Chemsearch is to ensure that the obligation is only cut down in the conceptual sense. 
5.4. Advantages of the partial enforcement approach 
There is much to commend the South African approach towards partial enforcement. In SW 
Strange in England 96 the court held that it was a defect that the courts in England had no power 
to re -frame the covenant. The South African courts will now be free from such constraints. 
Heydon 97 mentioned that the orthodox severability doctrine will be harsh upon clumsy - rather 
than malicious - restraints drawn up by laymen. This is a very powerful argument against the 
traditional doctrine in cases where there are strong interests to be protected and the restriction has 
only overshot the mark because of lay ineptitude 98. This will be a factor that the court will directly 
consider in determining whether partial enforcement can be made according to the Chemsearch 
approach. It is true that a party who consciously goes for too much should be "like the dog in the 
fable, they grasp at too much, and so lose all 99 ". But this should be determined on the facts of 
every case. 
The orthodox severability doctrine is overly formalistic and rigid. It developed in the context of 
promises on bonds where formalism is paramount too The traditional approach towards severance 
will frequently be arbitrary tot. It is often almost impossible to determine on the facts whether 
different aspects can be regarded as separate and whether the parties regarded them as separate. 
The partial enforcement doctrine asks the fundamental questions directly, and allows for matters of 
degree to be properly considered. 
The current approach towards severability in England and Scotland only augments the most 
difficult problem in restraint of trade law. Long, incomprehensible and cumbersome clauses have 
become standard because covenantees have to provide for every conceivable possibility. Clauses 
are often divided into fragments to allow courts to sever illegal aspects on the basis of the standard 
principles of severability. However, they may be simplified if a more flexible approach is taken 
towards reasonableness. It is hoped that simplification of clauses in South Africa will now be 
96 SW Strange Ltd y Mann [ 1965] 1 WLR 629 at 642. 
97. Heydon 284; Treitel 449. 
98 Commercial Plastics Ltd y Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623 at 647. 
99 Note (1888) 4 LQR 240 at 241; Heydon 287. 
tao Heydon 284 with reference to Marsh 351ff. 
tot Roffey y Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 4 SA 494 (N) 507; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1115, See the discussion of Heydon 284 -285 of Corbin, Christie 439. 
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perceived as being essential because courts will be reluctant to enforce partial clauses that are 
profuse or concluded in terrorem. 
Covenantors today often submit themselves to restraint of trade clauses which they do not intend 
to keep because they know such clauses to be too wide 102. The courts in South Africa will be able 
to do everything in their power to enforce them partially if this is the position. 
Heydon 103 argued that the law is internally inconsistent, because narrow severability notions are 
combined with often wide interpretation principles. This is not necessarily a criticism of the two 
devices, as they have different points of departure. But the courts will now at least be able to limit 
restraints without resorting to fanciful interpretation. 
The Chemsearch approach is not theoretically pure 104 It does not allow complete partial 
enforcement, but it liberates the doctrine from the shackles of traditional theory. It finely balances 
conflicting issues 105 and enables courts to stay close to the agreement without requiring them to 
be slaves to it. 
6. Acknowledgement of severability clauses 
Parties sometimes add a term to a restraint in which they acknowledge that some parts of the 
restraint agreement are intended to be severable from other parts . 116. The status of these clauses 
must be investigated. 
6.1. Acknowledgement clauses and severability 
The acknowledgement clause will sometimes merely restate the accepted principles of severability 
107 In such a case the clause will be of no real value. It would at most have an attitudinal impact 
where parties are in a position of equal bargaining. In Sasfin 108 Van Heerden JA stated that the 
onus will change if a contract contains such an acknowledgement clause. Yet it is difficult to see 
how this conclusion can be made, especially when the clause is as general and vague as it was 
102 Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) 507. 
103 Heydon 290. 
104 Schoombee 149. 
105 On the conflicting issues see Heydon 290. 
106 See cases where the issue was not discussed: National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 
1092 (T), David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W), Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 
(C), Hasson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A). 
107 See e.g. the clause Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C). 
108 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 24. 
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there. Stripped of all its trappings, the argument would amount to this: the onus will shift when the 
parties admit that what is severable can be severed. It is a complete non sequitur. 
The acknowledgement clause may show how the restraint clause should be judged in terms of 
existing principles 109 The intention of the parties and the manner in which they express it will 
impact on the extent to which the court will be prepared to sever clauses. The parties play an 
active role in determining what is severable and an acknowledgement clause may be relevant. The 
courts may take note of an acknowledgement clause if it is aimed at showing that certain aspects 
of a clause are truly intended to be separate from others. For instance, the two aspects of a clause 
will not be sufficiently separate if the parties agree that the covenantor will not solicit or deal with 
certain customers. However, the courts will perhaps sever soliciting if a further clause is added by 
which the parties agree that the two aspects are severable. Interpretation will be important. Courts 
will have to look at the acknowledgement clause, and will then have to determine whether it 
applies in a particular situation, and whether it changes the severability position if it is read with 
other relevant clauses. 
But parties will sometimes attempt to alter severability principles Ho Some clauses will be 
intended to be of a wider impact. The courts have often tried to narrow down the import of such 
clauses. It has been accepted either that very wide clauses only confirm standard severability 
principles 111, or that they only make limited inroads into standard principles 112. Yet none of the 
cases could have been so narrowed down, and this leads on to the next question: how will the 
courts deal with acknowledgements that are of wider import? 
In Sasfin 113 Smalberger JA more correctly interpreted the acknowledgement clause widely. He 114 
went on to say that such clauses would "offend the fundamental rule that the Court may not make 
a contract for the parties (Laws v Rutherford 1924 AD 261 at 264) ". The court recognised that a 
clause of this nature could be used to abuse the judicial process if it is not properly limited. It was 
explained that parties could in such cases "simply insert whatever they wish, good or bad, into a 
109. See McBryde 606. 
11°. Cf Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [ 1975] AC 571 at 580 the court 
suggested that estoppel cannot operate here because public policy comes into play. 
111 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 16; Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] 
IRLR 69 at 71. 
112. Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452, See Scott Robinson 156, Davies 500, Nelson 49; 
MacQueen 343. 
113 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 16, Christie 462; Kerr 135; See Hall Advertising Ltd v Woodward 
1992 GWD 29 -1686 where the court apparently saw an acknowledgement clause as playing a wide role. 
114 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 16; Van der Menve 147; Nelson 49 -50 although Sunshine Records 
is quoted out of context. 
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contract, and by resorting to a provision ... leave it to the court to separate the chaff from the 
wheat ". He finally concluded: "not only could this lead to slovenliness in the drafting of 
agreements, but it could also provide fruitful ground for the exploitation of the unwary, the 
unenlightened and the disadvantaged. A clause having that effect might per se be contrary to 
public policy ". Two possible grounds for not allowing these clauses can thus be discerned. 
- They will be illegal and contrary to public policy in their own right. 
- They may offend against the basic legal view of what an obligation ex contractu is. The parties 
must know what is expected of them in terms of the agreement "5. 
In Hinton & Higgs 116 Lord Dervaird was prepared to give effect to an acknowledgement clause, 
although he placed some qualification on his acceptance. He thought that the parties could change 
the accepted rules by agreement as long as it allowed only wider deletion. But this decision is 
unacceptable. The clause in Hinton & Higgs 117, even if the interpretation of Lord Dervaird is 
accepted, clearly still attempted to oust the normal principles of severability. There are important 
policy values underlying the doctrine, and these were not properly evaluated by the court 118. The 
notion that the courts should not physically rewrite a contract is only one, and probably not even 
the most important, aspect of the severability doctrine. The above mentioned objections to 
acknowledgement clauses will continue to apply even if the clause is so limited. 
6.2. Acknowledgement clauses and partial enforcement 
Acknowledgement clauses may be relevant in terms of the partial enforcement or Chemsearch 
test: 
- It might assist the court in determining whether the restraint was bona fide too wide or whether it 
was in terrorem. Courts will probably be critical of a clause where parties are in a position 
of unequal bargaining and the acknowledgement clause is added to an extremely wide 
clause. 
- It may assist the courts in determining whether partial enforcement will be reasonable towards 
the covenantor where the parties are equal. It will obviously play an important role in 
convincing the court that it would be fair to enforce the restraint partially if the covenantor 
has agreed that a particular more limited clause would be acceptable. 
115 See MacQueen 343; Davies 500; Nelson 50 it will cause uncertainty. 
116. Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 at 452, 453. 
117. Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450. 
118. See supra 3. 
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- Acknowledgement clauses might influence the burden to place evidence before the court 119 It 
will probably be taking such clauses too far to say that acknowledgement of severability 
clauses will lead to a change of onus, but such clauses, if properly framed, will at least 
force the party who does not bear the onus to disturb the balance of probability. 
An acknowledgement clause will probably have no effect in so far as it attempts to exclude any of 
the requirements of the partial enforcement doctrine. Each of these requirements is based on 
objective and important public policy and equity considerations; they cannot be ousted by the 
agreement of the parties. 
t19. Cf Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 24 supra 6.1. 
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1. Remedies: interdict/injunction 
Several remedies, such as declaratory orders 1 and claims for damages 2, can be utilised for breach 
of a restraint, but especially damages is regarded as inadequate 3. Most restraints are enforced by 
interdict in Scotland 4 and South Africa 5 and injunction in England (hereafter, for the purpose of 
simplicity, collectively referred to as interdict) 6. This discussion will therefore be geared towards 
looking at the role that interdicts will play in restraint of trade law. 
1.1. Discretion for granting interdict 
In English law the granting of specific performance is not the natural remedy, but in cases of 
injunction to enforce negative terms the court will take a more positive view. These injunctions 
will be granted even if it is not shown that damages will not be a proper alternative'. But a court 
will have a discretion to determine whether interdict should be granted 8, and this may alleviate 
some of the substantive problems of the doctrine in England 9. In Shell 1° it was accepted that an 
interdict could not be granted for a party who was acting unfairly, on the basis of the English 
principle that a person who comes to equity must come to it with clean hands. The court accepted 
that it could refuse to grant interdict even if such an event could not be considered in terms of the 
doctrine, because it was ousted by the notion that reasonableness had to be determined from the 
moment of conclusion. 
1. 
See Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413 440ff; Smith & Wood 143 with reference to 
Marion White Ltd v Francis [1972] 3 All ER 857. 
2. Trebilcock 77 -79, 258; See recently Hall Advertising Ltd v Woodward 1992 GWD 29 -1686; Specific 
performance can still be granted even if the contract provides for liquidated damages: National Provincial Bank v 
Marshall (1888) 40 ChD 112, Heydon 302, Curtis v Sandison (1831) 10 S 72 at 74, 75. 
3. Davies Turner & Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655 at 565; British Mannesmann Tube Co v Phillips (1903) 48 Sol 
Jo 117; Cf also Chitty 1214 and the possibility of the further possible remedy of recovery of profits; ; Kemp Sacs & 
Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 689; Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 
783 (C) 785; Contra Grigson v Kinsman 1921 NLR 172 at 177 cannot be accepted. 
4. See also the problem with interdict where the document that contains the restraint is lost: Chill Foods (Scotland) 
Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38, McBryde 607; Walker 190; Scott Robinson 155. 
5. See Kerr Tribute 198; Interdicts for the enforcement of restraints cannot be granted in Magistrates' Courts 
without an alternative claim for damages: Dendy 664, Badenhorst v Theophanous 1988 (1) SA 793 (C). 
6. Heydon 301 -302; Chitty 1202. 
7. Chitty 27 -041; Anson 520; Trebilcock 77 -79 and see the economic analysis criticism 148 -151, 258. 
8. Davies Turner & Co v Lowen (1891) 64 LT 655; Atiyah 442; Chitty 27 -040, 27 -043; This question must not be 
confused with ineffectiveness and severability issues see Marsh 352. 
9 
See the approach British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v Shelf [1921] 2 Ch 563 at 580. 
W. Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481 at 490, 492, See Atiyah 444. 
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In South Africa 11 and Scotland 12 specific performance of a contract is the natural remedy. 
Specific performance should be granted on interdict even where damages is a viable alternative 
(although this will seldom be the case 13). 
The question in South Africa is to determine how granting of final interdict in restraint of trade 
cases, which achieves specific performance, should relate to the specific performance principle. 
Interdicts have very specific requirements, and this may clash with strict principles of specific 
performance where an interdict has the effect of being final. Courts have generally accepted that 
the interdict requirements will apply even if the remedy is not an interdict but in name 14. However, 
there are relatively few cases where these issues are discussed 15. It must still be asked whether it 
is acceptable that these requirements should apply where a final remedy is craved. 
Christie 16 vigorously argued that the principles of specific performance should prevail. Lubbe and 
Murray 17 mentioned that the authorities on which Christie relied barely supported him, but they 
accepted his line of argument and persuasively explained why final interdicts in restraint of trade 
and other contract cases should be treated according to the principles of specific performance. In 
Kotze the two different issues were merely combined 18 
However, courts still have a discretion to refrain from enforcing interdicts and this discretion will 
apply to interdicts in restraint of trade cases: 
- Van Coller J in Kemp i9 refused to grant an interdict because the applicant had delayed his 
application and the respondent would have to stop working in a particular position, in 
which she had been employed for a considerable period. 
- The court in Capecan held that a remedy may be refused if an attempt is made to achieve an 
unfair advantage 20. 
11 Cf the unrefined view that a public house restraint could be enforced Ohlsson's Cape Breweries Ltd v Cossey 
1905 TH 16; Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 225, Dempsey v Shambo 1936 EDL 330. 
12. McBryde 511ff; See Curtis v Sandison (1831) 10 S 72 at 74, 74 and the granting of interdict. 
13 Supra 1. 
14. Admark (Recruitment) (Pty) Ltd v Botes 1981 (1) SA 860 (W); Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v 
Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0); But see M Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutìo in Integrum in South 
African Law (1989) 154ff and the criticisms, See Kerr 477. 
1 
. Christie 629. 
16 Christie 628 with reference Ohlsson's Cape Breweries Ltd y Cossey 1905 TH 16 20; See Kerr 646. 
17. Lubbe & Murray 545. 
18. Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 785. 
19 Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edens) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 689 -690. 
20. Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape v Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 460 -461; See the similar 
view in Edgcombe v Hodgson (1902) 19 SC 224 at 225. 
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- The court in Commercial Holdings 21 accepted that the discretion to grant interdict could be 
used to solve some of the problems of the pre-Magna Alloys approach towards the time at 
which reasonableness should be determined. This will still be true of the other legal systems 
under discussion, and the discretion can also be used to combat some of the problems of 
the post -Magna Alloys approach towards the time at which reasonableness should be 
determined. 
But judges have remained reluctant to exercise this discretion in favour of the denier 22, and some 
authorities in South Africa have even questioned the existence of a discretion 23. 
1.2. The enforcement of restraints and its extension to companies 
In all three legal systems it will be a question whether a company can be restricted in terms of the 
restraint if a restricted covenantor is involved in the activities of a company 24. The restriction will 
apply to a company that is expressly or impliedly included in a restraint 25, but a company can also 
be restricted in cases where this is not so. 
In Gilford 26 it was accepted that an interdict could also be brought against a company utilised by 
the covenantor. Lord Hamisworth MR 27 on appeal decided that the company could also be 
restrained as "the purpose of it was to try to enable him, under what is a cloak or a sham, to 
engage in business which ... was a business in respect of which he had a fear that the plaintiffs 
might intervene and object ". In PSM 28 it was accepted that this could be done even if the 
company was completely innocent in the matter. 
In J Louw 29 Didcott J distinguished Gilford on the facts, but he also doubted the orthodox 
approach as expressed in that case 30. He applied lifting of the veil principles. He finally maintained 
that it would create problems if the company in this case was restricted, because it would be 
21. Commercial & Industrial Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Leigh -Smith 1982 (4) SA 226 (ZS) 234. 
22. 
Capecan (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Western Cape y Van Nimwegen 1988 (2) SA 454 (C) 460 -461; Cf African 
Theatres Ltd y Jewell (1918) 39 NLR 1 where the court apparently accepted that it had a discretion although it took 
a narrow view of it. 
23. 
See the authorities mentioned Kemp Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk y Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (0) 689 -690. 
24. Cf also Bristol Clothing and Supply Co (Glasgow) Ltd y Dickie (1933) 49 ShCt 70 refused to enforce the 
restraint against the wife of the covenantor. 
25. Wholesale Provision Supplies CC v Exim International CC 1995 (1) SA 150 (T). 
26. 
Gifford Motor Co Ltd y Horne [1933] Ch 935; Chitty 1210. 
27. 
Ibid 956 and see also 961 and the discussion of Smith y Hancock [1894] 2 Ch 377 at 385, See Farwell J a quo 
943 -944, See also the similar point of Lawrence LJ 965, Romer LJ 969, See McBryde 606. 
28. 
PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 283. 
29. 
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difficult to lay down an interdict that would only apply when the company was used by the 
covenantor in a way that conflicted with the restraint. He stated in characteristically colourful 
fashion that: 
"no interdict against Lynkor [the company] should last longer than its dance to 
Richter's tune, one is left without a need to interdict it. All that is necessary is to 
stop the tune. The dance will then end. No occasion for stopping the tune, on the 
other hand, means none in any event to halt the dance 31 
But the court in Genwest 32 again took a more orthodox view of such an interdict. It did not 
expressly decide the case in terms of lifting the veil principles. It merely accepted that companies 
could also be restricted if competition, in breach of the restraints, took place through the company. 
The court decided that there were intentional assistances of breaches in casu and that the company 
could accordingly be interdicted. The judge answered the reservation of Didcott J in J Louw by 
stating that application could be brought for lifting of the interdict if the company was not in the 
hands of the covenantors any more. It seems to be the most acceptable solution to the problem. 
1.3. Relation between the content of a restraint and the scope of an interdict 
A restraint does not have to follow the ipsissima verba of the covenant, and a narrower restraint 
can be granted if a wider restraint will also be effective 33. There is no reason for drawing a 
distinction between verbal and substantive changes 34 as long as the courts remain within the 
parameters of the effective restraint of trade clause 35. However, part of an illegal restraint can 
31 J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 242. 
32. Genwest Batteries (Pty) Ltd v Van der Heyden 1991 (1) SA 727 (T). 
33. Rogers v Maddocks [1892] 3 Ch 346 at 356; Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478 at 482 -483; 
William Robinson & Co Ltd v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451 at 459 where this was not clearly kept apart from 
severability; Apparently contrary dicta in Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209 can be explained. 
The doctrine was not in issue, See Gooderson 425; Provident Financial Group plc v Hayward [1989] ICR 160 at 
167 seems to accept that an illegal restraint can be enforced in part, But there was also a valid implied term here see 
Taylor LJ 170 and JA Mont infra at 586 -587, 591; See JA Mont (UK) Ltd v Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 588 ancillary 
relief cannot be used to achieve what cannot be done by primary injunction; Heydon 290; Dumbarton Steamship Co 
Ltd v MacFarlane (1899) 1 F 993 at 997 -998; British Workmen's & General Assurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 1900 
SLT 67 at 68; Mulvein v Murray 1908 SC 528 at 532 especially 535; Cramond (Cash Register Terminals) Ltd v 
Reynolds 1988 GWD 8 -310; See Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 70 at 71 
counsel did not try to enforce the whole of the restraint but it felt obliged to try to justify the restraint as a whole; 
Walker 192; See the interdict in African Theatres Trust Ltd v Johnson 1921 CPD 25; Roberts Construction Co Ltd 
v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W) 304; Rhodesian Milling Co (Pvt) Ltd v Super Bakery (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 436 
(R) 442 -443 is unacceptable; Limiting down a restraint can play an important role in bridging some of the problems 
which a court may have with granting relief see Chitty 27 -044. 
34 
See supra and especially Gooderson 425. 
35. 
See Lewis v Miller 1994 GWD 23 -1388, The reclaiming motion Stirling Park & Co v Miller (Unrep), NCH 
(UK) Ltd v Mair 1994 GWD 34 -1986. 
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only be enforced if the part that is the subject of the restraint is severable in England 36 and 
Scotland or partially enforceable in South Africa. If not, that part will be tainted by the 
ineffectiveness and no interdict can be based on it. 
Lord Cowie in A & D Bedrooms 37 accepted that the interdict here would be acceptable - even if a 
wider restriction would not have been - merely because wider protection is not relevant on the 
interdict asked for. That is unacceptable. The argument can only be partly justified on the basis 
that the court was dealing with interim interdict (although it did not expressly discuss enforcement 
in such terms) 38. 
2. Urgent relief 
The most difficult problems will arise, however, where the remedy considered is interim or urgent 
interdict. Restraints are often of short duration and procedural delays will then be fatal to the 
covenantee. Interim interdict in England and Scotland will be analysed. This remedy has been 
fundamental in these legal systems. Then some remarks will be made about the position in South 
Africa . 
2.1. Interlocutory injunctions in England 
The rules and principles on interlocutory injunction have undergone radical changes in English law 
39 
In earlier English cases the rule was that a prima facie case had to be made out 40 before 
interlocutory relief could be granted. However, cases are today decided on the basis of the 
principles set out in the watershed case of Ethicon 41, although it is trite that these rules should not 
36 Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 at 1371; Cf Trebilcock 145 cannot be accepted, See also 
151. 
37. 
A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299. 
38. Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248 is also only explicable on this basis, Cf the more acceptable 
Wnciple 
argument of counsel for the covenantor. 
. Cf the unrefined approach Palace Theatre (Ltd) v Clensy (1909) 26 TLR 28. 
40 
Ronbar Enterprises Ltd v Green [1954] 2 All ER 266 at 270; GW Plowman & Son Ltd v Ash [1964] 2 All ER 
10 at 11; Regent Oil Co Ltd v Aldon Motors Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 956 at 961 -963; Regent Oil Co Ltd v JT Leavesley 
(Lichfield) Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1210 especially 1213, 1216; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chaiwyn Ltd [1967] 
RPC 339 at 341; Lyne -Pirkis v Jones [1969] 1 WLR 1293; Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd v Dartstone Ltd [1969] 1 
WLR 116; Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814 at 817, 829ff; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Kingswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd [1974] 1 QB 142 at 150; Clifford Davis Management Ltd WEA Records Ltd 
[1975] 1 WLR 61 at 66; George Orridge Ltd v Lee Jan 20 1975 (Unrep); T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [1974] Ch 
129. 
1. American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 at 407; See the critical acceptance of Fellowes & Son v 
Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 138, 140 -141 and especially Browne LJ 137 -138, Pennycuick LT at 140 -141; Lawrence 
David Ltd v Ashton [ 1989] ICR 123 at 135 -136, 131ff and the criticism of the views of Lord Denning in Fellowes 
and Office Overload (the same criticism would apply to Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 
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be too rigidly applied 42, and courts should not become too strict in separating the different 
aspects, as they are intertwined 43. The enforcer will firstly have to show that there is a serious 
issue to be tried 44, and the case will thereafter depend on balance of convenience 
45 
In cases of interlocutory injunction, it will be important to determine whether a claim for damages 
will make up for any loss that will be suffered if the party who was unsuccessful in the 
interlocutory injunction is successful at the trial 46. The court will start by determining whether the 
plaintiff can be compensated with damages if interlocutory injunction is not granted but he 
succeeds at the trial The question will firstly be whether damages are calculable 48, and secondly 
whether the defendant will be able to pay damages The court will be more prepared to refuse an 
injunction if the covenantor agrees to give account of all profits made by activities in conflict with 
the restraint or if all such profits are paid into a suspense account 50. If the plaintiff cannot be so 
compensated with damages, then the next question will be whether the defendant can be properly 
compensated if interlocutory injunction is granted and the defendant is successful at the trial It 
especially at 328); See also the explanation of the case in: Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 558 at 
567, John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 335, Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 96- 
97, Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 411ff; See also on the question whether there is a serious 
issue to be tried Apple Corps Ltd v Apple Computer Inc [1992] RPC 70 79; Cf however Rex Stewart Jellies Parker 
Ginsberg Ltd v Parker [1988] IRLR 483 at 488 the court merely stated that the restraint was valid and that it was 
accordingly unnecessary to express a view on balance of convenience; See Prescott 168. 
42. Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 139. 
43 
GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 541. 
44 Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 139, 141; Edwards v Worboys [1984] 1 AC 724 at 726, 728 and 
see the interpretation of Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] 1 AC 720. But especially Lord 
Denning did not appear to follow Ethicon; Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 558 at 567; John Michael 
Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 335; Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 96; Lawrence David Ltd 
v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 133; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 422; PSM International plc v 
Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 282, 283; Morris Angel & Son Ltd v Hollande [1993] ICR 71 at 79; GFI Group Inc 
v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 540. 
45 
Clifford Davis Ltd v WEA Records [1975] 1 WLR 61 at 65-66; Budget Rent A Car International Inc v Mamos 
Slough Ltd (1977) 121 Sol Jo 374; Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 96; Edwards v Worboys [1984] 1 AC 
724 at 728; Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 732; Cf Canada in Trebilcock 77. 
46. Edwards v Worboys [1984] 1 AC 724 at 728, Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 422, 431. 
47. Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 96; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 133 -134; Cf also 
Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 139, 141 although it was not really argued. 
48. Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 111; GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 542; Cf Office Overload Ltd 
v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 42; John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334. 
49. Business Seating Ltd v Broad [ 1989] ICR 729 at 732; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [ 1989] ICR 123 at 134; 
Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 328; Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 558 at 
567; PSM International plc v Whitehouse [ 1992] IRLR 279 at 283. 
513 
Clifford Davis Ltd v WEA Records [1975] 1 WLR 61 at 66. 
51 Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 97; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 134, Davies 504; 
Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 139, See 134 although the judge followed a different general 
approach; Business Seating Ltd v Broad [ 1989] ICR 729 at 733. 
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will be important to determine whether the enforcer will be able to pay damages 52. However, the 
major problem here is whether such damage will be calculable 53 
It will be regarded as a council of prudence to maintain the status quo if other issues are equal 54 
One such argument can be discerned from PSM, although it was not particularly related to the 
status quo element of the Cyanamid test and although the contentions were not always confined to 
interlocutory injunction cases 55. Counsel for the defendant argued that an injunction against an ex- 
employee to restrain him from fulfilling contracts with third parties could not be granted. The 
court rejected the full rigour of the argument, but it accepted that judges should be chary of 
granting equitable relief that will have this effect. The court in PSM did not in the end find these 
arguments conclusive. It seemed that the contracts with the third party was a breach of the duty of 
fidelity, as they were concluded during employment, and that it was open for the plaintiff to argue 
that the third party was on notice. This is entirely convincing. It should have some persuasive 
power if interlocutory injunction will have the effect of interfering with the existing position of 
third parties. But perhaps even less important arguments may also displace this status quo ground. 
General aspects of convenience may be relevant in determining the balance of convenience: 
- The court in GFI 56 shortened the period of restriction on the basis that it was not laid down with 
the possibility of damage in mind, while it was also emphasised that other employees with 
much shorter restrictions had also defected. 
- The court in Dairy Crest 5' considered that the employer would probably not lose customers 
even if prohibited from dealing with those customers because of the strong hold that he had 
over them. 
- In Cutsforth 58 the court considered that the defendants acted in a high- handed manner. 
- In Fellowes 59 the court considered that the covenantor would probably have no job if the 
restraint was granted, and the judge emphasised that it was not shown that the covenantor 
52. Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 134; Morris Angel & Son Ltd v Hollande [1993] ICR 71 at 79, 
80. 
53 Budget Rent A Car International Inc v Mamos Slough Ltd (1977) 121 Sol Jo 374; Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 
112; Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 558 at 567; See however Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 
92 at 97 where this issue was not sufficiently discussed; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 134 
where the court said long -term damage could often be avoided by providing for a speedy trial; Business Seating Ltd 
v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 733; Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 328; Davies 503. 
54 
See Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 141, 142; Budget Rent A Car International Inc y Mamos 
Slough Ltd (1977) 121 Sol Jo 374; Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 328 where the status quo 
argument was considered but rejected on the basis of sanctity of contract. 
55 PSM International plc v Whitehouse [1992] MLR 279 at 283. 
56 
GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 543 -544. 
57. Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 97. 
58. 
Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 558 at 567. 
59 Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 139 -140. 
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would get the job back if successful at the trial. It was also acknowledged that the 
covenantor had to work near his house because of his wife's health problems. On the other 
hand, it was accepted that it was not proven that the covenantee would suffer comparable 
damage if the interdict was not given 60. 
- The issue will not influence the reasonableness of the restraint, but the question whether the 
restraint is "uncommercial" and brought merely "on principle" should be important here. In 
PSM 61 it was argued by the defendant that an injunction should not be granted where no 
further damage could be suffered. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. It 
contended "on the contrary, the availability of damages was historically regarded as a bar 
to the equitable remedies.... ". However this is unacceptable. The judge confused the two 
concepts of damage and damages. He furthermore stated that the issue of possibility of 
damage was not specifically mentioned by the court in Ethicon. But such an argument 
cannot be conclusive even if the word damages is replaced with damage. The court in 
Ethicon did not attempt to enumerate a complete list of factors that may influence a 
restraint 62. The most important point in PSM was that there was still a possibility that 
damage would be suffered on the facts. The employee had stolen a client of the plaintiff 
and relationships between the employer and the client had soured, but there was still a 
chance that the customer would return if they could not deal with the employee. There 
might however be cases where this will be of importance. 
- The argument of counsel in JA Mont 63 that an injunction, and interlocutory injunction, will not 
be granted where the breach has been completed was accepted. The court should, 
however, not take a wide view of the issue. Restraints will generally constitute continuing 
obligations and a breach will not be completed before the end of the restraint, although 
there might be some exceptions where this issue will become important. 
- It will still be useful to allow undertakings to influence the injunction granted and this may still 
play an important role in balancing the interests of the parties 64. 
Finally the relative strength of the cases of the parties might sometimes be considered 65. The court 
in Ethicon was cautious of this 66. However, courts in restraint cases will take a wider view of the 
merits once certain requirements are met. 
60 
Fellowes & Son y Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 142. 




JA Mont (UK) Ltd y Mills [1993] FSR 577 at 589. 
64 Routh y Jones [1947] 1 All ER 179 at 194; Kerr y Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 112. See 
rejected for being impracticable. 
65. Fellowes & Son y Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 134, 139 -140, 142 although this issue 
Browne LJ 140 on the basis that it was "not improper ". Pennycuick 1 143 and Browne LJ 
the House of Lords; Business Seating Ltd y Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 733; Prontaprint 
the further undertakings 
was only considered by 
asked for direction from 
plc y Landon Litho Ltd 
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Many interlocutory injunctions for the purpose of enforcing restraints will be final 67; in many 
restraint of trade cases there will be a strong probability that they will not go to trial, and there are 
many restraints where the entire restrictive period or a substantial part of it will have run before 
the case comes to trial 68. Lord Denning argued that these cases were so unique that they still had 
to be treated in terms of the old approach according to which a prima facie case had to be made 
out 69. Judges will not today go as far as Lord Denning, but this aspect will now be the most 
important factor in determining whether the merits could be investigated 70. 
Courts must also look at the complexity of the merits. It may be relevant if the case wholly or 
substantially depends on interpretation by the court 71. Courts will be more willing to look at 
merits if facts and law can be easily ascertained 72. Uncontroverted facts may be investigated to see 
if they can tip the scales if the balance of uncompensatable advantages is more or less equal 73. 
Most fundamental is that the courts must remain in control of the process: 
- The judge must still control the case to ensure that it does not drag out, and the relative strength 
of the cases of the different parties must be evaluated with other balance of convenience 
factors 74. 
- If it is possible for the case to go to a speedy trial so that issues can be properly resolved, then 
the court must still see to it that it is done 75, and they should not waste time in trying to 
decide issues if they can be more effectively resolved at the trial. 
[1987] FSR 315 but see 328 and 329 it was accepted that it would not make a difference; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr 
[1991] 1 All ER 418 at 422 -425, 430 -433, 434 -435. 
6. American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 at 409, See Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 
130, 138, 141. 
67. See also Oswald Hickson Collier & Co v Carter -Ruck [1984] 1 AC 720 at 723 he also thought that this case 
would be final. 
68. Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 129, 133 -134; Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 43, 
44-45; Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 732; Not properly discounted in Budget Rent A Car 
International Inc v Mamos Slough Ltd (1977) 121 Sol Jo 374; Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [1989] ICR 92 at 97; 
Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 135; John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334- 
335; Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 at 327 although the court did not seem to have properly 
appreciated it; Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 423 -424, 430433, 434 -435; Davies 503; Cf Peter 
Prescott Notes (1975) 91 LQR 171 on investigation of merits. 
69. Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 113ff; Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 39 at 42, 43, 4445; 
Prontaprint plc v Landon Litho Ltd [1987] FSR 315 especially 327. 
7 °. Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 423 -425, 430 -433, 434 -435; Chitty 27 -041; Davies 505. 
71. Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 at 141. 
72. 
See Kerr v Morris [1987] Ch 90 at 103, 111ff; Business Seating Ltd v Broad [1989] ICR 729 at 733 although 
such cases will mostly not get this far because the court will find that there is no serious issue to be tried; Cf on the 
dangers of investigating merits Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 341. 
73. 
See Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122 discussing American Cyanamid 138. 
74. 
Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 at 424425, 435. 
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2.2. Interim interdict in Scotland 
In Scotland almost every recent reported restraint of trade case has been decided in interim 
interdict procedure 76. It can be said that a new test for determining whether restraints should be 
maintained has developed by merging elements of the doctrine with the principles of interim 
interdict. 
The courts do not follow the American Cyanamid approach 77. They first determine whether a 
prima facie case 78 has been made out and they thereafter look at the balance of convenience 79 
Yet the prima facie case issue is problematic. It is difficult to establish to what extent the merits 
should be looked at. The courts have taken widely divergent views. 
In Reed Stenhouse 8° Burn- Murdoch 81 was quoted and it was stated that the question at this stage 
"is not so much the absolute relevancy of the case as the seeming cogency of the need for interim 
interdict ". The court then took a very conservative view of prima facie cases and the approach is 
almost as narrow as the English law requirement that there must be a triable issue. Woolman 82 
stated that the petitioner "merely has to aver that the covenant has been agreed to and that breach 
75 Cf Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Chalwyn Ltd [1967] RPC 339 at 344; Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 
QB 122 at 129 although these cases normally did not go to trial; Cutsforth v Mansfield Inns Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 558 
at 567; Court a quo in the John Michael case see John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334; 
Dairy Crest Ltd v Pigott [ 1989] ICR 92 at 98; Lawrence David Ltd v Ashton [1989] ICR 123 at 134, 135; See PSM 
International plc v Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 281; In Morris Angel & Son Ltd v Hollande [1993] ICR 71 at 
79 it was argued on Appeal that interlocutory injunction could not be granted because the judge in the previous 
court did not properly consider this issue but the court did not accept it on the facts; Edwards v Worboys [1984] 1 
AC 724 727; For some of the problems with the fact that cases do not come before the court quickly see Systems 
Reliability Holdings plc v Smith [1990] IRLR 377; Cf Palace Theatre (Ltd) v Clensy (1909) 26 TLR 28 held that 
the interdict here could be granted if the trial came immediately as that would reduce interference with the ability to 
earn a living; Davies 504 -505, 506. 
76. 
McBryde 591; Woolman 254. 
77. 
See counsel in Malden Timber Ltd v Leitch 1992 SLT 757 at 759. The court did not however discuss the 
English approach in any detail. 
78. 
CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v Greenan 1993 SLT 1221 at 1223 and the criticism of the use of the 
phrase "bona fide case ". 
9. Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 74, See the more careful approach towards the merits 76; 
Rentokil Ltd IT Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450 although it was 
not given any weight; Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71; Bluebell Apparel 
Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 24, 29; A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297; Dallas McMillan & Sinclair 
v Simpson 1989 SLT 454; Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 732; Lewis v Miller 1994 GWD 23- 
1388; Stirling Park & Co v Miller (unrep); McBryde 607; Woolman 254 argued that the sole question will concern 
balance of convenience. 
80 
Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354 at 358; See also Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 
at 248; See the criticism of the approach to trade secrets supra. 
81. Burn- Murdoch Interdict 128. 
82. Woolman 256. 
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of it is likely to cause damage for the court to prefer his claim ". But the better view is that a 
stronger case will have to be made out. 
In most cases, the merits have been investigated to a considerable degree 83. Lord Abernethy in the 
recent Lux Traffic case 84 again did not even look at balance of convenience issues and the request 
for specification in this case must be commended. The extent to which the merits should be 
investigated is a matter of policy and Scots policy apparently leans towards considerable 
investigation, although it must be continuously kept in mind that evidence has not been tested in 
interim interdict cases 85 and that speed is at a premium here. 
In Malden Timber ß6 it was held that it would be important to the determination of balance of 
convenience if interim interdict proceedings would finally decide the case. This factor has not thus 
far been properly considered by the Scottish courts. It should be fundamentally important to the 
manner in which the court manages the case. The granting of interim interdict is generally a 
temporary measure 87, but it must be acknowledged that it will, in reality, play a different role in 
restraint of trade cases 88. Where restraints are final the courts should go to greater lengths to 
settle legal issues. It will be unsatisfactory if they are unnecessarily conservative towards the 
analysis of the legal merits in such cases. It should also lead the courts in Scotland towards greater 
resolution of factual problems in cases where an interim interdict will have the final say. The court 
can make use of judicial knowledge while they could perhaps allow evidence on limited disputes. 
The balance of convenience will have to be determined if it has been proved that the pursuer has a 
prima facie case. Woolman 89 stated in 1985 that "The requirement of 'balance of convenience' is 
not the procedural hurdle it once was for the petitioner to overcome ". However, a different picture 
emerges from the recent spate of restraint of trade cases. 
83. 
See also Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferner 1985 SC 70; WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 220; Davies 
505. 
84. Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Healey 1994 SLT 1153 at 1159ff; See Snap -on -tools Ltd v McCluskey 1991 GWD 7- 
367; Dallas McMillan v Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 457; Aramark plc v Sommerville 1995 GWD 8-408. 
85. Woolman 254, 256. 
86. 
Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 733; McBryde 607 also stressed that most restraints expire 
before the court can consider final interdict. 
87. Woolman 254; Cf Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 stated that it would cause problems if a partnership 
by the covenantor is allowed only to be dashed later. This will only be a problem where there is a possibility that the 
case will continue. 
88. This aspect is emphasised by Woolman 256 although he did not say how these matters should be considered. 
89. Woolman 256. 
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That the merits can be prima facie decided in favour of one party or the other will have an 
important impact on the balance of convenience 90. But the court must not rehash issues that have 
been properly considered under the prima facie case rubric 91. In Dallas 92 the judge noted that 
many arguments relevant in determining whether there is a prima facie case would also be relevant 
here and he accepted that the balance would favour the covenantor. He did not think it necessary 
to investigate balance of convenience separately, but some distinction will be required. 
The courts in Scotland have sometimes applied a watered down merits test that weighs the broad 
principles underlying the doctrine in an unsatisfactory and cursory manner They have 
sometimes juxtaposed the different interests affected and have then simply chosen one: 
- In A & D Bedrooms 94 the court attempted to determine what would cause the most 
inconvenience. The judge compared two aspects. The defender would lose her job and the 
pursuer would suffer untold damages if his secrets were disclosed. He -then decided to 
protect the pursuer. No reason was given why this should be so. It seems that watered 
down merits had been conclusive despite the court carefully saying that it could not be. 
- The court in Reed Stenhouse 95 generally compared the damage which the covenantee can suffer 
with the possible handicaps it will place on the employee in the exercise of his duties. This 
issue per se cannot carry very much weight. Fortunately other more apposite factors were 
also considered in the case 96 
The interests of the parties and the public must be weighed in determining whether a remedy 
should be granted. In WAC 97 it was suggested that interim interdict should be granted as no 
damage to the public interest arose from it. However, the court correctly rejected this argument. It 
will be enough for the covenantor to show that the public policy is affected via his interests. 
In some of the cases the interests of the covenantee were not properly appreciated: 
90 Malden Timber Ltd y McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 732, 734, 735; It played some role Steiner y Breslin 1979 SLT 
(Notes) 34 at 35; Scottish Agricultural Industries plc y Richard 1990 GWD 13 -640 without really discussing the 
issue. 
91 CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd y Greenan 1993 SLT 1221 at 1223. 
92. Dallas McMillan y Simpson 1989 SLT 454 at 457. 
93. Woolman 256 and his discussion of Anthony y Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 can be criticised on the same 
rounds. 
4. 
A & D Bedrooms Ltd y Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299. 




97. WAC Ltd y Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 218. 
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- In Randev 98 the restraint arose from the sale of a hotel business. The court decided that the 
balance of convenience favoured the covenantor as no new competition would arise. The 
covenantor acquired a business that was already competing. This may have a marginal 
impact in determining the balance of convenience but it cannot play the important role 
which the court ascribed to it. Direct competition by the covenantor may cause greater 
interference with goodwill in innumerable ways. The court did not discount the principle 
that goodwill could be protected here. 
Lord Ross in Bluebell 99 stated that the covenantee was a world -wide corporation and that the 
activities of the covenantor would not have a drastic effect on its business. He compared 
this with the observation that the covenantor would lose his employment if interim interdict 
was granted. However, it does not seem as if this vague and inconclusive comparison 
should have carried as much weight as was attached to it. A company should not be 
discriminated against merely because it was a large corporation whose interests as a whole 
would not be substantially affected because of its huge bulk. The Lord President came to 
an opposite conclusion when comparing the same factors 1o0 
But many of the comparisons of interests will remain important. A court can firstly look at the 
position of the parties when interdict is sought. Circumstances may in some cases show a clear and 
obvious de facto discrepancy between the interests which the parties have in the interdict. Granting 
of an interdict will, firstly, be determined by the fact that the benefit which the covenantee gains 
from the interdict is either disproportionally larger or smaller than that of the covenantor: 
- In Steiner 101 the restraint would make great inroads into the covenantor's ability to work and it 
could not be shown that losses to the covenantee would actually be caused by the new 
employment of the covenantor. 
- In Chill Foods 102 the petitioner was only a shareholder in an affected company and the influence 
of competition was unclear, but non -enforcement would have a clear and adverse effect on 
the business of the respondent. 
- The Second Division in Group 4 
103 recalled an interim interdict on the basis that it only had two 
more months to run and because the pursuer was responsible for the delays 104 However, a 
98. Randev v Pattar 1985 SLT 270. 
99. Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 24; McBryde 607. 
i00 Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 29. 
lol Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 at 35; Hargreaves Vending Ltd v Moffatt 1990 GWD 26- 1437; Douglas 
Llambias Associates Ltd v Napier 1990 GWD 39 -2243; Woolman 254. 
102 Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 40 although this aspect was not particularly 
related to restraints. 
103 Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 76; Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354 at 
358; McBryde 607. 
104 
See also on the role which delays can play Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355. 
322 
Chapter 15: Remedies in restraint of trade cases: interdict 
contrary view was taken in Greenan 105, where the court considered it as a factor that 
swayed the balance of convenience in favour of granting a restraint. It quoted from 
McKeag 106, where it was stated that the interdict, in appropriate cases, might be granted if 
the restraint has only a short time to run but where it was also acknowledged that this issue 
is a double edged sword. One factor should be looked at in determining the impact of 
remaining duration. A restraint may cause the termination of employment for the 
covenantor and may make it difficult for him to find a similar position. The court should be 
reluctant to grant an interdict where it will have this effect and where the restraint only has 
a short time to run. It was not properly considered in Greenan but the judge explicitly 
accepted that the covenantor in casu would be able to continue in similar employment after 
the restraint had run out 107 
- In WAC 108 a competing business would still be carried on by people who had previously been 
connected to the pursuer and who were not subject to restraints even if the defender had 
been restricted. There would be no utility in enforcing a restriction on the covenantor. 
On the other hand the court will seriously consider factors showing that the blow of the restraint 
to the covenantor will be softened in the particular case 109: 
- In Bluebell 110 the covenantee was still prepared to pay the covenantor his salary and to assist the 
covenantor in finding employment in the garment industry in a field that would not 
interfere with its interests. The court may sometimes utilise pro- active solutions to achieve 
the required balance. Woolman 111 submitted that interim interdict should, in suitable 
circumstances, be granted subject to conditions. The court may, for example, grant an 
interdict subject to the condition that the ex- employer will continue to pay the employee 
his salary. But the court must not consider it as an easy fix. The covenantee can in the right 
circumstances protect his interests without having to make such a payment, and payment 
for the duration of the restraint will not guarantee that the covenantor has an income after 
the restraint has terminated. The interdict might still deprive the covenantor of a particular 
opportunity for employment. 
105 
CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v Greenan 1993 SLT 1221 at 1224. 
106 CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v McKeag 1987 GWD 1 -2. 
107. But see the criticism infra. 
108 WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 218; See MacQueen 345. 
109 See also: CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v McKeag 1987 GWD 1 -2 where this was too easily accepted; 
Geo A Moore & Co Ltd y Menzies 1989 GWD 21 -868. 
110 Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16 at 24; Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 247 the 
First Division looked at this as a reasonableness aspect. 
111 Woolman 256, 258. 
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In Anthony 112 the covenantor was a medical practitioner whose husband was employed. and 
there was no suggestion of impoverishment. But this issue must be approached with even 
greater caution. The court will certainly be reluctant to enforce a restraint if it will 
impoverish the covenantor, but the opposite should not necessarily be true; freedom of 
work may still be radically interfered with even if there is no impoverishment. It could 
perhaps carry some weight that a person can rely on another for her livelihood but, it 
should be no more than a peripheral factor. 
It will be of importance if the restraint is in other respects limited and will only have a limited 
impact on the interests of the covenantor 113 Non -disclosure restraints will only inhibit the 
business activities of the covenantor to a very limited extent 114. In Group 4 115 Lord Ross 
maintained that the interdict would not prevent the employee from working for the 
competitors of the employer. He was appointed by his new employers as regional director 
for Scotland and he would only be excluded from dealing within 50 miles of Aberdeen. He 
could still carry out his duties in the rest of Scotland. 
In Harben Pumps 116 interim interdict was granted in terms of the implied duty not to use or 
disclose trade secrets. The court restricted an ex- employee from using certain information 
contained in documents. The ex- employee denied taking such documents. Yet, the court 
accepted that the ex- employee would not suffer because he would not have the information 
anyway if the documents were not taken. The court did not finally decide whether the 
information contained in documents constituted trade secrets, but it was accepted that the 
ex- employee would suffer no damage if the information was not secret, while 
unquantifiable and irretrievable damage would be suffered by the ex- employer if it was. But 
it is not necessarily so that information which is not a trade secret will not have value and 
that non -use will not lead to damage for the ex- employee. Information will still be very 
valuable where that information has become part of the personal skill and knowledge of the 
ex- employee. The most fundamental element here was probably that the information 
protected was contained in a document. The ex- employee could still use information 
acquired from other sources. 
Particularly grave interests of the covenantor may also play an important role in determining the 
balance of convenience. In Malden 117 the court stated that the balance of convenience favoured 
112 Anthony y Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 at 12; Cameron y Mathieson 1994 GWD 29 -1740. 
113 Rentokil Ltd y Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116 -117; Cameron y Mathieson 1994 GWD 29- 1740; Hutchison & 
Craft y Burns 1994 GWD 26- 1547. 
114 Malden Timber Ltd y McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 735 -736. 
115 Group 4 Total Security Ltd y Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 74. 
116 Harben Pumps (Scotland) Ltd y Lafferty 1989 SLT 752 at 754. 
117. Malden Timber Ltd y McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 733. 
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the covenantor as he had made investment in his new business, which provided him with his 
income's`. In Scotcoast 19 the covenantor would probably have to cease trading completely if he 
complied with the restraint on him. It makes sense that these type arguments should be relevant. 
However, these submissions must also be placed in perspective. In WAC 120 the defender made 
considerable investment in a new business and was providing employment for several people. But 
the judge showed little sympathy for him. It rejected the argument on the basis that the covenantor 
was aware of the terms of the restriction throughout. 
Woolman 121 stated that the courts may here preserve the status quo, and Chill Foods placed some 
weight on the principle that the long established business should in general be protected against the 
interloper 122. However, this issue should be no more than a peripheral factor. There is perhaps 
only one possible circumstance where this can be truly important and that is where a particular 
position has been brought about because of representations by any of the parties. In WAC 123 it 
was argued that interim interdict should not be granted because the pursuer had given the 
impression that disputes would be settled amicably. The court found that such an impression was 
not here created, but facts like this, if accepted, may play a considerable role in determining the 
balance of convenience. 
The court must consider different possible remedies that may be granted in terms of the restraint. 
It must attempt to protect the interests of the covenantee while interfering as little as possible with 
the interests of the covenantor. Judges will have to look at other possible interdicts when 
determining balance of convenience 124. The court will be reluctant to grant interdict on a wider 
restraint if proper protection can be gained by granting a narrower one. Where a non -solicitation 
restraint will allow proper protection the court will be reluctant to allow wider restraint 
125 
However, courts should remain cautious. In Living Design 
126 
it was contended that an interim 
interdict should not be granted in wider terms as a non -use and non -disclosure restraint could also 
118 See also Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734. 
119 
Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355. 
120. WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 218. 
121. Woolman 254. 
122. Chill Foods (Scotland) Ltd v Cool Foods Ltd 1977 SLT 38 at 41; McBryde 607; Cf Ballachulish Slate Quarries 
Co Ltd v Grant (1903) 5 F 1105 1117 where the question was whether interim execution should be allowed pending 
an appeal to the House of Lords. The court rejected the argument. 
123 WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 217 -218; Cf CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v Greenan 1993 
SLT 1221 at 1224. 
124 Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 732. 
125 Rentokil Ltd v Hampton 1982 SLT 422 at 423; Steiner v Breslin 1979 SLT (Notes) 34 at 35 where the 
argument played some role. 
126 Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson [1994] IRLR 69 at 71; Woolman 258. 
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be granted. But the courts have always accepted that these restrictions are insufficient i27. A 
contrary and more acceptable view was taken by the Second Division in Greenan 128. 
The issues of damages will also play an important role in Scotland 129, although the different 
aspects are not as systematically balanced as in English law 130, and although bold statements are 
sometimes made without proper investigation of all the issues 131 Courts may in some cases remit 
the petitioner or pursuer to his claim in damages 132, while they will in other cases allow interim 
interdict on the basis that the denier will have to seek his remedy in damages 133 But this solution 
will again not be applied where it will be difficult to prove or claim damages 134 This will often be 
so, and the damages issue will not be the panacea for the problems of interim interdict 135 The 
question whether the ex- employee would be able to find employment after the restraint had run 
out will be important and this will have to be properly investigated 136. It cannot merely be 
assumed. In Malden 137 it was important that the covenantor would keep a record of customers so 
that damages would be determinable. Moreover, the courts will not decide a case on this basis if it 
is possible that any of the parties will not be able to pay damages. But these problems have been 
solved in several ways: 
- The pursuer 138 or the defender 139 may be asked to lodge caution from which damages can be 
drawn. 
- In Malden 140 the court stated that inability to pay would at least suggest inability to compete, 
but that will be little consolation to a covenantee who has not only lost his customers but 
who has lost them to a less successful competitor. It is hoped that this argument will not 
carry too much weight with future Scottish courts. 
127. 
See supra Ch 8.5.3 and especially the Scottish decisions: Bluebell Apparel Ltd v Dickinson 1978 SC 16, Forte 
21 called the interdict here "limping ", SOS Bureau Ltd v Payne 1982 SLT ShCt 33 at 36. 
128. CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v Greenan 1993 SLT 1221 at 1223. 
129 Woolman 258. 
130 
A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299; Living Design (Home Improvement) Ltd v Davidson 
[1994] IRLR 69 at 71. 
31 Reed Stenhouse (UK) Ltd v Brodie 1986 SLT 354 at 358; Group 4 Total Security Ltd v Ferrier 1985 SC 70 at 
76. 
132 Hargreaves Vending Ltd v Moffatt 1990 GWD 26 -1437 although it was not really investigated; Woolman 256. 
133 
Scottish Agricultural Industries plc v Richard 1990 GWD 13-640 without really discussing the issue. 
134 Rentokil Ltd v Kramer 1986 SLT 114 at 116 -117; Hutchison & Craft v Burns 1994 GWD 26 -1547; McBryde 
607. 
135 Woolman 256 does not take proper notice of this. 
136 
CR Smith Glaziers (Dunfermline) Ltd v Greenan 1993 SLT 1221 at 1223, 1224. 
137 Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734. 
138 Macint}re v MacRaild (1866) 4 M 571; W Williams & Son v Fairbairn (1899) 1 F 944; Woolman 256. 
139 Woolman 258. 
140 Malden Timber Ltd v McLeish 1992 SLT 727 at 734. 
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The court will sometimes refrain from granting an interdict if suitable undertakings are made by 
the denier 141 However, it must again be ensured that the interest of the petitioner is not 
undermined by this. An undertaking will not be conclusive where the pursuer will have no faith in 
the undertaking 142 or where it will narrow down a wider restriction to which the covenantee will 
probably be entitled 143 
2.2.1. Rephrasing interdicts in England and Scotland 
It might become important for courts in England and Scotland to phrase interdicts in such a 
manner that they ensure protection of interests of the enforcer while limiting interference with the 
interests of the denier. Courts have followed a narrow approach to severability, but they should 
perhaps have a wider power to phrase temporary interdicts 144. This seems to have been impliedly 
accepted by the Scots courts in A & D Bedrooms and Agma Chemical 145. These cases can only 
really be sufficiently explained on this basis. 
In GFI 146 the court simply limited the duration of the restraint from 20 weeks to 13 weeks. The 
case might, however, be explained on different grounds. It concerned a restraint that operated 
during the notice period at the end of an employment contract. The effectiveness of the contract 
was apparently not in any real doubt. 
The court in Edwards 147 tried to strike a balance by providing that the injunction had to be 
prefaced by a consent clause (the restraint here provided for exceptions in the case of written 
consent). The court then retained a power to resolve disputes that may arise with regard to 
particular customers. This strategy will not be generally useful, but it may also be pragmatically 
applied in other situations. The general principle that it lays down should allow for other pragmatic 
interlocutory injunctions. 
But a narrow view was taken in John Michael 148, where interlocutory injunction was asked 
against the covenantor, who was prohibited from dealing with customers of the covenantee. The 
court a quo granted an injunction but it excluded one of the previous clients of John Michael (JM), 
141. 
Scotcoast Ltd v Halliday 1995 GWD 7 -355; Woolman 258. 
142 WAC Ltd v Whillock 1990 SLT 213 at 219-220. 
143 Anthony v Rennie 1981 SLT (Notes) 11 and 12. 
144 Cf Palace Theatre (Ltd) v Clensy (1909) 26 TLR 28; Infra 1.3. 
145 
A & D Bedrooms Ltd v Michael 1984 SLT 297 at 299, Agma Chemical Co Ltd v Hart 1984 SLT 246 at 248. 
146 
GFI Group Inc v Eaglestone [1994] FSR 535 at 543 -544. 
147. E4wards v Worboys [1984] 1 AC 724 at 727, 728. 
148 John Michael Design plc v Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334, 335. 
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who was now dealing with the covenantor and who, it was common cause, would not return to 
(JM) if it was not allowed to deal with the covenantor. This appears to be a fair and pragmatic 
solution but the Court of Appeal rejected it 149. Two tenuous arguments were put forward: 
- The sanctity of contract and the dislike of the courts for a deliberate breach of contract was 
mentioned although O'Connor LJ accepted that it was not of the greatest importance here 
150 
- It was an accepted principle that not only could customers who were faithful be protected, but 
customers on whom the employer has a tenuous hold could also fall within a restraint. The 
court emphasised that it has thus far been regarded as irrelevant for the purpose of 
reasonableness that restricted customers left the employer and had no intention to return 
151 
These contentions are all important reasonableness arguments, but their significance is reduced 
where balance of convenience for the granting of temporary interdict is considered. Here it has not 
been finally settled that the restraint is acceptable. 
In John Michael 152 the court acknowledged that the merits had to be investigated. The view was 
then taken that a final decision on the merits would exclude the possibility of pragmatic solutions 
like the one proposed in the court a quo, although it was admitted that solutions of this nature 
might be effective in other types of cases. But an investigation of the merits did not finally deal 
with all the important issues. Decisions on the merits might reduce the need for pragmatic 
remedies but will often not eliminate it completely. 
Courts should not shy away from pragmatic solutions despite John Michael. Only one real 
problem is mentioned by O'Connor LJ 
153. The courts must be careful not to cause even greater 
uncertainty when excluding certain contracts from an injunction. It might cause problems where 
certain contracts are excluded from an interlocutory injunction if the case will probably go on to 
trial and if it is possible that the contracts excluded may be interrupted, before conclusion, by the 
orders made at the trial 154 
2.3. Interim interdict in South Africa 
149 
. John Michael Design plc y Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334, 335, Cf also PSM International plc y 
Whitehouse [1992] IRLR 279 at 283, Cf also the criticism Atiyah 343. 
150 John Michael Design plc y Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334. 
151 John Michael Design plc y Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 334 and 335 and see supra Ch 6.4.3. 
152. 
See the discussion supra Ch 6.4.3. 
153 John Michael Design plc y Cooke [1987] 2 All ER 332 at 335. 
154. Supra. 
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Interim interdict does not play as important a role as it does in the other systems. In South Africa 
urgent interdict will often be used to enforce restraints. However, restraints will also sometimes be 
enforced by interim interdict, and the two orthodox requirements will again apply. An interdict will 
only be granted if there is a prima facie 155 case and the balance of convenience favours it 156 
Interim interdicts on the basis of restraints will often be final 15' and this will have to be taken into 
account 158. Marais J in BHT 159 took the issue one step further. He decided that substance is 
cardinal here, and not form. Interim interdict will be judged like final relief if the interim interdict 
will actually be final. 
The court in BHT 160 decided that relief will only be granted if it is sufficiently shown that such 
relief can be given on the affidavits of both parties regardless of the onus. Marais J stressed that 
this should be so because the applicant is the one who was prepared to come to court. However, it 
must be asked whether this argument should be conclusive in other cases. The enforcer is often 
forced to choose this process because it will be the only way in which he can be protected. The 
court should not lay too much at the door of the enforcer. It should go as far as possible to ensure 
that such cases are satisfactorily resolved. Courts should be more lenient towards allowing 
evidence to resolve disputes 161. It might often be simpler to allow viva voce evidence here 
because these cases normally do not turn on intricate factual disputes. 
2.4. Onus in urgent interdict cases in South Africa 
The change of onus effected by Magna Alloys will improve the position of the enforcer 162. But 
cases will mostly proceed on application and facts will be deduced from sworn affidavits. The 
enforcer will thus be disadvantaged because factual disputes will be decided on the facts averred 
by the applicant and admitted by the respondent as well as the further facts alleged by the 
155 SA Breweries Ltd v Muriel (1905) 26 NLR 362 at 372; Elcock and Co v Elcock 1928 WLD 121 at 124; David 
Wuhl (Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 436. 
156 
U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 150 -151; David Wuhl 
(Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 438; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 
512. 
157 Schoombee 150. 
158 
U -Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) 150 -151; David Wuhl 
(Pty) Ltd v Badler 1984 (3) SA 427 (W) 438. 
59 BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd y Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 54-56; Cf Kotze & Genis (Edms) Bpk v Potgieter 
1995 (3) SA 783 (C) 785 where the court accepted the argument although it was acknowledged that it did not make 
a difference in the particular case. 
160 
BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) 55. 
161 Cf however Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 510. 
162 Schoombee 150. 
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respondent 163. This will be the case even though the respondent will now normally bear the onus 
in restraint of trade cases 164 The court will have to distinguish two issues: 
- All the necessary facts may not be before the court because the contract denier, who bears the 
onus, has failed to lay the necessary facts before it. 
- It may be impossible to establish what the necessary facts are because they cannot be established 
in the particular process i.e. in a case of interim interdict because of a dispute. 
In the former type of case the court should decide for the enforcer in the latter interdict should not 
be allowed 165. Yet it must be acknowledged that interdict is often the only remedy that will 
provide adequate relief 166 
163 Cansa (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Nest 1974 (2) SA 64 (C) 65-66; National Chemsearch SA (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman 
1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1095; Chubb Fire Security (Pty) Ltd v Greaves 1993 (4) SA 358 (W) 359; Coin 
Sekerheidsgroep (Edms) Bpk v Kruger 1993 (3) SA 564 (T) 567; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) 753 
common cause between counsel. 
164 Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) 541 -542; See however Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) 
Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) 510 where the court merely accepted that the covenantor had not proved the 
necessary aspects of reasonableness and that he had accordingly not discharged the onus; Fisher v Salon La 
Mystique 1995 (2) SA 136 (0) 141. 
165 
. This seems to underlie the decision on the facts in BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 
(W) 56 because the court still places considerable emphasis on the onus. 




Some Broad conclusions 
The restraint of trade doctrine exists at the point where black -letter law and broad notions of 
policy converge. There is a great need for precision and specificity in this area. Restraints of trade 
are commercially important; they are used as planning instruments by commercial men. Great 
uncertainty will ensue if contracting parties cannot, to some extent, predict what would be an 
acceptable restraint. Yet the doctrine balances the fundamental principles of freedom of work and 
sanctity of contract. It will often be difficult to achieve this within the straitjacket of certainty. 
The solutions developed in England around the turn of the century finely balance these issues, and 
English law on this point has been substantially received in the mixed legal systems of Scotland 
and South Africa. The different legal systems are not in all respects similar. But differences are 
subtle. In South Africa some judges revolted against the English approach, but this only 
culminated in changes to the manner in which restraints are dealt with in the courts. Suggestions 
of change were sometimes proposed on rigid dogmatic grounds, but the changes that finally 
ensued are in many senses pragmatic, fair, and in accordance with the spirit of the doctrine. In 
Scotland reported cases on restraint came slowly. English cases were Often referred to, although 
they were sometimes slightly differently understood. But a spate of recent reported cases has had 
its impact in Scots law. Scots judges now more often refer to Scots authorities. Yet, the rules and 
principles in these cases are not that much different from those applying in England. In Scotland 
the biggest point of distinction has developed from procedural differences with English law. The 
Scots doctrine in interim interdict proceedings, where most restraint cases are decided, is 
sometimes quite far removed from the restraint of trade principles that courts purport to apply. 
Some of the decisions appear slipshod but inventive solutions have sometimes been proposed. It is 
manifest that the Scots judges have not regarded themselves as being as closely tied up by restraint 
of trade dogma as their English counterparts. 
The reasonableness test has remained the pivot around which the doctrine revolves. It will have to 
be established whether a clause is reasonable inter partes once it has been ascertained that it is in 
restraint of trade. Once a clause is in restraint of trade, it is unquestionable that the principle of 
freedom of work will be interfered with. Thus the most fundamental question will then be: can the 
restraint be justified? And this question has been answered by investigating the interests that the 
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the onus to prove effectivity will be on the person who wants to rely on it, and the onus to prove 
that the restraint is against public interest will be on the person who relies on that fact once 
reasonableness has been established. The distinction between the different legal systems is 
principally based on the essential preference for sanctity of contract over freedom of work in 
South Africa, although other factors also come into it. Whether the other legal systems should 
follow South Africa is a question of policy. 
In South Africa it has now been confirmed that illegal restraints are merely unenforceable. But it is 
difficult to determine exactly what the status of an unacceptable restraint in England and Scotland 
is. Most modern authorities seem to use the word unenforceable, but the full theoretical 
consequences of this have not received the attention of courts. It is suggested that the South 
African solution would probably be the most acceptable. A restraint relationship should be 
recognised by law in so far as it has been acted upon. Its effect on other obligations that cannot be 
severed probably will be that they will also become relatively unenforceable, although they might 
be enforced once the restraint has been performed. 
The great strength of the reforms effected by the South African Appeal Court in Magna Alloys is 
the new approach to the time at which reasonableness should be determined, and the acceptance of 
the notion that restraints can be partially enforced. The orthodox view is that reasonableness 
should be determined from the time at which the contract is concluded. But this has been rejected 
in South Africa. Reasonableness will there be determined from the time at which the court is asked 
to enforce the restraint. Important principles underlie the English and Scots stance, and these 
principles have not been properly considered in Magna Alloys, but it is submitted that the South 
African approach is preferable as long as it is pragmatically applied. Important public policy issues 
come into play in the area of restraint of trade, and it is necessary that these principles should be 
promoted with reference to up -to -date facts. Fairness towards the parties and respect for their 
planning devices can be achieved without accepting the entrenched Anglo- Scottish dogma. 
In determining whether unacceptable parts of restraint clauses can be taken out, the South African 
courts have apparently moved away from the pedantic severability doctrine. The partial 
enforcement approach was confirmed in Magna Alloys in South Africa. Recent South African 
decisions have found it difficult to break with old dogma, but it is suggested that the realistic 
approach in National Chemsearch should be followed in all three systems. It finely balances the 
conflicting notions that come into play here. The severability doctrine can rightly be described as 
an occult practice, and it is understandable that courts have preferred to narrow down restraints by 
means of contextual interpretation. 
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Finally, restraints produce very complex problems when it comes to judicial remedies. They are 
often of short duration and quick remedies will be required. The most important question that 
courts should ask in interim proceedings is whether there is any likelihood that the cases will go on 
to trial. Creative solutions will have to be sought if this is not the case. The merits will have to be 
investigated in so far as that is realistically possible. Legal issues will have to be resolved, and it 
might even be necessary to allow some evidence to be adduced. Some chopping and changing of 
restraints should be allowed. 
Remedies can be creatively used to provide some flexibility in the area of restraint of trade. 
Flexible granting of remedies will probably ensure realism in England and Scotland, even if the 
courts insist on taking a narrow view of the time at which reasonableness should be determined. 
Some doubts have in South Africa existed on the question whether a remedy can here be refused 
on the grounds of fairness, but it is suggested that it can. 
Only if the doctrine is understood in traditional cases can it be developed farther in the newer 
types of restraint cases that have come before the courts. The broad and consistent principles that 
have been developed here can also form the basis of the further development of the doctrine into 
new areas. Wider interests may be protected, different methodologies may be used, but the new 
restraints will still exist in the shadow of the principles and rules that have been expounded in the 
traditional cases. 
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